Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, plaintiffs Mark Bambach and his minor children sued defendants Gina Moegle and Susan Shaw, employees of Michigan's Children’s Protective Services, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that Moegle and Shaw violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by removing the children from Bambach's custody without a warrant and failing to return them after Bambach revoked his consent for the children to stay with their mother during an investigation into allegations of child abuse. The court found that no clearly established law put the state defendants on notice that they were violating the Bambach's Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment rights. The court determined that the key factual dispute underpinning the remaining claims was whether Bambach’s children were removed from his custody without his consent from December 29, 2015, to January 14, 2016. The court found that a reasonable jury could determine that Bambach had revoked his consent to his children’s placement with their mother by expressing to Moegle that he wanted to see his children and wanted to know when they would be back. But the court did not assess whether those constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the violations. The court found that Moegle and Shaw were entitled to qualified immunity as they could not have been on notice that their actions were unconstitutional. The court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment and remanded for entry of an order dismissing the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants. View "Bambach v. Moegle" on Justia Law

Child foster care systems in this country are administered by state governments. The federal government reimburses states for “foster care maintenance payments” that the state makes to certified foster caregivers who meet federal-eligibility requirements. In Ohio, there are also foster caregivers (typically relatives) whom the state does not certify as meeting those federal requirements. Ohio withholds payments for those caregivers and provides these non-certified caregivers with less generous payments through a separate state program. The plaintiffs, foster caregivers whom Ohio has considered ineligible to receive the higher foster care maintenance payments, sued. The district court dismissed, finding that the caregivers did not have to meet the same licensing standards as licensed caregivers in Ohio and thus were not “foster family homes” as required by federal law.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 671 (a), requires that all foster family homes eligible for payments under federal law meet the same licensing standards; the plaintiffs are subject to different standards than “licensed” caregivers are not “foster family home,” and are not eligible for the higher payments. View "T.M. v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Ohio’s Necessaries Statute permits creditors to collect certain debts from one spouse incurred by the other.. Seeking to recover outstanding legal defense bills owed by Snyder’s husband, who had been convicted of embezzlement, Finley filed a debt-collection lawsuit against Finley and her husband, asserting joint liability. Snyder contends that the lawsuit was “objectively baseless” and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e.The Sixth Circuit reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Finley. The Ohio Supreme Court has clearly held that the Necessaries Statute does not impose joint liability on a married person for the debts of a spouse. A creditor must first seek satisfaction of its claim from the assets of the spouse who incurred the debt and must show that the debtor-spouse is “unable to pay” for a non-debtor spouse to be liable under the Necessaries Statute. Finley’s claims against the husband remain pending in the Ohio state trial court. View "Snyder v. Finley & Co., L.P.A." on Justia Law

Tescari and Salame, Venezuelan citizens, have two minor children. Tescari removed the children from their home in Venezuela and brought them with her to the U.S. Salame filed a petition seeking their return under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Abduction. Tescari and the children were granted asylum in the U.S.The parties stipulated that Salame had a prima facie of wrongful removal and retention. Tescari claimed an affirmative defense under Article 13(b) of the Convention, 22 U.S.C. 9003(e)(2). The court concluded Tescari failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, her affirmative defense that returning the children to Venezuela would subject them to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because the alleged abuse was relatively minor, the court had no discretion to refuse the petition nor to consider potential future harm. The determination that Salame could provide the children with shelter, food, and medication in Venezuela is not clearly erroneous. Despite Venezuela’s political schisms and civil unrest, Tescari failed to introduce sufficient evidence that it is a zone of war, famine, or disease. Any defects in the Venezuelan court system fall short of "an intolerable situation." While the factors that go into a grant of asylum may be relevant to Hague Convention determinations, the district court has a separate and exclusive responsibility to assess the applicability of an Article 13(b) affirmative defense. View "Ajami v. Solano" on Justia Law

Debtor and Creditor have three children. Their decree of dissolution was entered in 2008. Domestic support and child custody issues have continued to be litigated. In 2017, Creditor obtained primary custody of the children; he filed a Motion for Child Support and Motion for Contempt in Family Court. A monthly support amount was determined. Pre-petition, the Family Court established that the parties would split the cost of the childrens' medical care and extra-curricular activities. Creditor was seeking reimbursement for Debtor’s share of incurred expenses when Debtor’s bankruptcy petition was filed. The Family Court, post-petition, found Debtor in contempt of a prior order.Debtor filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court requesting sanctions for violation of the automatic stay for the post-petition hearing and Creditor’s collection efforts made pursuant to Family Court orders. The Bankruptcy Court found that some actions violated the automatic stay and awarded attorneys’ fees as actual damages and punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The Family Court hearing was conducted to modify a domestic support obligation; the hearing and subsequent garnishment order were excepted from the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(2)(A)(ii); 362(b)(2)(C). The Family Court Judgment finding Debtor in civil contempt violated the stay and is void. An order of payment, directly to Creditor, toward a pre-petition debt, also violated the stay. View "In re: Dougherty-Kelsay" on Justia Law

The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services contracts out most of its fostering and adoption services to private child-placing agencies (CPAs), which perform home evaluations of prospective adoptive and foster parent(s). One CPA, St. Vincent Catholic Charities, shares the religious teachings of the Roman Catholic Church regarding same-sex marriage. It “cannot provide a written recommendation ... endorsing a family situation that would conflict with [its] religious beliefs” so St. Vincent refers out home evaluations for same-sex or unmarried couples to other CPAs. In 2015, Michigan codified this practice. M.C.L. 722.124e(1)(g) provides that “[t]o the fullest extent permitted by state and federal law," a CPA shall not be required to provide any services if those services conflict with, or provide any services under circumstances that conflict with," the CPA’s "sincerely held religious beliefs.”The Dumonts alleged that they were a same-sex couple interested in fostering and adoption, but that St. Vincent refused to assist them with the licensing process because of their sexual orientation. Michigan settled that suit by agreeing to enforce, against CPAs, a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. St. Vincent then claimed that the state violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by directing it to perform its duties in a manner that violates its sincerely held religious beliefs. The district court denied the Dumonts’ motions, seeking intervention. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to permissive intervention. Citing FRCP 24(b)(3), the court held that the Dumonts’ motion was timely, that it presented a common question of law, and that there is little risk of undue delay or prejudice to the existing parties. View "Buck v. Gordon" on Justia Law

A family of two parents and five children alleged that social workers employed by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services violated their Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting the children to warrantless in-school interrogations without reasonable suspicion of child abuse. They also claimed violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights by requiring adherence to a “Prevention Plan,” which constrained the mother’s ability to be alone with her children for approximately two months without any question as to her parental fitness and without any procedural protections.The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims. The law governing in-school interviews by social workers was not clearly established at the time of the relevant conduct. The Fourth Amendment does govern a social worker’s in-school interview of a child pursuant to a child abuse investigation; at a minimum, a social worker must have a reasonable suspicion of child abuse before conducting an in-school interview when no other exception to the warrant requirement applies. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity on the procedural and substantive due process claims. The complaint alleged that the supervision restrictions were imposed for approximately two months after there was no longer any question as to parental fitness without any procedural protections; they abridged the parents’ clearly established right to the companionship and care of their children without arbitrary government interference. View "Schulkers v. Kammer" on Justia Law

A Colombian father brought his one-year-old son, TCG, to the United States, planning that TCG would stay with TCG’s Colombian mother, who was attempting to immigrate to the U.S. Mother was detained by INS in Texas, so father left TCG with mother’s sister in Tennessee and returned home to Colombia. Mother was released on bond and joined TCG in Tennessee. About five months later, father visited the two in the U.S., then returned to Colombia, leaving TCG in the U.S. The relationship between mother and father, who were not married, soon deteriorated. Almost a year later, father filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 22 U.S.C. 9001(a)(2), claiming that TCG had been vacationing in the U.S. and that mother had wrongfully retained him there, beyond the expiration of his tourist visa. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition, finding that the U.S. was TCG’s habitual residence so that mother’s retention of the child was not wrongful. The acclimatization standard was “of limited utility” in TCG’s case, because of TCG’s age, but the court noted that TCG was “comfortable and settled” in his aunt’s home. The parental-intent standard was more appropriate in TCG’s case. Although father testified that he had always intended to return TCG to Colombia, the court found no evidence of any such plan. View "Vasquez v. Acevedo" on Justia Law

In January 2010, 15-year-old Robert arrived at a Detroit Police station wearing no shirt, no shoes, and a pair of shorts. Employees of Wayne County Department of Health Services (DHS) opened an investigation into his parents, the Brents, visited the Brents’ home, and allegedly took photographs without their consent. A petition to remove the five Brent children from their home detailed the poor conditions, concerns about lead-based paint on the walls, and that the Brents’ youngest child, age 10, appeared to have a severe speech impediment. The Brents claim that the petition contained falsehoods, that the judge did not actually sign the order, that officers used abusive tactics in removing the children, and that Robert became ill because he was given cough medicine that had expired while in a residential facility. Brents claim that officials threatened to and did interfere with their visitation with the children. The children were released to the Brents in June 2010 but remained under DHS supervision until September 2010. The Brents sued “seemingly every person or agency involved in the removal, custody, and care” of the children. The Sixth Circuit reinstated gross negligence claims against the state defendants but affirmed the rejection of those claims as to city defendants; affirmed summary judgment for city defendants on intentional infliction of emotional distress claims; rejected failure-to-train and failure-to-supervise claims against the city; and rejected 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against police officers. View "Brent v. Wayne County Department of Human Services." on Justia Law

Zank, a U.S. citizen, and Moreno, an Ecuadorian citizen, divorced and had joint custody of BLZ, born in Michigan in 2006. The decree prohibited Moreno from taking BLZ to Ecuador without prior notice to Zank. In 2009, Moreno took BLZ to Ecuador. Zank obtained a Michigan state court temporary sole custody order, contacted the State Department, and filled out a Hague Convention petition with the Embassy in Ecuador. Zank did not complete the process by filing the petition with the Ecuadorian courts. The State Department labeled Ecuador as noncompliant with its Hague Convention obligations. In Ecuador, Moreno enrolled BLZ in school. BLZ flourished, participating in extracurricular activities and making many friends. In 2010, Moreno permitted Zank to visit BLZ in Ecuador. Zank did not take BLZ to the Embassy or pursue a Hague Convention petition. Moreno obtained an ex parte order from an Ecuadorian court prohibiting BLZ from leaving the country. The parents eventually filed an agreement in Ecuador: Moreno received full legal custody and an increase in child support; Zank waived issues concerning BLZ's arrival in Ecuador. The "no travel" order was lifted. BLZ visited Zank in 2014. Moreno and Zank reiterated their agreement, for filing in the U.S.; it was filed in the wrong court. In 2016, BLZ visited Zank. Zank claims that BLZ told him that Moreno had physically abused her and that she did not wish to return to Ecuador. BLZ voiced a preference for living permanently with Zank. The Michigan court granted Zank custody. Moreno filed this Hague Convention petition in federal court, which held that the original abduction meant that Ecuador could not be the child’s habitual residence. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The proper remedy for the initial kidnapping was a Hague Convention petition in Ecuador, subject to applicable defenses, not self-help. View "Moreno v. Zank" on Justia Law