Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Seven Counties, a nonprofit provider of mental health services, attempted to file for Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 reorganization. For decades, Seven Counties has participated in Kentucky’s public pension plan (KERS). Because the rate set for employer contributions has drastically increased in recent years, Seven Counties sought to reject its relationship with KERS in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court and the district court both held that Seven Counties is eligible to file under Chapter 11 and that the relationship between Seven Counties and KERS is based on an executory contract that can be rejected. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Seven Counties is only eligible to be a Chapter 11 debtor if it is a “person” under 11 U.S.C. 109(a); a “governmental unit” is generally excluded from the category of “person.” Because the Commonwealth does not exercise the necessary forms of control over Seven Counties for it to be considered an instrumentality of the Commonwealth, Seven Counties is eligible to file. Seven Counties characterized its relationship with KERS as contractual, such that, to the extent it is executory, it may be rejected in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 365. KERS argued the relationship is purely statutory, similar to an assessment, such that it cannot be rejected. The Sixth Circuit certified the question of the nature of the relationship to the Kentucky Supreme Court. View "Kentucky Employees. Retirement System v. Seven Counties.Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Midwest hired Plaintiff. In 2015, Plaintiff informed Midwest that she was pregnant. Plaintiff claims her supervisor made negative comments and was annoyed by Plaintiff’s absences for pre-natal appointments. About three months later, Plaintiff was terminated “[d]espite … no record of discipline.” Plaintiff testified that Midwest’s president presented Plaintiff with an agreement and said that she “needed to sign then if [she] wanted any severance,” that she felt bullied and signed the agreement, which provided that Plaintiff would waive “any and all past, current and future claims” against Midwest. Plaintiff later stated that she assumed that "claims" referred to unpaid wages or benefits. Midwest paid and Plaintiff accepted $4,000.Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC, then filed suit, alleging that Midwest terminated her because of her pregnancy, that Midwest has a sex-segregated workforce, and discrimination in compensation, citing Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k); 42 U.S.C. 1981a; Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act; and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). After filing, Plaintiff returned the $4,00, saying that she was “rescinding the severance agreement.” The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment entered in favor of the Defendant. Under the tender-back doctrine, contracts tainted by mistake, duress, or even fraud are voidable at the option of the innocent party if the innocent party first tenders back any benefits received; if she fails to do so within a reasonable time after learning of her rights, she ratifies the contract. The doctrine does not apply to claims under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. View "McClellan v. Midwest Machining, Inc." on Justia Law

Gaffers is a former employee of Kelly, which provides outsourcing and consulting services to firms around the world, including “virtual” call center support, where employees like Gaffers work from home. Gaffers alleged that Kelly underpaid virtual employees, based on time spent logging in to Kelly’s network, logging out, and fixing technical problems. Gaffers sued on behalf of himself and his co-workers (over 1,600 have joined) seeking back pay and liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 216(b). About half of the employees that Gaffers sought to represent signed an arbitration agreement with Kelly (Gaffers did not sign one) stating that individual arbitration is the “only forum” for employment claims, including unpaid-wage claims. Kelly moved to compel individual arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 4. Gaffers contended that the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act rendered the arbitration agreements unenforceable. The district court agreed with Gaffers. The Sixth Circuit reversed. In 2018, the Supreme Court held, in Epic Systems, that the National Labor Relations Act does not invalidate individual arbitration agreements. The court rejected arguments that FLSA displaced the Arbitration Act by providing a right to “concerted activities” or “collective action” or rendered the employees’ arbitration agreements illegal and unenforceable. View "Gaffers v. Kelly Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Atkins, a type II diabetic, occasionally suffers from low blood sugar. She must respond to these episodes by quickly consuming glucose to avoid seizing or passing out. She asked her Dollar General manager if she could keep orange juice at her cash register in case of an emergency. The manager refused. She suffered two episodes while working alone. Each time she responded by drinking orange juice from the checkout cooler, paying for it immediately, and reporting the incident to her supervisor. Dollar General fired Atkins. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. A jury found that Dollar General had “discriminate[d] . . . on the basis of disability.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The claim was timely under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1), having been timely filed with a state agency that had authority to entertain it. Even if the company’s policy permitted alternative glucose sources, there was evidence suggesting that those options, though medically equivalent in the abstract, were not practically equivalent; the jury had a legally sufficient basis to conclude that Dollar General failed to provide Atkins reasonable alternatives. A company may not illegitimately deny an employee a reasonable accommodation to a general policy and use that same policy (the anti-grazing policy) as a neutral basis for firing him. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dolgencorp, LLC" on Justia Law

Rogers, an African-American woman, has been employed by HFHS for more than 30 years. After she was denied reclassification as a Senior Consultant, Rogers made an internal complaint of racial and age discrimination. An internal investigation found no evidence of discrimination. Rogers filed an EEOC charge. A few months later, co-workers began reporting that Rogers’s emotional state was erratic and that they feared she might pose a physical threat. Rogers was placed on paid leave and sent for a fitness-for-duty exam. After a doctor cleared Rogers for work, she claims that she was offered the choice of either transferring to an HFHS subsidiary or taking severance. Rogers chose the transfer, then filed another EEOC charge, alleging retaliation. The EEOC found probable cause. Rogers filed suit alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1981; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for HFHS with respect to Rogers’s claims of racial and age discrimination but reversed summary judgment with respect to retaliation. Rogers did not produce evidence that she performed job duties more advanced than those covered by her job description and, therefore, was qualified for reclassification and that she was treated differently than a similarly situated person outside the protected class. A reasonable factfinder could, however, conclude that Rogers suffered materially adverse actions very close in time after an employer learns of a protected activity. View "Rogers v. Henry Ford Health System" on Justia Law

The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission found that ConAg violated the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 815(c), by terminating Groves’s employment in retaliation for his reporting safety concerns to the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), which enforces health and safety standards. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A miner establishes prima facie case of discrimination by showing that he was engaging in protected activity and subject to an adverse employment action that was at least partially motivated by his protected activity. Groves engaged in a protected activity; while the ALJ did not find any direct evidence of animus or disparate treatment, she found the timing and knowledge to be persuasive. Groves made his first complaint approximately two-and-a-half months before his discharge. Groves’s meeting with the MSHA investigator occurred just five days before he was fired. The ALJ found the company’s affirmative defense implausible and the asserted reason for termination pretextual and did not impose her own business judgment on ConAg’s actions. View "Con-Ag, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Wooster hired Hostettler in 2013; she was pregnant. Wooster allowed new employees 12 weeks unpaid maternity leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601–2654, even if they did not otherwise qualify. Hostettler took 12 weeks of leave but as her return to work approached, she experienced severe postpartum depression. Hostettler’s OB/GYN, Dr. Seals, prescribed an antidepressant and indicated that a reduced schedule “was medically necessary” for the “foreseeable future.” Hostettler met with her supervisor, Beasley, and did not return to work as scheduled. Wooster indicated that it would accommodate a part-time schedule until June 30. Hostettler returned to work but her symptoms continue. Hostettler contends that she was able to do everything required of her position, doing some work from home, a common practice in the department. There were no complaints about her work. Beasley stated that Hostettler never failed to perform any responsibility or timely finish any assignment. June 30 passed. The parties disagree about whether Wooster insisted that she return full-time. In mid-July, Seals submitted an updated medical certification, stating that Hostettler might return full-time in September. Beasley fired Hostettler. Hostettler sued, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, the FMLA, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The court granted Wooster summary judgment, concluding that full-time work was an essential function of the position of HR Generalist. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Genuine disputes of material fact remain; Wooster may have preferred that Hostettler be in the office 40 hours a week but an employer cannot deny a modified work schedule without showing why the employee is needed on a full-time schedule. View "Hostettler v. College of Wooster" on Justia Law

Barry, a judicial administrative assistant, alleged that Franklin County Municipal Judge O’Grady created a hostile work environment with vulgar comments about women, either coming from O’Grady directly, encouraged by him, or tolerated by him. After overhearing the judge and bailiffs discussing the sex life of a female lawyer, Barry posted about the conversation on Facebook and told the female lawyer about it. When O’Grady learned that Barry had reported the conversation to the female lawyer, O’Grady retaliated. Barry brought O’Grady’s behavior to the attention of the court administration. She was moved out of O’Grady’s chambers, and accepted a transfer to a less-desirable position as her only real option. Her work life continued to devolve; she suffered from mental-health issues. Barry sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming retaliation in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. O’Grady argued qualified immunity. The district court disagreed, finding disputed issues of material fact and concluding that a reasonable jury could find in Barry’s favor. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal because O’Grady’s argument relied on disagreements with the district court’s weighing of facts and factual inferences, not questions of law. View "Barry v. O'Grady" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, retirees who worked at Honeywell’s Greenville, Ohio plant, were members of a bargaining unit. The final collective bargaining agreement (CBA) did not expire until May 2014. Honeywell sold the plant in 2011 but continued to provide healthcare benefits for retirees after the CBA expired. The 2011 CBA stated that “[u]pon the death of a retiree, the Company will continue coverage for the spouse and dependent children for their lifetime.” In December 2015, Honeywell sent a letter stating that it intended to terminate the retiree medical and prescription drug coverage on December 31, 2016. Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated retirees and eligible dependents under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132, claiming that Honeywell was obligated to provide retirees with lifetime healthcare benefits. Honeywell argued that the CBA’s general durational clause, which stated that the agreement remained in effect until May 22, 2014, governed its duty to provide those benefits. The Sixth Circuit held that the CBAs were unambiguous and do not vest retiree healthcare benefits for life. A CBA’s general durational clause applies to healthcare benefits unless it contains clear, affirmative language indicating the contrary. Retirees are not entitled to lifetime benefits; only the dependents of retirees who died while the CBA was in effect are entitled to lifetime benefits. View "Fletcher v. Honeywell International, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 11 minority firefighters who were laid off by Detroit in 2012 as part of a reduction in force (RIF) that followed the city’s bankruptcy, sued the city and their union, (DFFA), alleging a violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court rejected their claims on summary judgment, finding that only one Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies to pursue a claim against the city, but that even on the merits, Plaintiffs failed to present direct evidence or to establish a prima facie case under the circumstantial evidence approach, which includes a heightened burden in a RIF. The court concluded that Plaintiffs could not establish that the DFFA breached its duty of fair representation. The Sixth Circuit agreed that 10 Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies, that there was no direct evidence of discriminatory motive, and that Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence was not probative and did not establish a circumstantial case. The court reversed as to DFFA, holding that a prima facie disability discrimination claim against a union does not require that a plaintiff demonstrate that the union breached its duty of fair representation. View "Peeples v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law