Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Employees at Caterpillar’s Clayton, Ohio facility voted on whether they would be represented as a union by the UAW; 188 employees voted for representation and 229 voted against. The UAW filed objections to instances of interrogation, the creation of the impression of improper surveillance, and the improper announcements of an employee bonus and new smoking shelters shortly before the vote. While the objections were pending, Caterpillar held an employee meeting to announce the construction of a guard shack, during which Craft asked what the shack was for. General Manager Purcell responded that the shack was “for guards,” eliciting laughter. Craft, upset, allegedly told coworkers: You guys (union supporters) just gained another supporter, I’m sick of the way they treat us ... He (Purcell) thinks he can treat us like he treated the thugs he managed … I’m sick of it, that motherfucker is going down now, the gloves are fucking off now.” After the statements were reported to management, Purcell notified the police and terminated Craft’s employment. An ALJ found the interrogations, the bonus, the smoking shelters, and Craft’s termination to be violations of the National Labor Relations Act and ordered remedial measures and a new election held. The NLRB affirmed, also finding a violation by creating the impression of surveillance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed and ordered enforcement. View "Caterpillar Logistics, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

From 2009-2013​, Schleicher worked for Preferred, a Michigan-based company that provides staffing for corporate clients. With his female co-workerPiotrowski, Schleicher led Preferred’s healthcare information technology group. The two performed the same job, had the same responsibilities, and each earned a share of the profits they collectively generated. They requested to be paid pursuant to different compensation models: Schleicher received 20% of the group’s profit pool, while Piotrowski received a $100,000 base salary plus a 10% draw from the profit pool. Schleicher outearned Piotrowski by $694,159.38, but had disagreements with Seipenko and other Preferred employees. In 2013, the company modified Schleicher’s compensation model so that it matched Piotrowski’s. At the end of 2013, Seipenko terminated Schleicher. Schleicher sued under the Equal Pay Act, alleging that Preferred violated the statute by paying him more than Piotrowski for three years, then lowering his compensation so that it matched Piotrowski’s. The district court granted summary judgment to Preferred, finding that it had conclusively established that sex played no part in the pay differential between Schleicher and Piotrowski. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Preferred carried its “heavy burden” of proving that the disparity between Piotrowski’s and Schleicher’s pay was due to a “factor other than sex.” View "Schleicher v. Preferred Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Rembisz, an IRS investigator, did not obtain sought-after promotions. He filed an administrative charge of discrimination, claiming ongoing discrimination against his sex (male) and race (Caucasian) or color (white). The Treasury Department investigated and rejected the claim. Federal employees must file a civil action for discrimination “[w]ithin 90 days of receipt of final action,” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c). He filed suit on June 21, 2013, alleging that he received notice of the final agency decision on March 25, within the 90-day window. The Sixth Circuit rejected a motion to dismiss in 2014, stating that Rembisz would have to “come forward with evidence” to support his allegation concerning notice. On remand, he never did so. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. It is presumed that notice is given, “and hence the ninety-day limitations term begins running, on the fifth day following the [] mailing of [a right-to-sue] notification to the claimant[].” The agency served its notification by first class and certified mail on March 15, making March 20 the presumptive date that the limitations period began. Rembisz offered no evidence to the contrary. The government submitted a certified-mail receipt, showing that Rembisz received the notice on March 22, so that his complaint was one day late. View "Rembisz v. Lew" on Justia Law

Multi-employer funds established by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractor National Association and the Sheet Metal Worker’s Union sought confirmation of arbitration awards granted against five employers. None of the employers had participated in the arbitration, which concerned contributions to the funds. The district court declined to confirm the award, concluding that there was an open question as to whether the employers were party to the CBA, and, therefore, bound to its arbitration procedures. After initially ruling that state law applied to the question of whether the employers were bound to arbitrate under the CBA, the court certified a question for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b): whether state or federal law will apply at trial to the question of whether the employers “are bound/signatory to” the CBA? The Sixth Circuit reversed. While state contract law may provide helpful guideposts to federal courts, it is well-established that in the field of labor relations, the technical rules of contract law do not determine the existence of a CBA. The law to be applied to the question of whether a party has assented to the terms of a CBA, including an arbitration provision, is ultimately federal. View "Sheet Metal Employers Indus. Promotion Fund v. Absolut Balancing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011 UJC private jet charter services hired Plaintiff as a co-pilot. After altercations between Plaintiff, a woman, and male pilots, which Plaintiff perceived to constitute sexual harassment, Plaintiff wrote an email to UJC management. About three weeks later, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Plaintiff sued, alleging retaliation. Defendants’ answer stated that UJC had converted from a corporation to an LLC. Plaintiff did not amend her complaint. Defendants’ subsequent motions failed did not raise the issue of UJC’s identity. UJC’s CEO testified that he had received reports that Plaintiff had used her cell phone below 10,000 feet; that once Plaintiff became intoxicated and danced inappropriately at a bar while in Atlantic City for work; that Plaintiff had once dangerously performed a turning maneuver; and that Plaintiff had a habit of unnecessarily executing “max performance” climbs. There was testimony that UJC’s male pilots often engaged the same behavior. The jury awarded her $70,250.00 in compensatory and $100,000.00 in punitive damages. When Plaintiff attempted to collect on her judgment, she was told that the corporation was out of business without assets, but was offered a settlement of $125,000.00. The court entered a new judgment listing the LLC as the defendant, noting that UJC’s filings and witnesses substantially added to confusion regarding UJC’s corporate form and that the LLC defended the lawsuit as though it were the real party in interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating it was unlikely that UJC would have offered a generous settlement had it genuinely believed itself to be a victim of circumstance, or that it would be deprived of due process by an amendment to the judgment; the response indicated a litigation strategy based on “roll[ing] the dice at trial and then hid[ing] behind a change in corporate structure when it comes time to collect.” View "Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC" on Justia Law

Ford hired Ferrari in 1996. In 2000, Ferrari suffered a neck injury at work. He was on medical leave for almost two years. Ford then accommodated his restrictions for nine years, in light-work positions, and approved leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) four times. After the last leave, Brewer, Ford's doctor, cleared Ferrari to return from psychiatric medical leave. Brewer did not lift Ferrari’s neck injury restrictions pending further testing, citing recent notes finding Ferrari disabled and an ongoing need for narcotics. Another doctor had found that Ferrari was addicted. Meanwhile, two skilled trades apprenticeships, to which his seniority entitled Ferrari if he passed a physical, opened. Ferrari obtained clearances from outside doctors and a functional capacity evaluator. The evaluators did not address whether the opioids could affect his performance. Brewer concluded that Ferrari was “able to work without restrictions from a physical perspective,” but maintained the ladder-climbing and overhead-work restrictions until he could be taken off the prescribed opioids, "3-4 months.” The supervisor concluded that Ferrari’s restrictions disqualified him from the apprenticeship. Ferrari was bypassed and is now first on the wait list for an apprenticeship. Ferrari alleged that Ford’s decision was unlawful discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and FMLA retaliation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Ford. Ford only barred Ferrari from a particular job, temporarily; the evidence does not show that Ford regarded Ferrari’s opioid use as a substantial impairment on the major life activity of working. There was no evidence that the decision-makers did not honestly believe that his restrictions reflected a reasonable medical judgment. View "Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 2010, Craig was hired as a bookkeeper for Bridges. She would sometimes move her hours to a different week to avoid going over 40 hours. After demanding overtime pay, she was terminated and filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219, seeking compensation for four years’ worth of unpaid overtime work. The district court ruled in favor of the employer, holding that by “miscalculating” her own overtime pay rate, Craig had “failed to follow the reasonable time reporting procedures established by [the employer] and . . . therefore thwarted its ability to comply with the FLSA.” The Sixth Circuit reversed the summary judgment, concluding that there were material questions as to how an employer might acquire at least constructive knowledge of its employee’s overtime hours, and, factually, whether such knowledge on the part of a supervisor, is attributable to Bridges in this case. View "Craig v. Bridges Bros. Trucking LLC" on Justia Law

Edwards worked as a CSX train engineer for 31 years. He arrived at work on May 28, 2012, with an upset stomach. The bathroom in the lead locomotive was “nasty,” Edwards saw and smelled:“[U]rine, human waste, . . . [and] blue chemical” splattered all over the toilet and floor. Edwards sprayed disinfectant, closed the door, and started the trip. During a stop, about 80 miles and six hours later, Edwards’ nausea escalated. Unwilling to use a foul bathroom, he sprinted to a catwalk, outside of the locomotive. He threw up over the side. Then he vomited a second time and, in the process, fell over the handrail onto the ground below. He broke two of his vertebrae and cracked a rib, ending his career with CSX. Edwards sought damages under Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51; its regulations required CSX to keep its locomotive bathroom sanitary. On remand, CSX again obtained summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. CSX complied with the rules the day before Edwards’ injury, when it inspected and cleaned the bathroom; the regulations do not require railroads to ensure that the toilets are clean at any given moment between inspections. Edwards had abandoned his other negligence claims. View "Edwards v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Baker, an Ohio concrete construction business, subcontracts its work to smaller firms. In 2000, Baker signed a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Reinforced Concrete Contractors Association and the Union, covering current employees and employees not yet hired. A prehire CBA is allowed only in the construction industry, 29 U.S.C. 158(f). The CBA renewed automatically. On January 25, 2013, Baker sent the Union a letter, asserting: “Baker’s notice of its intent to terminate the Agreement, including any subsequent successor agreements.” The Union responded: "notice of withdrawal should be made not more than 60 days prior to the termination of the Agreement. The Agreement is in effect … until May 31, 2015, therefore your request was untimely." Baker reiterated that none of its employees perform work covered by the Agreement and that none had performed bargaining unit work covered by the Agreement for at least seven years. The Union filed a grievance. Baker stated that it did not recognize the arbitrator’s authority, but would appear to preserve its position. The arbitrator found Baker in violation of the CBA. The district court vacated the award. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, adopting the single-employee-unit rule; an employer may repudiate statutory and contractual obligations when the employer does not employ anyone within the relevant bargaining unit. View "Baker Concrete Constr., Inc. v. Reinforced Concrete Contractors Ass'n" on Justia Law

OSU hired Szeinbach in 1999 as a tenured professor in the College of Pharmacy, which then included doctors Vazquez (of Spanish origin) and Balkrishnan (of Indian origin). In 2005-2006, Szeinbach allegedly observed Balkrishnan and others discriminate against Seoane and that Balkrishnan favored Indian students. Szeinbach emailed the dean, stating that an evaluation of Seoane was “intentionally very biased.” Seoane filed an EEOC charge. Szeinbach later alleged that she had supported Seoane’s efforts by providing a copy of her email to the dean. She filed an internal complaint, alleging retaliation for her support of Seoane. In 2007 Balkrishnan wrote to the Primary Care Respiratory Journal, claiming that an article that Szeinbach had published was nearly identical to an article that Szeinbach had published in 2005. Balkrishnan sent similar correspondence to the dean and others and filed an internal complaint. A Committee concluded that Szeinbach’s use of and failure to cite her 2005 article demonstrated the “poorest of scholarly practices,” but closed its investigation. Balkrishnan continued to pursue the matter and, in a faculty meeting, called Szeinbach a “bitch.” In her suit for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, the jury awarded her $300,000 in damages for emotional suffering and harm to her professional reputation and $213,368 to account for income that Szeinbach allegedly would have earned absent OSU’s illegal conduct. The court reduced Szeinbach’s damages by $213,368. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding her evidence “wholly speculative.” View "Szeinbach v. Ohio State Univ." on Justia Law