Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stephens, born biologically male, worked as a funeral director for a corporation that operates Michigan funeral homes. Stephens was terminated shortly after informing the owner, Rost, that she intended to transition and would represent herself as a woman while at work. The EEOC investigated Stephens’s allegations of sex discrimination and learned that the Funeral Home provided its male public-facing employees with clothing that complied with its dress code while female public-facing employees received no such allowance. The EEOC sued, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by terminating Stephens’s employment on the basis of her transgender or transitioning status and refusal to conform to sex-based stereotypes and administering a discriminatory clothing policy. The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the EEOC. The Funeral Home engaged in unlawful discrimination against Stephens on the basis of her sex and did not establish that applying Title VII’s proscriptions against sex discrimination would substantially burden Rost’s religious exercise in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Even if Rost’s religious exercise were substantially burdened, the EEOC has established that enforcing Title VII is the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s compelling interest in eradicating workplace discrimination against Stephens. The EEOC may bring the clothing claim in this case because an investigation into the clothing-allowance policy was reasonably expected to grow out of the original discrimination charge. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked for Oleson’s in Michigan. The collective bargaining agreement between Oleson’s and the Union allowed Oleson’s to deduct union dues from employees’ paychecks if the employee signed an authorization form. That form provided that the authorization would be irrevocable for one year or until the termination of the agreement, and thereafter for yearly periods unless revoked by certified mail during a 15- day window. Plaintiffs joined the union and signed the authorization forms. Three years later, they resigned their membership but sent their permission revocations by regular, not certified, mail, outside of the 15-day window. The union refused to accept the revocations. The company continued to deduct dues. Plaintiffs filed a class action, claiming violation of the Labor Management Relations Act by imposing conditions on their ability to revoke their authorizations and by violation of its duty of fair representation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint, noting that one plaintiff had quit and the other had successfully revoked his membership. The Act makes it a crime for an employer to willfully give money to a labor union, 29 U.S.C. 186(a,b), and for a union to willfully accept money from an employer, except money deducted from the wages for dues if the employer has received a written assignment. This criminal provision creates no civil cause of action; the union did not act arbitrarily or in bad faith. View "Ohlendorf v. United Food & Commerical Workers International Union, Local 876" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked for Oleson’s in Michigan. The collective bargaining agreement between Oleson’s and the Union allowed Oleson’s to deduct union dues from employees’ paychecks if the employee signed an authorization form. That form provided that the authorization would be irrevocable for one year or until the termination of the agreement, and thereafter for yearly periods unless revoked by certified mail during a 15- day window. Plaintiffs joined the union and signed the authorization forms. Three years later, they resigned their membership but sent their permission revocations by regular, not certified, mail, outside of the 15-day window. The union refused to accept the revocations. The company continued to deduct dues. Plaintiffs filed a class action, claiming violation of the Labor Management Relations Act by imposing conditions on their ability to revoke their authorizations and by violation of its duty of fair representation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the complaint, noting that one plaintiff had quit and the other had successfully revoked his membership. The Act makes it a crime for an employer to willfully give money to a labor union, 29 U.S.C. 186(a,b), and for a union to willfully accept money from an employer, except money deducted from the wages for dues if the employer has received a written assignment. This criminal provision creates no civil cause of action; the union did not act arbitrarily or in bad faith. View "Ohlendorf v. United Food & Commerical Workers International Union, Local 876" on Justia Law

Mosby-Meachem, an in-house attorney for Memphis Light, Gas & Water, was denied a request to work from home for 10 weeks while she was on bedrest due to complications from pregnancy. MLG&W unsuccessfully argued that precedent precluded any reasonable jury from determining that Mosby-Meachem was a qualified individual while on bedrest because in-person attendance was an essential function of her job. A jury found in favor of Mosby-Meachem on her claim for disability discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act and awarded her compensatory damages. The district court also granted Mosby-Meachem’s motion for equitable relief and awarded her backpay for the period in which MLG&W did not permit her to telework. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Mosby-Meachem produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that in-person attendance was not an essential function of her job for the 10-week period in which she requested to telework. View "Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division" on Justia Law

Mosby-Meachem, an in-house attorney for Memphis Light, Gas & Water, was denied a request to work from home for 10 weeks while she was on bedrest due to complications from pregnancy. MLG&W unsuccessfully argued that precedent precluded any reasonable jury from determining that Mosby-Meachem was a qualified individual while on bedrest because in-person attendance was an essential function of her job. A jury found in favor of Mosby-Meachem on her claim for disability discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act and awarded her compensatory damages. The district court also granted Mosby-Meachem’s motion for equitable relief and awarded her backpay for the period in which MLG&W did not permit her to telework. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Mosby-Meachem produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that in-person attendance was not an essential function of her job for the 10-week period in which she requested to telework. View "Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division" on Justia Law

Pittington worked for Lumberjack for five months before he was fired for supporting his wife (a Lumberjack employee) in her sexual harassment complaint. Before being fired, Pittington was demoted, had his hours reduced, and was made to work in an unheated shack without a chair previously provided for Pittington's medical condition. Pittington sued, alleging that Lumberjack's actions were based on his disability and involvement in his wife’s complaint. Pittington presented evidence of his earnings and of his subsequent employment history and sought $40,632.50 in back pay. The jury found violations of Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act; the court directed a verdict in favor of Lumberjack on Pittington’s ADA claim. The jury declined to award compensatory or punitive damages and awarded $10,000 in back pay. The court declined to award front pay, increase the award, or hold a new trial on damages. Concluding that the 10% interest rate that Pittington requested would create an undue windfall, the court awarded compound prejudgment interest at the rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. 1961(a), 0.66%. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs who prove that they were fired in violation of Title VII are presumptively entitled to back pay for the amount they would have earned had they not been unlawfully terminated and an award of prejudgment interest is nearly always appropriate. A court must grant a new trial on damages when a jury awards a Title VII plaintiff back pay substantially less than the damages to which he is indisputably entitled. View "Pittington v. Great Smoky Mountain Lumberjack Feud, LLC" on Justia Law

Pittington worked for Lumberjack for five months before he was fired for supporting his wife (a Lumberjack employee) in her sexual harassment complaint. Before being fired, Pittington was demoted, had his hours reduced, and was made to work in an unheated shack without a chair previously provided for Pittington's medical condition. Pittington sued, alleging that Lumberjack's actions were based on his disability and involvement in his wife’s complaint. Pittington presented evidence of his earnings and of his subsequent employment history and sought $40,632.50 in back pay. The jury found violations of Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act; the court directed a verdict in favor of Lumberjack on Pittington’s ADA claim. The jury declined to award compensatory or punitive damages and awarded $10,000 in back pay. The court declined to award front pay, increase the award, or hold a new trial on damages. Concluding that the 10% interest rate that Pittington requested would create an undue windfall, the court awarded compound prejudgment interest at the rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. 1961(a), 0.66%. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs who prove that they were fired in violation of Title VII are presumptively entitled to back pay for the amount they would have earned had they not been unlawfully terminated and an award of prejudgment interest is nearly always appropriate. A court must grant a new trial on damages when a jury awards a Title VII plaintiff back pay substantially less than the damages to which he is indisputably entitled. View "Pittington v. Great Smoky Mountain Lumberjack Feud, LLC" on Justia Law

Working at Ford’s Twin Cities Plant in 2001, Saunders’s right arm got caught in a machine, causing him to lose almost all use of that arm. Saunders received workers’ compensation. He returned to work with restrictions that prohibited heavy lifting, engaging in repetitive motions, or using his right arm. Ford assigned him to temporary jobs, then to an airbag-installation job, but placed him on “no-work-available” (NWA) status when he developed carpal-tunnel syndrome. Ford assigned Saunders to a torque-inspector job, where Saunders worked for eight years. Ford transferred Saunders to Louisville in 2012, after Twin Cities closed. The Plant, in flux as dozens of Ford plants closed, allowed Saunders to continue working as an inspector for another year, although he lacked the seniority for the position there. After the Plant integrated its new workers, it reopened jobs to the normal bid process. A senior worker displaced Saunders, who was placed in short-term jobs, had periods of medical leave, and was on NWA status. Saunders got a permanent assignment in 2014, which he retains. Before that placement, Saunders filed grievances, then filed suit (Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185), alleging that Ford breached its collective bargaining unit by placing him on NWA status, retaliated after he reopened his workers’ compensation claim, and that his union failed to fully pursue his grievances. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Ford. Ford had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing Saunders on NWA status that no reasonable juror could conclude was pretextual. Breach of the duty of fair representation is not established merely by proof that the underlying grievance was meritorious. View "Saunders v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Cincinnati ordinances provide guidelines for selecting the “lowest and best bidder” on Department of Sewers projects to “ensure efficient use of taxpayer dollars, minimize waste, and promote worker safety and fair treatment of workers” and for bids for “Greater Cincinnati Water Works and the stormwater management utility division,” to employ skilled contractors, committed to the city’s “safety, quality, time, and budgetary concerns.” Allied alleged that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempted: a requirement that the bidder certify whether it contributes to a health care plan for employees working on the project as part of the employee’s regular compensation; a requirement that the bidder similarly certify whether it contributes to an employee pension or retirement program; and imposition of an apprenticeship standard. Allied asserts that the only apprenticeship program that meets that requirement is the Union’s apprenticeship program, which is not available to non-Union contractors. The ordinances also require the winning contractor to pay $.10 per hour per worker into a city-managed pre-apprenticeship training fund, not to be taken from fringe benefits. The district court granted Allied summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Where a state or municipality acts as a proprietor rather than a regulator, it is not subject to ERISA preemption. The city was a market participant here: the benefit-certification requirements and the apprenticeship requirements reflect its interests in the efficient procurement of goods and services. View "Allied Construction Industries v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Welding inspectors for Gulf Interstate Field Services, who served on an Ohio pipeline-construction project in 2013-2014 and were paid on a “day-rate” basis, brought suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207, and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (OMFWSA), asserting that they were entitled to overtime pay for weeks in which they worked more than 40 hours. The district court held, on summary judgment, that the employees were exempt from the overtime requirements because they qualified as highly compensated employees under the governing regulations. The Sixth Circuit reversed. While the employees concede that they were paid in a manner and at a rate consistent with being exempt, it matters whether their salaries were guaranteed, and in turn, whether a rational trier of fact could have concluded that there was no such guarantee. The employees’ salary was calculated on a daily basis and there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they were guaranteed a weekly salary. View "Hughes v. Gulf Interstate Field Services, Inc." on Justia Law