Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor
Several hundred children in Benton Harbor, Michigan, suffered from elevated lead levels in their blood after drinking lead-contaminated water from the city’s public water system for three years. Plaintiffs, represented by their guardians, filed a lawsuit against various state and city officials, as well as two engineering firms, alleging that these parties failed to mitigate the lead-water crisis and misled the public about the dangers of the drinking water. The claims included substantive-due-process and state-created-danger claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law negligence claims.The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed the complaint in full. The court found that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a violation of their constitutional rights and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their federal claims against the city and state officials and the state-law claims against one of the engineering firms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claims against the state officials, finding that the plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that these officials acted with deliberate indifference. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the claims against the city officials and the City of Benton Harbor, finding that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that these officials misled the public about the safety of the water, thereby causing the plaintiffs to drink contaminated water. The court also reversed the district court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims against the engineering firm and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "Mitchell v. City of Benton Harbor" on Justia Law
Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City of Lathrup Village, Mich.
Lathfield Investments, LLC, Lathfield Holdings, LLC, and Lathfield Partners, LLC (collectively, "Lathfield") own three commercial buildings in Lathrup Village, Michigan, rented to various commercial tenants. The City of Lathrup Village and its Downtown Development Authority (collectively, the "City") require landlords to obtain a rental license and list each tenant's name and principal business. Lathfield applied for a landlord rental license in July 2020 but did not list the required tenant information, leading to the denial of their application and their tenants' business license applications. Lathfield sued the City, alleging unlawful compulsion to apply for unnecessary licenses and make unnecessary property improvements, bringing eleven claims, nine against the City.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the City on all nine claims. Lathfield appealed, arguing that the City improperly required site plan approval, violated due process and equal protection rights, and engaged in inverse condemnation, among other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Lathfield's request for declaratory relief regarding site plan approval was moot since the site plan process was already completed. The court also found that Lathfield was required to obtain a general business license under the City Code and that the City Code's tenant registration requirement applied to Lathfield. The court rejected Lathfield's due process claims, noting that the City’s adoption of the Michigan Building Code was a legislative act not subject to procedural due process requirements. The court also dismissed Lathfield's equal protection claim due to a lack of evidence of differential treatment and found no basis for the Contracts Clause claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lastly, the court concluded that Lathfield failed to establish an inverse condemnation claim or a civil conspiracy. View "Lathfield Investments, LLC v. City of Lathrup Village, Mich." on Justia Law
Enbridge Energy, LP v. Whitmer
Enbridge Energy owns and operates a pipeline that runs from Wisconsin, through Michigan, and into Canada, crossing the Straits of Mackinac under a 1953 easement with the State of Michigan. In 2020, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer informed Enbridge that the State was revoking the easement, alleging that Enbridge had violated it by creating an unreasonable risk of an oil spill. Enbridge responded by filing a federal lawsuit against Governor Whitmer and the Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the State from interfering with the pipeline's operation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan rejected the defendants' argument that Enbridge’s claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The court held that Enbridge’s lawsuit fell within the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, which allows federal courts to hear cases seeking prospective relief against state officials for ongoing violations of federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that Enbridge’s lawsuit was not barred by sovereign immunity because it sought prospective injunctive relief against state officials for alleged violations of federal law, fitting within the Ex parte Young doctrine. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the suit was equivalent to a quiet title action or a request for specific performance of a state contract, finding that the relief sought would not divest the State of ownership or regulatory control over the land. Thus, the court concluded that Enbridge’s claims could proceed in federal court. View "Enbridge Energy, LP v. Whitmer" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law
Sierra Club v. Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation
The case involves a dispute over the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation’s (TDEC) issuance of a water quality certification to Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (TGP) for the construction and operation of a 32-mile natural gas pipeline in Tennessee. The pipeline would cross over one hundred bodies of water and require drilling across rocky terrain. Environmental groups Sierra Club and Appalachian Voices argue that TDEC failed to properly assess TGP’s application and ensure that the pipeline would not cause significant environmental damage.The lower court, TDEC, issued the water quality certification to TGP, authorizing temporary and permanent impacts to various water bodies and wetlands. TDEC imposed several conditions on TGP to minimize environmental disruption, including selecting the least impactful trenching techniques and obtaining written authorization before using controlled blasting. Petitioners filed a timely Petition for Review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing that TDEC’s issuance of the certification violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that TDEC did not violate the APA. The court held that TDEC adequately evaluated the water quality certification application and reasonably explained its decision-making process regarding waterbody crossings, rock removal methodology, downstream sedimentation, trench excavation, and baseline conditions of waterbodies. The court concluded that TDEC’s actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or inconsistent with its regulations. Consequently, the court denied the Petition for Review. View "Sierra Club v. Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
Ali v. Adamson
Fathiree Ali, a Muslim inmate, requested the Michigan Department of Corrections to provide him with a halal diet, which is required by his religion. The prison chaplain directed him to apply for the vegan meal option, but another official rejected his application after discovering that Ali had purchased over one hundred non-halal items from the prison commissary. Ali then sued the chaplain, the special activities coordinator, the warden, and the Michigan Department of Corrections under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free Exercise Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed Ali’s claims against the Department of Corrections and granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. Ali appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed Ali’s appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the rest of the district court’s decision. The court held that RLUIPA does not authorize money-damages claims against officials sued in their official or individual capacities. The court also found that Ali’s claims for injunctive relief against the chaplain and warden were moot because they no longer had the power to adjust his meal plan after his transfer to a different prison. Additionally, the court held that Ali’s claim for injunctive relief against the special activities coordinator was moot because the coordinator no longer worked for the Department of Corrections.The court concluded that Ali did not have a cognizable claim for injunctive or declaratory relief under RLUIPA because he had alternatives to access halal meat and could reapply for the vegan meal plan. The court also found that Ali failed to state a claim against the Michigan Department of Corrections as he did not identify a policy that violated RLUIPA. Finally, the court held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity on Ali’s Free Exercise Clause claims under § 1983. View "Ali v. Adamson" on Justia Law
Maryville Baptist Church v. Beshear
At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Kentucky issued orders prohibiting mass gatherings, including religious services, and closing non-life-sustaining organizations, which included religious organizations. Maryville Baptist Church held an Easter service in defiance of these orders, leading to a lawsuit against the Governor, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky initially declined to issue a preliminary injunction. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a partial stay, allowing outdoor worship. Subsequently, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, permitting both indoor and outdoor worship. The Governor later allowed places of worship to reopen, and the Kentucky General Assembly limited the Governor's authority to issue similar orders in the future. The underlying action was dismissed as moot, and the Church sought attorney’s fees, which the district court denied, ruling that the Church did not prevail.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court referenced the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lackey v. Stinnie, which held that a party who receives a preliminary injunction but whose case becomes moot before a final judgment does not qualify as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Applying this precedent, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of attorney’s fees, concluding that the Church's preliminary injunction did not constitute enduring judicial relief that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties. View "Maryville Baptist Church v. Beshear" on Justia Law
Linden v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Paula S. Linden applied for Social Security benefits online in September 2014 at the age of 62, which was before her full retirement age of 66. As a result, she received smaller monthly payments than she would have if she had waited until 66. Linden claimed that she applied early based on misinformation from the Social Security Administration (SSA), which allegedly told her that she would receive the same benefits as if she had applied at 66. She sought to have her benefits recalculated as if she had applied at 66.The SSA denied her request, both initially and upon reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) also ruled against her, stating that the statutory provision she cited, 42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5), only applied to individuals who failed to apply for benefits due to misinformation. The ALJ also found insufficient evidence that Linden received misinformation from the SSA. The Appeals Council denied her request for review. Linden then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which granted summary judgment in favor of the SSA and denied Linden’s motion for summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plain text of 42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(5) precluded Linden’s recovery because the statute only applies to individuals who failed to apply for benefits due to misinformation. Since Linden did apply for benefits, she did not meet the statutory requirement. The court also found that the SSA’s regulations supported this interpretation. Additionally, the court noted that even if there was misinformation, it would not change the outcome because Linden did not fail to apply for benefits. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Linden v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits
Coleman v. Hamilton County Bd. of County Commissioners
Misty Coleman alleges that she fell and broke her ankle after slipping on a wet shower floor in a county jail. She pursued constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence claims under Ohio law against the county, corrections officers, and medical personnel. Coleman claimed that the slippery shower violated the Due Process Clause and that a county policy or custom was behind her poor medical care. She also questioned whether the county could invoke state-law immunity from her negligence claim at the pleading stage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed all claims against all parties. The court found that Coleman failed to allege a plausible constitutional violation regarding the slippery shower and did not connect the inadequate medical care to a county policy or custom. The court also held that Ohio law granted immunity to Hamilton County on the negligence claim. The court allowed Coleman to conduct limited discovery to identify unnamed officers and nurses, but her subsequent amended complaint was dismissed as it was filed outside the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's dismissal, holding that Coleman’s claims accrued on the date of her accident and that her amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The court also found that Coleman did not meet the requirements for equitable tolling, as she did not allege facts showing that she was intentionally misled or tricked into missing the deadline. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Coleman’s complaint. View "Coleman v. Hamilton County Bd. of County Commissioners" on Justia Law
Ken Lick Coal Co. v. OWCP
Ken Lick Coal Company employed Bob Reed from 1973 to 1986, during which he was exposed to coal dust. Reed later worked for Green Valley Hydro Seeding & Reclamation and JPR, where he continued to be exposed to coal dust. Reed developed breathing problems and filed three claims for black-lung benefits. His first claim in 1986 was denied. His second claim in 2007 was initially granted but later denied by an administrative law judge who found Reed did not have pneumoconiosis. Reed's third claim in 2018 was pursued by his widow after his death.The district director awarded benefits and designated Ken Lick as the responsible operator. An administrative law judge upheld this decision, finding Reed had over 15 years of coal-mine employment, including his work with Green Valley and JPR. The judge also found that Ken Lick had stipulated to being the responsible operator during Reed's second claim, which the judge deemed binding in the third claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the administrative law judge erred in treating Ken Lick's prior stipulation as binding. The court found that the stipulation was a legal conclusion rather than a factual one, and thus, the judge had the authority to disregard it. The court noted that the administrative law judge would not have required Ken Lick to pay the benefits but for the stipulation. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit granted Ken Lick's petition for review and transferred the liability for Reed's claim to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. View "Ken Lick Coal Co. v. OWCP" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits
Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs
Donald Hunter, a former coal miner, applied for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) in 2019, claiming that he was totally disabled due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) caused by his coal mine employment. Southern Ohio Coal Company, his former employer, contested his claim, arguing that Hunter's COPD was caused by his significant history of smoking cigarettes rather than coal mine dust exposure.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reviewed the case and awarded benefits to Hunter, finding that his COPD constituted legal pneumoconiosis and that it was a substantially contributing cause of his total disability. Southern Ohio Coal appealed to the Benefits Review Board (BRB), arguing that the ALJ erred in discrediting its evidence and in crediting Hunter's evidence. The BRB affirmed the ALJ's decision, holding that the ALJ had properly considered and weighed the evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. Southern Ohio Coal argued that the ALJ erred by relying on a pulmonary function test (PFT) that did not comply with regulatory quality standards and by relieving Hunter of his burden to establish entitlement to benefits. The court found that the ALJ acted within his discretion in determining that the PFT was compliant and supported Hunter's entitlement to benefits. The court also held that the ALJ did not improperly rely on regulatory guidance or flip the burden of proof to Southern Ohio Coal. The ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including expert opinions and Hunter's testimony.The Sixth Circuit denied the petition for review, affirming the ALJ's decision to award benefits to Hunter. The court held that the ALJ correctly applied the law and that his decision was supported by substantial evidence. View "Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits