Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Torres started working for Precision in 2011. He was not then legally authorized to work in the U.S. but obtained work authorization about five months later. Torres listed a fake Social Security number on a tax form when he started the job. In May 2012, Torres injured his back at work. Precision did not pay all of the doctor's bills. Torres pursued a workers’ compensation claim. After receiving a September 2011 call from Torres’s lawyer, supervisors confronted Torres. Torres recorded their threatening and profanity-laced statements. Torres was immediately terminated.Torres sued, claiming Precision violated Tennessee law by firing him in retaliation for making a workers’ compensation claim. The district court rejected the claim, citing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. On remand, the district court found Precision liable for retaliatory discharge and held that federal law did not preempt a damage award. The court awarded Torres backpay, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Federal law makes it illegal to employ undocumented aliens, but Tennessee’s workers’ compensation law protects them. Because of federal law, the company cannot be required to pay lost wages that the alien was not allowed to earn; the employer is liable for wages the employee could have lawfully received, and for damages unrelated to the employee’s immigration status. View "Torres v. Precision Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

Strickland, an African-American Detroit Police Officer since 2008, claims that he has been subjected to race-based harassment throughout his tenure. He cited several incidents, social media posts, and Department reports and having been denied desired shift assignments and training in favor of white officers. A Committee on Race and Equality report concluded that “the department has a growing racial problem” and that African-American officers who complained were retaliated against. On January 22, 2017, off-duty, Strickland pulled into a gas station that, unbeknownst to him, was the site of an active police investigation of a reported incendiary device. He could not see the firetrucks or police cars. When Strickland saw a uniformed sergeant emerge from the fog, he immediately identified himself as an officer but was handcuffed in a way that was extremely tight. A sergeant led him away, belittling him in front of other officers. Strickland was later diagnosed with a bilateral wrist contusion and was suspended for three days without pay. Strickland complained. After an investigation, Strickland was charged with three code of conduct violations.Strickland sued, alleging hostile workplace and illegal retaliation (Title VII), and under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming an unlawful search and seizure and excessive force. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the hostile work environment claim but reversed the grant of qualified immunity to one officer on the excessive force claim and summary judgment in favor of the city on the retaliation claim. View "Strickland v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In 2010, Felten filed a qui tam complaint alleging that his then-employer, Beaumont Hospital, was violating the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3730(h), and the Michigan Medicaid False Claims Act by paying kickbacks to physicians and physicians’ groups in exchange for referrals of Medicare, Medicaid, and TRICARE patients. Felten also alleged that Beaumont had retaliated against him by threatening and “marginaliz[ing]” him for insisting on compliance with the law. After the government intervened and settled the case against Beaumont, the district court dismissed the remaining claims, except those for retaliation and attorneys’ fees and costs.Felten amended his complaint to add allegations of retaliation that took place after he filed his initial complaint: he was terminated after Beaumont falsely represented to him that an internal report suggested that he be replaced and that his position was subject to mandatory retirement. Felten further alleged that he had been unable to obtain a comparable position in academic medicine because Beaumont “intentionally maligned [him].”The district court dismissed the allegations of retaliatory conduct occurring after Felten’s termination. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The FCA’s anti-retaliation provision protects a relator from a defendant’s retaliation after the relator’s termination. View "Felten v. William Beaumont Hospital" on Justia Law

In 2008, State Bank, a Fentura subsidiary, hired Wollschlager to deal with “problem loans.” Wollschlager’s contract provided a golden parachute worth $175,000 if the Bank fired him early. In 2009, the FDIC deemed the Bank “troubled.” In 2010, Wollschlager negotiated an amended agreement worth $245,000. Wollschlager's 2011 separation agreement provided that the $245,000 payment would comprise $138,000 (one year’s salary) within 60 days of Wollschlager’s departure; $107,000 plus his base compensation through the end of the year ($28,000) would be paid once the Bank’s conditions improved. Fentura did not seek FDIC prior approval. The FDIC and the Federal Reserve subsequently approved the $138,000 installment. FDIC regulations “generally limit payments to no more than one year of annual salary.” In 2013, Fentura sought approval to pay the remainder, acknowledging that the agreements required prior approval. The FDIC refused, citing 12 U.S.C. 1828(k).The district court granted the FDIC judgment on the record. The Sixth Circuit affirmed The statute says that the agency should withhold golden parachute payments for misconduct and should also consider whether the employee “was in a position of managerial or fiduciary responsibility,” the “length of” the employment, and whether the “compensation involved represents a reasonable payment for” the employee’s services. The FDIC reasonably found that the payment would result in a windfall of two years’ salary for an employee who worked for just three years and that the Bank never sought initial approval. View "Wollschlager v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

Massey began working as a security guard in 2004. Massey alleges that her supervisors and co-workers commented on “her weight, the size of her breast, her looks and body [odor]”; and referred to her as the “Queen of FMLA.” She alleges she was denied medical leave. In 2015, Great Lakes became Massey’s employer. Supervisors told Massey that she looked “sloppy,” and that her breasts were “drooping.” Massey went to human resources; she claims the harassment continued. On October 29, 2017, Massey was driving a Great Lakes van when the van incurred damage. Massey claimed that she was not aware that she had been in an accident. Massey claims that she was approved for FMLA leave for breast reduction surgery through November 17: there is no record that anyone at Great Lakes knew about her FMLA leave for her surgery. On November 15, Massey was told that it had been determined that she falsified her incident report. Great Lakes terminated her employment on December 16, 2017.Massey filed an EEOC complaint, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation, and later sued, alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and gender discrimination under Title VII and the Michigan Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act and FMLA retaliation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Great Lakes, finding insufficient evidence that the harassment Massey faced was “severe or pervasive.” Great Lakes established that it honestly believed that Massey falsified her report as a basis for her termination. View "Nathan v. Great Lakes Water Authority" on Justia Law

Schwamberger, a former deputy director of the Marion County Board of Elections sued the Board and its former director, Meyer, asserting, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, that the defendants’ actions constituted First Amendment retaliation, violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Each Ohio County Board of Elections must have four members divided equally between the two major parties. The deputy director (Schwamberger) and the director (Meyer) are always members of opposite political parties, R.C. 3501.091, and deputy directors serve at the pleasure of their county boards. Schwamberger was terminated for impermissibly commenting on the election process, and therefore on policy and political issues related to her deputy-director position, after attempting to complain about errors in the 2018 election to the Board.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Schwamberger’s suit. Schwamberger’s speech proximately caused her termination but that speech implicated policy concerns; she was a policymaking employee, so her speech was unprotected. Schwamberger has not demonstrated a property interest in her position. Under Ohio law, she was an at-will employee who served at the pleasure of the Board. Even if the Board did act “arbitrarily” regarding her discharge, its actions do not create a constitutional claim. View "Schwamberger v. Marion County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit denied the consolidated petition for review brought by three coal mine operators challenging the Benefits Review Board's adverse black lung benefits determination. Honoring the Board's customary requirement that issues be raised first with the ALJ, the court held that the operators failed to preserve their Appointments Clause challenge.In this case, the court's review of the Department of Labor's regulations reveals a regulatory exhaustion requirement applicable to ALJ proceedings. The court explained that black lung benefits adjudication regulations require that litigants raise issues before the ALJ as a prerequisite to review by the Benefits Review Board. Moreover, the Board's longstanding practice of treating issues not raised below as forfeited confirms this conclusion. The court also concluded that by failing to comply with the Board's timeliness requirements, the operators failed to preserve their Appointments Clause challenges. Furthermore, the operators failed to identify an applicable exception that would excuse failure. Finally, the panel noted that, while it did not see evidence that the operators acted with a nefarious motive, the court is nonetheless mindful not to invite "sandbagging" or "judge-shopping" in future black lung proceedings. View "Joseph Forrester Trucking v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs" on Justia Law

Rembert, a nurse, routinely worked more than 40 hours per week for A Plus but did not receive overtime. Rembert filed a purported class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Department of Labor investigated. The court certified a class and ordered A-Plus to provide a list of persons potentially fitting within the class. The deadline passed. A magistrate scheduled a phone conference; defense counsel failed to appear. A Plus provided responsive information about five weeks after the deadline. The parties began discovery, which was notable for defense counsel’s repeated failure to comply. Rembert’s counsel finally filed a motion to compel. The magistrate granted the motion and ordered A Plus to pay “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” Defense counsel failed to respond. Rembert filed another motion. As a result of the DOL investigation, some class members received full payment of the amounts owed to them. The parties ultimately agreed to the entry of judgment in favor of Rembert and the remaining class members, $18,961.Rembert moved for an award of fees and costs under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). Her lawyers requested hourly rates of $350 and $300, respectively, and submitted detailed records for 21.2 hours of work for the motion to compel and 98.7 hours on the remainder of the case. The court approved the rates but reduced counsel’s total compensable hours to 46.2 and cut the fee award an additional $1,660. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The plaintiffs obtained 100% of the recovery due to them. The court did not explain which hours it rejected and apparently did not consider the impact of delays caused by defense counsel. The court remanded with instructions to grant the petition for fees and costs in the amount of $38,765.00. View "Rembert v. A Plus Home Health Care Agency, LLC" on Justia Law

Thompson, an African-American, has arthritis in her knees, back, and neck. Her doctor gave her lifting restrictions at a previous job. She was approved for Social Security Disability payments in 2014 based on a primary disability of morbid obesity and a secondary disability of arthritis. She is no longer morbidly obese. Fresh hired Thompson, age 52, as a production worker in 2016. Thompson did not mention her arthritis diagnosis and did not have restrictions on her ability to work; she performed her job duties without accommodations. Thompson later decided she would like to work part-time “to get some work done on [her] back.” Her supervisors do not recall any conversations about her pain or desire to work part-time. She did not provide medical documentation. Fresh began experiencing a reduction in sales and changed its shift schedule. Thompson indicated that she was unable to work the new schedule but did not provide an explanation. Thompson later asked about part-time hours. As one of five employees who indicated that she could not work proposed shift changes, Thompson was laid off.Thompson sued, alleging disability discrimination, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–12117, age discrimination, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–634, and race discrimination, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2–2000e-5. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Fresh. Thompson has not established a prima facie case of discrimination. View "Thompson v. Fresh Products, LLC" on Justia Law

Pelcha began working as a bank teller in 2005. A new supervisor, Sonderman, began overseeing Pelcha in 2016 and required her direct reports to submit written requests for any time out of the office by the middle of the month before the month of the requested time off. In July 2016, Pelcha planned to take time off from work but did not use the written request form. She told Sonderman that she was “not filling [the request out] because [she didn’t] have to.” Pelcha nonetheless completed the form, placing it in Sonderman’s office on the day before her time off. The next day, Sonderman spoke with CEO Niesen, at a regularly scheduled management meeting, about Pelcha’s failure to submit the form, Pelcha's negative attitude, and failure to timely complete tasks. Niesen stated that he had no tolerance for insubordination and told everyone he intended to fire Pelcha. He asked Sonderman to memorialize the chain of events in a memo. Days later, Niesen terminated Pelcha’s employment and informed her that it was because of her insubordination.Pelcha, then 47 years old, sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her claims. Nielsen’s comments about another employee were irrelevant to Pelcha’s termination. Pelcha’s insubordination was a legitimate reason for the termination and was not pretextual. Pelcha failed to establish disparate treatment. View "Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc." on Justia Law