Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of noncitizens from Mexico, El Salvador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, who had lived in the United States for years without lawful status, were arrested by federal immigration authorities and detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) without being granted bond hearings. Most had only minor traffic offenses and many were parents to U.S.-citizen children. Their detention was based on the interpretation that, as “applicants for admission,” they were subject to mandatory detention without individualized assessment of flight risk or dangerousness.Each petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in either the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan or the Western District of Michigan. They argued that they should have been detained, if at all, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, which allows for bond hearings, not under the mandatory detention provision. They also claimed that detention without a bond hearing violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights. The district courts agreed with the petitioners, holding that § 1226(a) governed their detention, requiring bond hearings, and that detention without such a hearing violated due process for those who had lived in the interior of the United States for years.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed these consolidated appeals. The court held that noncitizens present in the interior of the United States who have not affirmatively sought lawful entry are not “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore are not subject to mandatory detention without bond. Instead, their detention is governed by § 1226, which requires an individualized bond hearing. The court also affirmed that detaining such noncitizens without a bond hearing violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The court affirmed the district courts’ judgments granting habeas relief. View "Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft" on Justia Law

A man who was born in India entered the United States illegally and sought asylum, which was denied. He then submitted a second asylum application under a false identity and later married a U.S. citizen, using the same false information to obtain permanent residency and, eventually, naturalization as a U.S. citizen. After obtaining a U.S. passport and reentering the country, he was questioned by border agents and gave false answers regarding his identity. As a result, he was charged with using a fraudulently obtained passport and making false statements to federal agents. He pleaded guilty to the passport charge, with the other charge dismissed, and was sentenced to probation. Both his plea agreement and the district court informed him of potential immigration consequences, including possible loss of citizenship.Later, the government initiated denaturalization proceedings, alleging that he had illegally procured citizenship through fraud and misrepresentation. The man petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not advise him that his guilty plea could lead to denaturalization. The district court denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding he had not shown a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s advice, he would have chosen a different course. After a Second Circuit decision in Farhane v. United States adopted a broader view of counsel’s obligations, he sought reconsideration, which was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the appeal and held that the Sixth Amendment does not require defense attorneys to advise naturalized citizens that a guilty plea may carry the risk of denaturalization and eventual deportation. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration. View "United States v. Singh" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan national of indigenous Mayan Quiche descent entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor in 2015 and was placed in removal proceedings. He conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, alleging persecution based on his indigenous identity. In a 2022 removal hearing, he testified regarding his experiences. The Immigration Judge found him credible but concluded he did not meet the legal standards for relief, ordering his removal to Guatemala.The petitioner timely appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. On February 10, 2025, the Board affirmed the removal order. The petitioner then filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, but did so 79 days after the Board’s final order—well beyond the 30-day deadline set by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the government moved to dismiss the petition as untimely, arguing that the 30-day filing deadline was not subject to equitable tolling. The petitioner argued for equitable tolling, citing extraordinary circumstances and diligence. The Sixth Circuit held that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. Bondi, the § 1252(b)(1) deadline is a claims-processing rule rather than jurisdictional, and is therefore subject to equitable tolling, following the interpretive framework from cases such as Holland v. Florida and Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner. However, the court concluded that the petitioner did not demonstrate the requisite diligence or extraordinary circumstances to merit equitable tolling in this case. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the petition for review as untimely. View "Oxlaj-Perez v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Mauritanian national entered the United States without valid documents and was detained by federal immigration authorities. He admitted removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming he had been enslaved and tortured in Mauritania. In his testimony before an immigration judge, he provided inconsistent accounts regarding his experiences and statements, including contradictions about where he lived, whether he had been arrested or tortured by police, and the fate of his family members. Different court-appointed interpreters assisted him during his hearings.The immigration judge found the petitioner not credible due to numerous inconsistencies and denied his applications for relief. The petitioner did not appeal the initial decision but later moved to reopen the proceedings, alleging that interpretation at one hearing was flawed because the interpreter had since been disqualified. He provided an affidavit expressing difficulty understanding the interpreter but did not specify any translation errors. The immigration judge denied the motion to reopen, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, noting the lack of objections at the hearing and absence of identified errors. The Board also rejected a request for sua sponte reopening, finding no exceptional situations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered the petition for review. It held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because the petitioner failed to identify material translation errors or evidence likely to change the outcome. The court also found no due process violation, noting the petitioner did not object during the hearing or show that the judge was aware of interpretation problems. Finally, the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the claim regarding sua sponte reopening. The petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Deh v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan citizen who entered the United States unlawfully in 2000 was placed in removal proceedings after being arrested in connection with a criminal investigation. He conceded his removability but sought cancellation of removal under § 240A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, arguing that his deportation would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his two U.S.-citizen children. He and his wife, both of whom are the children’s sole providers, testified that if he were removed, the family would relocate to Guatemala, where the children would face significant financial, educational, and medical challenges.An Immigration Judge denied the application, finding that the children would not suffer hardship beyond what is typical for families facing deportation. The judge reasoned that the family had resources to transition to life in Guatemala, including the parents’ ability to work and certain assets that could assist their resettlement. The judge also noted that the children did not have unique medical or educational needs and that the hardships described—such as a lower standard of living and reduced educational opportunities—were not extraordinary. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, and the petitioner then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying the substantial-evidence standard under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, held that the determination by the Board was conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. The court found that the hardships identified did not rise to the level of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” required for cancellation of removal and that no reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach a contrary conclusion. The petition for review was denied. View "Us v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan national entered the United States illegally as a minor and was charged with removability. He twice failed to appear at scheduled immigration hearings, resulting in an in absentia removal order, which was later rescinded after he successfully moved to reopen his case. He conceded his removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing threats and assaults from the Mara 18 gang due to his refusal to join, harm to his sister allegedly in retaliation, and his Mayan ethnicity. He also claimed the Guatemalan authorities would not protect him due to discrimination against Mayans.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found his testimony credible but identified inconsistencies in his statements and supporting evidence. The IJ held that the four social groups he identified—various groupings of young men, indigenous men, those lacking police protection, and his family—were either too broad or not sufficiently particular to be recognized under Guatemalan society as required for asylum or withholding of removal. The IJ further found that he was targeted by the gang for recruitment, not because of group membership, and that his experiences did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ also denied his claim under the Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, finding that he had waived his CAT claim.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied his petition. The court held that he had forfeited arguments concerning the social groups he identified before the agency and failed to exhaust new social group arguments presented in his petition. Without establishing membership in a particular social group, his asylum and withholding of removal claims could not succeed. The court also found his remaining challenges either unexhausted or meritless. View "Gamas-Vicente v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Canadian citizen married an American citizen in 2017. The couple lived in Canada until 2020, then moved to Hawaii, where the American spouse began working as a physician. The Canadian spouse entered the United States on a tourist visa and soon applied for lawful permanent residency. To support this application, the American spouse signed a federal Affidavit of Support, committing to maintain the non-citizen’s income above 125% of the federal poverty line. The Canadian spouse obtained permanent residency in 2021. Around that time, the marriage ended, and the American spouse moved to Michigan and filed for divorce. In 2022, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and consented divorce judgment in Michigan, in which they resolved all issues—including spousal support—and released any claims against each other.The Canadian spouse later filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that his former spouse had failed to provide the financial support required by the Affidavit of Support. The former spouse moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that the divorce judgment precluded the claim. The district court rejected the jurisdictional argument but agreed that claim preclusion under Michigan law barred the lawsuit, and dismissed the action.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that federal courts must give state court judgments the same preclusive effect they would have under state law, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Act. The court ruled that Michigan claim preclusion law applied, and that the prior divorce judgment barred the new lawsuit because the claim could have been raised in the divorce proceedings. The court also rejected arguments that federal law or preemption required a different result. View "Ramgoolam v. Gupta" on Justia Law

A Mauritanian national entered the United States without authorization and was subsequently detained by immigration officials. During removal proceedings, he conceded his removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming that he would face persecution based on his ethnicity and political activism if returned to Mauritania. He alleged that police had arrested, jailed, and tortured him multiple times and that his friends had been beaten to death. His written application did not mention family members being persecuted, but at his hearing, he testified that his brothers were also arrested and beaten with him. Additionally, he provided inconsistent accounts of how he obtained his passport to leave Mauritania. He did not provide corroborating evidence, such as testimony from his brother living in New York or medical records from his alleged hospitalizations.An Immigration Judge denied his applications, finding his testimony not credible due to inconsistencies between his written and oral statements, implausibilities in his account of repeated arrests, and lack of corroboration. The judge also found that members of the Fulani ethnic group do not face a pattern of persecution in Mauritania. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, agreeing that there were specific and cogent reasons for the adverse credibility finding and that the evidence showed only widespread discrimination rather than persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Board’s final order and, applying a substantial evidence standard to factual findings and reviewing legal questions de novo, found that substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility determination and the conclusion that there is no pattern or practice of persecuting black Fulanis in Mauritania. The court held that the petitioner was ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, and denied the petition for review. View "Sy v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The defendant, a native and citizen of Jamaica, repeatedly entered the United States unlawfully after being removed several times due to criminal convictions, including firearms and drug offenses. In May 2023, he was apprehended at the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit and charged with unauthorized reentry following his removal subsequent to conviction for an aggravated felony, violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326. This constituted his eleventh felony conviction and fifth felony immigration conviction under § 1326.After being indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that § 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee by discriminating against Mexican and other Latino immigrants. The district court rejected his motion, finding that he failed to link the legislative history and intent of the 1929 Act and its predecessors to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, which codified § 1326. The court also determined that he did not provide evidence of disparate impact or invidious discriminatory purpose regarding § 1326’s enforcement, and adopted the analysis from United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, 68 F.4th 1133 (9th Cir. 2023). The district court sentenced him to 51 months’ imprisonment and he timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s refusal to dismiss the indictment de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court held that the defendant failed to establish discriminatory intent or disparate impact under the Arlington Heights framework. The court emphasized that the legislative history of the 1929 Act is not controlling for § 1326, and Congress is not required to purge previous discriminatory intent when enacting new legislation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Myrie" on Justia Law

Milder Escobar-Temal, a Guatemalan national, unlawfully entered the United States in 2012, living and working in Nashville, Tennessee. In October 2022, Nashville police responding to a domestic incident found three firearms at his residence. He was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits possession of firearms by individuals unlawfully present in the United States. Escobar-Temal had no prior criminal convictions except a dismissed charge for driving without a license.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee denied Escobar-Temal’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he argued that § 922(g)(5)(A) violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied. The district court reasoned that, while the Second Amendment’s protections may extend to unlawfully present persons, historical tradition supported disarming those who had not sworn allegiance to the state. After denying the motion, Escobar-Temal pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the constitutional issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that the Second Amendment does protect individuals unlawfully present in the United States if they have developed sufficient connections to the national community. However, it further held that there is a longstanding historical tradition of disarming groups lacking a formal relationship with the government, such as unlawfully present noncitizens, due to regulatory difficulties rather than inherent dangerousness. Therefore, the court concluded that § 922(g)(5)(A) does not violate the Second Amendment, either on its face or as applied to Escobar-Temal, and affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Escobar-Temal" on Justia Law