Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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Left Fork’s Straight Creek underground coal mine is subject to inspections under the Federal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. 801, enforced by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). During a 2011 inspection, MSHA inspector Middleton noted elevated methane gas readings and issued a No Access Order that closed the mine, except for ventilation, required examinations, re-energizing of power, monitoring seals, and de-watering. Left Fork proposed an investigation, but, because of the No Access Order, was required to submit an abatement plan, which it did the next day. MSHA did not respond, but issued an order alleging failure to submit a plan. Left Fork submitted another plan, which was denied in writing. Negotiations failed. On January 11, 2012, MSHA ordered that Left Fork de-energize all power and withdraw all miners. Underground pumps shut down; the mine flooded. On January 17, Left Fork sought a hearing before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, which was held on January 30-31. It did not request temporary interim relief. On April 3, an ALJ invalidated the abatement orders. Neither party appealed. Left Fork had experienced flood damage and sought compensation for MHSA’s “malicious and retaliatory” actions. The court found that it did not satisfy requirements of the Federal Torts Claims Act for state common-law claims against MSHA employees and was precluded by the Mine Act from a remedy under Bivens. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the existence of an alternate statutory remedial scheme precluded a judicially-created damages remedy. View "Left Fork Mining Co., Inc. v. Hooker" on Justia Law

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The FAA may “delegate to a qualified private person . . . the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a certificate … and … issuing the certificate,” 49 U.S.C. 44702(d)(1), and may rescind delegation “at any time for any reason.” Airworthiness Representative-Maintenance (DAR-T) authorization to conduct aircraft inspections and issue airworthiness certificates has no expiration. Burdue was appointed as a DAR-T in 2001. In 2013, Burdue’s supervisors were informed of issues related to Burdue’s export certifications. The FAA’s Special Emphasis Investigations Team (SEIT) concluded that Burdue performed multiple aircraft inspections out of his assigned geographic area without authorization and had issued export certificates to aircraft owned by his wife, a conflict of interest. After review of Burdue’s response, Burdue’s certificate was revoked, both “for cause,” 14 C.F.R. 183.15(b)(4) and under the discretionary-revocation provision, 14 C.F.R. 183.15(b)(6). An Appeal Panel affirmed. Burdue brought a Bivens action, claiming due process violations and wrongful termination, then filed statutory claims in the Sixth Circuit. The district court stayed the Bivens proceedings. The Sixth Circuit declined to review the statutory claims because the FAA’s decision is committed to agency discretion and declined to review the constitutional claims that belong in the district court View "Burdue v. Fed. Aviation Admin." on Justia Law

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Water flows through Old Hickory Dam on the Cumberland River toward Nashville. The Dam’s reservoir is divided into three pools. If water exceeds the capacity of the surcharge pool, the Army Corps of Engineers must accelerate discharges through the dam to prevent it from being destroyed. The surcharge pool is kept empty except during floods. An unprecedented storm swept through the Cumberland River Basin on May 1–2, 2010. Water was kept at its usual depth even though the Corps was aware of the forecast; discharges through the dam were not increased until a flood emergency was declared. Releases were less than the natural flows from the rainfall and the stormwater draining into the reservoir. While the Corps’ manager was absent, water levels in the reservoir rose in the surcharge pool. When the water level had risen to the top of the surcharge pool, the Corps was forced to release massive volumes of water, but never warned downstream residents about the unprecedented discharge. The discharged waters reached the Nashville area, breaching levees and destroying and damaging property. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, reasoning that the claims are barred by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act. View "Cont'l Ins. Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Michigan corrections officers must perform several pre-shift and post-shift activities, including “punching a mechanical time clock,” “waiting in line” for security, and “walking to assigned locations.” These activities take place off the clock. Corrections officers and their union filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state law to recover overtime payments, 29 U.S.C. 206, 207; Mich. Comp. Laws 408.414, .414a. The Michigan Department of Corrections successfully moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Without a past (or imminent future) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has no remedial power under Section 5 to authorize private lawsuits against the states; absent permissible Section 5 legislation abrogating the state’s immunity from suit, federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain these FLSA claims against the Department of Corrections or to grant a declaratory judgment under Ex parte Young against the Department’s director, to address an alleged ongoing violation of the FLSA. View "Mich. Corrs. Org. v. Mich. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

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In 1996, Robinson pleaded guilty to mail fraud and aiding and abetting. The district court sentenced Robinson to 97.5 months of imprisonment and ordered him to pay criminal restitution of $286,875. A year later, Robinson pleaded guilty to a second set of criminal violations, resulting in convictions of wire fraud and aiding and abetting. The district court imposed a 24-month term of imprisonment and again ordered Robinson to pay restitution, this time $100,000. Robinson paid only $7,779.44 of the first judgment and $200 of the second before filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 13. The government, under the criminal restitution judgments, is a lien creditor. Filing for bankruptcy triggered the automatic stay, which suspends all activities related to the collection and enforcement of prepetition debts, 11 U.S.C. 362(a). The bankruptcy court denied the government’s motion to bypass the stay under 18 U.S.C. 3613(a), which provides that the government may enforce a judgment imposing restitution “notwithstanding any other Federal law.” The district court reversed, reasoning that it did not matter whether the debtor or the bankruptcy estate holds nominal title to the property because section 3613(a) allows the government to enforce a restitution order against all property of the person ordered to pay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; section 3613 supersedes the automatic stay and allows the government to enforce restitution orders against property included in the bankruptcy estate. View "Robinson. v. United States" on Justia Law

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The 1977 Mine Act, 30 U.S.C. 801(c), authorizes the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) to promulgate mandatory health or safety standards, conduct regular inspections of mines, and issue citations and orders for violations of the Act or regulations. If an operator has a pattern of violations of mandatory health or safety standards and has been given required notice and an opportunity to comply, the Act authorizes issuance of an order requiring the operator to vacate the mine until the violation has been abated. The MSHA promulgated the first pattern of violations rule in 1990. The final rule issued in 2013, as 30 C.F.R. Part 104. Mining interests challenged the rule. The Sixth Circuit dismissed, concluding that the rule is not within the definition of a mandatory health or safety standard over which the Act grants appeals courts jurisdiction.View "Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Sec'y of Labor" on Justia Law

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Because of a 2007 car accident, Glenn suffers from degenerative disc disease, a closed head injury and cerebral concussion that cause dizziness and memory loss, left shoulder tendonitis, and post-traumatic headaches. She also suffers major depression, with slow thought processes, mood swings, agitation, poor concentration, anxiousness, feelings of anger and hopelessness, paranoia, auditory hallucinations, and suicidal and homicidal ideation. She has a chronic skin condition that has caused cysts around the vulva that occasionally prevent her from walking and require frequent bathroom breaks. In 2008, Glenn sought social security benefits. Following her hearing, at which Glenn appeared without counsel, the ALJ denied the application at the fifth step of the required analysis: whether, taking into account age, education, and work experience, the claimant can perform other work. The Appeals Council declined review. The district court remanded, based on five errors, but denied attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, finding that the government’s position on appeal was “substantially justified” because the magistrate rejected three of Glenn’s claims of error. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of fees. Regardless of what happens on remand, Glenn had to retain counsel to ensure that her claim would be properly adjudicated.View "Glenn v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

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Sterling, a former coal miner, received a favorable decision from an administrative law judge (ALJ) declaring him eligible for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901. The Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition by Sterling’s employer that argued that the ALJ wrongly applied the statutory presumption of pneumoconiosis, improperly discredited certain medical opinions disputing Sterling’s pneumoconiosis diagnosis, and failed to explain his resolution of conflicting evidence about the extent of Sterling’s past cigarette smoking. View "Central OH Coal Co. v. Dir.r, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

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Nationwide, with 32,000 employees in 49 states, has an ERISA employee-benefits plan that provides short-term disability (STD), long-term disability (LTD), and “Your Time” benefits. An employee can receive Your Time benefits for personal reasons, such as vacation or illness. To receive STD benefits, an employee must be “STD Disabled,” which means “a substantial change in medical or physical condition due to a specific illness that prevents an Eligible Associate from working their current position.” Specific rules govern maternity leave. The first five days of paid maternity leave come out of an associate’s Your Time benefits. Thereafter, a new mother is considered STD Disabled and entitled to STD benefits for six weeks following a vaginal delivery, or eight weeks following a cesarean section. Wisconsin’s Family Medical Leave Act requires that employers allow six weeks of unpaid leave following “[t]he birth of an employee’s natural child[.]” The Act’s “substitution provision” requires employers to allow an employee to substitute “paid or unpaid leave of any other type provided by the employer” for the unpaid leave provided by the statute. A Wisconsin Nationwide employee had a baby. She received six weeks of STD benefits under Nationwide’s plan. She then requested an additional period of STD benefits pursuant to the substitution provision. The plan denied the request, finding that she was no longer short-term disabled under the plan. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that, ERISA did not preempt the Wisconsin Act. The district court held that, under the Supremacy Clause, the administrator was required to comply with ERISA rather than the Wisconsin Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Sherfel v. Newson" on Justia Law

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Rais, born in Pakistan in 1975, entered the U.S. in 2002 to attend school, married a citizen, and applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residency. He was convicted of domestic violence against his wife, in 2002, and was granted advance parole, allowing him to leave the U.S. without abandoning his application for adjustment of status. He was paroled back into this country in 2003. In 2004, his application for adjustment of status was denied. Rais married another U.S. citizen in 2005, and again applied for adjustment of status. That application was denied in 2009 because of the domestic violence conviction. An IJ ordered his removal, determining that she lacked jurisdiction to grant adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255. The BIA affirmed. Rais twice moved to reopen removal proceedings, requesting that proceedings be suspended while the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services adjudicates his application for adjustment of status. The BIA denied the first motion on the merits and refused to exercise its sua sponte authority to grant the second, which was untimely and number-barred. Rais sought review of the second denial. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to refrain from exercising its authority. View "Rais v. Holder" on Justia Law