Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Authority was formed under Ga. Code 46-4-82(a) to provide member municipalities with natural gas. It operates as a non-profit, distributing profits and losses to member municipalities: 64 in Georgia, two in Tennessee, 12 in other states. It pays its own operating expenses and judgments; it is exempt from state laws on financing and investment for state entities and has discretion over accumulation, investment, and management of its funds. It sets its governance rules; members elect leaders from among member municipalities. Smyrna, Tennessee has obtained gas from the Authority since 2000, using a pipeline that does not run through Georgia. The Authority entered a multi-year “hedge” contract for gas acquisition, setting price and volume through 2014, and passed the costs on. The market price of natural gas then fell due to increased hydraulic fracturing (fracking), but Smyrna was still paying the higher price. Smyrna sued for breach of contract, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. The district court denied the Authority’s motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity under Georgia law and the Eleventh Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the Authority’s claim that any entity referred to as a state “instrumentality” in a Georgia statute is entitled to state-law sovereign immunity “requires quite a stretch of the imagination.” View "Town of Smyrna, TN v. Mun. Gas Auth. of GA" on Justia Law

Harkness, a reserve Commander in the Navy Chaplain Corps, was denied a promotion to the rank of Captain by an annual selection board. The Secretary of the Navy denied his request to convene a special selection board (SSB) to review that decision. Harkness filed suit, claiming that promotion policies and procedures for chaplains violated the Establishment Clause. The district court dismissed, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies required by 10 U.S.C. 14502(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that non-promoted officers must first petition the Secretary to convene an SSB. The Secretary must weigh certain factors, including whether an administrative error caused the original selection board not actually to consider the officer, or whether a material error caused the original board to mistakenly fail to recommend promotion. If the Secretary determines that an SSB is not warranted, the officer can seek review of that denial in federal court. The language of Harkness’s request apparently challenged only the composition of the board and fell short of giving the Secretary a meaningful opportunity to respond to Harkness’s constitutional contention. View "Harkness v. United States" on Justia Law

Triple A, a Michigan corporation, has offices in Dearborn, Michigan, the Congo (previously known as Zaire), and Sierra Leone. In 1993, Zaire ordered military equipment worth $14,070,000 from Triple A. A South Korean manufacturer shipped the equipment to Zaire at Triple A’s request. For 17 years, Triple A sought payment from Zaire and then the Congo without success. In 2010, Triple A sued the Congo for breach of contract. The district court dismissed the case, citing lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the language of the Act, under which federal courts have jurisdiction “in any case in which the action is based upon” the following: [1] a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or [2] upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or [3] upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States. View "Triple A Int'l, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo" on Justia Law

Cleveland has had an age-65 mandatory retirement policy for police and fire department personnel since 1960. The policy allowed the chief of police or the fire department to allow a person to continue on active duty on a year to year basis, subject to approval of the Director of Public Safety, following independent medical evaluation. Extensions were routinely granted until 2010, when budget cuts caused lay-offs and the police chief denied all requests. The fire department continued to grant extensions. Former officers, forced into retirement, alleged violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621., Ohio’s age discrimination statute, Ohio Rev. Code 4112, and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal law includes an exception that allows state and local governments to set mandatory retirement ages for firefighters and law enforcement officers; the city established that its retirement plan exists for the efficiency of the police department and is not a subterfuge to evade the Act. View "Sadie v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Janosek owns a business that makes welded ring products. The business uses water to cool hydraulics used in the process. In or before 1999 Janosek installed closed loop water chillers that he hoped would recapture the water and significantly decrease water consumption. Instead of seeing a decrease in his water bills, Janosek continued to pay in excess of $150,000 a year until 2002, when the bills dropped to between $10,000 and $25,000 a year. Janosek suspected that he had been over-charged based on the Cleveland Water Department practice of estimating water consumption. Cleveland’s Moral Claims Commission, established to consider monetary claims that Cleveland is not legally obligated to pay, held a hearing, without notifying Janosek, and denied the claim. The district court dismissed Janosek’s case, finding that claims of unjust enrichment, taking without just compensation, and negligence were barred by the statute of limitations, and that a due process claim concerning the lack of notice failed because Janosek had not identified a valid property interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Any legitimate property interest that Janosek had in the overpayments lapsed with the running of the limitations period. View "Janosek v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

In 2008, Washburn was seriously injured when the door of an airplane hangar, T-hangar 12, blew off and hit her in the face and torso during a storm at an airpark owned by Lawrence County and operated by Attitude Aviation. Watson had leased T-hangar 12 for more than 20 years at the time of the accident; his lease made him responsible for the condition of the hangar. Attitude was never included in any of the hangar lease negotiations or lease renewals. Rejecting Washburn’s suit on summary judgment, the district court held that the County and Attitude owed no duty of care to Washburn because they had no control over the hangar. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Washburn v. Lawrence Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs receive subsidies from Michigan’s Child Development and Care Program for providing home childcare services for low-income families. Following creation of the Home Based Child Care Council, a union was established and authorized to bargain on their behalf, based on submission of 22,180 valid provider-signed authorization cards out of a possible 40,532 eligible providers. The union and the Council entered into a collective bargaining agreement and the state began deducting union dues and fees from the subsidy payments. Plaintiffs sought to file a class-action lawsuit for the return of the money, collected allegedly in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied certification of plaintiffs’ proposed class (all home childcare providers in Michigan) based on conflict of interest: some members voted for union representation and others voted against representation. Plaintiffs attempted to cure by proposing a subclass of only providers who did not participate in any election related to union representation. The district court rejected the proposal, finding that it could not assume that all members of the subclass opposed representation and that, even if all members of the proposed subclass did oppose representation, their reasons for opposition were different enough to create conflict within the class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Schlaud v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Under the Medicaid program, the federal government offsets some state expenses for medical services to low-income persons; a state’s plan must cover medical assistance for specific populations, but a state may expand its Medicaid program by obtaining a waiver for an “experimental, pilot, or demonstration project.” In 1993, Tennessee obtained a waiver for TennCare, to cover uninsured and uninsurable individuals. Following approval, hospitals received reimbursement under the umbrella of TennCare. Because hospitals serving large numbers of low-income patients generally incur higher costs than Medicaid flat payment rates reflect, hospitals that treated a disproportionate share of low-income patients could apply for the “DSH” adjustment. A fiscal intermediary processed requests for reimbursement, including DSH adjustment payments. Due to discrepancies between the practices of fiscal intermediaries in different states, the Secretary issued a 2000 rule, providing that eligibility waiver patients were to be included as individuals “eligible for medical assistance” under Medicaid for purposes of DSH adjustment calculations. The 2005 Deficit Reduction Act ratified the rule. Adventist, a not-for-profit hospital network, provided more than 1,200 patient care days to TennCare expansion waiver patients 1995-2000. The fiscal intermediary did not include those days in calculating the adjustment. The Secretary’s Provider Reimbursement Review Board upheld the exclusion. The district court dismissed, concluding that section 1315 provided the Secretary discretion to exclude expansion waiver patient days from the DSH calculation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

In 2007, the Army Corps of Engineers issued two nationwide general permits that authorized surface and underground coalmining operations to discharge dredged and fill material into waters of the United States. The Corps conducted a public notice-and-comment period and completed a cumulative-impacts analysis that projected the permits’ respective environmental impacts before determining that compensatory mitigation would reduce adverse impacts to a minimal level. The Corps disclosed its analyses and findings in each permit’s Environmental Assessment in lieu of an environmental impact statement. Riverkeeper sued, alleging violations of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344(e), the National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706, during the Corps’ issuance of two nationwide coal-mining waste-discharge permits in 2007. The district court granted summary judgment to the Corps. During Riverkeeper’s appeal, the permits at issue expired. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the case remains in controversy and reversed in part. Although the Corps repeatedly objected to the feasibility of Riverkeeper’s demands, in taking the “easier path” of preparing an environmental assessment instead of an environmental impact statement the Corps failed to follow CWA and NEPA regulations by documenting its assessment of environmental impacts and examining past impacts. View "KY Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rowlette" on Justia Law

In 1997, Warf began working for Veterans Affairs as a program assistant to the Chief of Psychology. In 2004, a specialist from Human Resources performed an audit and concluded that Warf was performing duties that warranted GS-7 status on the government pay scale, a step higher than her GS-6 status. Between 2004 and 2008, Warf requested promotions, but nothing happened. In 2008 Warf filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The director retroactively promoted Warf and she received back pay. Warf was subsequently denied a promotion and brought claims of hostile work environment, gender discrimination, retaliation, and Equal Pay Act violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000(e), and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1). The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the department. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Warf provided no any evidence that she and DeLong (who got the promotion) performed substantially similar jobs. Warf’s position was that of an administrative assistant, which did not encompass any education or training responsibilities. There is a significant difference between DeLong, who held a master’s degree in business and had seven years of experience teaching, and Warf, who was working towards her bachelor’s degree. View "Warf v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law