Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

S.C., a high school freshman, was unwillingly video-recorded engaging in non-consensual sexual activity with a male student on school property. The video was shared online and other students began to harass S.C. Students then began harassing and threatening S.C. and her family. S.C. and her mother met with Detective, Carrigan, who assumed the video-recording and sexual encounter were consensual and repeatedly rejected S.C.’s statements and information about the threats, suggesting that S.C. had participated in producing child pornography. Following another meeting, Principal Kessler denied being informed that the encounter was not consensual or of any harassment, although a list of students making threats was found in Kessler’s file. Kessler suspended S.C., after which she was expected to return to school. The Assistant Principal also declined to address the threats. S.C. entered an in-patient facility and continued coursework remotely. Because the threats continued, her family moved to a different county. S.C.'s grades dropped substantially, she began abusing drugs and alcohol, and she engaged in self-harm. Before the incident, the district already had “a widespread problem of students circulating sexual pictures and videos of themselves and their peers.” The district was aware of the problem.S.C. alleged deliberate indifference to student-on-student harassment before she was assaulted; deliberate indifference during the investigation; and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims. S.C.’s Title IX “before” claim was dismissed. The court found the district liable for emotional distress and other damages on the Title IX “after” claim, but not liable under section 1983. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded the Title IX and Section 1983 “before” claims and affirmed that the district is liable on S.C.’s Title IX “after” claim. View "S.C. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

In 1970, Michigan voters approved Proposal C, amending Article VIII, section 2 of Michigan’s constitution: “No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized, by the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary schools.” The plaintiffs allege that Proposal C was spurred by the legislature’s passage of 1970 PA 100, which “allowed the Department of Education to purchase educational services from nonpublic schools in secular subjects,” and authorized $22 million in spending during the 1970-71 school year. Plaintiffs allege that “nonpublic schools” meant “religious schools”; opposition to 1970 PA 100 resulted in Proposal C. In 2000, Michigan voters rejected a ballot initiative that would have amended the section to authorize “indirect” support of non-public school students and create a voucher program for students in underperforming public school districts to attend nonpublic schools.Plaintiffs brought unsuccessful free exercise claims, alleging they have funded Michigan Education Savings Program plans and wish to use those plans to pay for their children’s religious school tuition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their equal protection claim that section 2, while facially neutral, creates a political structure that unconstitutionally discriminates against religion because religious persons and schools cannot lobby their state representatives for governmental aid or tuition help without first amending the state constitution. View "Hile v. State of Michigan" on Justia Law

Doe, a University of Michigan student, was accused of sexual assault in 2018. Before the University’s investigation had concluded, he sued. alleging that the University’s disciplinary procedures for cases involving sexual assault violated his due process rights. The district court granted him a preliminary injunction preventing the disciplinary process from proceeding. The Sixth Circuit remanded for reconsideration in light of “Baum,” in which it held that the University’s disciplinary procedures violated due process and in light of the University’s new disciplinary policy implemented in response to that decision.The district court granted in part and denied in part the University’s motion to dismiss and granted in part Doe’s motion for partial summary judgment. The University appealed again, renewing its jurisdictional arguments. Before the appeal was heard, the complainant decided she no longer wished to participate. The Sixth Circuit determined that the appeal had become moot and vacated the summary judgment order. Doe then sought attorney fees, which the district court granted.The University appealed again. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that issues of ripeness, standing, and mootness have gone unaddressed through more than five years of litigation. Doe had standing to sue to seek the release of his transcript but that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his remaining claims. Doe was the prevailing party only as to his due process claim seeking the release of his transcript. View "Doe v. University of Michigan" on Justia Law

Churches, private religious schools, affiliated pastors, and the parents of students (on behalf of themselves and their minor children) sued Kentucky Governor Beshear in his individual capacity for alleged violations of their free-exercise rights, their rights to private-school education, and their rights to assemble peacefully and associate freely, based on Beshear’s Executive Order 2020-969, which temporarily barred in-person learning at all private and public elementary and secondary schools in Kentucky in response to a surge in COVID-19 transmission in the winter of 2020.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit on the basis of qualified immunity. Previous orders in cases involving challenges to pandemic-related executive orders did not make “sufficiently clear t[o] a reasonable official” that temporarily mandating remote learning for all elementary and secondary schools— religious and secular alike—ran afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. An “active and vibrant debate on the constitutional question existed at the time.” EO 2020-969 deprived the parent plaintiffs of neither a choice to send their children to private school over public school nor input in their children’s curriculum. The Governor did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights to assemble peacefully or associate freely. View "Pleasant View Baptist Church v. Beshear" on Justia Law

Michigan State University's “COVID directives,” included a requirement that all employees receive a vaccine by August 31, 2021, even those who worked remotely. The policy included religious and medical exemptions. Medical exemptions were limited to “CDC-recognized contraindications and for individuals with disabilities.” It did not provide an exemption based on immunity acquired from a COVID-19 infection. The plaintiffs all tested positive for COVID-10 and claimed that, based on their natural immunity, it was medically unnecessary for them to be vaccinated. They did not comply with the policy; one was terminated, one was placed on unpaid leave, and one received a religious exemption.Their suit claimed violations of their constitutional rights to bodily autonomy and to decline medical treatment, alleging that MSU cannot establish a compelling governmental interest in overriding those constitutional rights; the policy constitutes an unconstitutional condition on continued state employment; and the policy contradicts the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) statute, 21 U.S.C. 360bbb-3. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. It is sufficient that MSU could rationally believe that requiring the vaccine for naturally immune individuals would further combat COVID-19 on its campus. The plaintiffs did not adequately explain how receiving a vaccine violates a fundamental right, which would invoke a higher level of scrutiny. The EUA is meant to ensure patients’ consent to the pharmaceutical they are receiving and does not mean that MSU cannot require vaccination as a term of employment. View "Norris v. Stanleys" on Justia Law

H.K., a high-school student, created a fake Instagram account impersonating one of his teachers. The account was benign at first, but became graphic, harassing, and threatening when two of his friends added their own posts to the account. The posts included statements about sex and violence. News of the account spread. H.K.’s friends tagged teachers in their posts. H.K. eventually decided that the attention was too much and deleted the account. The school traced the account to H.K. and the other two students and imposed an immediate five-day suspension pending further investigation. After concluding the investigation and providing H.K. with an administrative hearing, the school suspended him for 10 days.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in H.K.’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendants had the authority to regulate H.K.’s off-campus speech; the “gross misbehavior” rule the defendants relied on to discipline H.K. was sufficiently definite. The student speech at issue involved serious or severe harassment of three teachers and another student; H.K. bore some responsibility for the speech and the speech substantially disrupted classwork or the defendants reasonably believed the speech would disrupt classwork. View "Kutchinski v. Freeland Community School District" on Justia Law

M.Q., a student attending public school in Knox County, Tennessee, was diagnosed with autism. M.Q. is largely nonverbal and has developmental delays in communication skills, social/emotional behavior, and pre-vocational skills. A suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794; and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleged that M.Q. was improperly excluded from the general education classroom setting and placed him in a self-contained classroom for students with disabilities for nearly all his kindergarten academic instruction.The district court held that this placement violated the IDEA but rejected claims that also it also violated Section 504 and the ADA. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly found that the district complied with the statutory requirements with respect to including a general education teacher on M.Q.’s individual education plan (IEP) team— albeit under their most literal interpretation. The IEP cannot stand because it placed M.Q. in a more restrictive educational setting than his disability required. View "Knox County, Tennessee v. M.Q." on Justia Law

Based on nominations, UC awarded “triumph cords” to graduating students who had overcome adversity. UC did not vet the nominees and unintentionally awarded a cord to a convicted sex offender. Goldblum, UC’s Title IX coordinator, told her supervisor, Marshall, that she would investigate how UC evaluated admissions applications from convicted sex offenders and address the controversy in the student newspaper. Goldblum forwarded a letter to Marshall, who ordered Goldblum not to submit anything until Marshall coordinated with other University officials. The administration had authorized Dean Petren to address the controversy. Marshall told Goldblum that Petren would issue UC’s response. Marshall also identified problems with the letter’s content. Goldblum texted Marshall that she intended to submit the letter and accept “any repercussions.” Marshall texted: “Please do not send.” Goldblum sent the letter, which was never published. Marshall reported Goldblum’s insubordination. During an investigation, UC discovered additional infractions: Goldblum repeatedly ignored Title IX complaints, criticized her colleagues in front of her staff, and missed reporting deadlines. UC allowed Goldblum to resign in lieu of termination.Goldblum sued UC for unlawful termination under Title VII and Title IX. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. UC had legitimate nonretaliatory reasons to fire Goldblum, who has not produced “sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably reject” UC’s proffered reasons. Her letter was not “protected activity.” No reasonable juror could conclude that UC’s work-performance rationale was not based in fact. View "Goldblum v. University of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Before 2017, B. lived in Illinois; he had no formal mental health diagnoses. B.’s school records reflected that he was meeting academic and behavioral expectations with no safety plan, individualized education program (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2), or section 504 plan. The family moved to Tennessee. There were disciplinary referrals during the first several weeks of school. B. was admitted to a medical center. His discharge papers listed: unspecified disruptive, impulse-control, and conduct disorder, and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. His parents and the school discussed the possibility of an IEP or section 504 plan. B. received additional disciplinary referrals and was arrested by a school resource officer for disorderly conduct. B. was suspended pending a hearing. His parents withdrew B. from school before the hearing and enrolled B. in a private school for the 2018–2019 school year.B.’s parents alleged B. had been denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by failure to identify and evaluate him for special education services and failing to implement an IEP. The district initiated an evaluation and determined that B. was eligible for services. An ALJ found that the district did not deny B. a FAPE and that the parents were not entitled to reimbursement for B.’s private school education.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the parents’ IDEA suit. B. had no history of receiving special education services and attended the school for a very brief time. It is contested whether the school was aware of B.’s formal diagnoses. Expert witnesses testified that they did not believe a special education referral had been necessary. While the district was not as communicative or responsive as it could have been, it did not overlook “clear signs of disability” and was not negligent in failing to order testing. View "Ja. B. v. Wilson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

In 1978, Ohio State hired Richard Strauss, M.D., as an assistant professor of medicine. From 1978-1996, Strauss treated students and student-athletes, as the team doctor for multiple sports and as a student health center physician. When Strauss voluntarily, retired in 1998, the university designated him as an Emeritus Professor although he had been “quietly” placed on leave in 1996 following multiple reports of abuse. In 2018, former student-athletes publicly accused the school of covering up Strauss’s abuse. An investigation reported that Strauss had sexually abused at least 177 students. Plaintiffs allege that the school failed to meaningfully investigate numerous complaints, hid or failed to maintain records of abuse complaints, and failed to inform students and some staff of the abuse until 2018. Plaintiffs allege that they could not have known about the school’s knowledge, and cover-up, of their abuse until the 2019 release of the report; 532 plaintiffs brought 37 separate cases. This appeal concerns students who were abused by Strauss from 1978-1998.The district court dismissed the Title IX claims as time-barred by Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations, whether measured by a discovery rule or an occurrence rule; denied motions for recusal based on the judge’s connections and his wife’s connections to Ohio State; and dismissed Title IX retaliation claims that alleged Ohio State employees made public comments, in a retaliatory attempt to “silence” them.The Sixth Circuit vacated in part but affirmed the denial of the recusal motion and the dismissal of the retaliation claims. Just when the plaintiffs should have known that Strauss’s conduct was abuse, and when they should have known about Ohio State’s role in causing their injuries are questions of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. View "Garrett v. The Ohio State University" on Justia Law