Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cincinnati ordinances provide guidelines for selecting the “lowest and best bidder” on Department of Sewers projects to “ensure efficient use of taxpayer dollars, minimize waste, and promote worker safety and fair treatment of workers” and for bids for “Greater Cincinnati Water Works and the stormwater management utility division,” to employ skilled contractors, committed to the city’s “safety, quality, time, and budgetary concerns.” Allied alleged that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempted: a requirement that the bidder certify whether it contributes to a health care plan for employees working on the project as part of the employee’s regular compensation; a requirement that the bidder similarly certify whether it contributes to an employee pension or retirement program; and imposition of an apprenticeship standard. Allied asserts that the only apprenticeship program that meets that requirement is the Union’s apprenticeship program, which is not available to non-Union contractors. The ordinances also require the winning contractor to pay $.10 per hour per worker into a city-managed pre-apprenticeship training fund, not to be taken from fringe benefits. The district court granted Allied summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Where a state or municipality acts as a proprietor rather than a regulator, it is not subject to ERISA preemption. The city was a market participant here: the benefit-certification requirements and the apprenticeship requirements reflect its interests in the efficient procurement of goods and services. View "Allied Construction Industries v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

The Michigan National Guard terminated two “dual-status” technicians, who are military employees that must be members of the National Guard, hold a military grade, and wear an appropriate military uniform while performing military duties, 32 U.S.C. 709(b), but are also “Federal civilian employee[s]” who are “assigned to a civilian position,” 10 U.S.C. 10216(a). Dual-status technicians are “afforded the benefits and rights generally provided for federal employees in the civil service,” including rights under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), 5 U.S.C. 7101–7135. The technicians appealed through the Guard’s internal administrative process, represented by their union. The Guard sent a letter to the union that could be read as temporarily forbidding all private communication between union representatives and Guard employees. The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) found that this letter violated the FSLMRS. The Sixth Circuit enforced the order as modified. “Accepting the FLRA’s arguable but somewhat implausible interpretation of the letter under deferential substantial-evidence review, the letter did violate the FSLMRS and was within the purview of the FLRA." View "Federal Labor Relations Authority v. Michigan Army National Guard" on Justia Law

Insane Clown Posse, a Michigan music group, performs songs with “harsh language and themes.” Its fans, “Juggalos,” wear distinctive tattoos, clothing, and insignia, including clown face paint and the “hatchetman” logo. The Attorney General’s National Gang Intelligence Center's (34 U.S.C. 41507) 2011 gang-activity report, described Juggalos as “a loosely-organized hybrid gang.” “Juggalo[] subsets exhibit gang-like behavior and engage in criminal activity and violence.” Although “Most crimes ... are sporadic, disorganized, individualistic,” and minor, “a small number of Juggalos are forming more organized subsets and engaging in more gang-like criminal activity, such as felony assaults, thefts, robberies, and drug sales.” Four states recognize Juggalos as a gang. Juggalos who allege that they do not knowingly affiliate with any criminal gang, but have suffered violations of their Fifth Amendment due-process rights and a chill in the exercise of their First Amendment expression and association rights due to the designation, sued under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(b). Some alleged that they had been detained; an Army Corporal with Juggalo tattoos alleges that he is “in imminent danger of suffering discipline or an involuntary discharge.” Local law enforcement caused a musical event to be canceled. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal; the designation was not reviewable because it was not a final agency action and was committed to agency discretion by law. View "Parsons v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The United States charged Hall with unlawful gambling and money laundering and obtained a preliminary criminal forfeiture order for 18 parcels in Knox County. The County determined that Hall owed substantial delinquent real property taxes, giving it a first lien under Tennessee law. Under 21 U.S.C. 853(n)(2), a party asserting an interest in property that is subject to criminal forfeiture may seek a hearing on his alleged interest within 30 days. Knox County filed an untimely claim. The court amended the preliminary forfeiture order to cover three more Knox County properties. Knox County filed a timely second claim and requested an interlocutory sale and delay of forfeiture. The United States stated that accrued taxes and interest would be paid, regardless of whether the taxing authority filed a claim, but argued that Knox County would have no legal interest in accruing taxes once title passes, citing the Supremacy Clause, and objected to delaying a final forfeiture order. The Sixth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order. Knox County has a legal interest in the property (tax lien), so the district court erred in dismissing its claim for lack of standing but it is not necessarily entitled to a hearing. The court may ascertain the scope of Knox County’s interest on summary judgment but must account for that interest before entering a final forfeiture order. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Knox County’s motion for an interlocutory sale. View "United States v. Hall" on Justia Law

Robinson is a stockholder in the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) (the Companies), for-profit corporations organized by the government under 12 U.S.C. 1716-1723 and 1451-1459. During the economic recession in 2007–2008, Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA), which created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and authorized FHFA to place the Companies in conservatorship. The Companies, through FHFA, entered into agreements with the Department of the Treasury that allowed the Companies to draw funds from Treasury in exchange for dividend payments and other financial benefits. An Amendment to those agreements modified the dividend payment structure and required the Companies to pay to Treasury, as a quarterly dividend, an amount just short of their net worth. The Amendment effectively transferred the Companies’ capital to Treasury and prevented dividend payments to junior stockholders, such as Robinson. Robinson brought suit. The district court found and the Sixth Circuit affirmed that Robinson’s claims under the Administrative Procedures Act were barred by HERA’s limitation on court action and that Robinson had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Robinson failed to demonstrate that FHFA or Treasury exceeded the statutory authority granted by HERA. View "Robinson v. Federal Housing Finance Agency" on Justia Law

Gatlin, an employee of Hopkins County Coal (HCC), was terminated from his job after refusing to perform a pre-shift examination that he believed entitled him to extra pay. Gatlin filed a discrimination complaint with the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). After forwarding the complaint to HCC and making an initial request to interview HCC managerial employees, the MSHA sent a letter requesting to review documents that it claimed were necessary to properly evaluate Gatlin’s claim. Following a series of letters and a site visit, HCC refused to produce Gatlin’s personnel file and the personnel files of other employees at the mine who faced discipline during the previous five years for engaging in the conduct that led to Gatlin’s termination. An MSHA investigator issued citations and an order to HCC under sections 104(a) and (b)1 of the Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. 814. An ALJ with the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission upheld the citations and order. The Commission and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting HCC’s claims that the MSHA exceeded its authority under the Mine Act by demanding company personnel documents without first identifying any basis for a discrimination claim and the MSHA’s demands to inspect the records violated HCC’s Fourth Amendment rights. View "Hopkins County Coal v. Mine Safety and Health Administration" on Justia Law

At a campaign rally in Louisville, Kentucky, in March 2016, then-candidate Trump responded to protesters by stating, “Get ‘em out of here,” followed closely by, “Don’t hurt ‘em—if I say go ‘get ‘em,’ I get in trouble with the press.” Allegedly in response to Trump’s initial statement, three protesters were assaulted by Trump supporters. Those protesters filed a complaint in Kentucky state court, which was removed to federal court. The district court denied in part Trump’s motion to dismiss, holding the complaint stated a plausible claim for “incitement to riot” under Kentucky law. The Sixth Circuit granted a petition for leave to appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). A district court may certify an order for interlocutory appeal if it is “of the opinion” that: “[1] the order involves a controlling question of law to which there is [2] substantial ground for difference of opinion and . . . [3] an immediate appeal may materially advance the termination of the litigation.” When the district court certifies its order and a timely petition follows, the Circuit Court must decide whether to exercise its “discretion,” as a prudential matter, to permit an appeal. The three factors that justify interlocutory appeal should be treated as guiding criteria rather than jurisdictional requisites. In this case, these criteria, along with other prudential factors, indicate that interlocutory appeal is “hardly imprudent.” View "In re: Donald Trump" on Justia Law

Kerr sought judicial review of the final determination that Kerr’s husband was not disabled and not entitled to any Social Security disability insurance benefits before his death. Kerr was due to receive any payment owed to Mr. Kerr. The parties stipulated to reversal and remand under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). Kerr then sought an award of $3,206.25 in attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d), with any fees awarded “be made payable to Plaintiff’s counsel,” attaching an “Affidavit and Assignment of EAJA Fee.” The Commissioner did not oppose the motion. The district court granted the award, declined to honor Kerr’s assignment, and concluded that it was required to order payment to Kerr as the prevailing party. The court held that it could not “ignore the Anti-Assignment Act,” which prohibits “an assignment of a claim against the United States that is executed before the claim is allowed, before the amount of the claim is decided, and before a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued” but “le[ft] it to the Commissioner’s discretion to determine whether to waive the Anti-Assignment Act and make the fee payable to Mr. Marks.” The Commissioner responded that she would accept [Kerr’s] assignment and suggested that the court deny as moot Kerr’s Rule 59(e) motion. The district court and Sixth Circuit agreed that Kerr’s motion was moot, and did not reconsider the application of the AAA to the EAJA assignment. View "Kerr v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law

Abilify is approved to treat schizophrenia, Bipolar Disorder, major depressive disorder and irritability associated with autism. There are no disapproved treatments for elderly patients, but the FDA has included a warning since 2007 that Abilify is associated with increased mortality in elderly patients with dementia-related psychosis. Relators, former BMS employees, alleged in a qui tam suit that BMS and Otsuka engaged in a scheme to encourage providers to prescribe Abilify for unapproved (off-label) uses and improperly induced providers to prescribe Abilify in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. Nearly identical allegations were leveled against the companies years earlier. In 2007-2008, the companies each entered into an Agreement as part of a settlement of qui tam actions concerning improper promotion of Abilify. Relators allege that, despite those agreements, the companies continued to promote Abilify off-label and offer kickbacks, causing claims for reimbursement for the drug to be submitted to the government, in violation of the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729. The district court dismissed in part. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; the complaint did not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s requirement that relators adequately allege the entire chain to fairly show defendants caused false claims to be filed. As sales representatives, relators did not have personal knowledge of provider’s billing practices.The alleged plan was to increase Abilify prescriptions through improper promotion, which does not amount to conspiracy to violate the FCA. View "Ibanez v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co." on Justia Law

ICN, a religious nonprofit, operates a Nashville mosque and a school. In 2008, it began building a new school building, financed by an ijara agreement, to avoid “running afoul of the Islamic prohibition on the payment of interest.” The bank essentially bought the property, leased it back to ICN, and then sold it back to ICN, with the lease payments substituting for interest payments. The agreement lasted until October 2013; the property was “continuously occupied by [ICN] and physically used solely for exempt religious educational purposes.” The transfer of title prompted the tax assessor to return the property to the tax roll. In February 2014, ICN applied for a property tax exemption, seeking retroactive application. The Tennessee State Board of Equalization’s designee regranted ICN's exemption, but not for the time during which the bank had held title. An ALJ and the State Board’s Assessment Appeals Commission upheld the decision. ICN did not seek review in the chancery court, but filed suit in federal court under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act; the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act; the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act; and the Establishment Clause. The court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Tennessee’s statutory provision for state-court appeal provides a plain, speedy, and efficient alternative to federal-court review, so the Tax Injunction Act bars ICN’s suit in federal court. View "Islamic Center of Nashville v. State of Tennessee" on Justia Law