Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A tenured English professor at a public university in Ohio, who identifies as transgender, became involved in discussions about leading the university’s Center for the Study of Gender and Sexuality during a period of departmental restructuring. Although the professor expressed interest in directing the Center and was considered a strong candidate, the position was not open as the Center had gone dormant. The professor was offered a partial teaching load reallocation to help develop a new gender-studies major, but after a series of profanity-laden and disparaging social media posts targeting colleagues and administrators, the offer was rescinded. The professor also sought a tenure transfer to the main campus, which was denied by faculty committees after considering collegiality and departmental needs, with no discussion of gender identity.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment for the university and individual defendants on all claims. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact and concluded that the university’s actions were based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, including the professor’s unprofessional conduct and the department’s academic requirements. The professor appealed, challenging the district court’s rulings on claims of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and perceived-disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination or retaliation, that the professor’s social media posts did not constitute protected speech on matters of public concern under the First Amendment, and that there was insufficient evidence to support a perceived-disability claim. The court clarified that adverse employment actions under Title VII need only cause some harm, but found the university’s reasons for its decisions were not pretextual. View "GPat Patterson v. Kent State University" on Justia Law

Christina Henry, a Licensed Practical Nurse at Southern Ohio Medical Center (SOMC), refused to comply with SOMC’s COVID-19 policy requiring either vaccination or weekly nasopharyngeal testing, citing religious objections. SOMC granted her a religious exemption from vaccination but denied her request for an exemption from all forms of COVID testing. Henry maintained that her religious beliefs prohibited her from undergoing any COVID test, including non-invasive methods, and proposed self-screening as an alternative. After continued refusal to test or vaccinate, SOMC placed her on unpaid leave. Henry did not request alternative testing methods during her leave and later declined to return to SOMC after the testing requirement was lifted.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of SOMC. The court found that Henry’s communications to SOMC indicated she sought exemption from all COVID testing, not just nasopharyngeal testing. It held that accommodating her request would impose an undue hardship on SOMC by endangering vulnerable patient populations. The court also determined that even if Henry had requested saliva testing, this would still constitute an undue hardship due to delays in obtaining test results and reduced effectiveness. Additionally, the court found that Henry failed to show SOMC’s stated reasons for placing her on unpaid leave were pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that Henry did not provide sufficient notice to SOMC of a limited objection to only certain types of testing and that either exempting her from all testing or providing saliva testing would impose an undue hardship on SOMC. The court also held that Henry failed to establish pretext in her retaliation claim. View "Henry v. Southern Ohio Medical Center" on Justia Law

Samantha Graf worked as a Certified Nursing Assistant Technician at Morristown-Hamblen Hospital Association (MHHA). She alleged that during a lunch break on hospital grounds, a security guard employed by a third-party firm raped her. Graf reported the incident to hospital human resources, but after a limited investigation, HR concluded the sexual encounter was consensual. MHHA terminated Graf for violating hospital policy by having intercourse while on the clock and in an unauthorized area. Graf continued to communicate with the security guard after the incident, and both parties disputed the nature of their relationship and the encounter.Graf filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, asserting claims under Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), as well as state tort claims. The district court dismissed several claims and one defendant, Shield and Buckler Security, Inc., on statute of limitations grounds. After summary judgment, only Graf’s retaliation claims under Title VII and THRA, and her negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, proceeded to trial. Before trial, the district court ruled on the admissibility of evidence regarding Graf’s sexual history, allowing some communications with the security guard but excluding other evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 412. The jury found in favor of MHHA on all counts, and judgment was entered against Graf.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Graf argued that the district court erred in requiring her to prove she did not consent to the alleged rape for her Title VII retaliation claim, and in admitting evidence of her sexual history. The Sixth Circuit held that a Title VII retaliation plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable and good-faith belief that the conduct opposed was unlawful, and that evidence regarding consent was relevant to this inquiry. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The judgment was affirmed. View "Graf v. Morristown-Hamblen Hospital" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a long-term employee of a brewery, suffered two work-related back injuries, the second of which led to significant physical restrictions. The brewery accommodated him with light duty work for a period, but when such work was no longer available, he was placed on leave and later participated in a transitional work program. The plaintiff requested the creation of a new position to accommodate his restrictions, which the brewery declined. After his restrictions were lifted, he returned to his original position. During his employment, the plaintiff also applied unsuccessfully for other internal positions and was later suspended following allegations of inappropriate workplace conduct. He was offered a choice between a last chance agreement and a severance package, ultimately declining both and leaving the company.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims. The court found that the plaintiff failed to exhaust or timely exhaust administrative remedies for certain claims, and for others, lacked evidence to establish pretext for discrimination or retaliation. The plaintiff appealed, challenging the district court’s findings regarding the adequacy of his EEOC charge and the sufficiency of his evidence for disability and age discrimination, retaliation, and failure to accommodate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA, as it was neither explicitly included in his EEOC charge nor reasonably related to the facts alleged, and was also untimely. The court further held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case or pretext for his remaining ADA, state law disability, and age discrimination claims. The court also found that the plaintiff forfeited his Title VII and motion for reconsideration arguments by failing to adequately brief them. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed in full. View "Pemberton v. Bell's Brewery, Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a mail clerk with sickle cell anemia, was employed by the United States Postal Service (USPS) and had a history of attendance issues, some of which were covered by the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). To avoid termination, he entered into a Last Chance Agreement (LCA) that limited unscheduled absences and specified that FMLA-approved absences would not count against him if properly documented. After several disputed absences, some of which the plaintiff claimed were FMLA-protected, USPS terminated his employment for violating the LCA.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of USPS on most of the plaintiff’s claims, finding that he failed to establish FMLA coverage for all but one disputed date and did not sufficiently notify USPS of a need for accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act. The court also held that the plaintiff’s FMLA medical certification, which estimated two days of intermittent leave per month, created a hard cap on his FMLA leave. The plaintiff’s claims regarding one date were settled, and his motion for reconsideration was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the December 26, 2018 absence and the Rehabilitation Act claim, finding no evidence of a request for accommodation. However, it reversed the district court’s holding that the FMLA medical certification imposed a strict monthly limit on unforeseeable intermittent leave, clarifying that such certifications provide only estimates, not hard caps. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the plaintiff gave proper notice for FMLA leave on certain dates and vacated the district court’s summary judgment on FMLA interference and retaliation claims related to the LCA, pending resolution of factual disputes. View "Jackson v. Postal Service" on Justia Law

Dorothy Bivens worked as a territory sales representative for a company that manufactures and distributes cleaning products. During a visit to a client’s motel, the client locked the office door and propositioned her, making her uncomfortable. Bivens reported the incident to her supervisor, who reassigned the client so she would not have further contact. Around the same period, the company’s president decided to reduce staff due to cost concerns, targeting positions in low-revenue territories, including Bivens’s. She was subsequently terminated.After her termination, Bivens filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging a hostile work environment, retaliation for reporting harassment, and racial discrimination under both Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The district court denied her motion to compel production of certain documents and granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims, finding insufficient evidence to support her allegations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. The appellate court held that, under Title VII, an employer can only be held liable for harassment by a non-employee (such as a client) if the employer itself intentionally caused or was substantially certain harassment would occur, rejecting the negligence standard adopted by most other circuits and the EEOC. The court found no evidence that the employer intended for Bivens to be harassed. The court also found that Bivens’s retaliation claim failed because the decisionmaker who terminated her was unaware of her complaint, and her racial discrimination claim failed due to lack of evidence that she was singled out because of her race. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Bivens v. Zep, Inc." on Justia Law

A multiemployer pension fund managed by the Operating Engineers Local 324 Pension Fund assessed withdrawal liability against Ace-Saginaw Paving Company after Ace partially withdrew from the fund in December 2018. The dispute centered on the interest rate assumption used to calculate the withdrawal liability. Ace argued that the rate should match the fund’s minimum funding interest rate of 7.75%, resulting in a lower liability, while the fund’s actuary used a much lower rate of 2.27% (the PBGC rate), resulting in a significantly higher liability. The actuary’s choice of rate was based on policy considerations and a desire to protect the fund’s remaining employers, rather than his best estimate of the fund’s anticipated investment experience.The parties proceeded to arbitration, as required by ERISA. The arbitrator found that the actuary’s use of the 2.27% rate violated 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1) because it was not the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan. The arbitrator ordered the fund to recalculate Ace’s withdrawal liability using a rate that complied with the statutory requirements. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan affirmed the arbitrator’s findings and granted summary judgment to Ace on the statutory violation, but declined Ace’s request to require use of the minimum funding rate as the remedy, instead allowing the fund’s actuary another opportunity to select a compliant rate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the actuary’s use of the PBGC rate was not his best estimate and thus violated ERISA. The court also held that, on remand, the actuary may use a different rate from the minimum funding rate only if it is justified by factors that improve the accuracy of the withdrawal liability calculation, not by policy considerations. The court denied both parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. View "Ace-Saginaw Paving Co. v. Operating Engineers Local 324" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the management of an ERISA fund, specifically the Southern Ohio Painters Health and Welfare Plan and Trust. Plaintiffs, including union-appointed trustees and the International Union of Painters and Allied Trades District Council No. 6, allege that two union-appointed trustees, Smith and Clark, have engaged in actions that violate their fiduciary duties. These actions include procedural changes that benefit themselves and undermine the union's authority, such as amendments to the Trust Agreement that make it difficult to remove trustees and provide benefits to retired trustees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the employer-appointed trustees and denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs sought to remove Smith and Clark as trustees, terminate their employment with the Fund, and prevent the Fund from paying their legal expenses, among other relief. The district court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, a necessary requirement for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the plaintiffs did not show they would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. The court noted that the plaintiffs' concerns about self-dealing and the inability to exercise fiduciary duties were speculative and could be addressed through monetary damages. The court also declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the district court's dismissal of the claims against the employer-appointed trustees, as the issues were not inextricably intertwined with the appeal of the preliminary injunction denial. View "Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians and its employee welfare plan (the Plan) alleged that Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (Blue Cross) breached fiduciary duties under ERISA and related duties under Michigan state law. The Tribe claimed that Blue Cross submitted false claims, causing the Tribe to overpay for hospital services. The Tribe also alleged violations of the Michigan Health Care False Claims Act (HCFCA) and sought to amend its complaint to include additional facts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the Tribe’s ERISA and common-law fiduciary duty claims as time-barred, granted summary judgment to Blue Cross on the HCFCA claim, and denied the Tribe’s motion for leave to amend its complaint a second time. The court found that the Tribe had actual knowledge in 2009 that it was not receiving Medicare-Like Rates (MLR) and thus the claims were time-barred. The court also concluded that Blue Cross was not directly governed by the MLR regulations, and therefore, the Tribe could not prove a violation of the HCFCA based on Blue Cross’s failure to apply MLR.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court agreed that the Tribe’s fiduciary duty claims were time-barred because the Tribe knew in 2009 that it was not receiving MLR. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the HCFCA claim, finding that the MLR regulations did not apply to Blue Cross. Additionally, the court found no error in the district court’s denial of the Tribe’s motion for leave to amend its complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have cured the deficiencies in the ERISA claim. View "Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan" on Justia Law

Monica Gray, a long-time employee of State Farm, assisted a colleague, Sonya Mauter, in securing an ADA accommodation. Mauter's supervisor, Joe Kyle, opposed the accommodation and later reported Gray for timecard falsification. State Farm investigated and terminated Gray. Gray sued for retaliation under the ADA and Ohio law, alleging that Kyle targeted her due to her assistance to Mauter.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment to State Farm, concluding that the company had an honest belief that Gray engaged in misconduct, thus negating her retaliation claim. Gray appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Gray presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, including her protected activity, State Farm's knowledge of it, and a causal connection between her activity and termination. The court also determined that Gray raised a genuine dispute over whether State Farm's stated reason for her termination was pretextual, particularly given the differential treatment between Gray and another employee, Diane Parker, who had similar timekeeping discrepancies but was not reported.The Sixth Circuit held that Gray could proceed on a theory of vicarious liability, as Kyle's alleged bias and selective reporting could have influenced State Farm's decision to terminate her. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gray v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co." on Justia Law