Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Boxill worked at Franklin County Municipal Court. Boxill alleges that the defendants, judges and an administrator, formulated a concealed policy that female employees asserting complaints about abusive and discriminatory treatment by judges would be discouraged and intimidated. She claimed that in 2011 O’Grady began making sexist and racist comments and that Brandt was “hostile and intimidating." Boxill reported this to administrators and judges in 2011-2013; “[n]o administrator or Judge acted ... each discouraged [her] from action.” They began removing her responsibilities. A week after others reported O’Grady’s behavior Boxill was demoted. She claims that O’Grady then recruited other judges to monitor her and her staff. The Defendants began bypassing her and going directly to the Caucasian male subordinate. She resigned and later filed suit, alleging that each Defendant retaliated against her in violation of the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1981 and contributed to a hostile work environment. The district court dismissed her claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Boxill offered no plausible, non-conclusory facts to show that O’Grady was aware of her complaints and cannot demonstrate that O’Grady’s adverse actions were motivated by her protected speech. Reversing as to the hostile work environment claim, the court stated Boxill’s complaint plausibly alleged that O’Grady made sexist and racist comments to her and others for years, she reported that behavior, and the harassment was sufficiently severe and/or pervasive that others found it necessary to memorialize their concerns in writing. View "Boxill v. O'Grady" on Justia Law

Dyer, a Ventra employee, has migraine headaches that often prevent him from working. Ventra’s collective bargaining agreement's attendance policy does not require the employee to justify an absence; points are assessed for absences, depending on whether the employee calls in to report the absence and whether the employee is absent for his entire shift or only part of it. Once an employee accumulates 11 or more points, he is terminated. Certain absences, including leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1), are expressly excluded from the point-accumulation system. Employees who have perfect attendance for 30 days will have their total points reduced by one point. Taking leave for vacations, bereavement, jury duty, military duty, union leave and holidays keeps the 30-day clock running. The point reduction schedule did not count FMLA and other unpaid leave (such as disability) as days “worked” toward 30-day perfect attendance. Beginning in 2013, Dyer used intermittent FMLA leave. Dyer did not have any points for using his FMLA leave. Ventra terminated Dyer in 2016, for accumulating 12 points. The district court granted Ventra summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Resetting Dyer’s perfect-attendance clock every time he took FMLA leave effectively denied him the flexibility of the no-fault attendance policy that employees not taking FMLA leave enjoyed. Dyer's ability to remain employed hinged on his not taking FMLA leave. FMLA leave is treated less favorably than other equivalent leave statuses. View "Dyer v. Ventra Sandusky, LLC" on Justia Law

Hubbell worked as a FedEx parcel sorter. She alleges that her manager told her she should accept a demotion because “females are better suited to administrative roles and males are better suited to leadership roles,” repeatedly disciplined her, then eventually demoted her from her position as lead parcel sorter based on her sex. She also alleges that FedEx retaliated against her for filing complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and for filing a lawsuit by unfairly disciplining her, not allowing her to earn extra pay by clocking in early or clocking out late, and closely surveilling her. Eventually, she was fired. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding in favor of Hubbell on her Title VII retaliation claim and the reduction of her attorney’s fees from the requested amount. A reasonable factfinder could find that several of the actions Hubbell testified about would be sufficient, on their own or in combination, to dissuade a reasonable worker from filing or pursuing an EEOC complaint. A reasonable factfinder could also find that some or all these acts were taken in retaliation for Hubbell’s EEOC complaints. A reasonable factfinder could determine that, despite its formal anti-discrimination policy, FedEx did not engage in good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII. View "Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc." on Justia Law

Hendrickson petitioned for review of the Board's finding that Hendrickson's statements constituted unfair labor practices because they coerced employees in the exercise of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and order requiring Hendrickson to post remedial notices around its plant.The Sixth Circuit granted the petition, holding that the Board's opinion was not supported by substantial evidence. The court held that there was no record of unfair labor practices at Hendrickson's plant that would cast Hendrickson's plant-wide letter -- cautioning employees that contract negotiations would begin "from scratch" -- in a threatening light. Furthermore, Hendrickson's statements about changing company culture were projections of consequences beyond its control, rather than threats to retaliate against employees for authorizing union representation. Accordingly, the court denied the Board's cross-appeal for enforcement. View "Hendrickson USA, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Erickson is the only unionized crane rental company in western Michigan. In 2015, the Local insisted that only members of the Local, not the company’s other unions, perform crane-operator work. The Local threatened to stop referring union members for regular temporary-labor needs and operators began seeking the Local’s help with payroll mix-ups rather than resolving them with Erickson. When the company told employees to “quit talking to Brandon because he’s going to get you in trouble,” the Local filed its first-ever grievance and unfair labor practice charge against Erickson, which eventually agreed to allow workers to seek the Local’s help. In 2016 Erickson discovered that the Local was approaching customers and encouraging them to hire through the Union’s referral process rather than contracting with the company. Erickson fired six members of the Local, 30% of the company’s operators. Erickson told the fired workers about the lack of work for small cranes; the layoffs “could be reversed,” if the workers would “get the Union to back off.” Erickson put six small cranes on the market. The Local filed unfair labor practice charges under 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1); 158(a)(3). The Sixth Circuit affirmed an NLRB decision in favor of the Local. Even if Erickson exited the small-crane market for unrelated reasons, the need to terminate the operators did not necessarily follow. Erickson had a dramatic increase in temporary hires immediately after the discharges, often for tasks the fired workers performed. The company’s justification was pretextual. View "Erickson Trucking Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The union accused the employer, which operates coal-fired power generation facilities in Ohio and Pennsylvania, of implementing terms and conditions of employment that were inconsistent with the employer’s final impasse offer during collective bargaining negotiations and of unilaterally subcontracting out periodic maintenance work historically performed by union employees. The National Labor Relations Board affirmed an administrative law judge’s findings in favor of the union on both charges. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158 (a)(5), (a)(1), when, after impasse, it selectively implemented certain pre-impasse bargaining proposals that were inextricably linked to other proposals not imposed. The court reversed with respect to subcontracting the turbine/generator outage work without first bargaining with the union. The decision to subcontract a planned project involving the shutdown and maintenance of one of its turbine-generator units is properly characterized as a business management decision, driven by the employer's responsibility to keep its generating units in working order, while continuously offering full service, or face penalties. The court reversed the Board’s order requiring the employer to supply requested information regarding subcontracting. View "FirstEnergy Generation, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Hickle began working for AMC in 2004, while in high school. In 2006, he was promoted to Operations Coordinator. In 2008, he joined the Ohio Army National Guard. Before leaving for training, Hickle interviewed for a management position with Kalman, stating that he was going to have to leave for military training for approximately six months; Kalman ended the interview immediately. The person who got the promotion later told Hickle: “Thanks for joining the military. I just got promoted.” AMC promoted Hickle to management when he returned from training; in 2013 Hickle was again promoted. In the interim, Hickle continued his military service, including serving for over a year in Afghanistan. AMC never prevented Hickle from fulfilling his military obligations or denied him time off, but Senior Manager Adler repeatedly expressed disapproval. During meeting with Kalman and Adler, Hickle provided Kalman with a pamphlet on the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). Adler continued to insinuate that Hickle could or should be fired for taking time off for military duty. After an incident involving allegations of stealing food from the AMC kitchen, there was an investigation, performed by a Compliance Manager. Hickle was suspended and was ultimately fired for “unprofessional behavior.” The district court rejected Hickle’s USERRA suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Hickle gathered evidence during discovery that would allow a reasonable jury to find that military service was a motivating factor in AMC’s termination decision. View "Hickle v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc." on Justia Law

After Booth started working at a Tennessee Nissan factory, he injured his neck and sought medical treatment. Booth’s physician recommended several work restrictions, including that he not reach above his head or flex his neck too much. Booth. continued to work on the assembly line for about a decade without incident. In 2015, Booth requested a transfer to another position in the factory, which Nissan denied because that position’s duties conflicted with Booth’s work restrictions. Booth claimed that Nissan’s denial was disability discrimination that violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101. Nissan then announced plans to restructure the assembly line. Booth alleged that two additional jobs Nissan assigned to him as part of the restructuring would have violated his work restrictions, When he informed Nissan about this conflict, Nissan told him to see a physician. Booth’s physician modified the restrictions, clearing him to work the new jobs. Although Booth remains a Nissan employee, he claimed that Nissan failed to accommodate him—a separate ADA violation—by pressuring him to remove his work restrictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Nissan. To sue under the ADA, the plaintiff must be disabled; just because a plaintiff has work restrictions does not mean that he is disabled. Booth has not advanced evidence that he is disabled. View "Booth v. Nissan North America, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, battalion chiefs in Battle Creek’s fire department, were responsible for many administrative tasks. While they did not have direct authority to make hiring and firing decisions, they conducted performance evaluations and approved vacation requests. Plaintiffs’ suggestions and recommendations as to hiring, firing, advancement, or promotion of other employees were given "particular weight.” Plaintiffs were required to periodically serve on “standby” duty and be “on call” from 5:00 pm until 8:00 am the following morning for seven days. Plaintiffs received 1.5 hours of pay for each day of standby duty, plus overtime pay for hours worked if they were called back to active duty while on standby. The individual on standby duty was required to monitor a pager and a radio, answer phone calls, and help handle problems. Plaintiffs were occasionally required to respond to the scene of a fire while on standby duty. Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, by failing to pay overtime. The district court ruled and the Sixth Circuit affirmed that Plaintiffs were exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay requirement under the executive exemption. Ample evidence supported a finding that Plaintiffs’ primary duty was managerial in nature. View "Holt v. Battle Creek" on Justia Law

A class of 28,177 exotic dancers alleged that dance clubs violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and state wage-and-hour laws by “intentionally misclassif[ying] class members as independent contractors, refus[ing] to pay minimum wage, unlawfully requir[ing] employees to split gratuities, and unlawfully deduct[ing] employee wages through rents, fines, and penalties.” The Agreement required that every club provide its dancers with an assessment to determine whether they should be classified as employees or an Independent Professional Entertainers and limited the control that the clubs may exercise over the Independent Entertainers. The Agreement also addresses tip-pooling, commissions, reimbursement for license and permit fees required to perform at the club, and provision of logo costumes; it divides a total award of $6.55 million into a Net Cash Payment Settlement Fund, Secondary Pool Remuneration, and attorneys’ fees. The district court approved a settlement over the objections of four class members. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, considering: the “high risk of continued litigation and the uncertain likelihood of success on the merits” and that the Agreement “offers value to the class in the form of cash, rent-credit or dance-fee payments, and long-term structural changes to Defendants’ business practices, all of which directly benefit class members.” The court rejected an argument that the settlement violated the procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because the class release was impermissibly broad and the class notice failed to adequately apprise the class members of their rights. View "Doe v. Deja Vu Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law