Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stoudemire, then age 23, entered the Michigan Department of Corrections system in 2002, suffering from systemic lupus erythematosus, a chronic, painful autoimmune disease; hypercoagulapathy, a related disorder involving tendency to develop blood clots; and depression. Stoudemire bore a significant risk of experiencing kidney and liver damage, heart attacks, amputations, and chronic pain. Stoudemire’s health quickly deteriorated. She experienced a heart attack, liver failure, and life-threatening embolisms. She underwent three amputations, losing both legs below the knee. At her 2007 parole, she suffered from chronic depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and conditions related to medications. In her suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132; and Michigan law, Stoudemire, alleged that she was placed in a segregation unit following her amputation that lacked accommodations for disabled persons, and was subjected to a strip search that served no legitimate purpose. The district court denied motions by the warden and an officer, seeking summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit vacated with respect to the warden, stating that the court did not adequately analyze deliberate indifference, but affirmed with respect to the officer, stating that the excessively invasive nature of the search outweighed any need to conduct it. View "Stoudemire v. MI Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Dorothy resided at the Landing assisted living facility from 2001 until 2007. She was 80 years old in 2007. She had Parkinson’s disease, dementia, and had suffered a stroke in 2001. She had no history of diabetes or hypoglycemia. She was able to groom herself, use the restroom, walk with a walker, and feed herself. An employee discovered Dorothy in an unresponsive state in her room. She spent 15 months in a semicomatose state before dying. Her son sued for negligence, violation of Ohio’s Patients’ Bill of Rights (OH Rev Code 3721.17), and wrongful death. He alleged that employees mistakenly gave Dorothy antidiabetic medication, which caused hypoglycemia and resulted in permanent brain dysfunction. Because he could not prove exactly how Dorothy received the medication, he requested a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur, which the district court gave. The jury awarded $680,000 in compensatory damages and $1,250,000 in punitive damages, plus attorney fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to jury instructions on res ipsa and punitive damages and rejected a claim of judicial bias, but remanded with instructions to reduce the punitive damages award to $800,000. View "Freudeman v. Landing of Canton" on Justia Law

Watts began working for UPS in 1990; in 2000 she injured her back while unloading her truck. She was diagnosed with acute back strain and placed on medical leave. Watts was awarded Temporary Total Disability (TTD) payments, including medical treatment, and did not return to work for two years. In 2002 a doctor reported that Watts had reached “maximum medical improvement,” as defined by the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and was ready for gradual return to normal work in a restricted time frame. UPS terminated Watts’s TTD payments. UPS had a light-duty work program, Temporary Alternative Work. Typical tasks included answering phones, pumping gas, and washing cars. Watts was rejected from the program. UPS claims that Watts was not qualified for the program under the collective bargaining agreement. Watts’s claims have gone to trial three times and been appealed once before. Most recently the district court granted UPS judgment as a matter of law on grounds that Watts’s claim was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, and was untimely under the six-month limitations period. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that section 301 does not preempt an Americans with Disabilities Act claim in federal court. View "Teresa Watts v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are five pension funds operated by the State of Ohio for public employees that invested hundreds of millions of dollars in 308 mortgage-backed securities (MBS) between 2005 and 2008, all of which received a “AAA” or equivalent credit rating from one of the three major credit-rating agencies. The value of MBS collapsed during this period, leaving the Funds with estimated losses of $457 million. The Funds sued under Ohio’s “blue sky” laws and a common-law theory of negligent misrepresentation, alleging that the Agencies’ ratings were false and misleading and that the Funds’ reasonable reliance on those ratings caused their losses. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Even if a credit rating can serve as an actionable misrepresentation, the Agencies owed no duty to the Funds and the Funds’ allegations of bad business practices did not establish a reasonable inference of wrongdoing View "OH Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

Hensley worked in various capacities as a coal miner at various times between 1972 and 1988. He also smoked half a pack of cigarettes every day for at least 10 years. From 1990 to 2010, Hensley sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901. In 2010, after two rejections, an ALJ concluded that Hensley suffered from a disabling form of pneumoconiosis caused by his jobs in the coal mines and awarded him benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the ALJ failed to account for relevant record material, relying solely on x-ray evidence, while other evidence cut the other way, permitting a finding that Hensley does not suffer from pneumoconiosis. The biopsy of Hensley’s lungs came back negative, CT scans may have been inconclusive, and several physicians testified against an award of benefits. View "Dixie Fuel Co., LLC v. Dir. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

Kohl, a certified bomb technician, participated in an experiment funded by the U.S. Department of Defense at the Tennessee State Fire Academy, which involved constructing and detonating explosives in vehicles and collecting post-blast debris for analysis. Officers of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives participated. Following detonation, after an “all-clear” was given, participants, including Kohl, entered the range to inspect the vehicles. Kohl searched the passenger’s side, while another technician attempted to search the driver’s side of the vehicle. The driver’s side door would not open. While other team members were preparing to winch the door a second time, Kohl returned to the passenger’s side door. Kohl’s negligence complaint alleged that due to the winching, the door came loose and the frame crashed into Kohl’s head. Kohl was diagnosed with “post-concussive syndrome with persistent headaches and cognitive changes” and has not been employed since the incident. Relying on the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671, the district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the government’s decisions about how to extract evidence and what types of equipment to use are shielded from liability by the exception. View "Kohl v. United States" on Justia Law

Two former employees of Coca-Cola claim that they were injured while performing their jobs. They reported their injuries to Coca-Cola’s third-party administrator for worker’s compensation claims, Sedgwick, which denied benefits. Plaintiffs claim that the medical evidence strongly supported their injuries, but that Sedgwick engaged in a fraudulent scheme involving the mail: using Dr. Drouillard as a “cut-off” doctor. They sued alleging that the actions of Sedgwick, Coca-Cola, and Dr. Drouillard violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B), 1962(c), and 1964(c). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that since the dismissal, several of the issues were resolved by its 2012 opinion in another case. The district court misapplied the elements of a RICO cause of action to the plaintiffs’ allegations. The court declined to abstain from exercising jurisdiction pending the outcome of state workers comp proceedings. The alleged acts have the same purpose: to reduce Coca-Cola’s payment obligations towards worker’s compensation benefits by fraudulently denying worker’s compensation benefits to which the employees are lawfully entitled. The allegations suggest that the defendants’ scheme would continue on well past the denial of any individual plaintiff’s benefits View "Jackson v. Segwick Claims Mgmt Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Al-Mansoob filed a lawsuit concerning a traffic accident in July 2009. When he instituted Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings two months later, he did not list his claims against Malloy and Wilburn Archer Trucking, Inc. (Defendants), among his assets, but did list a suit against State Farm, arising out of the same accident. Upon learning of the omission, Defendants sought summary judgment, arguing that Al-Mansoob was judicially estopped from pursuing the claims. Relying on a Sixth Circuit case decided a few days before Al-Mansoob filed his response, the district court granted the motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that judicial estoppel should not apply to the trustee, who had been substituted as real party in interest, and that Al-Mansoob’s failure to disclose the case was inadvertent in any event. View "Al-Mansoob v. Malloy" on Justia Law

Cleveland sued financial institutions, alleging that by securitizing subprime mortgages and foreclosing on houses, defendants allegedly contributed to declines in property values, shrinking tax base, and increased criminal activity, causing a public nuisance. The district court dismissed, finding preemption by state law and failure to demonstrate that defendants unreasonably interfered with a public right or were the proximate cause of alleged harm. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Cleveland filed another suit in state court against non-diverse institutions, alleging public-nuisance, violation of the Ohio Corrupt Activities Act, (RICO analogue), by inaccurately claiming title to mortgages and notes in foreclosures in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2923.32. Cleveland also sought to recover (Ohio Revised Code 715.261) costs incurred maintaining or demolishing foreclosed houses. While the case was pending, banks sought a declaratory judgment that Cleveland’s public-nuisance claim was preempted by the National Bank Act and an injunction against the suits. The district court suggested that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed. Subsequently, the state court dismissed Cleveland’s public-nuisance and OCAA claims; appeal is pending. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the first case, so that declaratory relief is now moot. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to the second suit; the district court had jurisdiction.View "Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Otteren was driving behind his travel companion, Daggett, when Daggett made an illegal U-turn. As Otteren repeated Daggett’s U-turn, his vehicle cut off a motorcycle being driven by Rupert, resulting in his death. Rupert’s widow sued Daggett under the theory that the accident was a reasonably foreseeable result of Daggett’s own negligence because she knew Otteren was following her. The district court granted summary judgment to Daggett upon holding, under Michigan law, that Otteren’s operation of his own vehicle constituted a superseding, intervening cause that cut off any liability on Daggett’s part. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiff raised genuine issues of material fact as to each element of the prima facie negligence case. View "Rupert v. Daggett" on Justia Law