Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rosebrough was born without a left hand. After she expressed interest in a job as a school bus driver, the supervisor informed her that a waiver is required from the Ohio Department of Education before an individual who is missing a limb is allowed to operate a school bus and told her to come to the office to pick up the waiver forms. Rosebrough received approval of the waiver. After having conflicts with her assigned trainer, Rosebrough stopped short of obtained her commercial driver’s license and filed suit asserting violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 and the Ohio Revised Code, 4112.02, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finding that Rosebrough was not qualified to be a bus driver because she did not have a CDL, the district court granted summary judgment to the school. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Rosebrough’s ADA-covered position as a trainee was at issue, and she could not be required to have a CDL to be “otherwise qualified” for the position of training to obtain a CDL. Having a CDL was not necessary for Rosebrough to perform the essential functions of her training position View "Rosebrough v. Buckeye Valley High Sch." on Justia Law

Branham began teaching in 1983 and was a tenured law professor. She sometimes suffered from seizures. She had a 12-month teaching contract for 2006. For the spring semester she was assigned to teach constitutional law and torts. Branham indicated that she did not want to teach the classes, citing health reasons and her greater experience with criminal law. She nonetheless taught the courses. In summer Branham sold her house, moved to Illinois, and was granted a leave of absence. Assigned to teach constitutional law after returning from leave, she refused to do so. The dean terminated her employment in December. Her contract required that dismissal be voted upon by faculty. That process was not initially followed. Branham sought damages for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. The district court dismissed all but the contract claim, granted a motion to limit the remedy on the contract-breach claim to equitable relief, held that the school had breached the contract, and ordered compliance. Faculty and the board of directors concurred in the dismissal. The district court entered judgment against Branham. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch." on Justia Law

John was a ninth grade special education student. Jane, in eighth grade, believed that she was John's girlfriend. Jane's mother claims that John sexually harassed Jane by shoving her into a locker out of jealousy, requesting oral sex, and making obscene gestures during a basketball game. After confronting John, who became hostile, Jane's stepfather wrote to administration. John's IEP team created a plan requiring constant adult supervision at school for the next 30 days. Seven weeks after the supervision ended, after school, John sexually assaulted Jane on school grounds. John, who had a long disciplinary history, including harassment and assault, and had been arrested twice, was then expelled. A school he previously attended had agreed not to expel John and to purge disciplinary records in exchange for his withdrawal. Jane's mother filed sued the school and officials, alleging violations of Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered judgment for defendants on all counts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff abandoned her 1983 claim, did not establish animus for a 1985 claim, did not establish deliberate indifference, or a special relationship that would create a duty to protect her daughter, or that Jane was deprived of access to educational opportunities.

Plaintiff, a new teacher, approached the principal to deny rumors that she had a sexual relationship with a minor student, JS. The principal spoke with JS, who denied the allegations. Days later, JS changed his story. The school called the police. JS stated he had consensual sex with plaintiff at her apartment and described her apartment and a tattoo and skin graft on her body. Plaintiff admitted to exchanging sexually inappropriate text messages, but denied having a physical relationship and that he visited her apartment. Photos matched JS's descriptions of plaintiff's tattop and apartment, and a warrant issued. Prior to execution of the warrant, plaintiff's attorney, asked for a polygraph. Plaintiff appeared for the polygraph, but the exam was never administered. At trial , JS significantly changed his testimony and plaintiff was acquitted. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of due process and claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Kentucky law. The state's attorney acted in the course of his prosecutorial duties, entitling him to absolute immunity, and his actions were not in violation of clear constitutional rights, entitling him to qualified immunity.

A Caucasian high school football player (H) accidentally hit an African-American team member (D) with his car, causing D to suffer a sprained ankle. H got out and apologized. D threatened to kill him. The principal had instructed staff to be lenient with African-Americans because too many were serving suspensions. Although the Code of Conduct prohibits threats, the school did not discipline D. D's parents threatened suit. The principal admitted suspending H for 10 days to "cover" himself and the school. H's witness statements were not provided to panelists in advance. H's attorney was limited to passing notes and not allowed to present witnesses. Employees were informed that they would lose their jobs if they attended the hearing. The board sustained the charge of reckless endangerment and suspension, so that it went on H's record. An appeal was denied. Before his suspension, college recruiters had approached H and a congressman had offered an appointment, the first step to attend a military academy. H alleges he lost those opportunities. The district court dismissed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims for substantive due process violations, failure to train, and negligence; claims by H's parents; claims against individuals in their official capacities; claims against the board of education and the public school system. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss procedural due process and equal protection claims based on the conduct of three defendants and that those defendants are not protected by qualified immunity.

Proposal 2, a successful voter-initiated amendment to the Michigan Constitution, became effective in 2006 and prohibited public colleges from granting "preferential treatment to[] any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin." The district court entered summary judgment upholding Proposal 2. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and applying strict scrutiny because the enactment changed the governmental decision-making process for determinations with a racial focus. Proposal 2 targets a program that "inures primarily to the benefit of the minority" and reorders the political process in Michigan in such a way as to place "special burdens" on racial minorities. Admissions committees are political decision-making bodies and the Proposal is more than a mere repeal of desegregation laws. The court noted the procedural obstacles that would be faced by minorities favoring race-based admissions.

A continuing education student, suffering cognitive disabilities, obtained an injunction requiring the university to provide him with on-campus housing and an award of $101,676 in attorney fees. While appeal was pending, the student lived in a dormitory and completed the program. He has no intention to return. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot and vacated the district court order, leaving the fee award undisturbed. The university did not appeal the fee award and the matter is not "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The court declined to apply the "public interest" exception.

The government sought an injunction under the child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 201-219, based on the boarding school's use of uncompensated minors in its kitchen and housekeeping departments, agricultural operations, auto repair shop, Sanitarium, and other operations. The district court concluded that the students are not employees and, therefore, not subject to the Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected the school's claim that students in a vocational program can never be considered employees and the government's argument that the test of whether "trainees" are employees should apply, and applied a "primary benefit" test. The school staff is sufficient to perform the work even if the students did not work and the school is not at competitive advantage with respect to the work; the students benefit from hands-on training in an accredited program that is run consistently with their parents' religious beliefs.