Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A construction company with a longstanding union relationship entered into negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement in 2018, following the union’s withdrawal from a multiemployer contract. This led to protracted disputes, including strikes, litigation, and unfair labor practice charges. Amid negotiations, some employees sought to decertify the union, but the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) dismissed these decertification petitions, finding a causal nexus between the company's alleged unfair labor practices and employee dissatisfaction. During ongoing litigation, the company unilaterally raised employee wages in 2021 and 2022 without bargaining with the union, then later refused to bargain with the union or provide requested information, instead claiming a right to judicial review of the decertification petition dismissals.Administrative proceedings before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) resulted in findings that the company had committed several unfair labor practices: granting unilateral wage increases, withdrawing recognition from the union, refusing to bargain, and failing to provide information. The ALJ ordered the company to recognize and bargain with the union, cease unfair labor practices, and provide the requested information. The NLRB affirmed these findings and the remedial order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case, applying de novo review to legal conclusions and substantial evidence review to factual findings. The court held that the company failed to prove the union waived its right to bargain over wage increases, that the company's actions constituted an unlawful withdrawal of union recognition, and that the refusal to bargain and provide information were not justified as a “technical refusal to bargain” because the decertification petition dismissals did not alter the company's bargaining obligations. The court denied the company’s petition for review and enforced the NLRB’s order. View "Rieth-Riley Constr. Co., Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

A construction company operating in Michigan employed operating engineers represented by a union. Since at least 1993, collective bargaining occurred through a multiemployer association. In early 2018, with the expiration of their collective bargaining agreement approaching, the union gave notice that it wished to withdraw from multiemployer bargaining in order to negotiate individual contracts with employers, including the company at issue. Tensions rose when the company unilaterally stopped making benefit contributions, gave wage increases, and later sought to recover those payments directly from employees, all without bargaining with the union. The employer also participated in a lockout after the union refused to bargain on a multiemployer basis. Subsequently, the union organized a strike, citing the employer’s alleged unfair labor practices.An administrative law judge for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that the union’s withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining was timely and lawful, and that the company committed several unfair labor practices, including the lockout and unilateral changes to wages and benefits. The judge concluded, however, that the strike was economic in nature rather than an unfair labor practice strike. On appeal, the NLRB affirmed most of the administrative law judge’s findings but reversed on the nature of the strike, determining it was motivated at least in part by the company’s unfair labor practices. The NLRB issued an order requiring the company to bargain in good faith and temporarily prohibiting decertification attempts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the union’s withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining was timely under Supreme Court and Board precedent, that the company committed unfair labor practices by insisting on multiemployer bargaining, making unilateral wage and benefit changes, and implementing a lockout, and that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that the 2019 strike was partly an unfair labor practice strike. The court denied the company’s petition for review and granted enforcement of the NLRB’s order. View "Rieth-Riley Constr. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

A Tennessee-based commercial bakery, which provides a self-funded health benefits plan governed by ERISA for its employees, structured its prescription drug benefits through a pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) and created an in-house pharmacy offering lower copays to employees. Tennessee enacted laws targeting PBMs, requiring pharmacy network access for any willing provider and prohibiting cost-sharing incentives to steer participants to certain pharmacies, including those owned by the plan sponsor. The bakery and its PBM excluded a pharmacy from their network after an audit, and after the pharmacy filed administrative complaints under the new Tennessee law, the bakery sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court, claiming ERISA preempted these PBM-focused state laws.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee found that the bakery, as plan fiduciary, had standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge. The court concluded that the Tennessee PBM laws were preempted by ERISA because they required specific plan structures, governed central aspects of plan administration, and interfered with uniform national plan administration. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the bakery, permanently enjoining the Tennessee Commissioner from enforcing the PBM laws against the bakery’s health plan or its PBM.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court agreed with the district court’s analysis, holding that the challenged Tennessee PBM statutes have an impermissible connection with ERISA plans and are therefore preempted. The court found that the laws mandated network structure and cost-sharing provisions, interfering directly with ERISA plan administration. The Sixth Circuit also held that the ERISA saving clause did not preserve these laws from preemption due to the deemer clause’s application to self-funded plans. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "McKee Foods Corp. v. BFP Inc." on Justia Law

A construction company and several employee plaintiffs were involved in a labor dispute with a group of union-affiliated fringe benefit funds and their trustees. The company had employed members of a local union and, under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), was required to contribute to a set of employee benefit funds for each hour worked. When the CBA expired and was mutually terminated, the company and union failed to negotiate a new agreement. The company continued attempting to make contributions to the funds, but the funds’ trustees eventually refused to accept them unless the company provided written confirmation of its agreement to abide by the funds’ governing documents. The company declined, arguing that federal labor law required the funds to continue accepting contributions during negotiations. The funds then stopped accepting contributions, and the company placed the rejected payments into escrow.The company and employees filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, asserting that the funds’ trustees had breached their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by refusing the contributions, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the complaints, finding that the ERISA claims were preempted by the Garmon doctrine, which generally requires courts to defer to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) on matters arguably subject to sections 7 or 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The district court also denied motions for a preliminary injunction and for leave to amend the complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ ERISA claims were preempted under the Garmon doctrine because they were inextricably linked to labor law questions subject to the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction. The court also found that the district court properly denied the requests for preliminary injunctive relief and for leave to amend the complaint, as any amendment would have been futile. View "Rieth-Riley Construction Co. v. Operating Engineers Local 324" on Justia Law

Americare Healthcare Services, Inc., a third-party home care provider in Ohio, and its owner, Dilli Adhikari, hired live-in workers—most of whom cared for their own family members—to provide services to elderly or disabled clients. Between October 2018 and October 2021, Americare failed to pay overtime wages to these employees, claiming entitlement to exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA): the “Companionship Services Exemption” and the “Live-In Exemption.” The Department of Labor, however, had promulgated a 2013 regulation that prohibited third-party employers from relying on these exemptions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to the Department of Labor, finding Americare and Adhikari liable for willful violations of the FLSA’s overtime requirements. The district court further held that the 2013 Third-Party Regulation was valid, and that Americare and Adhikari lacked standing to challenge a related regulatory definition that narrowed the scope of “companionship services.” Americare and Adhikari appealed only the district court’s rulings on the regulation’s validity and their lack of standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case, applying the framework for agency rulemaking authority post-Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The Sixth Circuit held that the FLSA’s express statutory delegation allowed the Department of Labor to define and delimit the applicability of the companionship and live-in exemptions, including excluding third-party employers from their reach. The court further held that Americare and Adhikari lacked standing to challenge the definition of companionship services because the bar to their use of the exemption arose from the third-party regulation, not from the definition itself. The judgment of the district court was therefore affirmed. View "Department of Labor v. Americare Healthcare Services" on Justia Law

Retired employees of two companies, who participated in their employers’ defined benefit pension plans, brought class action lawsuits alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). These plaintiffs, all married, claimed that their plans calculated joint and survivor annuity benefits using mortality tables based on outdated data from the 1960s and 1970s. Because life expectancies have increased since then, the plaintiffs asserted that using such outdated mortality assumptions improperly reduced their benefits, resulting in joint and survivor annuities that were not the actuarial equivalent of the single life annuities to which they would otherwise be entitled, as required by ERISA.Each group of plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court—one in the Eastern District of Michigan against the Kellogg plans and one in the Western District of Tennessee against the FedEx plan—asserting that the use of obsolete actuarial assumptions violated 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d) and constituted a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. The district courts in both cases dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim, holding that ERISA does not require use of any particular mortality table or actuarial assumption in calculating benefits for married participants, and thus the allegations, even if true, did not establish a violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissals de novo. The court held that, under ERISA’s statutory requirement that joint and survivor annuities be “actuarially equivalent” to single life annuities, plans must use actuarial assumptions, including mortality data, that reasonably reflect the life expectancies of current participants. The court concluded that plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the use of outdated mortality tables was unreasonable and could violate ERISA. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district courts’ judgments and remanded both cases for further proceedings. View "Reichert v. Kellogg Co." on Justia Law

Employees at a Kentucky bourbon distillery, dissatisfied with stagnant and uncompetitive wages, began discussing unionization with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. After management learned that a significant portion of employees supported the union effort, the company announced and implemented a $4-per-hour pay raise, expanded merit-based salary increases, and allowed more flexible vacation policies. These benefits were conferred after management had previously stated no further raises would be given that year. As the union election approached, the company also distributed bottles of bourbon to employees. Support for the union declined, and the union lost the election.An Administrative Law Judge found that the employer’s actions, including the wage increases and gifts, constituted unfair labor practices that interfered with employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act. The judge recommended ordering the company to bargain with the union, citing both the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. and the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) then-recent decision in Cemex Construction Materials Pacific, LLC. The NLRB adopted the judge’s factual findings and issued a bargaining order but relied solely on the Cemex standard rather than the Gissel standard.On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that while substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding of unfair labor practices, the Board exceeded its authority by issuing a bargaining order based solely on the Cemex standard. The court determined that the Cemex standard was an improperly promulgated rule of general applicability, not derived from the facts of the case or designed as a case-specific remedy, and thus could not serve as the legal basis for the bargaining order. The Sixth Circuit granted the employer’s petition for review, denied the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement, and remanded the matter to the NLRB for further proceedings under proper standards. View "Brown-Forman Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was employed as a legal assistant and later a paralegal in a law firm’s Liquor Group, initially at one firm and then at another firm, Adams and Reese, LLP, after her group switched employers. She alleged that a supervisor, who moved with the group, persistently directed sexualized comments and jokes at her in the workplace, which included derogatory remarks, inappropriate suggestions, and comments about her appearance and personal life. She also claimed that after her employer changed her work schedule, she experienced difficulties related to her disabilities and was subsequently terminated when she was unable to comply with the new attendance requirements. She brought claims of sexual harassment and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee reviewed the employer’s motions to dismiss the sexual harassment claim and to compel arbitration of the ADA claims, based on an arbitration agreement between the parties. The district court denied both motions, holding that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a plausible sexual harassment claim under applicable standards and that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) barred enforcement of the arbitration agreement as to her entire case, not just the sexual harassment claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the plaintiff’s complaint plausibly alleged pervasive sexual harassment sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. It further determined that the EFAA renders predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable with respect to an entire “case” relating to a sexual harassment dispute, not just the specific sexual harassment claim. Therefore, the arbitration agreement could not be enforced as to any of the plaintiff’s claims in this action. The disposition was to affirm and remand for further proceedings. View "Bruce v. Adams & Reese, LLP" on Justia Law

An employee at a construction company alleged that he faced repeated harassment at work after revealing that he was bisexual. According to his account, coworkers and a supervisor directed homophobic slurs and derogatory comments at him over several months. The employee reported the harassment to a manager on two occasions, initially without naming the harassers, and later with more details. Eventually, after a particularly hostile exchange, he formally complained to the company’s human resources department, which initiated an investigation. The HR manager interviewed the employee and nine other workers, none of whom corroborated his claims. Nonetheless, the company issued a written warning to the supervisor for inappropriate language, required all employees to review the antidiscrimination policy, and allowed the employee to transfer worksites and take medical leave.After the employee took extended medical leave, the company offered him several alternative work assignments, which he either declined or raised objections to. Ultimately, the company considered his refusals as a voluntary resignation and terminated his employment. The employee sued, alleging a hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII and Michigan law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the employer on both claims. It found the company’s actions in response to the harassment allegations were prompt and appropriate, and that the employee failed to show that the termination was pretext for retaliation. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the employer was not liable for coworker harassment because it took reasonable steps to investigate and address the allegations, and that the employee did not present sufficient evidence of pretext regarding his termination. View "Hamm v. Pullman SST, Inc." on Justia Law

A parent enrolled his teenage son, who had a history of serious behavioral and mental health issues, in a residential treatment center after other interventions failed. The family’s health insurer initially approved and paid for the first 21 days of residential treatment, then denied further coverage, asserting that the treatment was no longer medically necessary. The parent appealed this decision through the insurer’s internal process, submitting medical records and opinions from the child’s treating clinicians that supported the need for continued residential care. The insurer upheld its denial after cursory reviews that did not address the treating clinicians’ recommendations or key evidence of the child’s ongoing difficulties.The parent filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, alleging that the insurer’s denial was arbitrary and capricious under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and violated the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer on both claims, finding that the decision to deny coverage was not arbitrary and capricious and that there was no evidence of a parity violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the insurer’s coverage decision was procedurally arbitrary and capricious, as it failed to consider the treating clinicians’ opinions, selectively reviewed the medical record, and did not adequately explain its change from initially approving coverage to denying it. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment on the ERISA claim and remanded with instructions to send the matter back to the insurer for a full and fair review. However, it affirmed the district court’s judgment on the Parity Act claim, holding that the parent failed to produce evidence showing that the insurer’s limitations on mental health treatment were more restrictive than those applied to medical or surgical benefits. View "T. E. v. Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield" on Justia Law