Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Yanjun Xu, a Chinese citizen and member of China’s Ministry of State Security, was convicted of conspiracy to commit economic espionage and conspiracy to steal trade secrets from multiple aviation companies over a five-year period. Xu was also convicted of attempted economic espionage by theft or fraud and attempted theft of composite fan-blade technology from GE Aviation. He was sentenced to a combined 240 months’ imprisonment. Xu appealed, seeking to vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial, arguing that the district court erred in failing to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 as duplicitous and abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). Alternatively, Xu sought to have his sentence vacated, arguing it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied Xu’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that the conspiracy counts were not duplicitous as they alleged a single overarching conspiracy. The court also admitted expert testimony from James Olson, a retired CIA officer, who testified about espionage techniques and tradecraft, which Xu argued violated Rule 704(b). The court overruled Xu’s objections, finding that Olson’s testimony did not directly opine on Xu’s intent but rather described common practices in espionage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the indictment was not duplicitous as it charged a single conspiracy with multiple overt acts. The court also found that Olson’s testimony did not violate Rule 704(b) and that any potential error was cured by the district court’s limiting instructions to the jury. Additionally, the appellate court found Xu’s sentence to be procedurally and substantively reasonable, noting that the district court properly calculated the intended loss and considered the § 3553(a) factors. The court concluded that Xu’s sentence was within the Guidelines range and not disparate compared to similarly situated defendants. View "United States v. Yanjun Xu" on Justia Law

You, a U.S. citizen of Chinese origin, worked as a chemist, testing the chemical coatings used in Coca-Cola’s beverage cans. You was one of only a few Coca-Cola employees with access to secret BPA-free formulas. You secretly planned to start a company in China to manufacture the BPA-free chemical and received business grants from the Chinese government, claiming that she had developed the world’s “most advanced” BPA-free coating technology. On her last night as a Coca-Cola employee, You transferred the formula files to her Google Drive account and then to a USB drive. You certified that she had not kept any confidential information. You then joined Eastman, where she copied company files to the same account and USB drive. Eastman fired You and became aware of her actions. Eastman retrieved the USB drive and reported You to the FBI.You was convicted of conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets, 18 U.S.C. 1832(a)(5), possessing stolen trade secrets, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit economic espionage, and economic espionage. The Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing after rejecting You’s claims that the district court admitted racist testimony and gave jury instructions that mischaracterized the government’s burden of proof as to You’s knowledge of the trade secrets and their value to China. In calculating the intended loss, the court clearly erred by relying on market estimates that it deemed speculative and by confusing anticipated sales of You’s planned business with its anticipated profits. View "United States v. You" on Justia Law

In 2012, Rife moved from Kentucky to Cambodia, took a position as an elementary school teacher, began a relationship with a Cambodian woman, and adopted a young Cambodian girl. For six years, Rife lived and worked exclusively in Cambodia, obtaining annual “Extension of Stay” temporary visas through his U.S. passport. Rife did not visit the U.S. during that period but maintained a bank account and property in Kentucky. In 2018, Cambodian authorities investigated allegations that Rife had sexually assaulted his young female students. Rife’s school terminated his employment. He returned to Kentucky, where federal agents interviewed him. Rife eventually confessed to abusing two female students.Rife was charged with two counts of illicit sexual conduct in a foreign place, 18 U.S.C. 2423(c). The government did not allege that Rife offered anything of value in connection with his abuse of the girls; his “illicit sexual conduct” was non-commercial in nature. Rife argued that Congress lacked constitutional authority to punish him for non-commercial acts of sexual abuse that occurred in a foreign country years after he had traveled there. The district court denied Rife’s motion to dismiss, passing over the foreign commerce issue but upholding section 2423(c) as a valid exercise of Congress’s power to implement the Optional Protocol. The court sentenced Rife to 252 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing Supreme Court precedent; section 2423(c) as applied here was within Congress’s power to enact legislation implementing treaties. View "United States v. Rife" on Justia Law

Tescari and Salame, Venezuelan citizens, have two minor children. Tescari removed the children from their home in Venezuela and brought them with her to the U.S. Salame filed a petition seeking their return under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Abduction. Tescari and the children were granted asylum in the U.S.The parties stipulated that Salame had a prima facie of wrongful removal and retention. Tescari claimed an affirmative defense under Article 13(b) of the Convention, 22 U.S.C. 9003(e)(2). The court concluded Tescari failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, her affirmative defense that returning the children to Venezuela would subject them to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because the alleged abuse was relatively minor, the court had no discretion to refuse the petition nor to consider potential future harm. The determination that Salame could provide the children with shelter, food, and medication in Venezuela is not clearly erroneous. Despite Venezuela’s political schisms and civil unrest, Tescari failed to introduce sufficient evidence that it is a zone of war, famine, or disease. Any defects in the Venezuelan court system fall short of "an intolerable situation." While the factors that go into a grant of asylum may be relevant to Hague Convention determinations, the district court has a separate and exclusive responsibility to assess the applicability of an Article 13(b) affirmative defense. View "Ajami v. Solano" on Justia Law

IMSS is the main social-service agency of the Mexican government, responsible for government-run medical care for most Mexican citizens. It purchases medical products from private companies. Stryker manufactures and sells medical devices. Stryker’s parent company is based in Kalamazoo, Michigan. It has subsidiaries around the world. IMSS sued Stryker, alleging that in 2003-2015 Stryker bribed government officials and that the U.S. government has established the existence of that bribery. These bribes allegedly totaled tens of thousands of dollars and were handled by a non-party Mexican law firm. Stryker moved to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, arguing that the Mexican judicial system was better suited to hear the case. IMSS argued that the United Nations Convention against Corruption forecloses the application of forum non conveniens and, alternatively, that the relevant factors favored hearing the case in the U.S. courts.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. Requiring that American courts be open to foreign states in cases that implicate the Convention does not require the alteration of established domestic legal frameworks, such as forum non conveniens, that predate the Convention. IMSS’s choice of forum receives little deference, Mexican courts are available to hear this case, and the public and private interest factors support Stryker. View "Instituto Mexicano del Seguro v. Stryker Corp." on Justia Law

Prevent, a group of European companies that specializes in turning around distressed automotive parts suppliers, organized an effort to halt supplies of their parts to obtain better terms from Volkswagen, based in Germany. Volkswagen responded by not doing business with the affiliated companies. Begun in 2016, this litigation initially involved claims of unfair business practices and anticompetitive behavior under German and European law and was handled by German courts. Volkswagen prevailed in most of the suits.In 2019 two members of Prevent, Eastern, based in the Netherlands, and Prevent's American subsidiary sued Volkswagen and its American subsidiary in Michigan, alleging that the carmaker unfairly prevented them from acquiring distressed automotive-parts manufacturers. The district court dismissed the complaint, citing forum non conveniens. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Germany is an adequate forum to hear this case. It appears that a Germany-based antitrust lawsuit would reach more conduct and more injuries than an American suit. German and Portuguese are the languages of the relevant documents. Local interest in the dispute, the location of the injury, the fullness of the court’s docket, preference for trying cases in the place of the governing law, hesitance to apply foreign law, and desire to avoid conflict-of-law problems, predict an American court’s potential “administrative and legal problems” with trying the case. View "Prevent USA Corp. v. Volkswagen AG" on Justia Law

In its 28 U.S.C. 1782(a) discovery application, ALJ sought a subpoena for documents from FedEx and deposition testimony of a FedEx corporate representative. ALJ alleged that FedEx Corp. was involved in contract negotiations and performance of two contracts between ALJ and FedEx International, a FedEx subsidiary. Each contract became the subject of commercial arbitration, one pending in Dubai, the other in Saudi Arabia. The arbitration in Saudi Arabia was dismissed. The district court denied ALJ’s application, holding that the phrase “foreign or international tribunal” in section 1782(a) did not encompass the arbitrations. The Sixth Circuit, reversed, noting that the Supreme Court provided guidance for interpretation of section 1782(a) in 2004. Considering the statutory text, the meaning of that text based on common definitions and usage of the language at issue, as well as the statutory context and history the court held that this provision permits discovery for use in the private commercial arbitration at issue. View "In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings" on Justia Law

Jones, a Michigan citizen, began working in Equatorial Guinea around 2007. In 2011, he started IPX to provide telecommunication services in Equatorial Guinea. IPX is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Equatorial Guinea. Jones was a shareholder, director, and employee, working as a Director-General under a contract, signed annually in Equatorial Guinea. He lived and worked there during the contract’s term. IPX decided in 2015 to open a U.S. subsidiary and sent Jones to Michigan. His work there was supposed to take six months. Jones would then return to Equatorial Guinea. After Jones arrived in Michigan, IPX learned that he may have stolen money and neglected important business relationships and suspended Jones. Jones claims that the suspension was a pretext to divest him of his stock. He sued for breach of contract in the Eastern District of Michigan. The court dismissed the complaint under forum non conveniens. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Equatorial Guinea is an available and adequate forum; IXP is subject to process there. Most of the witnesses and key documents are in Equatorial Guinea; witnesses can be compelled to testify there. Equatorial Guinean law governs under the underlying employment contract’s choice-of-law provision. There is strong evidence that Jones is not at home in the United States, negating the assumption that a U.S. court is most convenient for him. View "Jones v. IPX International Equatorial Guinea S.A." on Justia Law

Asgari came to the U.S. for education, earning a doctorate in 1997. He returned to Iran and became a professor at Sharif University. His work involves transmission electron microscopy. Asgari traveled to the U.S. in 2011, stating on his visa application that he planned to visit New York, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Los Angeles. He traveled to Cleveland to see an Iranian-American friend at Case Western’s Swagelok Center. They began collaborating. Asgari returned to Iran and obtained another visa for “temp[orary] business[/]pleasure,” identifying his destination as his son’s New York address. He applied for a job at Swagelok. The FBI investigated. The Center’s director stated that Asgari was on a sabbatical from Sharif University; that the Center conducted Navy-funded research; and that an opening had emerged on the project. Agent Boggs obtained a warrant to search Asgari’s personal email account for evidence that Asgari made materially false statements in his visa application and that Asgari violated the prohibition on exporting “any goods, technology, or services to Iran.” Based on information uncovered from that 2013 search, the government obtained another warrant to search Asgari’s subsequent emails. Indicted on 13 counts of stealing trade secrets, wire fraud, and visa fraud, Asgari successfully moved to suppress the evidence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The affidavit was not “so skimpy, so conclusory, that anyone ... would necessarily have known it failed to demonstrate probable cause.” The sanctions on Iran are broad; probable cause is a lenient standard. View "United States v. Asgari" on Justia Law

Martirossian, a citizen of Armenia now living in China, refused to answer criminal charges, relating to money-laundering and conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 1956, in the Southern District of Ohio. When his lawyers moved to dismiss the indictment, the court declared him a fugitive and refused to rule on the motion until he submitted himself to its jurisdiction. Martirossian appealed and in the alternative filed a mandamus petition asking the Sixth Circuit to order the district court to rule on his motion. The Sixth Circuit held that, because the district court’s decision is not a final order, it lacked jurisdiction over Martirossian’s appeal. Martirossian did not meet the high bar for granting the “extraordinary writ” of mandamus. Federal courts do not play “catch me if you can.” If a defendant refuses to appear to answer an indictment, ignores an arrest warrant, or leaves the jurisdiction, the court may decline to resolve any objections to the indictment in his absence. The “fugitive disentitlement doctrine” generally permits a federal court to insist on a defendant’s presence in the jurisdiction before it resolves challenges to the criminal charges. View "United States v. Martirossian" on Justia Law