Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Milder Escobar-Temal, a Guatemalan national, unlawfully entered the United States in 2012, living and working in Nashville, Tennessee. In October 2022, Nashville police responding to a domestic incident found three firearms at his residence. He was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits possession of firearms by individuals unlawfully present in the United States. Escobar-Temal had no prior criminal convictions except a dismissed charge for driving without a license.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee denied Escobar-Temal’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he argued that § 922(g)(5)(A) violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied. The district court reasoned that, while the Second Amendment’s protections may extend to unlawfully present persons, historical tradition supported disarming those who had not sworn allegiance to the state. After denying the motion, Escobar-Temal pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the constitutional issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that the Second Amendment does protect individuals unlawfully present in the United States if they have developed sufficient connections to the national community. However, it further held that there is a longstanding historical tradition of disarming groups lacking a formal relationship with the government, such as unlawfully present noncitizens, due to regulatory difficulties rather than inherent dangerousness. Therefore, the court concluded that § 922(g)(5)(A) does not violate the Second Amendment, either on its face or as applied to Escobar-Temal, and affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Escobar-Temal" on Justia Law

A woman from Guatemala entered the United States without inspection in 1994 and later applied for asylum, using the address of a man she believed to be an immigration attorney. She was served a Notice to Appear at that address for a removal hearing in 1997 but did not attend, resulting in her removal in absentia. Over a decade later, in 2010, she moved to reopen her removal proceedings, arguing she never received notice of the hearing. The immigration judge (IJ) requested more evidence, but she did not respond, and her motion was denied. She did not appeal that denial.In 2020, she filed a second motion to reopen, again claiming lack of notice. The IJ found this motion was barred because only one such motion is permitted and she did not qualify for any exception. She appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), raising arguments about notice and extraordinary circumstances but did not specifically challenge the IJ’s finding that her motion was numerically barred or argue for equitable tolling of the limit. The Board dismissed her appeal, deeming those issues waived, and declined to reopen her case sua sponte, citing her long delay and lack of due diligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed her petition. The court held that, because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by not contesting the number-bar ruling before the Board, review of that issue was denied. The court further held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s discretionary refusal to reopen proceedings sua sponte. Finally, the court rejected her due process claim, finding the Board’s explanation sufficient. Accordingly, the petition was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Herrera v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Honduras fled to the United States in 2016 after members of the MS gang targeted him and his brother, allegedly due to their refusal to join the gang. After suffering threats, extortion, and a kidnapping in Honduras, he relocated within the country but continued to receive threats. Fearing for his safety, he eventually left for the United States, where his family later joined him. He expressed fear that returning to Honduras would result in serious harm or death at the hands of the gang.Removal proceedings were initiated against him by the Department of Homeland Security, and an Immigration Judge (IJ) found him removable. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), but his asylum application was filed about fourteen months late. At his merits hearing, the IJ found his testimony credible but determined that he had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances justifying the late filing. The IJ denied his asylum application as untimely and also denied his applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection, finding that the harm he suffered was not severe enough to constitute persecution and that he failed to show a nexus between the harm and the proposed social groups. The IJ further noted he did not demonstrate the Honduran government was unable or unwilling to protect him.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, determining that he had not established extraordinary circumstances for the asylum application’s untimeliness, and that he had waived his CAT claim and the issue of government protection by failing to meaningfully challenge these findings before the Board.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary determination regarding extraordinary circumstances under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) and found that the petitioner had forfeited the necessary government protection element for withholding of removal. The court denied the petition in part and dismissed in part. View "Osabas-Rivera v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Three citizens of El Salvador entered the United States in 2014 and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings by the Department of Homeland Security. They conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge denied all three forms of relief.The petitioners appealed the immigration judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), indicating their intention to file a supporting brief. Their attorney filed a notice of appearance using a post office box as her address. The BIA granted an extension to file the brief, and on the new deadline, the petitioners submitted their brief, but it listed the attorney’s physical address instead of the post office box. The BIA rejected the brief due to the address discrepancy and instructed the petitioners to file with the correct address. The petitioners re-filed the brief with the post office box address, but the BIA rejected it as untimely and required a motion for late filing. The petitioners complied, but the BIA ultimately denied their motion, finding their rationale insufficient, and later summarily dismissed the appeal because no timely brief had been filed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s actions for abuse of discretion. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by rejecting the timely brief based on an address discrepancy that was not mandated by regulation or the BIA’s published procedures. The court further held that summarily dismissing the appeal for failure to file a brief, when a timely brief had in fact been submitted, was irrational and an unexplained departure from established policies. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition for review and reversed the BIA’s order. View "Pineda-Guerra v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Salvadoran woman and her two daughters entered the United States unlawfully after the woman, who owned a beauty salon in El Salvador, was allegedly threatened by men she believed to be gang members. She claimed that after paying them “rent” for two years, she stopped making payments and was threatened with violence. Fearing for her safety and that of her daughters, she sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States, arguing she would be targeted in El Salvador as a Salvadoran woman and as a business owner.An immigration judge denied her applications, finding her not credible and concluding she had not established membership in a legally cognizable particular social group (PSG), nor shown that she could not reasonably relocate within El Salvador to avoid harm. The immigration judge also determined she failed to meet the standards for withholding of removal and CAT protection. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, agreeing that her proposed PSGs—“Salvadoran women,” “single Salvadoran women who are working professionals,” and “salon owners in El Salvador”—were not cognizable and that she could reasonably relocate. The Board also upheld the denial of her CAT claim, finding no particularized threat or evidence of government acquiescence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that none of the proposed PSGs were sufficiently particular or socially distinct to qualify under the relevant statutes and precedent. The court further concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the petitioner could reasonably relocate within El Salvador and that she had not demonstrated a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence necessary for CAT relief. View "Cristales-de Linares v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan national, who entered the United States without inspection in 1994 and lived in Michigan, was detained in 2019 following a DUI conviction and placed into removal proceedings. He sought cancellation of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, citing his youngest daughter, a U.S. citizen, as his qualifying child. At the time of his removal hearing before the immigration judge (IJ) in April 2020, his daughter was seventeen years old.The IJ granted his application for cancellation of removal, finding him credible and of good moral character, and determining that his daughter would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he were removed. The Department of Homeland Security appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), but did not challenge whether his daughter qualified as a "child"—their appeal focused on whether the hardship standard was met. The BIA did not address the merits of the IJ’s findings. Instead, in February 2025, the BIA vacated the IJ’s decision and ordered removal, reasoning that the daughter was over twenty-one when the BIA ruled and therefore no longer a qualifying child under the statute.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered when a noncitizen’s child’s age should be assessed for cancellation of removal eligibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The court held that the relevant time to determine whether the individual has a qualifying child is when the IJ issues its decision, not when the BIA acts on appeal. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit granted the petition for review and reversed the BIA’s decision, reinstating the IJ’s grant of cancellation of removal. View "Filadelfo Perez-Perez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan national entered the United States without authorization after fleeing gang violence in his home country. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but an immigration judge denied these requests and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the removal order. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, which clarified the requirements for a valid “notice to appear,” the petitioner moved to reopen his removal proceedings to seek voluntary departure, a form of relief that would allow him to leave the United States without a formal removal order. To qualify, he needed to show, among other things, that he had the means to depart the country, typically by possessing a valid passport.The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his motion to reopen, finding that his affidavit—stating only that he was in the process of renewing his Guatemalan passport—was too conclusory and unsupported by documentary evidence. The Board concluded that he had not sufficiently demonstrated that he would be able to depart the United States if granted voluntary departure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Board’s denial. The court held that the Board applied the correct legal standard, requiring only a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief at the motion-to-reopen stage, not conclusive proof. The court found that the Board did not err in determining that the petitioner’s unsupported and conclusory statement about his passport application failed to meet even this threshold. The Sixth Circuit therefore denied the petition for review, upholding the Board’s decision. View "Pastor-Hernandez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A woman from Honduras entered the United States without inspection in 2005 and was served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) for removal proceedings, which included the time, date, and location of her initial hearing, as well as instructions to update her address. She failed to appear at her first scheduled hearing, which was dismissed because the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had not filed the NTA with the immigration court. After DHS filed the NTA and moved to recalendar, subsequent hearing notices sent to her listed address were returned as undeliverable. She did not appear at the rescheduled hearing in November 2009, and the immigration judge (IJ) ordered her removal in absentia.She later filed three motions to reopen her removal proceedings, arguing each time that she had not received notice of her hearing. The first motion was denied by the IJ, who found she had constructive notice and was at fault for not updating her address; the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Her second motion was denied by the BIA as repetitive. In her third motion, she cited new Supreme Court decisions (Pereira v. Sessions and Niz-Chavez v. Garland) and raised a new jurisdictional argument, but the BIA found the motion untimely and numerically barred, declined to exercise its sua sponte authority, and rejected her legal arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial under an abuse-of-discretion standard. The court held that even if multiple motions to reopen based on lack of notice were permitted, the petitioner’s arguments lacked merit because she received an NTA that satisfied statutory notice requirements and failed to fulfill her obligation to update her address. The court also held that the immigration court had jurisdiction and that it lacked authority to review the BIA’s discretionary decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte. The petition for review was denied. View "Vargas-Rodriguez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen entered the United States without authorization in 2005. In 2018, the Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings against him, initially serving him with a Notice to Appear (NTA) that did not specify the date and time of his hearing. He later received a subsequent notice with the specific date, time, and location of his hearing, which also warned of the consequences of failing to appear. Neither he nor his attorney appeared at the scheduled hearing, resulting in an in absentia removal order.He first moved to reopen the proceedings, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, but the Immigration Judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit all denied relief. While his appeal was still pending, he filed a second motion to reopen, arguing that the initial NTA was deficient and that, under recent Supreme Court precedent, he was entitled to rescission of the removal order and eligibility for cancellation of removal. He also requested that the BIA reopen his case on its own motion (sua sponte). The BIA denied all requested relief, finding that he had received proper notice under the law, was ineligible for cancellation of removal, and declining to exercise its sua sponte authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court held that the petitioner was not entitled to rescission of the in absentia removal order because, although the initial NTA was deficient, he received a subsequent notice that satisfied statutory requirements. The court also held that he forfeited his argument for cancellation of removal by failing to adequately develop it. Finally, the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his claim regarding the BIA’s refusal to reopen the case sua sponte. The petition was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Guzman-Torralva v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A woman who entered the United States illegally as a child was later granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status, which rendered her prior removal order unenforceable. She frequently visited a local Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) office to post bond for detainees and was well known to the staff. During one such visit, ICE agents detained her without a warrant or probable cause, despite being aware of her DACA status. She was held for eight days and transferred between multiple locations before being released. While detained, she sought habeas relief, but her petition was denied as moot after her release.She subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against the ICE agents, alleging violations of her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The district court initially dismissed her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that DACA status rendered the removal order non-executable and outside the jurisdiction-stripping provision. The Sixth Circuit also dismissed her First Amendment claim based on Supreme Court precedent. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, finding they constituted new Bivens contexts and that alternative remedies existed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims arose in new Bivens contexts—specifically, immigration enforcement by ICE agents outside the home and outside the federal employment context. The court further found that alternative remedies, such as administrative complaint procedures under the Immigration and Nationality Act and habeas corpus, precluded the extension of Bivens. Thus, no implied damages remedy was available. View "Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman" on Justia Law