Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 144 years of the Kentucky Derby, only one horse to cross the finish line first had been disqualified. No winning horse had ever been disqualified for misconduct during the race itself. In 2019, at the 145th Derby, “Maximum Security,” the horse that finished first, was not declared the winner. He would come in last, based on the stewards’ call that Maximum Security committed fouls by impeding the progress of other horses. His owners, the Wests, were not awarded the Derby Trophy, an approximate $1.5 million purse, and potentially far greater financial benefits from owning a stallion that won the Derby.They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the individual stewards, the individual members of the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, an independent state agency, and the Commission, claiming that the regulation that gave the stewards authority to disqualify Maximum Security is unconstitutionally vague.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The decision to disqualify Maximum Security was not a “final order[] of an agency” under KRS 13B.140(1) and is not subject to judicial review. The owners had no constitutionally-protected right. Kentucky law provides that “the conduct of horse racing, or the participation in any way in horse racing, . . . is a privilege and not a personal right; and ... may be granted or denied by the racing commission or its duly approved representatives.” View "West v. Kentucky Horse Racing Commission" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Ohio Department of Transportation began a construction project on a portion of Interstate Highway 75 near the Plaintiffs’ Hancock County properties. As a result of this construction, storm and groundwater flooded those properties three times and caused significant damage. The Plaintiffs filed suit, including a claim brought directly under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution, seeking a declaratory judgment that the flooding caused a “change in topography [that] constitutes a taking of private property without just compensation,” and compensation for the same, and a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages for the alleged taking. The district court dismissed, finding that Ohio’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. States’ sovereign immunity predates the Constitution; unless the Constitution itself, or Congress acting under a constitutional grant of authority, abrogates that immunity, it remains in place. The Sixth Circuit has previously held that the states’ sovereign immunity protects them from takings claims for damages in federal court and that Ohio’s statutory mechanism for obtaining compensation to remedy a Takings Clause violation does provide reasonable, certain, and adequate procedures. View "Ladd v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law

While in office, Courser, a former Republican member of the Michigan House of Representatives, had an affair with another representative, Gamrat. The defendants were legislative aides assigned to Courser and Gamrat. Worried that he and Gamrat eventually would be caught, Courser concocted a plan to get ahead of the story by sending out an anonymous email to his constituents accusing himself of having an affair with Gamrat, but including outlandish allegations intended to make the story too hard to believe. Courser unsuccessfully attempted to involve one of the defendants in the “controlled burn.” The defendants reported Courser’s affair and misuse of their time for political and personal tasks to higher-ups. In retaliation, Courser directed the House Business Office to them. After they were fired, the defendants unsuccessfully tried to expose the affair to Republican leaders, then went to the Detroit News. Courser resigned and pleaded no contest to willful neglect of duty by a public officer.Courser later sued, alleging that the defendants conspired together and with the Michigan House of Representatives to remove him from office. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all of Courser’s claims: 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985; violation of the Fair and Just Treatment Clause of the Michigan Constitution; computer fraud; libel, slander, and defamation; civil stalking; tortious interference with business relationships; negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress; RICO and RICO conspiracy; intentional interference with or destruction of evidence/spoliation; and conspiracy. View "Courser v. Allard" on Justia Law

The Randolph-Sheppard Act, 20 U.S.C. 107, requires government agencies to set aside certain contracts for sight-challenged vendors. States license the vendors and match them with available contracts. In 2010, Michigan denied Armstrong’s bid for a contract to stock vending machines at highway rest stops. A state ALJ ruled in Armstrong’s favor and recommended that she get priority for the next available facility/location. The state awarded Armstrong an available vending route later that year. Armstrong nonetheless requested federal arbitration, seeking nearly $250,000 in damages to account for delays in getting the license. The arbitrators ruled that Armstrong was wrongfully denied the location she sought and ordered Michigan to immediately assign Armstrong the Grayling vending route but declined to award damages, reasoning that her request was “too speculative.”The district court upheld the arbitration award and rejected Armstrong’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims, concluding that the Randolph-Sheppard Act created the sole statutory right to relief under federal law. Michigan subsequently granted her the Grayling license. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The unfavorable arbitration decision was not arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Armstrong may not sue under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to vindicate her rights under the Randolph-Sheppard Act. View "Armstrong v. Michigan Bureau of Services for Blind Persons" on Justia Law

The City of Flint and city and state officials allegedly caused, sustained, and covered up the poisoning of the people of Flint. Plaintiffs filed a 2017 “Master Complaint,” containing the allegations and claims made by plaintiffs across the coordinated litigation; “short-form” complaints charted certain components of the Master Complaint, including named defendants, alleged injuries, and claims. In this case, the district court declined to dismiss all defendants other than former State Treasurer Andy Dillon.Earlier in 2020, the Sixth Circuit, in "Waid," decided that the same officials who are defendants in this case plausibly violated plaintiffs’ substantive due process right to bodily integrity and are not entitled to qualified immunity and rejected Flint’s and Michigan Governor Whitmer’s arguments that the Eleventh Amendment required their dismissal. Defendant Johnson argued that the allegations against him in this case differently than those levied against him in Waid. The court concluded that there is no reason to treat Johnson differently. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that higher-ups should be treated differently than officials making decisions on the ground. . View "In re Flint Water Cases" on Justia Law

Hargett, born in 1965, has a high-school education and previously worked as a semi-truck driver, municipal worker, maintenance mechanic, and industrial cleaner. He last worked in March 2015. Hargett applied for disability insurance benefits; he had high blood pressure, type-two diabetes, curvature of the spine, and COPD. Hargett’s primary care physician, Lucardie, referred Hargett to a physical therapist for a functional capacity evaluation (FCE), which indicated that Hargett had a maximum lifting capacity of 35 pounds and maximum carrying capacity of 20 pounds--the “medium strength” category-- but that Hargett could continuously stand for no more than five minutes; could continuously walk for no more than 0.1 miles; could never balance while standing, crouching, or walking; and could never crouch, stoop, or crawl. Lucardie reviewed and signed the FCE.An ALJ denied Hargett’s claim, finding that Hargett retained the residual functional capacity to perform light work. The ALJ gave only “partial weight” to the FCE, discounting its indication that Hargett’s ability to stand or walk did not meet any standard for work activity. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The ALJ should have considered the FCE as a treating-source opinion, which, in 2015, had to be given controlling weight if “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” and “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.” The error was not harmless. View "Hargett v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

General’s clinicians perform services in long-term care facilities. General bills Medicare under 42 U.S.C. 1395. A Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) contractor, AdvanceMed, initiated audits in 2002 after the CMS fraud unit received complaints about General’s billing practices. In 2004 AdvanceMed initiated an audit of General’s physicians without providing any notice to General. AdvanceMed sent records requests to physicians at 12 General facilities, covering 382 claims involving 278 patients in 2002-2004. General was not notified of these requests. AdvanceMed did not request any records from General. AdvanceMed determined that 35 of the 382 claims were allowed as billed; 33 claims were allowed at different levels than billed. The remaining 314 claims were denied: 3 did not meet policy guidelines, 73 had no documentation to support the services, and 238 were medically unnecessary.General learned of this audit when it received a letter in 2007, indicating that General had been overpaid by $16,778.80; the overpayment was extrapolated to a universe of 41,818 claims. The total amount of overpayment demanded was $1,836,646.56. The Appeals Council determined and the Sixth Circuit affirmed that no remedy should be granted because the lack of notice was inconsequential and did not prevent General from ably and thoroughly arguing the principal issues resulting from the audit, the validity of the sampling methodology, and the coverage of the reviewed claims. The addition of more medical records would not have materially impacted its findings. View "General Medicine, P.C. v. Azar" on Justia Law

In a consolidated putative class action based on the Flint Water Crisis, the defendants include government officials from the State of Michigan, the City of Flint, state agencies, and private engineering companies. While government officials like former Governor Snyder and former Treasurer Dillon have been litigating the issue of qualified immunity, discovery against private parties has proceeded.In 2019, the district court granted the government officials’ motions to dismiss claims alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 equal-protection violations, section 1985(3) conspiracy, Michigan’s Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act, section 1983 state-created danger, and gross negligence. The court denied motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ section 1983 bodily-integrity claim on the bases of qualified and absolute immunity,. The court entered a comprehensive case management order.Snyder and Dillon claimed that they cannot be deposed as non-party fact witnesses with respect to other defendants, arguing that they are immune from all discovery until they have exhausted every opportunity for appeal from the denial of their motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit denied Snyder’s and Dillon’s request for a stay of non-party depositions pending resolution of their appeal from the order denying their request for a protective order, and dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, their appeal from the denial of a protective order. View "Waid v. Earley" on Justia Law

Lake manufactures steel-framed buildings. In June 2016, in Akron, two Lake employees were working atop the steel frame of a partially completed building, 28 feet above the ground. The employees were wearing safety harnesses that, if anchored to the building, would prevent them from falling; they had chosen to remain unanchored while they worked with a crane to place bundles of steel decking. An OSHA compliance officer cited their failure to anchor their harnesses as a violation of OSHA’s fall-protection regulations. The on-site foreman disagreed, asserting that those workers were “connectors.” An ALJ upheld the citation, reasoning that the workers were only “placing” the decking bundles, rather than “placing and connecting” them, 29 C.F.R. 1926.751. OSHA’s regulations generally require ironworkers to use fall protection whenever working above a height of 15 feet, but there is an exception to that rule for “connectors,” who are specially trained to work with incoming loads from hoisting equipment and need to remain unencumbered to escape collapses and incoming steel. A “connector,” is defined as “an employee who, working with hoisting equipment, is placing and connecting structural members and/or components.” The Sixth Circuit granted Lake’s petition for review. The court agreed with the Commission’s interpretation of the regulation but concluded on this record that Lake lacked fair notice of that interpretation. View "Lake Building Products, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Tennessee issued “shelter-in-place” orders. On April 8, 2020, the Governor ordered that “[a]ll healthcare professionals and healthcare facilities ... postpone surgical and invasive procedures that are elective and non-urgent,” until April 30 in order to preserve personal protective equipment and prevent community spread of COVID-19 through nonessential patient-provider interactions. Elective and non-urgent procedures were defined as those that can be delayed because they are not required to provide life-sustaining treatment, to prevent death or risk of substantial impairment of a major bodily function, or to prevent rapid deterioration or serious adverse consequences to a patient’s physical condition … as reasonably determined by a licensed medical provider. A Tennessee woman may receive a “medication abortion” within 11 weeks from her last menstrual period or a “procedural abortion” within the first 20 weeks (aspiration or dilation and evacuation), subject to a 48-hour waiting period and in-person visitation requirements.On April 17, the district court enjoined Tennessee from enforcing that ban against doctors performing abortion procedures. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, acknowledging the challenges Tennessee faces in responding to the public health crisis,” but concluding that the “response, in this one respect, unduly curtailed constitutional liberty." The court ordered modification of the injunction so that it prohibits the state from enforcing the ban against plaintiffs to the extent they provide procedural abortions to specific patients, including women who, in the good-faith professional judgment of the provider, will likely be forced to undergo a D&E procedure instead of an aspiration if their procedures are delayed. View "Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery" on Justia Law