Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dura began testing employees at its Lawrenceburg, Tennessee manufacturing facility for substances in illegal drugs and in prescription medications packaged with warnings about operating machinery. Plaintiffs, none of whom has a disability under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA), worked at the facility and took various prescribed medications. After they tested positive, Dura directed the employees to disclose their medications to FFS, a third-party company hired to administer the tests. FFS reported the machine-restricted drugs to Dura, which warned plaintiffs to discontinue using the offending medications. After retests came back positive, Dura terminated their employment. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), which prohibits employers from requiring “medical examination[s]” or “mak[ing] inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability ... unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” A jury found for all but one plaintiff and awarded damages of more than $870,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed a holding that Dura’s drug-testing protocol constituted as a matter of law, a medical examination or disability inquiry and the related punitive-damages award. On remand, the jury must decide whether Dura’s drug testing constituted a medical examination or disability inquiry, relying on definitions and illustrative examples provided by EEOC guidance. If the jury finds Dura liable, it can proceed to consider punitive damages. The court affirmed with respect to the availability of statutory damages and the jury’s adverse business necessity/ job-relatedness verdict. View "Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Kroll was an emergency medical technician (EMT) for WLAA when she began a romantic affair with her married coworker. As the relationship unraveled, Kroll became increasingly emotional at work. After Kroll had a personal altercation with one a coworker, her supervisor expressed concern regarding her “immoral” sexual conduct and demanded that she undergo psychological counseling. When Kroll refused, she was fired. Kroll claimed that WLAA violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by requiring a medical examination that was not “job-related and consistent with business necessity,” 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A). On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of WLAA. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that there was evidence record to establish a genuine factual dispute as to whether the required counseling was “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” View "Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth." on Justia Law

Groves worked as a strip miner for more than 20 years and a smoker who accumulated more than 50 pack-years. His first claim for black lung benefits, in 1998, was denied. Groves filed his current application in 2006. The ALJ awarded benefits in 2009. The Benefits Review Board vacated and remanded so that the ALJ could provide more detailed explanations. On remand, the ALJ again granted benefits after a careful review of the medical opinions of several different doctors who evaluated Groves’ lung disease, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). The Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit remanded. While substantial evidence supported the determination that Groves’s COPD arose at least in part out of coal mining employment, the ALJ apparently did not apply the correct standard in determining that his total disability was due to pneumoconiosis.View "Arch on the Green, Inc. v. Groves" on Justia Law

Forester was awarded benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901-944, as amended by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, after the ALJ determined that Forester’s five years of private coal mine employment with Navistar’s predecessor, combined with his16 years of employment as a mine inspector with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration , rendered him eligible for the rebuttable presumption that, having been employed for at least 15 years in underground coal mines, and having a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, he was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, commonly known as black lung disease. The Benefits Review Board upheld the award. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that a federal mine inspector is not a “miner” for purposes of the BLBA, and remanding for determination of whether Forester is entitled to an award of BLBA benefits without the benefit of the 15-year presumption. View "Navistar, Inc. v. Forester" on Justia Law

Groups of hospitals in the Cincinnati area and in rural Iowa, challenged the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ calculation of how much to pay those hospitals for inpatient services under Medicare Part A. The hospitals objected to the agency’s decision to include in the calculation the hours associated with a short-term disability program paid from a hospital’s general funds through its payroll system and a program offering a full-time salary for part-time weekend work. The district court entered summary judgment for the Secretary. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the agency’s interpretation was not arbitrary or capricious and referring to “the most completely impenetrable texts within human experience,” statutes and regulations that “one approaches ... at the level of specificity herein demanded with dread.” View "Atrium Medical Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are non-profit entities affiliated with the Catholic Church who have religious objections to certain preventive care standards under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13, particularly the requirement that their employer-based health insurance plans cover all FDA-approved contraception, sterilization methods, and counseling. All are eligible for either an exemption from the requirement or an accommodation to the requirement, through which the entities will not pay for the contraceptive products and services and the coverage will be independently administered by an insurance issuer or third-party administrator. Nonetheless, they alleged that the contraceptive-coverage requirement violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment; and the Administrative Procedure Act. Two district courts denied the appellants’ motions for a preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits of any of their properly raised claims; because they did not demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, they also do not demonstrate that they will suffer irreparable injury without the injunction. View "MI Catholic Conference v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Sjöstrand graduated magna cum laude from Ohio State University in only two and a half years. She applied to the school’s Ph.D program in School Psychology, where her grade-point average (3.87) was tied for highest in the applicant pool and her GRE scores (combined 1110) exceeded OSU requirements. Sjöstrand suffers from Crohn’s disease. She claims that, in interviews, two of the program’s professors focused on her disease. Of seven applicants interviewed by the school, only Sjöstrand was rejected. She was initially told only that she did “not fit the program.” She sued under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701. The district court granted OSU summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that jury questions remained regarding whether she was rejected because of her disability.View "Sjostrand v. Ohio St. Univ." on Justia Law

Lucas County has about 440,000 residents and includes Toledo. Two-thirds of the county’s patients have government-provided health insurance, such as Medicare or Medicaid; 29 percent have private insurance, which pays significantly higher rates to hospitals than government-provided insurance. General acute-care (GAC) inpatient services include “primary services,” such as hernia surgeries, radiology services, and most inpatient obstetrical (OB) services. “Secondary services,” such as hip replacements and bariatric surgery, require more specialized resources. “Tertiary services,” such as brain surgery and treatments for severe burns, require even more specialized resources. “Quaternary services,” such as major organ transplants, require the most specialized resources. Different hospitals offer different levels of service. In Lucas County ProMedica has 46.8% of the GAC market and operates three hospitals, which together provide primary (including OB), secondary, and tertiary services. Mercy Health Partners has 28.7% of the GAC market and operates three hospitals in the county, which provide primary (including OB), secondary, and tertiary services. University of Toledo Medical Center (UTMC) has 13% of the GAC market with a single teaching and research hospital, focused on tertiary and quaternary services. It does not offer OB services. St. Luke’s Hospital had 11.5% of the GAC market and offered primary (including OB) and secondary services. In 2010 ProMedica merged with St. Luke’s, creating an entity with 50% of the market in primary and secondary services and 80% of the market for obstetrical services. The FTC challenged the merger under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The Commission found that the merger would adversely affect competition and ordered ProMedica to divest St. Luke’s. The Sixth Circuit upheld the order. View "ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked until 2006, when the plant closed, and retired under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); that provided that the employer would provide health insurance, either through a self-insured plan or under a group insurance policy and identified the employer’s contribution to the premium. The CBAs provided that the coverage an employee had at the time of retirement or termination at age 65 or older other than a discharge for cause “shall be continued thereafter provided that suitable arrangements for such continuation[] can be made… In the event… benefits … [are] not practicable … the Company in agreement with the Union will provide new benefits and/or coverages as closely related as possible and of equivalent value." In 2011 TRW (the employer’s successor) stated that it would discontinue group health care coverage beginning in 2012, but would be providing “Health Reimbursement Accounts” (HRAs) and would make a one-time contribution of $15,000 for each eligible retiree and eligible spouse in 2012, and in 2013, would provide a $4,800 credit to the HRAs for each eligible party. The HRAs shifted risk, and potentially costs, to plaintiffs. TRW did not commit to funding the HRAs beyond 2013. Plaintiffs sued, claiming that the change breached the CBAs, in violation of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The district court certified a class and granted summary judgment, ruling that the CBAs established a commitment to lifetime health care benefits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed View "United Steel, Paper, Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. Kelsey-Hayes Co." on Justia Law

Cameron returned to Kentucky after serving as a Marine in Iraq and applied for VA Medical Benefits, but did not include verification of service (DD-214). Four months later, the VA verified his service, but its record did not reflect combat service or other eligibility; his status was “Rejected.” A week later, Cameron’s records were updated and he was retroactively enrolled. Cameron had been involved in killing a civilian family. His parents had contacted the Lexington VA mental health department and urged their son to seek help. Tiffany, his wife, told him that she and their baby would not continue to live with him unless he sought help. Days before his enrollment was corrected Cameron went to the Leestown VA. The intake clerk recognized that Cameron was in urgent need of help and talked to him for 40 minutes, despite not finding his enrollment. She concluded that Cameron was suicidal. No mental health professional was available at Leestown. She sent him to Cooper Drive VA. Cameron called his father later, stating that he had been turned away from Cooper Drive because he did not have his DD-214. Cameron drove home. He and Tiffany searched for the form. Cameron became frustrated and threatened Tiffany, who called 911. While on the phone, she heard a shot. Her husband had committed suicide. His family asserted claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court dismissed, holding that it did not have jurisdiction over a “benefits determination,” Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, 38 U.S.C. 511.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Whether the clinics had a duty to care for Cameron is an improper question for this stage. The government failed to show that the actions of the VA employees satisfied the test of the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. View "Anestis v. United States" on Justia Law