Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

HCEA was recognized under the Tennessee Education Professional Negotiations Act (EPNA) as the exclusive representative of Hamilton County Board of Education professional employees. In 2011, HCEA and the Board entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), to expire in June 2014. While this agreement was in effect, Tennessee enacted the Professional Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act, replacing EPNA. PECCA would not govern the parties’ relationship until the expiration of their existing agreement. HCEA and the Board entered into the latest version of their CBA under EPNA in September 2013. PECCA created a new category: “management team” members, including principals and assistant principals, no longer considered “professional employees” entitled to participate in concerted activities as part of professional employee organizations. PECCA also made it unlawful for a professional employee organization to “[c]oerce or attempt to intimidate professional employees who choose not to join a professional employee organization.” Communications following HCEA’s September 2013 monthly meeting resulted in a Board letter, requesting that HCEA “refrain from … negative or coercive statements.” HCEA filed suit, alleging violation of EPNA and the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment favoring the Board. EPNA claims were not rendered moot by PECCA’s intervening effective date, but the letter did not violate EPNA. It contained no threat of reprisal and did not significantly burden HCEA’s expressive activity. View "Hamilton Cnty. Ed. Ass'n. v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Witham claims she was fired from her position as a Louisville hotel general manager because she sought workers’ compensation after sustaining injuries on the job during a confrontation with a non-guest visitor to the hotel lobby. The hotel claims it fired her because she engaged in a heated verbal exchange with that man, followed by a physical confrontation. Video footage of the incident validated the company’s version of what happened, including Witham’s taunting of the man and attempt to block his retreat. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the hotel. View "Witham v. Intown Suites Louisville NE" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class-action suit against their former employer, Huntington Bank, alleging that the Bank failed to pay overtime compensation as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-219. Plaintiffs moved to conditionally certify a class of all current and former employees whose primary job duty consisted of “underwriting,” or “providing [Huntington’s] credit products to customers after reviewing and evaluating the loan applications against [the Bank’s] credit standards and guidelines that governed when to provide those credit products to those customers.” The court certified a smaller class of underwriters. The court found, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, that those who worked with residential-loan products are administrative employees and not entitled to overtime pay. Their job duties related to the general business operations of the Bank, and they exercised discretion and independent judgment when performing those duties. View "Lutz v. Huntington Bancshares, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against their employer, FTS, a cable-television business for which the plaintiffs work or worked as cable technicians. The district court certified the case as an FLSA collective action, allowing 293 other technicians to opt in. FTS Technicians are paid pursuant to a piece-rate compensation plan; each assigned job is worth a set amount of pay, regardless of the amount of time it takes to complete the job. FTS Technicians are paid by applying a .5 multiplier to their regular rate for overtime hours. They allege that FTS implemented a company-wide time-shaving policy that required its employees to systematically underreport their overtime hours. Technicians either began working before their recorded start times, recorded lunch breaks they did not take, or continued working after their recorded end time. Technicians also presented documentary evidence and testimony showing that FTS’s time-shaving policy originated with FTS’s corporate office. A jury returned verdicts in favor of the class, which the district court upheld before calculating and awarding damages. The Sixth Circuit affirmed certification of the case as a collective action and a finding that sufficient evidence supports the verdicts, but reversed the calculation of damages. View "Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1998, Jackson began working at DRH’s Crisis Center as a mental health technician. RNs were required to authorize patient-discharges. MHTs assisted with paperwork and physically escorting the patient. Before the patient is escorted out, both the RN and the MHT are required to check the patient’s identification wristband and bloodwork to verify that the correct patient is discharged. On September 6, 2013, Jackson assisted with a discharge; both she and the RN failed to check the ID band. The patient returned to the Center voluntarily about seven hours later. At an emergency meeting, Jackson admitted her mistake. Three days later, DRH terminated Jackson’s employment, citing “major infractions” of disciplinary policy. Jackson had consistently received high ratings on her performance evaluations and was apparently never disciplined for any prior infraction. At the time, 14 of 18 nurses were female; nine of 12 social workers were female. Jackson was the only female among 14 MHTs. Jackson claimed that the Center preferred male MHTs for their ability to physically handle unruly patients and filed suit, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Jackson argued that DRH did not terminate male MHTs who made mistakes of comparable seriousness. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of her suit. View "Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp." on Justia Law

On September 15, 2011, Elder Living ordered a background screening report on Rocheleau from First Advantage's predecessor, in conjunction with Rocheleau’s application for employment. The search disclosed criminal convictions matched to Rocheleau’s name and birth date. On September 16, First notified Rocheleau that it was reporting information derived from his public record and to direct any questions to its disclosure center. Days later, it sent another notice, advising that information from Rocheleau's report “may adversely affect [his] employment status” and that he was entitled to dispute it. The notice included a summary of rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681. On September 26, First notified Rocheleau that he had not been hired again advising Rocheleau of dispute procedures. Rocheleau contends that Elder shared the report with his then-employer, which terminated his employment. Rocheleau contacted First and complained that he had not authorized the report's release; he did not dispute its accuracy. On November 25, 2013, Rocheleau filed suit under FCRA, claiming that Elder obtained the report without his permission or notifying him that adverse action could result; that neither First nor Elder issued certifications mandated by statute; and that First failed to adhere to required “strict procedures” in releasing his information. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of the claims as time-barred under the two-year limitations period. View "Rocheleau v. Elder Living Constr., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, plaintiff started work at defendant’s Murfreesboro plant and was informed about the company’s sexual harassment policy. Plaintiff observed Leonard “come up behind” another man, “grab[] him in the butt,” and then sniff his finger. Twice, Leonard came up behind plaintiff and touched him inappropriately; both times plaintiff warned him. A month later, Leonard came up behind him again, “grabbed [him] by [the] hips and started hunching on [him]” so that Leonard’s “privates” were “up against [Plaintiff’s] tail.” Plaintiff confronted Leonard, then reported the incident. Although there had been other incidents, Leonard was suspended for two days and given a form, stating, “No contact with any employees that would be interpreted as sexual harassment.” Plaintiff did not return to work. He suffered anxiety attacks. His short-term disability insurance ran out. Plaintiff’s licensed clinical social worker diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder. Leonard was fired after he admitted in a deposition that he had “mooned” or touched other men in the workplace. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging sexual harassment, wrongful termination, and retaliation under the Tennessee Human Rights Act and hostile work environment and constructive discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2. The court granted partial summary judgment, rejecting the retaliation and constructive discharge claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict and award of $300,000 on his Title VII claim. View "Smith v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

From 1983-2005, Moen entered into collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the union. Employees who retired 1983-1996 and their dependents received hospitalization, surgical and medical coverage without cost. If the retirees (or spouses) were over age 65, Moen also reimbursed the full cost of Medicare Part B premiums. After 1996, retirees and dependents received hospitalization, surgical, and medical coverage upon payment of a co-premium frozen at the time of retirement. If over 65, they received Part B premium reimbursements at specified rates. In 2008, Moen shut down its Elyria operations. A “Closure Effects Agreement” provided that health-care coverage “shall continue” for retirees and spouses “under the [final] Collective Bargaining Agreement.” In 2013, Moen decreased benefits in response to “recent Medicare improvements” and the imposition of an excise tax on “Cadillac plans” through the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. 4980I. Medicare-eligible retirees no longer receive coverage or Part B premium reimbursements; Moen shifted non-Medicare-eligible retirees to a plan that requires higher out-of-pocket payments. The court certified a class of about 200 individuals who had retired from the plant and were not covered by an earlier settlement agreement, then granted the plaintiffs summary judgment in reliance on Sixth Circuit precedent that was subsequently repudiated by the Supreme Court. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on that 2015 decision. View "Gallo v. Moen Inc." on Justia Law

During negotiations, Rubber Associates proposed to the Union that it decrease its contribution rate to the United Food and Commercial Workers Union Employer Pension Fund (governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001) from 62 cents per hour to 30 cents per hour. The Fund’s actuary opined that collecting withdrawal liability would result in a better funding status for the Fund than accepting reduced contributions. Rubber Associates agreed to maintain its previous contribution rate. Negotiations resumed without success. The Union authorized a strike, which lasted for 17 months. After the Union unilaterally disclaimed interest in representing its employees, Rubber Associates was deemed to have withdrawn from the Fund, pursuant to the Multiemployer Pension Protection Amendments Act (MPPAA). The Fund calculated Rubber Associates’ withdrawal liability obligation at $1,713,169, which the arbitrator awarded in full. The Fund sued to enforce the award. Rubber Associates counterclaimed that, because withdrawal from the Fund was union-mandated, its liability should be calculated by an alternate method, making its liability only $312,000. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the counterclaim, declining to recognize a claim under the federal common law of ERISA for equitable relief in the case of union-mandated withdrawals. View "United Food & Commercial Workers v. Rubber Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

Blesedell, employed by Chillicothe Telephone Company since 1996, was terminated in 2012 for falsifying a timecard and impersonating a customer in telephone calls to the company. Blesedell sued the company and his union, asserting a hybrid 29 U.S.C. 185 (section 301)-fair-representation claim. Blesedell also asserted a defamation claim against the company’s human resources manager, based on the manager’s statements to union members and a police officer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the union did not breach its duty of fair representation during the grievance process, and the human resource manager’s statements at issue were true or were protected by a qualified privilege. View "Blesedell v. Chillicothe Telephone Co." on Justia Law