Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Guatemalan national entered the United States illegally as a minor and was charged with removability. He twice failed to appear at scheduled immigration hearings, resulting in an in absentia removal order, which was later rescinded after he successfully moved to reopen his case. He conceded his removability and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, citing threats and assaults from the Mara 18 gang due to his refusal to join, harm to his sister allegedly in retaliation, and his Mayan ethnicity. He also claimed the Guatemalan authorities would not protect him due to discrimination against Mayans.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found his testimony credible but identified inconsistencies in his statements and supporting evidence. The IJ held that the four social groups he identified—various groupings of young men, indigenous men, those lacking police protection, and his family—were either too broad or not sufficiently particular to be recognized under Guatemalan society as required for asylum or withholding of removal. The IJ further found that he was targeted by the gang for recruitment, not because of group membership, and that his experiences did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ also denied his claim under the Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, finding that he had waived his CAT claim.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied his petition. The court held that he had forfeited arguments concerning the social groups he identified before the agency and failed to exhaust new social group arguments presented in his petition. Without establishing membership in a particular social group, his asylum and withholding of removal claims could not succeed. The court also found his remaining challenges either unexhausted or meritless. View "Gamas-Vicente v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A Canadian citizen married an American citizen in 2017. The couple lived in Canada until 2020, then moved to Hawaii, where the American spouse began working as a physician. The Canadian spouse entered the United States on a tourist visa and soon applied for lawful permanent residency. To support this application, the American spouse signed a federal Affidavit of Support, committing to maintain the non-citizen’s income above 125% of the federal poverty line. The Canadian spouse obtained permanent residency in 2021. Around that time, the marriage ended, and the American spouse moved to Michigan and filed for divorce. In 2022, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and consented divorce judgment in Michigan, in which they resolved all issues—including spousal support—and released any claims against each other.The Canadian spouse later filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that his former spouse had failed to provide the financial support required by the Affidavit of Support. The former spouse moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that the divorce judgment precluded the claim. The district court rejected the jurisdictional argument but agreed that claim preclusion under Michigan law barred the lawsuit, and dismissed the action.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that federal courts must give state court judgments the same preclusive effect they would have under state law, pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Act. The court ruled that Michigan claim preclusion law applied, and that the prior divorce judgment barred the new lawsuit because the claim could have been raised in the divorce proceedings. The court also rejected arguments that federal law or preemption required a different result. View "Ramgoolam v. Gupta" on Justia Law

A Mauritanian national entered the United States without authorization and was subsequently detained by immigration officials. During removal proceedings, he conceded his removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming that he would face persecution based on his ethnicity and political activism if returned to Mauritania. He alleged that police had arrested, jailed, and tortured him multiple times and that his friends had been beaten to death. His written application did not mention family members being persecuted, but at his hearing, he testified that his brothers were also arrested and beaten with him. Additionally, he provided inconsistent accounts of how he obtained his passport to leave Mauritania. He did not provide corroborating evidence, such as testimony from his brother living in New York or medical records from his alleged hospitalizations.An Immigration Judge denied his applications, finding his testimony not credible due to inconsistencies between his written and oral statements, implausibilities in his account of repeated arrests, and lack of corroboration. The judge also found that members of the Fulani ethnic group do not face a pattern of persecution in Mauritania. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, agreeing that there were specific and cogent reasons for the adverse credibility finding and that the evidence showed only widespread discrimination rather than persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the Board’s final order and, applying a substantial evidence standard to factual findings and reviewing legal questions de novo, found that substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility determination and the conclusion that there is no pattern or practice of persecuting black Fulanis in Mauritania. The court held that the petitioner was ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection, and denied the petition for review. View "Sy v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The defendant, a native and citizen of Jamaica, repeatedly entered the United States unlawfully after being removed several times due to criminal convictions, including firearms and drug offenses. In May 2023, he was apprehended at the Ambassador Bridge in Detroit and charged with unauthorized reentry following his removal subsequent to conviction for an aggravated felony, violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326. This constituted his eleventh felony conviction and fifth felony immigration conviction under § 1326.After being indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that § 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee by discriminating against Mexican and other Latino immigrants. The district court rejected his motion, finding that he failed to link the legislative history and intent of the 1929 Act and its predecessors to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, which codified § 1326. The court also determined that he did not provide evidence of disparate impact or invidious discriminatory purpose regarding § 1326’s enforcement, and adopted the analysis from United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, 68 F.4th 1133 (9th Cir. 2023). The district court sentenced him to 51 months’ imprisonment and he timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s refusal to dismiss the indictment de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The appellate court held that the defendant failed to establish discriminatory intent or disparate impact under the Arlington Heights framework. The court emphasized that the legislative history of the 1929 Act is not controlling for § 1326, and Congress is not required to purge previous discriminatory intent when enacting new legislation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Myrie" on Justia Law

Milder Escobar-Temal, a Guatemalan national, unlawfully entered the United States in 2012, living and working in Nashville, Tennessee. In October 2022, Nashville police responding to a domestic incident found three firearms at his residence. He was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits possession of firearms by individuals unlawfully present in the United States. Escobar-Temal had no prior criminal convictions except a dismissed charge for driving without a license.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee denied Escobar-Temal’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in which he argued that § 922(g)(5)(A) violated the Second Amendment both facially and as applied. The district court reasoned that, while the Second Amendment’s protections may extend to unlawfully present persons, historical tradition supported disarming those who had not sworn allegiance to the state. After denying the motion, Escobar-Temal pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the constitutional issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that the Second Amendment does protect individuals unlawfully present in the United States if they have developed sufficient connections to the national community. However, it further held that there is a longstanding historical tradition of disarming groups lacking a formal relationship with the government, such as unlawfully present noncitizens, due to regulatory difficulties rather than inherent dangerousness. Therefore, the court concluded that § 922(g)(5)(A) does not violate the Second Amendment, either on its face or as applied to Escobar-Temal, and affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Escobar-Temal" on Justia Law

A woman from Guatemala entered the United States without inspection in 1994 and later applied for asylum, using the address of a man she believed to be an immigration attorney. She was served a Notice to Appear at that address for a removal hearing in 1997 but did not attend, resulting in her removal in absentia. Over a decade later, in 2010, she moved to reopen her removal proceedings, arguing she never received notice of the hearing. The immigration judge (IJ) requested more evidence, but she did not respond, and her motion was denied. She did not appeal that denial.In 2020, she filed a second motion to reopen, again claiming lack of notice. The IJ found this motion was barred because only one such motion is permitted and she did not qualify for any exception. She appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board), raising arguments about notice and extraordinary circumstances but did not specifically challenge the IJ’s finding that her motion was numerically barred or argue for equitable tolling of the limit. The Board dismissed her appeal, deeming those issues waived, and declined to reopen her case sua sponte, citing her long delay and lack of due diligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed her petition. The court held that, because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by not contesting the number-bar ruling before the Board, review of that issue was denied. The court further held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Board’s discretionary refusal to reopen proceedings sua sponte. Finally, the court rejected her due process claim, finding the Board’s explanation sufficient. Accordingly, the petition was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Herrera v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Honduras fled to the United States in 2016 after members of the MS gang targeted him and his brother, allegedly due to their refusal to join the gang. After suffering threats, extortion, and a kidnapping in Honduras, he relocated within the country but continued to receive threats. Fearing for his safety, he eventually left for the United States, where his family later joined him. He expressed fear that returning to Honduras would result in serious harm or death at the hands of the gang.Removal proceedings were initiated against him by the Department of Homeland Security, and an Immigration Judge (IJ) found him removable. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), but his asylum application was filed about fourteen months late. At his merits hearing, the IJ found his testimony credible but determined that he had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances justifying the late filing. The IJ denied his asylum application as untimely and also denied his applications for withholding of removal and CAT protection, finding that the harm he suffered was not severe enough to constitute persecution and that he failed to show a nexus between the harm and the proposed social groups. The IJ further noted he did not demonstrate the Honduran government was unable or unwilling to protect him.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, determining that he had not established extraordinary circumstances for the asylum application’s untimeliness, and that he had waived his CAT claim and the issue of government protection by failing to meaningfully challenge these findings before the Board.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary determination regarding extraordinary circumstances under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) and found that the petitioner had forfeited the necessary government protection element for withholding of removal. The court denied the petition in part and dismissed in part. View "Osabas-Rivera v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Three citizens of El Salvador entered the United States in 2014 and were subsequently placed in removal proceedings by the Department of Homeland Security. They conceded removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge denied all three forms of relief.The petitioners appealed the immigration judge’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), indicating their intention to file a supporting brief. Their attorney filed a notice of appearance using a post office box as her address. The BIA granted an extension to file the brief, and on the new deadline, the petitioners submitted their brief, but it listed the attorney’s physical address instead of the post office box. The BIA rejected the brief due to the address discrepancy and instructed the petitioners to file with the correct address. The petitioners re-filed the brief with the post office box address, but the BIA rejected it as untimely and required a motion for late filing. The petitioners complied, but the BIA ultimately denied their motion, finding their rationale insufficient, and later summarily dismissed the appeal because no timely brief had been filed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s actions for abuse of discretion. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by rejecting the timely brief based on an address discrepancy that was not mandated by regulation or the BIA’s published procedures. The court further held that summarily dismissing the appeal for failure to file a brief, when a timely brief had in fact been submitted, was irrational and an unexplained departure from established policies. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition for review and reversed the BIA’s order. View "Pineda-Guerra v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Salvadoran woman and her two daughters entered the United States unlawfully after the woman, who owned a beauty salon in El Salvador, was allegedly threatened by men she believed to be gang members. She claimed that after paying them “rent” for two years, she stopped making payments and was threatened with violence. Fearing for her safety and that of her daughters, she sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States, arguing she would be targeted in El Salvador as a Salvadoran woman and as a business owner.An immigration judge denied her applications, finding her not credible and concluding she had not established membership in a legally cognizable particular social group (PSG), nor shown that she could not reasonably relocate within El Salvador to avoid harm. The immigration judge also determined she failed to meet the standards for withholding of removal and CAT protection. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, agreeing that her proposed PSGs—“Salvadoran women,” “single Salvadoran women who are working professionals,” and “salon owners in El Salvador”—were not cognizable and that she could reasonably relocate. The Board also upheld the denial of her CAT claim, finding no particularized threat or evidence of government acquiescence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that none of the proposed PSGs were sufficiently particular or socially distinct to qualify under the relevant statutes and precedent. The court further concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the petitioner could reasonably relocate within El Salvador and that she had not demonstrated a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence necessary for CAT relief. View "Cristales-de Linares v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan national, who entered the United States without inspection in 1994 and lived in Michigan, was detained in 2019 following a DUI conviction and placed into removal proceedings. He sought cancellation of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, citing his youngest daughter, a U.S. citizen, as his qualifying child. At the time of his removal hearing before the immigration judge (IJ) in April 2020, his daughter was seventeen years old.The IJ granted his application for cancellation of removal, finding him credible and of good moral character, and determining that his daughter would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he were removed. The Department of Homeland Security appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), but did not challenge whether his daughter qualified as a "child"—their appeal focused on whether the hardship standard was met. The BIA did not address the merits of the IJ’s findings. Instead, in February 2025, the BIA vacated the IJ’s decision and ordered removal, reasoning that the daughter was over twenty-one when the BIA ruled and therefore no longer a qualifying child under the statute.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered when a noncitizen’s child’s age should be assessed for cancellation of removal eligibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The court held that the relevant time to determine whether the individual has a qualifying child is when the IJ issues its decision, not when the BIA acts on appeal. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit granted the petition for review and reversed the BIA’s decision, reinstating the IJ’s grant of cancellation of removal. View "Filadelfo Perez-Perez v. Bondi" on Justia Law