Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The City of Chattanooga added a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) to its Fire and Police Pension Fund in 1980. In 2000, the city amended the COLA for a third time to create a fixed three-percent annual increase in retirement benefits. The city amended the COLA again in 2014 to a lower, variable annual increase. Fund participants challenged the 2014 amendment under the Contract Clause, claiming a right to the fixed three-percent COLA. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is no unmistakable evidence of the city’s intent to be bound to the fixed COLA, because the COLA is neither vested nor accrued within the meaning of the City Code. Absent some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, a statute does not create a contractual relationship. The City Code contains one vesting provision: After 10 years of service, a participant has the right either to a full refund of her contributions or to retirement benefits upon turning 55. The section does not mention the COLA. The fact that the Fund described the fixed three-percent COLA as “guaranteed” when enacting the 2000 amendment does not prove that the city intended to be bound to the fixed COLA. View "Frazier v. City of Chattanooga" on Justia Law

In 2009, Tennial, an African-American began working as the Business Manager of a UPS Packaging Center. His supervisors noted serious performance deficiencies at that facility over the next two years. Tennial contends that his performance was on par with Caucasian managers. After moving to a new position, Tennial’s deficiencies persisted. There was one incident in which over 200 packages were not sorted in a timely manner. He refused to step down. Tennial claims that an extremely hostile work environment ensued. As a result, Tennial requested and was granted leave for stress, depression, and anxiety under the Family Medical Leave Act. He missed UPS’s peak holiday season. When he returned to work, new supervisors noted numerous service failures. Tennial was placed on a Management Performance Improvement Plan and eventually demoted to a position that he currently holds. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Tennial argued that the Plan and his subsequent demotion were motivated by race, age, and disability discrimination, and by retaliation for taking medical leave. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Caucasian managers identified by Tennial were not valid comparators; the reasons for his demotion were not pretextual. View "Tennial v. United Parcel Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Before accepting a transfer to a Bridgestone facility in North Carolina, Deschamps expressed concern about losing pension credit for his 10 years of employment with Bridgestone in Canada. After receiving assurances from Bridgestone’s management team that he would keep his pension credit, Deschamps accepted the position. For several years, Deschamps received written materials confirming that his date of service for pension purposes would be August 1983. He turned down employment with a competitor at a higher salary because of the purportedly higher pension benefits he would receive at Bridgestone. In 2010, Deschamps discovered that Bridgestone had changed his service date to August 1993, the date he began working at the American plant. After failed attempts to appeal this change through Bridgestone’s internal procedures, Deschamps filed suit, alleging equitable estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, and an anti-cutback violation of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1054(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Deschamps on all three claims. The text of the plan “is at worst ambiguous, but at best, favors Deschamps’s argument that he was a covered employee in 1983” and, as a result of the change in the interpretation of this provision that excluded foreign employees from being classified as covered employees, Deschamps’s benefits were decreased. View "Deschamps v. Bridgestone Americas, Inc." on Justia Law

The Michigan office of Alix, an international company, administers payroll and benefits for U.S. employees and is directly involved in U.S. hiring. In 2013, Alix hired Brewington, a Texas resident, for its Dallas Corporate Services team. The employment agreement provides that it “will be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Michigan” and states, “any dispute arising out of or in connection with any aspect of this Agreement and/or any termination of employment . . ., shall be exclusively subject to binding arbitration under the . . . American Arbitration Association . . . decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding as to both parties.” In 2014, Brewington was terminated. He filed a demand for arbitration, asserting claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, on behalf of himself and a purported nationwide class of current, former, and potential Alix employees. The Michigan district court ruled that Brewington was precluded from pursuing arbitration claims on behalf of any purported class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that court’s refusal to dismiss, finding that Brewington had sufficient contacts with Michigan to establish personal jurisdiction, and upheld summary judgment in favor of Alix. An agreement must expressly include the possibility of classwide arbitration to indicate that the parties agreed to it. This clause is silent on the issue and is limited to claims concerning “this Agreement,” as opposed to other agreements. It refers to “both parties.” View "AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington" on Justia Law

Richardson, then age 50, began working at Wal-Mart in 2000. Richardson’s evaluations were generally positive. Wal-Mart’s first three levels of employee discipline are “written coachings,” the fourth is termination. The second and third levels require a plan of action and electronic acknowledgement of the coaching. Richardson’s first coaching, in 2011, involved her attempt to influence the exchange of her daughter’s computer. Her second coaching involved failure to package properly a hazardous-material item. Richardson drafted an action plan. Richardson's third coaching, in August 2012, involved violating Wal-Mart’s attendance policy, with four unscheduled absences in six months. Richardson drafted another action plan. Richardson claimed a medical excuse, but did not provide documentation. Richardson claims that in late 2012, she perceived that she was mistreated by management, based on her age. In March 2013, Richardson was stacking merchandise when she fell and broke her wrist. Store manager Darby reviewed a surveillance video and concluded that Richardson had created a safety hazard through her placement of equipment. Other managers reached a similar conclusion. Darby concluded that the coaching for unsafe work practices would result in termination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, rejecting claims of age discrimination under Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. Richardson lacked direct evidence that her termination was based on her age and failed to establish that Wal-Mart’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge was pretextual. View "Richardson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

On May 6, 2016, the NLRB (Board) found that the Union had violated the National Labor Relations Act by seeking to undermine prior NLRB judgments. The Union petitioned for review on June 13. The Board cross-petitioned on July 6. On July 13, five of the six charging parties, all winners in the Board proceedings, moved to intervene in both the Union’s petition and the Board’s cross-petition after the court clerk’s office directed them to do so. On August 2, more than 30 days after the Union filed its initial petition for review, the charging parties’ counsel filed another amended motion to intervene, clarifying that they had inadvertently omitted a sixth charging party, Hunt Construction, from their first two motions. No one objected to Hunt’s motion. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(d), which sets forth the conditions for intervening and includes a 30-day filing deadline, does not implement any general jurisdictional statute and is claim-processing-rule that permits forfeiture and equitable exceptions to the deadline. View "Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Stevens worked for Baker from 1989 until 1996. When his employment ended, Stevens signed a contract in which he promised to maintain the confidentiality of Baker’s trade secrets. In 1999, Stevens sued, alleging failure to fully pay the compensation due him during his employment. The parties eventually settled; Baker paid Stevens $10,000. Around that time, Stevens formed S&S Chemical to produce polyethylene products. Baker suspected that S&S was improperly using Baker’s EP Processes and sent Stevens a letter in 2002 reminding Stevens of his Termination Agreement. Stevens responded that he had independently developed the processes used to manufacture S&S’s chemicals. Baker later confirmed that S&S was not then using Baker’s confidential information. Baker again became suspicious and, in 2014, sued Stevens. The Sixth Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Stevens. Petrolite unquestionably knew of and approved each step that gave rise to the settlement contract at issue, the Release Provision of which unambiguously released Stevens from the obligations of the Termination Agreement. View "Baker Hughes Inc. v. S&S Chemical, LLC" on Justia Law

Samaan, a General Dynamics engineer since 1977, believed that the company was using the wrong shock-and-vibration testing methods on Stryker armored vehicles developed for use by the Army in Afghanistan and Iraq, which led, in turn, to submission of purportedly erroneous reports detailing the shock-and-vibration specifications for the vehicles. Samaan alleged that from 2004-2010 he repeatedly raised his concerns and eventually “filed a formal claim of data misrepresentation, fraud, and retaliation” with the Human Resources Department in 2010. General Dynamics allegedly gave Samaan his first poor performance evaluation in 2011, with a statement that his evaluation “would improve if he would ‘forget’ about the testing misrepresentation and fraud.” Samaan eventually took his concerns to the Army. He was suspended without pay, then filed suit, alleging retaliation, and resigned. An arbitrator, required by Samaan’s employment agreement, issued an award in favor of the Company, which the district court declined to vacate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the procedures employed during arbitration and stating that the Federal Arbitration Act does not allow for vacatur based on the fulfillment of moral and ethical obligations. View "Samaan v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Black drove a truck for Western, one of 48 freight service providers that carry raw paper to Dixie’s Bowling Green factory. Black parked the truck, containing 41,214 pounds of pulpboard rolls, separated by 10-lb. rubber mats. Black received permission from Chinn, the Dixie forklift operator, to enter the loading dock. It was “[c]ommon practice” for the truck driver to unload the rubber mats so that the Dixie forklift operator did not “have to get off each time.” Chinn and Black got “into a rhythm” in unloading the materials until Chinn ran over Black’s foot with the forklift, leading to a below-the-knee amputation of Black’s leg. Black received workers’ compensation from Western, then filed a tort action against Dixie, seeking $1,850,000. Following a remand, the district court denied Dixie summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act barred Black’s claims, Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.610(2), .690. The work Black was doing as part and parcel of what Dixie does; a worker injured in this setting will receive compensation regardless of fault by a company in Dixie’s shoes or one in Western’s shoes. The immunity from a further lawsuit applies as well. This burden and benefit are the trade-offs built into any workers’ compensation system. View "Black v. Dixie Consumer Prods., LLC" on Justia Law

Kellogg and the Union have a Master Agreement, effective 2012-2015, and the supplemental Memphis Agreement, effective 2010-2013. The Master Agreement grants regular employees various benefits without defining regular employees. The Memphis Agreement distinguishes between regular and casual employees. Negotiations for a new Memphis Agreement stalled over Kellogg’s proposals that the casual program no longer simply provide relief to regular employees, but “include any employees hired by Kellogg to perform production or any other bargaining unit work covered by” the Memphis Agreement; casual employees would no longer “be limited in the scope of their work, duties, tasks, hours, or in any other terms or conditions of employment,” could “be employed on an indefinite basis,” and would have seniority rights, access to a grievance procedure, participation in the job bidding process, and priority if Kellogg established an alternative crewing schedule. Insisting that Kellogg was attempting to amend the Master Agreement, the Union concluded negotiations. Kellogg sent a “Last/Best Offer.” The Union did not respond, Kellogg locked out 200 bargaining-unit employees. An ALJ concluded that Kellogg’s proposals were not mid-term modifications of the Master Agreement, so Kellogg was entitled to impose a lockout. The National Labor Relations Board disagreed, finding that Kellogg’s proposal effectively modified the terms of the unexpired Master Agreement. The Sixth Circuit vacated, stating that the proposal did not modify the Master Agreement's express terms and that the “effective modification” theory has been disclaimed. View "Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law