Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, allegedly injured while working for Cassens, sought worker's compensation benefits under Michigan’ law. Cassens’s third-party administrator, denied each plaintiff benefits. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the denials were fraudulent and violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B), 1962(c), and 1964(c). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Supremacy Clause prevents the Michigan legislature from preempting a RICO remedy by declaring its worker"s compensation scheme to be exclusive of federal remedies. An expected entitlement to benefits under the state statute qualifies as property, as does the claim for such benefits, and the injury to such property creates, under certain circumstances, a RICO violation.

While working for plaintiff, Hashman was standing in the open compartment, driving a forklift manufactured by Raymond when she either fell or stepped from the open side of the compartment. Her foot was trapped. She suffered severe injuries resulting in partial amputation. After settling Hashman's workers' compensation claim, plaintiff sought subrogation from Raymond, claiming that a design defect, failure to include a rear guard door on the forklift, caused the injuries. The district court granted summary judgment for Raymond, finding that plaintiff could not sustain a design defect claim without expert testimony and that the methods of its proposed expert were not sufficiently reliable to support the proffered opinions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There were at least four problems with the expert's methodology: anecdotal evidence, improper extrapolation, failure to consider other possible causes, and lack of testing. Although plaintiff could argue a "consumer expectations" theory without expert testimony, there was insufficient evidence to support the claim.

In 2006, U.S. Marshals worked with officers in 24 states on a fugitive round-up that led to arrests of 10,733 people, including plaintiff, who was wrongfully arrested because of clerical mistakes. All charges were eventually dropped, but news reporters had filmed her arrest and aired the story, including plaintiff's name and a statement that she was wanted for identity theft, after the dismissal. One station also placed the video on its website, along with a written story. Plaintiff's attorney faxed a cease and desist letter to the station, which removed the story, although it remained accessible by keyword search for several days. Most of plaintiffs' claims against the federal and city governments, the U.S. Marshals Service, the broadcast company and employees, and various named and unnamed Marshals, were resolved. The district court rejected defamation and false light claim against the broadcast company, based on the fair report privilege requirement of proof of actual malice, and a Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), claim against the U.S. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the discretionary function exception. Investigating and apprehending plaintiff was discretionary and not within the safe harbor for intentional torts.

Plaintiff fell and broke bones while walking in defendant’s campground. She sought damages for medical expenses and lost earning capacity. Before her injury, she worked part-time in childcare, earning $9,000 to $10,000 annually; she claims that her injuries forced her to switch jobs and work as a full-time manicurist. She presented testimony of an accountant, that, but for her injury, plaintiff could have earned approximately $17,600 a year as a full-time childcare worker; her annual earning capacity as a full-time manicurist was approximately the same. Factoring in her disability and increased likelihood of missed work, he concluded that lost earning capacity totaled $232,346. The jury awarded $200,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court excluded the accountant’s expert testimony as unduly speculative. Although plaintiff testified that her injuries prevented her from performing procedures that would have earned additional money, the court instructed the jury that it could not award damages for lost earning capacity. The jury awarded $10,000. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to liability, but vacated on damages. The expert testimony was not unreasonably speculative; the court “appears to have misunderstood the concept of lost earning capacity.”

Plaintiffs sought insurance coverage for settlement and defense costs related to thousands of asbestos-exposure products-liability lawsuits that began in 1981. Many of the underlying asbestos claims arose from exposure to products manufactured by Reardon, a corporation that sold its assets and liabilities to plaintiff and became a division of plaintiff's business in 1966. The policies did not expressly identify Reardon or its later incarnation as "Named Insureds," but provided coverage for asbestos claims related to the Reardon products, and each has paid pursuant to the policies' aggregate limits for "Products Hazard" claims. The insurance companies, collectively, have paid more than $100 millions plaintiffs sought more than $125 million in additional coverage, arguing that the Products Hazard caps did not apply to the Reardon claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurance companies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the policy language supported application of the cap,

Hit by a vehicle in 2004, plaintiff had medical bills of $82,036 that were paid in full by Medicare. The owner of the vehicle settled with plaintiff for $125,000. Medicare sought reimbursement of $62,338 under 42 U.S.C. 13955y(b)(2)(B)(i)., which plaintiff paid under protest. An ALJ rejected plaintiff's argument that an unknown motorist was responsible for 90 percent of the damage so that only 10 percent of the settlement was for medical expenses and the rest was for pain and suffering. The Medicare Appeals Council, district court, and Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that plaintiff presented no evidence of hardship.

Plaintiff, a pipefitter, worked with asbestos-containing gaskets made by defendant from 1962 until 1970. From 1962 until 1975, he also sustained significant exposure to asbestos insulation. He died in 2008, of mesothelioma, a cancer of the lining of the lung. Before his death, plaintiff sued under theories including strict liability and negligence. Defendant does not dispute that asbestos-containing products likely caused the mesothelioma, but argues that the mesothelioma was caused by exposure to asbestos insulation, and that its own gaskets were not a substantial factor. A jury awarded plaintiff $516,094. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Given that plaintiff failed to quantify the exposure to asbestos from defendant's gaskets and concedes that plaintiff sustained massive exposure to asbestos from non-defendant sources, there was insufficient evidence to infer that defendant's gaskets probably, as opposed to possibly, were a substantial cause of plaintiff's mesothelioma.

Plaintiff suffered a back injury in a work-related vehicle accident in 1994, developed depression, then sought social security disability benefits. The Commissioner of Social Security adjudged him not to be disabled for purposes benefits. The district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The ALJ did not apply the "treating physicians" or "good reasons" rules in rejecting the treating doctor's opinion. That opinion was not patently wrong, so the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

Following a 2007 train derailment and three-day fire that allegedly exposed a small Ohio town to cancer-causing agents, plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of a putative class. Plaintiffs' expert testified that the normal background level of dioxin is four parts per trillion and that the range within area homes was from 11.7 to 274 ppt. A doctor testified about increased risk of cancer. The district court granted summary judgment for the train company, finding that plaintiffs had not established general or specific causation and, as a matter of law, any increased risk of cancer or other diseases was too insignificant to warrant the court's ordering a lengthy period of medical monitoring. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the absence of conclusive medical evidence that plaintiffs faced even a one-in-a-million increased risk of cancer.

Plaintiff was in a work-related vehicle accident that injured his back in 1994. He worked on and off until 2000 when back pain prevented him from continuing as a truck driver. A 2001 claim for social security disability benefits was denied. Plaintiff had some relief following surgery in 2001 and was released to work in 2002. When the pain increased he began mental health treatment. In 2004 an ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. In 2007, following remand, an ALJ again denied benefits. The appeals council denied jurisdiction. The district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to properly apply the treating physician rule and the good reasons rule in disregarding the conclusion of a treating psychiatrist and testimony of a treating counselor. Agency procedural rules require that the ALJ balance factors to determine what weight to give a treating source and to give good reasons for the weight actually assigned.