Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

From 1977-2009, Kennard worked as a blaster on strip mines, sometimes directly for a coal company and sometimes for contractors. In 2009, Kennard filed for black lung benefits, 30 U.S.C. 901. Kennard has a significant history of smoking, which gave him cancer in his right lung. The lung was removed. He experiences shortness of breath, coughing, and sleep apnea. His treating physician diagnosed Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disorder (COPD). His breathing is extremely limited. After the claims examiner initially recommended that his claim, an ALJ concluded that Kennard was entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he had pneumoconiosis and that the disease caused his total disability because he had worked in conditions that were substantially similar to those in an underground mine. The ALJ held that the employer had successfully rebutted the presumption that Kennard had clinical pneumoconiosis, but had failed to rebut the presumption of legal pneumoconiosis or the presumption that Kennardʼs disability was caused by his employment in a coal mine. The employer appealed, arguing that the 15-year presumption should not apply, and, if it did apply, the company had successfully rebutted it. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the award supported by substantial evidence. View "Brandywine Explosives & Supply v. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

KIF is a Tennessee coal-fired plant generating electricity. In 2008, a KIF coal-ash containment dike failed, spilling 5.4 million cubic yards of coal-ash sludge over 300 acres of adjacent land. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) responded, pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. EPA delegated authority to TVA, 42 U.S.C. 9604(a)-(b). TVA engaged Jacobs as the prime contractor for planning and oversight of remediation. Jacobs provided a Site Wide Safety and Health Plan that applies to all construction at the site, and to CERCLA remediation activities in accordance with EPA’s Standard Operating Safety Guide. The Plaintiffs worked on the KIF remediation and, in 2013, sued, alleging that Jacobs improperly monitored fly ash; inadequately trained workers about hazards of inhaling toxic fly ash; inadequately monitored their medical conditions; denied requests for respirators and dust masks; exposed them to high concentrations of flyash toxic constituents; and fraudulently concealed that exposure. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that Jacobs was entitled to government-contractor immunity as a corollary of the discretionary-function exception to the Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that such immunity is not jurisdictional and that the court should have considered a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. View "Adkisson v. Jacobs Eng'g Grp, Inc" on Justia Law

Approximately 10 years after Marc Silverman, D.D.S. performed a root canal on one of Newberry’s teeth, Newberry returned to Silverman because the tooth was hurting. Silverman examined the tooth, offered a tentative diagnosis unrelated to the root canal, and sent Newberry on his way. Several years later, Newberry and Silverman repeated this exercise, with the same outcome. Finally, in 2012, Newberry sought a second opinion and found out that his original root canal had not been properly completed. When Newberry requested his records, Silverman claimed that the old records were no longer available. Newberry sued. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings with respect to Newberry’s fraud claim, but affirmed on all other grounds. Newberry’s claims of dental malpractice, negligence, and infliction of emotional distress were time-barred. The spoiliation claim failed because Newberry’s complaint against Silverman was not disrupted by the allegedly destroyed dental records. View "Newberry v. Silverman" on Justia Law

GE manufactures Omniscan, an FDA-approved gadolinium-based contrast agent that has been associated in some patients with development of nephrogenic systemic fibrosis (NSF), a rare and deadly condition that leads to the hardening (fibrosis) of the kidneys. Omniscan was administered to Wahl for two MRIs she received in Nashville in 2006. About one year later, she displayed the first symptoms of NSF. She was officially diagnosed with NSF in 2010. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all pre-trial litigation of Omniscan-related cases in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. In 2011, Wahl filed a complaint in that court. With the agreement of Wahl and GE, the MDL judge transferred the case, in 2013, to the Middle District of Tennessee, the “proper venue.” GE then moved for summary judgment, arguing that all Omniscan doses produced from 2004 to 2006 were marked with expiration dates two years after manufacture, so the Omniscan administered to Wahl must have expired no later than 2008; the Tennessee Products Liability Act’s statute of repose requires suits to be instituted within one year of the expiration date appearing on a product’s packaging. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, favoring GE, applying Tennessee choice-of-law rules. View "Wahl v. Gen. Elec. Co." on Justia Law

On Christmas night 2011, Coil and Starcher were walking home in Brilliant, Ohio. They stopped to rest along the road. Officer Kamerer approached in his cruiser and asked if anything was wrong. According to Starcher, the two stated that nothing was wrong. Kamerer asked for their names, but Coil got up and walked away. That caused Kamerer to “go[] off on [them] like a crazy person.” The parties disagree about the details, but ultimately both Coil and Kamerer were struck by a car. The crash caused Coil severe traumatic brain injury, requiring around-the-clock care. Kamerer broke his shoulder and leg and spent 30 days in a hospital. Coil’s legal guardian filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The district court denied Kamerer’s motion for qualified immunity, stating that a reasonable jury could find that Kamerer seized Coil without reasonable suspicion and was deliberately indifferent to Coil’s safety, based on Starcher’s account and the length of time Kamerer left Coil handcuffed, face-down in the road. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although Kamerer exposed himself to danger when he raced into the road to try to save Coil from the approaching car, it is possible that he behaved recklessly, rather than negligently, in handcuffing Coil in the street. That is a jury question. View "Family Serv. Ass'n v. Wells Twp" on Justia Law

Johnson, a long-time city employee (garbage collectors) was denied utility services by Memphis Light, Gas & Water, a division of the city, in February 2010 because he did not possess a state-issued photo identification card. Johnson, born in rural Mississippi, lacked a birth certificate, was illiterate and had intellectual disabilities that made it difficult for him to navigate the process of obtaining the necessary state identification. He lived without utilities for more than 18 months and died of heat stroke in August 2011. His wife and sister sued MLGW under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), Tenn. Code 29-20-205.; and Tennessee’s wrongful death statute, Tenn. Code 20-5-106. The court granted summary judgment for MLGW on the grounds that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statutes of limitations. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding sufficient evidence that Johnson was of unsound mind to apply the state's earlier tolling statute. View "Johnson v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div." on Justia Law

In 1992, Fugate, receiving workers’ compensation, obtained disability benefits from the Social Security Administration. In such cases, SSA reduces payments until the total benefits equal 80 percent of the recipient's “average current earnings.” Using Fugate’s December 1991 pay stub, SSA calculated “one-twelfth of the total of his wages . . . for the calendar year in which he had the highest such wages,” on which FICA taxes are paid. Fugate had 1991 gross earnings of $22,964.41. After subtracting pretax benefits and retirement contributions (not subject to FICA), SSA calculated his covered earnings as $21,693.30. Fugate complained that SSA should have used pay stubs from his three highest months of earnings in 1991. In 2004, after a periodic review, SSA erroneously determined that Fugate’s covered earnings should have been $22,964.41 and paid Fugate an extra $8,875. In 2006, after another periodic review, SSA realized its mistake and asked Fugate to refund the $8,875. Instead of requesting a refund waiver, Fugate sought reconsideration of calculation of benefits for the same reasons he had cited since 1993. An ALJ declined to reconsider the 2004 decision, but erroneously held that Fugate was entitled to a waiver even though he had not requested one. Fugate nonetheless appealed. The Appeals Council vacated. The district court granted the Administration summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Fugate v. Comm'r of Social Sec." on Justia Law

Yoder hosts auctions for used construction equipment. Its largest annual auction is in Florida. Efacts, owned by Garafola, provides auctioneers with online bidding platforms. In 2003, Yoder began accepting live Internet bids during the Florida auction. Efacts provided services. Efacts received and maintained confidential customer information relating to Yoder’s auctions. In 2008 the companies had a falling out. Yoder terminated the contract and hired RTB, another online bidding services company. On February 7-9, 2010, Efacts accessed the RTB bidding platform without authorization, using an RTB administrative username and password. Garafola was aware of the username and password combination from Efacts’ prior relationship with Yoder and submitted winning bids with a combined price of $41,000 for which it did not pay. On February 10- 11, an Efacts employee gained unauthorized access to the RTB platform, posing as a Yoder customer, and placed 18 winning bids with a combined price of $1,212,074 which were not paid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Yoder, rejecting claims based on denial of spoliation sanctions; denial of hearsay objections to documents produced by internet service providers; denial of summary judgment on Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim; and imposition of sanctions under FRCP 37. View "Yoder & Frey Auctioneers, Inc v. EquipmentFacts, LLC" on Justia Law

Elvira was driving a car, owned by Mullalli, when she hit ice and collided with a negligently parked vehicle. Elvira, who suffered a traumatic brain injury, acute cervical and lumbar sprains, bulging discs, and other injuries, sued in federal court to recover under Mullalli’s no-fault State Farm automobile insurance policy,. Elvira and Mullalli are citizens of Michigan; State Farm is an Illinois citizen. The district court dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction, reasoning that the suit was a “direct action” under 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1), requiring Mullalli’s Michigan citizenship to be imputed to State Farm. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because the direct action proviso does not apply to suits brought against the insurer by insured persons identifiable before the accident occurs, this suit was not a direct action and Mullalli’s citizenship should not have been imputed to State Farm. The court distinguished between the personal protection provisions of Michigan’s no-fault law that require coverage of an identifiable group of individuals: the named insured, a spouse, any relatives living with them, and any occupant of a car they own and the property protection provision of the statute, which states simply that “an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental damage.” View "Ljuljdjuraj v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Water flows through Old Hickory Dam on the Cumberland River toward Nashville. The Dam’s reservoir is divided into three pools. If water exceeds the capacity of the surcharge pool, the Army Corps of Engineers must accelerate discharges through the dam to prevent it from being destroyed. The surcharge pool is kept empty except during floods. An unprecedented storm swept through the Cumberland River Basin on May 1–2, 2010. Water was kept at its usual depth even though the Corps was aware of the forecast; discharges through the dam were not increased until a flood emergency was declared. Releases were less than the natural flows from the rainfall and the stormwater draining into the reservoir. While the Corps’ manager was absent, water levels in the reservoir rose in the surcharge pool. When the water level had risen to the top of the surcharge pool, the Corps was forced to release massive volumes of water, but never warned downstream residents about the unprecedented discharge. The discharged waters reached the Nashville area, breaching levees and destroying and damaging property. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, reasoning that the claims are barred by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act. View "Cont'l Ins. Co. v. United States" on Justia Law