Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

St. Marys makes portland cement at a plant in Charlevoix. The Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment deemed the plant’s pollution controls sufficient and excused St. Marys from the retrofitting requirement under the Clean Air Act’s Regional Haze Rule, 40 C.F.R. 51.308–.309, which requires the states to determine which facilities within their borders create visibility-impairing pollutants that may “be emitted and transported downwind” to a federal park or wilderness area. States then must decide which of those sources are eligible for “Best Available Retrofit Technology.” The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency disagreed with the state and required the plant to add more stringent pollution controls. The Second Circuit upheld the EPA decision, rejecting challenges to EPA’s scientific and technological assertions concerning the plant’s nitrous oxide emissions, and a claim that St. Marys was exempt from the retrofitting requirement. View "St. Marys Cement Inc. v. Envtl. Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Kruse, a Norfok train conductor, was injured on the job in March, reported his injury, and took leave until August. Shortly after he returned to work, Kruse was suspended for 30 days without pay for exceeding speed limits. Kruse’s union appealed under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153. Both the on-property investigation and the arbitration board concluded that Norfolk “was justified,” but reduced the suspension. While his grievance-related appeal was pending before the arbitration board, Kruse filed a Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) complaint with the Department of Labor, claiming that his suspension was in retaliation for reporting his prior work-related injury. The ALJ ruled in favor of Kruse, denying Norfolk’s motion to dismiss based on FRSA, which prohibits a railroad carrier from retaliating against employees who report work-related injuries and potential safety violations, and provides that “[a]n employee may not seek protection under both this section and another provision of law for the same allegedly unlawful act of the railroad carrier,” 49 U.S.C. 20109(f). The Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board affirmed and the Sixth Circuit denied review, reasoning that prior arbitration of a grievance under the RLA did not trigger the FRSA’s election-of-remedies provision. View "Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Perez" on Justia Law

The State of Tennessee operated the Arlington Developmental Center, an institutional home for people with mental disabilities. In 1992, the United States sued Tennessee under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act alleging that, among other things, Tennessee had failed to provide Arlington’s residents with adequate food, medical care, supervision, and shelter. After a trial on the merits, the district court found that Arlington’s conditions violated the due-process rights of its residents. The court ordered the State to submit a plan to improve conditions there. Since then, People First of Tennessee has presented 19 applications for attorneys’ fees to the district court. Tennessee consented to pay every dollar of fees requested in the first 18 applications filed by intervenors-appellees People First of Tennessee (a total of about $3.6 million, including over $400,000 for the period at issue here). But the State objected to People First’s 19th application, which for the most part sought fees for a contempt motion that the district court had stricken from the docket and that People First never renewed. The 19th application also sought fees for hours that People First’s attorneys had chosen to spend monitoring the State’s compliance with the consent decree, even though the State had already paid $10.6 million in fees to a monitor whom the court had appointed for that same purpose. Despite those circumstances, the district court awarded People First $557,711.37 pursuant to the application, holding that People First had been a “prevailing party” with respect to its contempt motion. The State appealed the district court's award. After review, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's judgment, reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Tennessee" on Justia Law

Left Fork’s Straight Creek underground coal mine is subject to inspections under the Federal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. 801, enforced by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). During a 2011 inspection, MSHA inspector Middleton noted elevated methane gas readings and issued a No Access Order that closed the mine, except for ventilation, required examinations, re-energizing of power, monitoring seals, and de-watering. Left Fork proposed an investigation, but, because of the No Access Order, was required to submit an abatement plan, which it did the next day. MSHA did not respond, but issued an order alleging failure to submit a plan. Left Fork submitted another plan, which was denied in writing. Negotiations failed. On January 11, 2012, MSHA ordered that Left Fork de-energize all power and withdraw all miners. Underground pumps shut down; the mine flooded. On January 17, Left Fork sought a hearing before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, which was held on January 30-31. It did not request temporary interim relief. On April 3, an ALJ invalidated the abatement orders. Neither party appealed. Left Fork had experienced flood damage and sought compensation for MHSA’s “malicious and retaliatory” actions. The court found that it did not satisfy requirements of the Federal Torts Claims Act for state common-law claims against MSHA employees and was precluded by the Mine Act from a remedy under Bivens. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the existence of an alternate statutory remedial scheme precluded a judicially-created damages remedy. View "Left Fork Mining Co., Inc. v. Hooker" on Justia Law

The FAA may “delegate to a qualified private person . . . the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a certificate … and … issuing the certificate,” 49 U.S.C. 44702(d)(1), and may rescind delegation “at any time for any reason.” Airworthiness Representative-Maintenance (DAR-T) authorization to conduct aircraft inspections and issue airworthiness certificates has no expiration. Burdue was appointed as a DAR-T in 2001. In 2013, Burdue’s supervisors were informed of issues related to Burdue’s export certifications. The FAA’s Special Emphasis Investigations Team (SEIT) concluded that Burdue performed multiple aircraft inspections out of his assigned geographic area without authorization and had issued export certificates to aircraft owned by his wife, a conflict of interest. After review of Burdue’s response, Burdue’s certificate was revoked, both “for cause,” 14 C.F.R. 183.15(b)(4) and under the discretionary-revocation provision, 14 C.F.R. 183.15(b)(6). An Appeal Panel affirmed. Burdue brought a Bivens action, claiming due process violations and wrongful termination, then filed statutory claims in the Sixth Circuit. The district court stayed the Bivens proceedings. The Sixth Circuit declined to review the statutory claims because the FAA’s decision is committed to agency discretion and declined to review the constitutional claims that belong in the district court View "Burdue v. Fed. Aviation Admin." on Justia Law

Water flows through Old Hickory Dam on the Cumberland River toward Nashville. The Dam’s reservoir is divided into three pools. If water exceeds the capacity of the surcharge pool, the Army Corps of Engineers must accelerate discharges through the dam to prevent it from being destroyed. The surcharge pool is kept empty except during floods. An unprecedented storm swept through the Cumberland River Basin on May 1–2, 2010. Water was kept at its usual depth even though the Corps was aware of the forecast; discharges through the dam were not increased until a flood emergency was declared. Releases were less than the natural flows from the rainfall and the stormwater draining into the reservoir. While the Corps’ manager was absent, water levels in the reservoir rose in the surcharge pool. When the water level had risen to the top of the surcharge pool, the Corps was forced to release massive volumes of water, but never warned downstream residents about the unprecedented discharge. The discharged waters reached the Nashville area, breaching levees and destroying and damaging property. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, reasoning that the claims are barred by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act. View "Cont'l Ins. Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Michigan corrections officers must perform several pre-shift and post-shift activities, including “punching a mechanical time clock,” “waiting in line” for security, and “walking to assigned locations.” These activities take place off the clock. Corrections officers and their union filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state law to recover overtime payments, 29 U.S.C. 206, 207; Mich. Comp. Laws 408.414, .414a. The Michigan Department of Corrections successfully moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Without a past (or imminent future) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has no remedial power under Section 5 to authorize private lawsuits against the states; absent permissible Section 5 legislation abrogating the state’s immunity from suit, federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain these FLSA claims against the Department of Corrections or to grant a declaratory judgment under Ex parte Young against the Department’s director, to address an alleged ongoing violation of the FLSA. View "Mich. Corrs. Org. v. Mich. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

In 1996, Robinson pleaded guilty to mail fraud and aiding and abetting. The district court sentenced Robinson to 97.5 months of imprisonment and ordered him to pay criminal restitution of $286,875. A year later, Robinson pleaded guilty to a second set of criminal violations, resulting in convictions of wire fraud and aiding and abetting. The district court imposed a 24-month term of imprisonment and again ordered Robinson to pay restitution, this time $100,000. Robinson paid only $7,779.44 of the first judgment and $200 of the second before filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 13. The government, under the criminal restitution judgments, is a lien creditor. Filing for bankruptcy triggered the automatic stay, which suspends all activities related to the collection and enforcement of prepetition debts, 11 U.S.C. 362(a). The bankruptcy court denied the government’s motion to bypass the stay under 18 U.S.C. 3613(a), which provides that the government may enforce a judgment imposing restitution “notwithstanding any other Federal law.” The district court reversed, reasoning that it did not matter whether the debtor or the bankruptcy estate holds nominal title to the property because section 3613(a) allows the government to enforce a restitution order against all property of the person ordered to pay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; section 3613 supersedes the automatic stay and allows the government to enforce restitution orders against property included in the bankruptcy estate. View "Robinson. v. United States" on Justia Law

The 1977 Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. 801(c), authorizes the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) to promulgate mandatory health or safety standards, conduct regular inspections of mines, and issue citations and orders for violations of the Act or regulations. If an operator has a pattern of violations of mandatory health or safety standards and has been given required notice and an opportunity to comply, the Act authorizes issuance of an order requiring the operator to vacate the mine until the violation has been abated. The MSHA promulgated the first pattern of violations rule in 1990. The final rule issued in 2013, as 30 C.F.R. Part 104. Mining interests challenged the rule. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, concluding that the rule is not within the definition of a mandatory health or safety standard over which the Act grants appeals courts jurisdiction.View "Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Sec'y of Labor" on Justia Law

Because of a 2007 car accident, Glenn suffers from degenerative disc disease, a closed head injury and cerebral concussion that cause dizziness and memory loss, left shoulder tendonitis, and post-traumatic headaches. She also suffers major depression, with slow thought processes, mood swings, agitation, poor concentration, anxiousness, feelings of anger and hopelessness, paranoia, auditory hallucinations, and suicidal and homicidal ideation. She has a chronic skin condition that has caused cysts around the vulva that occasionally prevent her from walking and require frequent bathroom breaks. In 2008, Glenn sought social security benefits. Following her hearing, at which Glenn appeared without counsel, the ALJ denied the application at the fifth step of the required analysis: whether, taking into account age, education, and work experience, the claimant can perform other work. The Appeals Council declined review. The district court remanded, based on five errors, but denied attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, finding that the government’s position on appeal was “substantially justified” because the magistrate rejected three of Glenn’s claims of error. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of fees. Regardless of what happens on remand, Glenn had to retain counsel to ensure that her claim would be properly adjudicated.View "Glenn v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law