Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Commonwealth of Kentucky initiated a lawsuit against several pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and related entities, asserting that these firms contributed to the opioid crisis in Kentucky by conspiring with drug manufacturers to increase opioid supply. Kentucky alleged the PBMs negotiated with drug companies to give opioids preferred placement on formularies in exchange for rebates and fees, thus violating state consumer protection laws and creating a public nuisance. The PBMs served both federal and commercial clients, including federal workers under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act, TRICARE members, and Veterans Health Administration beneficiaries.Following removal of the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky by the PBMs under the federal officer removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1442), Kentucky sought to remand the case to state court, arguing its complaint disclaimed liability for conduct undertaken at the direction of federal officers. The district court granted Kentucky’s motion to remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. Relying on its prior decision in Ohio ex rel. Yost v. Ascent Health Services, LLC, and similar decisions from other circuits, the Sixth Circuit determined the PBMs acted under federal officers when administering federal health benefits and that Kentucky’s claims related to conduct performed under federal supervision. The court found the PBMs had raised colorable federal defenses, including immunity and preemption under federal statutes governing federal health plans, TRICARE, ERISA, and Medicare Part D. The court concluded that Kentucky’s complaint targeted indivisible conduct relating to federal duties, so the PBMs met the requirements for removal under § 1442. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Commw. of Ky. v. Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

Israel Bo Sword worked as a heavy equipment operator for VNS Federal Services, LLC at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Ohio, where he and co-workers were represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18. VNS was bound by the General Presidents’ Project Maintenance Agreement (GPPMA) in its dealings with the Union. In February 2020, Sword complained to his supervisor that a side agreement guaranteeing another operator 40 hours per week violated the collective bargaining agreement, and he later sought assistance from his union representative to address his concerns. Shortly after the union meeting with management about Sword’s complaint, Sword was permanently laid off, while other operators returned to work.Sword filed unfair labor practice charges against VNS with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging unlawful discharge in retaliation for engaging in protected concerted activity. After a hearing, an administrative law judge found that VNS violated Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). VNS filed exceptions, but the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s findings and issued an order requiring VNS to offer Sword reinstatement, provide backpay, and post remedial notices. The NLRB declined to resolve disputes over remedies at that stage, following its practice of deferring such issues to compliance proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the NLRB’s petition to enforce its order. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB’s determination that Sword engaged in protected concerted activity, that VNS discharged him because of animus toward that activity, and that VNS’s justification for the layoff was pretextual. The Sixth Circuit granted enforcement of the NLRB’s order in full, declining to address challenges to the scope of remedies until compliance proceedings are completed. View "NLRB v. VNS Fed. Servs., LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiff alleged she experienced race and gender discrimination, harassment, and retaliation while employed at a facility operated by a subsidiary corporation in Michigan. Initially, she sued the parent corporation, claiming it was her employer and responsible for the alleged misconduct. The parent corporation contended she had sued the wrong entity and provided evidence that the subsidiary, not the parent, was her employer. The district court in the first case sided with the parent corporation, finding that it was not the plaintiff’s employer and that the complaint did not support a joint-employer theory or veil-piercing. After this ruling, the plaintiff filed a new suit against the subsidiary, asserting similar factual allegations and an additional hostile work environment claim under Michigan law.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the subsidiary moved to dismiss the new case, arguing that claim preclusion barred the suit because the parent and subsidiary were in privity. The district court rejected the argument that the subsidiary had controlled the prior litigation but applied a “close-and-significant-relationship” test based on the parent-subsidiary relationship and equitable considerations. Concluding that privity existed and the other elements of claim preclusion were met, the district court granted the subsidiary’s motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the district court erred by applying the “close-and-significant-relationship” test for privity, rather than the six recognized exceptions to nonparty preclusion from Taylor v. Sturgell. None of the exceptions—pre-existing substantive legal relationship, control, or adequate representation—applied to the facts. Therefore, claim preclusion did not bar the plaintiff’s suit against the subsidiary. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. View "Williams v. Mastronardi Produce-USA, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of Guatemalan nationals were recruited under the H-2A visa program by a Michigan agricultural company and its owners to work seasonal jobs between 2017 and 2019. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants illegally charged recruitment fees, underpaid wages, forced them to live in poor conditions, confiscated personal documents, limited their freedom, and threatened them with deportation if they complained. The plaintiffs claimed these actions violated federal anti-trafficking laws, the Fair Labor Standards Act, Michigan labor and trafficking statutes, and state contract law.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on most claims, awarding both compensatory and punitive damages, while denying certain claims against one defendant and rejecting the defendants’ counterclaims. The district court denied the defendants’ motions for mistrial, to dismiss for forum non conveniens, for a new trial, and for remittitur of punitive damages. The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, including damages, attorney fees, and costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the punitive damages awarded were not grossly excessive or arbitrary and thus did not violate due process, applying the guideposts from BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, denial of a mistrial, or in allowing the case to proceed in Michigan rather than Guatemala. The court further concluded that alleged statute of limitations defenses were either inapplicable or waived. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Gomez-Echeverria v. Purpose Point Harvesting, LLC" on Justia Law

A company sponsored a health benefit plan for its employees, which was administered by another entity. An employee under this plan, referred to as Patient AA, sought medical treatment from several out-of-network providers. Before providing care, these providers contacted the plan administrator to confirm the reimbursement rate. The administrator’s employees orally stated that reimbursement would be at the usual, customary, and reasonable (UCR) rate, a standard commonly used in the industry. Relying on these assurances, the providers treated Patient AA. When they later sought payment, they were reimbursed at a much lower rate, calculated according to Medicare rates, not the promised UCR rate.The providers sued both the employer and the plan administrator, asserting state-law claims for negligent misrepresentation and promissory estoppel based on the oral statements about reimbursement. The action began in California state court but was removed to federal court and transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The district court agreed, applying the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the claims “related to” the ERISA plan and were thus preempted. The district court also denied the providers’ post-judgment request for leave to amend their complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, under its precedent in Cromwell, ERISA expressly preempts state-law negligent-misrepresentation and promissory-estoppel claims by third-party healthcare providers when those claims are based on oral assurances regarding the terms of coverage or reimbursement under an ERISA-governed plan. The district court’s dismissal with prejudice was upheld. View "Laurel Hill Mgmt. Servs., Inc v. La-Z-Boy Inc." on Justia Law

A former Fire Chief of the Cincinnati Fire Department, who had worked for the department since 1993 and was promoted to Fire Chief in 2021, was terminated by the City Manager in 2023 without being given a pre-termination hearing. The City Charter provided that, after serving six months as Fire Chief, the individual could only be removed for cause. When promoted, the Fire Chief signed a memorandum stating the position was “unclassified” and subject to dismissal without cause, but the Charter’s language provided for-cause protection after the first six months. The City Manager provided the Fire Chief with a termination letter listing reasons for the firing and publicized the termination, including to the media, citing the reasons as “for cause.” The Fire Chief did not receive a pre-termination or post-termination hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied summary judgment to the City Manager and the City, holding that the City Manager was not entitled to qualified immunity regarding pre-termination due process violations. The court found that, under the Charter, the Fire Chief had a property interest in continued employment after six months and that there were unresolved factual disputes regarding waiver of those rights. The district court also denied statutory immunity to the City Manager on the Fire Chief’s state law defamation claim, finding triable issues regarding whether her statements were knowingly false or made with malice.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Sixth Circuit held that the City Charter unambiguously gave the Fire Chief for-cause removal protection after six months, creating a property interest protected by procedural due process. It found that no “clear and unmistakable” waiver of those rights was effected by the memorandum. The court also held that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to decide whether the City Manager acted with malice or bad faith in making allegedly defamatory statements. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Mark Pannek and Thomas Strotman, both former vice presidents at U.S. Bank, alleged the bank retaliated against them after Pannek filed an ethics complaint against their supervisor, Gemrich, who had made inappropriate sexual comments and engaged in other unprofessional conduct. Pannek also claimed age discrimination after his termination, asserting he was replaced by a younger employee. Following internal investigations, U.S. Bank issued a written warning to Gemrich and eventually terminated him, but before that, Pannek and Strotman were terminated as part of a departmental reorganization. Their responsibilities were redistributed among other employees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on all claims. The court found insufficient evidence for the retaliation, hostile work environment, and age discrimination claims, concluding that the bank’s actions were justified by a neutral workforce reduction and that Pannek and Strotman failed to establish a causal link between the ethics complaint and their terminations. The district court also determined the hostile work environment claims did not meet the necessary legal standards, and that Pannek was not replaced in a manner that would support his age discrimination claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that summary judgment was improper for the Title VII retaliation claims, finding genuine disputes of material fact about whether the terminations were motivated by retaliation for the ethics complaint. It affirmed summary judgment for the Title VII hostile-work-environment claims, ruling U.S. Bank was entitled to the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense because it had a reasonable harassment policy and Pannek and Strotman failed to promptly and fully utilize corrective measures. The court also affirmed summary judgment on Pannek’s ADEA claim, finding he was not replaced in a manner supporting age discrimination and presented no additional evidence of discriminatory motive. The retaliation claims were remanded for further proceedings. View "Pannek v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

A former Detroit Police Department officer, after sustaining injuries in car accidents, was placed on restricted duty due to permanent physical limitations. Over several years, she raised various grievances related to her employment status, overtime, and accommodations for her disabilities. In 2021, following additional injuries and extended sick leave, she failed to report for duty or provide updated medical documentation as requested by her employer, leading to her termination. Shortly after her termination, her physician sent documentation indicating she was unable to perform most police functions.She filed two lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, both under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging intentional discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation for engaging in ADA-protected activity. The district court consolidated the cases and granted summary judgment to the City on her retaliation claim, finding the City had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination—her repeated failure to report for duty or supply requested medical forms. The remaining claims for intentional discrimination and failure to accommodate proceeded to trial, where the jury found in favor of the City.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiff argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment, that no reasonable jury could have sided with the City, that jury instructions were incorrect, and that the City engaged in fraud at trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. It held that the City’s actions were supported by legitimate reasons, the jury’s verdict was reasonable, the instructions accurately stated the law, and the fraud claims were unpreserved and insufficient for relief. The disposition was affirmed. View "Henry v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

Gertrude Crisp, an emergency medical technician, alleged that a co-worker, Joshua Gullett, sexually harassed her at their workplace, the Scioto Ambulance District. Crisp claimed that Gullett made inappropriate comments, touched her without consent, and engaged in other sexually charged behavior. After reporting one incident to a supervisor and showing him Gullett’s Fetlife profile, the employer separated Crisp and Gullett on future shifts but did not otherwise discipline Gullett. Years later, Crisp showed nude images, allegedly of Gullett and his wife, to several co-workers at work, purporting to warn them about Gullett’s behavior. Following an investigation, Scioto Ambulance District terminated Crisp for sharing the images while on duty.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Crisp sued Scioto, arguing that her termination was unlawful retaliation under federal and Ohio antidiscrimination laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, finding that Crisp’s conduct in showing the images was not protected activity under the relevant statutes. Crisp appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that Title VII and the Ohio Civil Rights Act do not protect an employee who, in the course of opposing workplace discrimination, gratuitously shares nude or sexually explicit images of co-workers while on the job. The court reasoned that while some complaints of sexual harassment are protected, Crisp’s sharing of such images was not necessary to her complaint and extended beyond protected conduct. Therefore, Crisp’s firing did not constitute unlawful retaliation, and the district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Crisp v. Scioto Ambulance Dist." on Justia Law

A physician was employed by a medical group and its affiliated healthcare organization when they implemented a COVID-19 vaccination policy requiring employees to either be vaccinated or obtain a medical or religious exemption. The physician objected to the policy on scientific and religious grounds and engaged in internal advocacy, including meetings with leadership and organizing a petition among medical staff. She also communicated with a disbarred attorney who was promoting litigation against the vaccine mandate, forwarding confidential internal emails and documents to him to build his case. Although she was granted a religious exemption, she was subsequently terminated for cause, with the employer citing misappropriation of company property, policy violations, disruptive conduct, and breach of loyalty.After exhausting administrative remedies, the physician filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, asserting federal claims for retaliation under Title VII and the ADA, and state claims for retaliation, discharge against public policy, breach of contract, tortious interference, and declaratory relief from her non-compete clause. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, finding no violation of state or federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that the physician did not engage in protected activity under Title VII or the ADA, as her conduct did not qualify under either the participation or opposition clauses. Her state retaliation claims failed for the same reasons. The court also ruled that Kentucky’s wrongful discharge tort applies only to at-will employees, and her contract employment precluded such a claim. Finally, it found no breach of contract, as her conduct violated company policies and justified termination for cause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "DiChiara v. Summit Medical Group, Inc." on Justia Law