Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tennessee previously recognized only statewide political parties as automatically entitled to have their candidates identified on the ballot by their party affiliation. In 2011, the state created a new designation, “recognized minor party,” for any group that successfully filed a petition conforming to requirements established by the coordinator of elections, bearing, at minimum the signatures of registered voters equal to at least 2.5% of the total number of votes cast for gubernatorial candidates in the most recent election of governor, Tenn. Code 2-1-104(a)(24). In 2012, Tennessee again amended its statutes, requiring recognized minor parties to satisfy specific requirements to maintain their status as a recognized minor party beyond the current election year. Two minor parties filed suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for plaintiffs’ on an equal-protection challenge to the ballot-retention statute, and on a First Amendment challenge to a loyalty oath requirement. The court concluded that the entirety of the statute is not invalid and vacated summary judgment on plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges to a section that simply requires a party’s rules of operation to be filed with the Tennessee Secretary of State and is unrelated to the loyalty oath requirement. View "Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Russell brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Kentucky Secretary of State, Attorney General, and other state and local officials, alleging that Kentucky Revised Statute 117.235(3), which creates a 300-foot no-political-speech buffer zone around polling locations on election day, violated Russell’s free-speech rights. Russell’s business property is 150 feet from a polling location, with a four-lane highway and guardrails between. Citing the statute, Sheriff’s deputies have removed political signs from his property on previous election days, and the statute’s language prohibits Russell from, on his own property, waving signs and offering campaign literature to passersby. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined its enforcement. The Sixth Circuit granted a partial stay of that injunction, which was issued only days before the 2014 general election, and expedited an appeal. The court then affirmed, holding that it had jurisdiction over the case, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against any of the remaining defendants, and that the statute facially violates the First Amendment because Kentucky failed to carry its burden of showing why it required a no-political-speech zone vastly larger than the Supreme Court has previously upheld. View "Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes" on Justia Law

In 2010, the House of Representatives passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), by a vote of 219 to 212, following significant debate over whether PPACA included taxpayer funding for abortion. Driehaus, a Representative from Ohio and an anti-abortion Democrat, was an outspoken advocate of the “no taxpayer funding for abortion in the PPACA” movement, insisting that he would not vote for PPACA without inclusion of the Stupak-Pitts Amendment, expressly forbidding use of taxpayer funds “to pay for any abortion or to cover any part of the costs of any health plan that includes coverage of abortion” except in cases of rape, incest, or danger to the life of the mother. Driehaus voted for the PPACA without the Amendment. President Obama later issued Executive Order 13535: “to … ensure that [f]ederal funds are not used for abortion services … consistent with a longstanding [f]ederal statutory restriction … the Hyde Amendment.” Debate continues as to whether PPACA includes federal funding for abortion. SBA, an anti-abortion public-advocacy organization, publicly criticized Driehaus, among other congressmen, for his vote. Driehaus considered SBA’s statement untrue and filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission, alleging violation of Ohio Revised Code 3517.21(B) (Unfair Political Campaign Activities). OEC found probable cause of a violation. SBA sued, claiming that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech. Driehaus counterclaimed defamation. Staying the other claims, pending agency action, the district court granted summary judgment, holding that associating a political candidate with a mainstream political position, even if false, cannot constitute defamation. The Sixth Circuit Affirmed. View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law

Former county administrators of elections from eight Tennessee counties in Tennessee filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that after the 2008 statewide elections and a shift in the controlling political party in the state assembly, they were ousted from their positions by the defendants, county election commissioners, because of their actual or perceived political party affiliation. The district court held that the statutory position of county administrator of elections in Tennessee is lawfully subject to patronage dismissal under Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. All of the identified duties of the administrator that involve policy matters are matters of political concern. Administrators spend a significant portion of time advising the commissioners on how to exercise their statutory policymaking authority, including apprising the commissioners of current laws and changes in the law, assisting in reapportionment matters, preparing the annual budget, and overseeing election operations, and control the lines of communications to the commissioners. View "Peterson v. Dean" on Justia Law

Ohio voters can cast a ballot in person on Election Day, or by using absent voter’s ballot procedures, Ohio Rev. Code 3509.01. One can vote by mail or early, in person, at a designated location if a request is timely received. Overseas uniformed military, those subject to disability or confinement, those in unforeseen hospitalization and those confined for a misdemeanor or awaiting trial can submit ballot applications up to 90 days before an election. Boards of elections send teams to obtain the ballots from confined voters. While teams visit nursing homes up to a month before the election, they wait until Election Day to visit the jails: persons jailed after 6:00 P.M. on the Friday before Election Day who are not released in time to vote on Election Day and who have not already voted are unable to vote. If a voter or the voter’s minor child is “confined in a hospital as a result of an accident or unforeseeable medical emergency” an absentee ballot application can be delivered to the board by 3:00 P.M. on Election Day and the ballot can be entrusted to a family member or to a team for delivery. No corresponding provision exists for persons in jail on Election Day. Plaintiffs alleged violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Voting Rights Act, and the Seventeenth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit instructed the district court to dismiss. The organizational plaintiff did not establish concrete and particularized injury to itself or its members. Even if it could demonstrate Article III standing, it asserts the rights of third parties. Its relationship with the persons whom it seeks to help—unidentified, future late-jailed voters—does not resemble the close relationship of the lawyer-client or doctor-patient relationships recognized by the Supreme Court. View "Fair Elections OH v. Husted" on Justia Law

Aspiring Ohio state court judges must run for office and must follow the Code of Judicial Conduct, promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Code limits candidates’ campaign-related speech to help maintain an “independent, fair, and impartial judiciary,” free of “impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” After the Sixth Circuit struck parts of the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, Ohio narrowed its Code. As amended, all judicial candidates—incumbents and challengers—are subject to restrictions on direct, personal monetary solicitation; bans on public political party speeches and endorsements of other candidates; and a prohibition on receiving campaign money earlier than 120-days before the primary. Platt, an attorney who wishes to run for Ohio judicial office, wanted to publicly endorse other candidates, directly solicit campaign funds in person, and to receive campaign contributions without the time limitations. Platt sued to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of the rules as applied to non-sitting judicial candidates. The district court denied Platt’s request, holding that Platt failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his First Amendment claims and that the requested injunction would cause substantial harm to sitting judicial candidates who would still be subject to the restrictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Platt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Grievances & Discipline" on Justia Law

The Green Party of Tennessee and the Constitution Party of Tennessee sought to appear on general election ballots as minor political parties. They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging laws that they claimed have unconstitutionally impeded their access to the ballot. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs; the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, in part because Tennessee had amended the statutes at issue. On remand, the district court again granted the plaintiffs’ motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, first holding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge Tennessee’s election laws, but held that summary judgment was inappropriate. The court remanded the questions of whether the state’s ballot-access scheme for minor political parties unconstitutionally burdens the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights and whether the state’s preferential ballot-ordering statute impermissibly discriminates against minor political parties in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs are a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees, but the court vacated the district court’s fee award and remanded for recalculation.View "Green Party of TN v. Hargett" on Justia Law

The district court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting Ohio from enforcing and implementing SB 238’s amendments to section 3509.01 of the Ohio Revised Code reducing the EIP [early in person] voting period from 35 days before an election to the period beginning the day following the close of voter registration. The court ordered that, for purposes of the 2014 general election: the EIP voting period shall consist of the 35 days prior to the election; all Ohio county Boards of Election must set uniform and suitable EIP voting hours, in addition to those currently established on specific dates. In setting such hours, the Secretary of State must, in good faith, take into consideration findings and legal conclusions regarding the impact of a lack of evening voting hours on the protected classes of voters. The Sixth Circuit declined to enter a stay pending appeal. Plaintiffs convincingly argued that informally, the Order’s contents already were disseminated to the public. Staying the Order would add to confusion and adversely affect voter turnout during EIP voting if the Order is ultimately affirmed. View "OH State Conference of the NAACP v. DeWine" on Justia Law

The district court entered a preliminary injunction, enjoining Ohio from enforcing SB 238’s amendments to section 3509.01 of the Ohio Revised Code reducing the EIP [early in person] voting period from 35 days before an election to the period beginning the day following the close of voter registration; providing that, for the 2014 general election, the EIP voting period shall consist of the 35 days prior to the election; and that, for the 2014 general election, all county Boards of Election must set uniform and suitable EIP voting hours for specific days. The state requested that the Sixth Circuit stay provisions “that could possibly require action” before resolution on appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion. The state did not make a strong showing of likelihood to succeed on the merits or demonstrate that they will suffer more than a mere possibility of irreparable harm, but only articulated that failure to stay the Order would harm the “strong public interest in smooth and effective administration of the voting laws” and would “require additional time and money.” Plaintiffs demonstrated that the public will likely suffer significant harm if the stay is granted by arguing that the Order’s contents already have been disseminated to the public. Staying the Order would create confusion, adversely affecting voter turnout during EIP voting if the Order is affirmed on appeal.View "Finn v. Warren Cnty" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, physicians and Medicaid providers, wanted to support candidates in the 2010 election, but were barred from doing so by Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45, which limits campaign contributions from Medicaid providers. They sued , arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court rejected that position on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding unconstitutionality “clear” and “unavoidable.” The district court then entered a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees and costs (42 U.S.C. 1988) of $665,645.68. A magistrate recommended an award of $454,635.53 in fees and $6,442.03 in costs, with a $100,183 reduction for investigatory work performed before plaintiffs signed a fee agreement; a 25 percent reduction on discovery fees; and a 25 percent reduction on appellate fees. The district court awarded only $128,908.74 in fees and $6,315.00 in costs, drastically cutting hourly rates, striking hours spent on third-party discovery and other miscellaneous matters, and reducing appellate hours by 50 percent. After arriving at its lodestar calculation, the district court further reduced the fees by 35 percent under the Johnson factors. The court expressed concern that “taxpayers will ultimately bear the burden … Plaintiffs are medical doctors presumably abundantly capable of paying for representation” and that “counsel was merely scouring through campaign laws hoping to find an old one … to challenge in the hope of raking in overstated fees.” The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for recalculation before a different judge. View "Lavin v. Husted" on Justia Law