Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gonzalez entered the U.S. with a temporary-visitor visa in 1999. Three months short of 10 years later, police arrested him in Mississippi for driving without a license. He was served with notice of removal proceedings. The notice to appear contained all of the requisite information, except the date and time of the initial hearing. Gonzalez entered the U.S. with a temporary-visitor visa in 1999. The immigration judge denied his request for “cancellation of removal,” a discretionary form of relief available to aliens who have been continuously physically present in the U.S. for at least 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). The Board of Immigration Appeals has held that the 10-year clock stops running upon service of the notice to appear, even if it fails to tell the immigrant when the hearing will occur. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal, stating that the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the relevant statutes is entitled to Chevron deference and that it makes no difference that the government later amended the charge to account for the reality that Gonzalez entered the country legally but stayed longer than his visa allowed. View "Gonzalez-Garcia v. Holder" on Justia Law

Suarez, a citizen of Cuba, was paroled into the U.S. in 1980, under 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5). In 1984, he was convicted of robbery, unlawful possession of a weapon, and receiving stolen property in New Jersey state court and received a combined sentence of 10 years. Citing the convictions and his lack of an immigrant visa or other valid entry document, the government initiated removal proceedings. After obtaining a second continuance, to apply for deferral of removal and to seek separate relief under the Cuban Adjustment Act, Suarez failed to file an application to defer his removal within the 60 days. The IJ denied a third continuance, noting that the removal proceedings already had been delayed for over a year. Suarez then filed an application to defer his removal, relying on the United Nations Convention Against Torture and alleged that he had filed an application to change his citizenship status under the Cuban Adjustment Act. The IJ again denied a continuance. After his sixth request to postpone the proceedings was denied, Suarez appealed. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, finding no denial of due process. View "Suarez-Diaz v. Holder" on Justia Law

Ruiz unsuccessfully applied for asylum in 1993 and was interviewed by an asylum officer in 2007. DHS initiated removal proceedings. Ruiz and his wife, who were in the country illegally, applied to cancel removal and, in 2011, appeared before an Immigration Judge. On direct examination Ruiz confessed that his asylum application contained an untrue statement and that he repeated the lie at his interview. He testified that a notary public had written his application because Ruiz could not then read or write English. Ruiz learned later that the notary had written that Ruiz had been threatened by guerillas in Guatemala. He had not. The government may only cancel removal if the applicant “has been a person of good moral character” during his time in the U.S. 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(B), which excludes a person who “has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter.” There is an exception under the doctrine of retraction. The IJ did not consider whether Ruiz had timely retracted his prior testimony, but found a “clear violation.” The BIA concluded that the exception did not apply because retraction was not timely. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded: timeliness is determined by whether the falsehood was retracted before it was or was about to be exposed. Ruiz chose, to his own detriment, to retract his statement at his first opportunity to testify after his interview and with no evidence that his lie would have been exposed. Ruiz should not be prejudiced by the BIA’s backlog. View "Ruiz-Del-Cid v. Holder" on Justia Law

Dr. Kutty ran Tennessee and Florida medical clinics under several corporate entities. Physicians employed by the clinics entered the U.S. on J-1 nonimmigrant visas, 8 U.S.C. 1182(j)(1) that allow physicians to remain in the U.S. for graduate and medical training, but require them to return to their home country for two years following the J-1 visa’s expiration upon completion of their studies. A government agency may request a J-1 waiver of the two-year requirement on the physicians’ behalf if the physician has a contract to practice medicine for at least three years in an area designated as having a shortage of health-care professionals. Each of the 17 physicians Kutty employed obtained a J-1 waiver. Kutty signed Labor Condition Applications, certifying that they would be paid the greater of the actual wage level the employer paid to other individuals with similar experience for the type of employment at issue or the prevailing wage level for the occupational classification in the area of employment. Applicable rates ranged from $52,291 to $115,357. When an administrator told Kutty that physicians were absent or arriving late, Kutty withheld salaries, which he released when they began seeing more patients. The doctors complained to the Department of Labor claiming. The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division found multiple violations. An Administrative Law Judge affirmed, found the clinics liable for back wages and the costs of obtaining J-1 waivers and H-1B visas, held Kutty personally liable, and assessed a civil penalty. The Administrative Review Board affirmed; the district court dismissed Kutty’s petition for review. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Kutty v. U.S. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Toviave immigrated to the U.S. in 2001, and, using false immigration documents, later brought four young relatives from Togo to live with him. He made the children cook, clean, and do laundry. He occasionally made the children babysit for his girlfriend and relatives. Toviave would beat the children if they misbehaved or failed to follow rules. Toviave provided for the children by working two jobs and did yard work. Toviave bought the children sports equipment and let them play soccer. The children exercised with him and went on family trips together. Toviave emphasized education; many of his punishments stemmed from problems related to schoolwork. He hired a tutor to teach the children English. He imposed mandatory study periods. The children always attended school. Teachers began to suspect abuse. Michigan authorities investigated. The children were removed from the house. The Department of Homeland Security obtained a warrant and discovered false immigration documents in Toviave’s home. Toviave pled guilty to visa and mail fraud charges, and the government dropped a human trafficking charge. Toviave was convicted of four counts of forced labor, 18 U.S.C. 1589. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that Toviave’s treatment of the children was “reprehensible,” but was not forced labor.View "United States v. Toviave" on Justia Law

More than 10 years after Jama was admitted to the U.S. as a refugee based on his sworn statement that he was the minor child of a principal refugee, USCIS learned that Jama was not a minor or the biological child of the principal refugee. After notice and an opportunity to respond, USCIS terminated Jama’s refugee status on the basis of fraud. USCIS denied Jama’s pending applications for status adjustment and fraud waiver, denied a motion to reopen, and initiated removal proceedings. The agency did not rule on Jama’s application for asylum and for withholding of removal which had been submitted before the termination decision. In August 2011, USCUS sent a notice to appear on the removability charges and referred Jama’s application for asylum to the IJ presiding over the removal proceedings. In June 2012, the IJ held a hearing and concluded that Jama was removable based on the charge that he did not possess a valid immigrant visa or entry document and that Jama was not eligible for an entry document as a derivative beneficiary at the time of his entry. The IJ dismissed Jama’s argument that his refugee status was improperly terminated, The IJ did not rule on Jama’s asylum claims, which remain pending. The district court dismissed his complaint seeking review, under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Jama failed to state a claim.View "Jama v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Stanovsek, a citizen of Australia, was admitted on a nonimmigrant visitor visa in 1990 and later adjusted status to lawful permanent resident by virtue of his marriage to a U.S. citizen. In 2009, Stanovsek was convicted for the offense of aggravated theft and was sentenced to three years of imprisonment. Stanovsek’s crime constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). DHS charged Stanovsek with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as a noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony after his admission. Stanovsek conceded the charge of removability, but requested an adjustment of status and waiver from removal based on “extreme hardship” on the alien’s citizen spouse, parent, or child, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h). The IJ held that Stanovsek was ineligible for a 212(h) waiver and the BIA affirmed, based on language that: No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if . . . since the date of such admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Sixth Circuit remanded, distinguishing between an alien admitted as an immigrant and an alien admitted as a nonimmigrant who later adjusts to immigrant status. View "Stanovsek v. Holder" on Justia Law

Rais, born in Pakistan in 1975, entered the U.S. in 2002 to attend school, married a citizen, and applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residency. He was convicted of domestic violence against his wife, in 2002, and was granted advance parole, allowing him to leave the U.S. without abandoning his application for adjustment of status. He was paroled back into this country in 2003. In 2004, his application for adjustment of status was denied. Rais married another U.S. citizen in 2005, and again applied for adjustment of status. That application was denied in 2009 because of the domestic violence conviction. An IJ ordered his removal, determining that she lacked jurisdiction to grant adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255. The BIA affirmed. Rais twice moved to reopen removal proceedings, requesting that proceedings be suspended while the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services adjudicates his application for adjustment of status. The BIA denied the first motion on the merits and refused to exercise its sua sponte authority to grant the second, which was untimely and number-barred. Rais sought review of the second denial. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to refrain from exercising its authority. View "Rais v. Holder" on Justia Law

Harmon was born in Liberia in 1984, shortly before the start of the Civil War. She was separated from her parents at four-years-old and recently learned that her parents were killed in that conflict. Harmon was repeatedly sexually molested and raped. In 1992, Harmon’s aunt, Barroar, took Harmon to the Liberian embassy in Gambia, where Barroar worked. Harmon was 10 years old when her aunt brought her to the U.S. on a visitor’s visa to live with Harmon’s brother Herbert. She now has no family or connections in Liberia. Harmon turned 18 in 2002. Months later, Herbert assisted her in obtaining Temporary Protected Status (TPS). When Harmon turned 19, she left Herbert’s home, and was unsuccessful without his assistance. She missed the TPS deadline while trying to collect money for the application fee, had her next application denied, and sent her appeal to the wrong address. In 2007, Harmon tried to enter Canada, thinking that she could get refugee protection, but was stopped by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. She received notice that she was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B) and sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied relief on the merits, approved the denial of TPS, and ordered removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Harmon’s appeal and her subsequent motion to reopen. While appeal was pending, Harmon entered Canada and applied for the equivalent of lawful permanent resident status. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Harmon v. Holder" on Justia Law

Sheya and Mtandazo Mandebvu are school teachers who spoke out criticizing Robert Mugabe’s violent and corrupt Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party and government. Sheva came to the U.S. in 1999 and earned two masters’ degrees by 2006, never returning to Zimbabwe. Mtandazo came to the U.S. with their two children in 2000 after being forced into hiding for her political activities in Zimbabwe. Other family members have also been beaten, detained, or threatened. As they grew more concerned with deteriorating conditions in Zimbabwe, Sheya and Mtandazo became politically active with ZANU-PF’s opposition in the U.S. They attempted to file for asylum in 2005 but, through no fault of their own, the applications were never filed. They were served with notices that they were subject to removal in 2007 and filed applications for asylum and withholding of removal in 2008. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed an Immigration Judge’s denial of the Mandebvus’ applications The Sixth Circuit remanded, finding that the decision that the asylum applications were untimely was infected by legal error and that the evidence showed that it is likely that the Mandebvus will be persecuted for their political opinion or tortured if returned to Zimbabwe.View "Mandebvu v. Holder" on Justia Law