Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When Colonel Antoon (U.S. Air Force, retired) learned that he needed prostate surgery, he researched options and specialists, which led him to the Cleveland Clinic and Dr. Kaouk. Antoon interviewed Kaouk and arranged for him to perform the operation. When Antoon experienced complications following the surgery, his further investigation caused him to suspect that Kaouk did not actually perform the surgery, but passed off major duties to a surgical resident. Antoon lodged several complaints and filed a medical malpractice action in state court, which was dismissed voluntarily. Antoon then filed suit as a relator under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act (FCA), premised on the theory that Kaouk billed the government for work he did not perform, and promoted the robotic surgical device he recommended in violation of the anti-kickback statute, 42 U.S.C. 1302a-7b(b)(2). The United States declined to intervene. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, based on a jurisdictional bar. Antoon does not have any direct and independent knowledge of the information upon which his fraud allegations are based; therefore he cannot qualify as an original source of that information, and cannot establish standing as a qui tam plaintiff under the FCA, 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(B). View "Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found." on Justia Law

The State of Tennessee operated the Arlington Developmental Center, an institutional home for people with mental disabilities. In 1992, the United States sued Tennessee under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act alleging that, among other things, Tennessee had failed to provide Arlington’s residents with adequate food, medical care, supervision, and shelter. After a trial on the merits, the district court found that Arlington’s conditions violated the due-process rights of its residents. The court ordered the State to submit a plan to improve conditions there. Since then, People First of Tennessee has presented 19 applications for attorneys’ fees to the district court. Tennessee consented to pay every dollar of fees requested in the first 18 applications filed by intervenors-appellees People First of Tennessee (a total of about $3.6 million, including over $400,000 for the period at issue here). But the State objected to People First’s 19th application, which for the most part sought fees for a contempt motion that the district court had stricken from the docket and that People First never renewed. The 19th application also sought fees for hours that People First’s attorneys had chosen to spend monitoring the State’s compliance with the consent decree, even though the State had already paid $10.6 million in fees to a monitor whom the court had appointed for that same purpose. Despite those circumstances, the district court awarded People First $557,711.37 pursuant to the application, holding that People First had been a “prevailing party” with respect to its contempt motion. The State appealed the district court's award. After review, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court's judgment, reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Tennessee" on Justia Law

Keathley retired from working at strip mines. His health deteriorated. He sought Black Lung Benefits Act benefits, 30 U.S.C. 901. Keathley established eligibility under the 15 -year presumption; he had worked in mines for more than 16 years and was able to show a totally disabling impairment by medical opinion testimony and tests showing poor pulmonary function. His employer rebutted this presumption by offering testimony by Dr. Broudy, who diagnosed Keathley with “a combination of chronic obstructive asthma and pulmonary emphysema and chronic bronchitis” caused by smoking. Conceding that “coal dust may have contributed,” Broudy concluded that “it’s far more likely that the impairment was due to obstructive airways disease from cigarette smoking and some predisposition to asthma or bronchospasm.” On remand, the ALJ awarded benefits; the Benefits Review Board affirmed, rejecting Broudy’s opinion that “bronchitis associated with coal dust exposure usually ceases with cessation of exposure,” as contrary to federal regulations, which state that “pneumoconiosis” may be “latent and progressive” and arise after exposure ceases. The Sixth Circuit denied the employer’s petition for review. The employer did not challenge the evaluation of individual tests, identify any factor the ALJ overlooked, or offer any basis for distinguishing among the tests. View "Sunny Ridge Mining Co., Inc. v. Keathley" on Justia Law

Dura began testing employees at its Lawrenceburg, Tennessee manufacturing facility for substances in illegal drugs and in prescription medications packaged with warnings about operating machinery. Plaintiffs, none of whom has a disability under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA), worked at the facility and took various prescribed medications. After they tested positive, Dura directed the employees to disclose their medications to FFS, a third-party company hired to administer the tests. FFS reported the machine-restricted drugs to Dura, which warned plaintiffs to discontinue using the offending medications. After retests came back positive, Dura terminated their employment. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), which prohibits employers from requiring “medical examination[s]” or “mak[ing] inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability ... unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” A jury found for all but one plaintiff and awarded damages of more than $870,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed a holding that Dura’s drug-testing protocol constituted as a matter of law, a medical examination or disability inquiry and the related punitive-damages award. On remand, the jury must decide whether Dura’s drug testing constituted a medical examination or disability inquiry, relying on definitions and illustrative examples provided by EEOC guidance. If the jury finds Dura liable, it can proceed to consider punitive damages. The court affirmed with respect to the availability of statutory damages and the jury’s adverse business necessity/ job-relatedness verdict. View "Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Kroll was an emergency medical technician (EMT) for WLAA when she began a romantic affair with her married coworker. As the relationship unraveled, Kroll became increasingly emotional at work. After Kroll had a personal altercation with one a coworker, her supervisor expressed concern regarding her “immoral” sexual conduct and demanded that she undergo psychological counseling. When Kroll refused, she was fired. Kroll claimed that WLAA violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by requiring a medical examination that was not “job-related and consistent with business necessity,” 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A). On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of WLAA. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that there was evidence record to establish a genuine factual dispute as to whether the required counseling was “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” View "Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth." on Justia Law

Groves worked as a strip miner for more than 20 years and a smoker who accumulated more than 50 pack-years. His first claim for black lung benefits, in 1998, was denied. Groves filed his current application in 2006. The ALJ awarded benefits in 2009. The Benefits Review Board vacated and remanded so that the ALJ could provide more detailed explanations. On remand, the ALJ again granted benefits after a careful review of the medical opinions of several different doctors who evaluated Groves’ lung disease, Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). The Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit remanded. While substantial evidence supported the determination that Groves’s COPD arose at least in part out of coal mining employment, the ALJ apparently did not apply the correct standard in determining that his total disability was due to pneumoconiosis.View "Arch on the Green, Inc. v. Groves" on Justia Law

Forester was awarded benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901-944, as amended by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, after the ALJ determined that Forester’s five years of private coal mine employment with Navistar’s predecessor, combined with his16 years of employment as a mine inspector with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration , rendered him eligible for the rebuttable presumption that, having been employed for at least 15 years in underground coal mines, and having a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, he was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, commonly known as black lung disease. The Benefits Review Board upheld the award. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that a federal mine inspector is not a “miner” for purposes of the BLBA, and remanding for determination of whether Forester is entitled to an award of BLBA benefits without the benefit of the 15-year presumption. View "Navistar, Inc. v. Forester" on Justia Law

Groups of hospitals in the Cincinnati area and in rural Iowa, challenged the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ calculation of how much to pay those hospitals for inpatient services under Medicare Part A. The hospitals objected to the agency’s decision to include in the calculation the hours associated with a short-term disability program paid from a hospital’s general funds through its payroll system and a program offering a full-time salary for part-time weekend work. The district court entered summary judgment for the Secretary. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the agency’s interpretation was not arbitrary or capricious and referring to “the most completely impenetrable texts within human experience,” statutes and regulations that “one approaches ... at the level of specificity herein demanded with dread.” View "Atrium Medical Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are non-profit entities affiliated with the Catholic Church who have religious objections to certain preventive care standards under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13, particularly the requirement that their employer-based health insurance plans cover all FDA-approved contraception, sterilization methods, and counseling. All are eligible for either an exemption from the requirement or an accommodation to the requirement, through which the entities will not pay for the contraceptive products and services and the coverage will be independently administered by an insurance issuer or third-party administrator. Nonetheless, they alleged that the contraceptive-coverage requirement violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment; and the Administrative Procedure Act. Two district courts denied the appellants’ motions for a preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits of any of their properly raised claims; because they did not demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, they also do not demonstrate that they will suffer irreparable injury without the injunction. View "MI Catholic Conference v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Sjöstrand graduated magna cum laude from Ohio State University in only two and a half years. She applied to the school’s Ph.D program in School Psychology, where her grade-point average (3.87) was tied for highest in the applicant pool and her GRE scores (combined 1110) exceeded OSU requirements. Sjöstrand suffers from Crohn’s disease. She claims that, in interviews, two of the program’s professors focused on her disease. Of seven applicants interviewed by the school, only Sjöstrand was rejected. She was initially told only that she did “not fit the program.” She sued under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701. The district court granted OSU summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that jury questions remained regarding whether she was rejected because of her disability.View "Sjostrand v. Ohio St. Univ." on Justia Law