Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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Alvin Moore, a Black man, worked at Coca-Cola Bottling Company (CCBC) from 2015 to 2018. In March 2017, after a workplace accident, Moore tested positive for marijuana at a level below the company's threshold. Despite this, he signed a Second Chance Agreement (SCA) requiring random drug testing for 24 months. In June 2017, Moore was fired for insubordination but was reinstated under a Last Chance Agreement (LCA), which he signed under pressure. In 2018, Moore tested positive for marijuana again and was terminated. He sued CCBC for racial discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and Ohio law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio granted summary judgment in favor of CCBC, finding that Moore had waived his pre-LCA claims by signing the LCA and failed to establish that CCBC's reasons for his termination were pretextual. The court presumed Moore had made a prima facie case for racial discrimination and retaliation but concluded that Moore did not show that CCBC's reasons for his termination were a pretext for discrimination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Moore voluntarily waived his pre-LCA claims by signing the LCA. The court noted that Moore's union representative had advised him to sign the LCA, suggesting he could still pursue his claims. The court also found that Moore had shown enough evidence to suggest that CCBC's reasons for his termination could be pretextual, particularly in light of the different treatment of similarly situated white employees.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Moore to pursue his claims of racial discrimination and retaliation. View "Moore v. Coca-Cola Consolidated, Inc." on Justia Law

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Aimee Sturgill, a registered nurse and devout Christian, objected to the American Red Cross's COVID-19 vaccination mandate, citing her religious beliefs. She requested a religious exemption, explaining that her faith required her to treat her body as a temple and avoid defiling it with the vaccine, which she believed could cause harm due to her blood clotting disorder. The Red Cross denied her request, stating that her objections were medically, not religiously, based and terminated her employment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed Sturgill's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court held that she did not plausibly allege a prima facie case for a failure-to-accommodate claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court also concluded that Sturgill did not set forth a separate disparate-treatment claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred by requiring Sturgill to establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage, which is not necessary under the plausibility standard set by Twombly and Iqbal. The appellate court found that Sturgill's complaint plausibly alleged that her refusal to take the COVID-19 vaccine was an aspect of her religious observance or belief. However, the court agreed with the district court that Sturgill's complaint did not set forth a standalone disparate-treatment claim. Consequently, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sturgill v. American Red Cross" on Justia Law

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Two employees, Tanika Parker and Andrew Farrier, participated in 401(k) plans managed by subsidiaries of Tenneco Inc. The plans were amended to include mandatory individual arbitration provisions, which required participants to arbitrate disputes individually and barred representative, class, or collective actions. Parker and Farrier alleged that the fiduciaries of their plans breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by failing to prudently manage the plans, resulting in higher costs and reduced retirement savings. They sought plan-wide remedies, including restitution of losses and disgorgement of profits.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied the fiduciaries' motion to compel individual arbitration. The court found that the arbitration provisions limited participants' substantive rights under ERISA by eliminating their ability to bring representative actions and seek plan-wide remedies, which are guaranteed by ERISA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Sixth Circuit held that the individual arbitration provisions were unenforceable because they acted as a prospective waiver of the participants' statutory rights and remedies under ERISA. The court emphasized that ERISA allows participants to sue on behalf of a plan and obtain plan-wide relief, and the arbitration provisions' restrictions on representative actions and plan-wide remedies violated these statutory rights. Consequently, the arbitration provisions were invalid, and the district court's judgment was affirmed. View "Parker v. Tenneco, Inc." on Justia Law

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Joel M. Guy, Jr. murdered his parents in 2016 with the intent to collect the proceeds from his mother’s insurance plans. His mother had life insurance and accidental death and dismemberment insurance through her employer, naming Guy and his father as beneficiaries. Guy was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and abuse of a corpse by a Tennessee jury.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee determined that Guy would be entitled to the insurance proceeds if not disqualified. However, the court ruled that Guy was disqualified under Tennessee’s slayer statute or federal common law, which prevents a murderer from benefiting from their crime. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Guy’s family members, who argued that Guy was not entitled to the benefits. Guy appealed, arguing that ERISA preempts Tennessee’s slayer statute and that no federal common-law slayer rule applies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that ERISA does not explicitly address the issue of a beneficiary who murders the insured, and thus, either Tennessee law or federal common law must apply. The court found that both Tennessee’s slayer statute and federal common law would disqualify Guy from receiving the insurance proceeds. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that Guy’s actions disqualified him from benefiting from his mother’s insurance plans under both state and federal law. View "Standard Insurance Co. v. Guy" on Justia Law

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Next Century Rebar, LLC (NCR) worked on a project in Detroit, Michigan, within the jurisdiction of Local Union Number 25 (Local 25). Due to a shortage of Local 25 iron workers, NCR hired workers from out-of-state unions, Local 416 and Local 846. NCR made benefits contributions to the funds associated with these out-of-state unions. In 2021, Local 25 Funds conducted an audit and found that NCR had not made contributions to the Local 25 Funds for these out-of-state employees. NCR contested this, arguing that it had already made contributions to the out-of-state funds.The Local 25 Funds filed a lawsuit under 29 U.S.C. § 1145, seeking unpaid contributions. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the Local 25 Funds, awarding them $1,787,300.75 in unpaid contributions, $143,075.41 in interest, and $288,598.80 in liquidated damages. The court also awarded $18,233.15 in costs and $99,812.25 in attorney fees. NCR appealed, arguing that the district court applied the wrong summary-judgment standard, improperly granted summary judgment despite genuine disputes of material fact, and abused its discretion by not awarding a setoff for contributions made to out-of-state funds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Local 25 CBA required contributions based on the specific employee’s gross earnings for the vacation fund and base wages for the pension fund. However, it was unclear whether the audit used the correct wage rates. The court also found that the Local 25 Funds' request for contributions violated the International Agreement’s prohibition on double payments. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trustees of Iron Workers Defined Contribution Pension Fund v. Next Century Rebar, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves an unfair labor practice dispute between Rieth-Riley Construction Co., a highway construction contractor in Michigan, and Local 324, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO. The dispute centers on subcontracting and employee wages. The last collective-bargaining agreement expired on May 31, 2018, and despite multiple bargaining sessions, no successor agreement has been reached. The Union went on strike on July 31, 2019, and picketing incidents ensued, including an altercation where a striking union member, Michael Feighner, assaulted a truck driver, Karl Grinstern.The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) General Counsel issued complaints against both parties: against the Union for picketing misconduct and against Rieth-Riley for failing to provide requested subcontracting and employee information. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Rieth-Riley violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by not providing the requested information and that the Union violated the NLRA when Feighner assaulted Grinstern. The ALJ ordered Rieth-Riley to provide the requested information and the Union to cease and desist from such misconduct. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision with a slight modification.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that President Biden lawfully removed the NLRB General Counsel, and the General Counsel had unreviewable prosecutorial discretion. The court found substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusions that the requested information was relevant to the Union’s bargaining responsibilities and that Rieth-Riley’s refusal to provide it violated the NLRA. The court also upheld the finding that the Union’s assault on Grinstern was an unfair labor practice. The court denied Rieth-Riley’s petition for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement of its order in full. View "Rieth-Riley Construction Co. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

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During the COVID-19 pandemic, Kalitta Air, LLC implemented a vaccine mandate for all its employees. Employees who could not receive a vaccination due to a disability or a sincerely held religious belief could request an accommodation and would be placed on unpaid leave. If they remained unvaccinated after the leave period, they could either voluntarily resign or be terminated. Eleven employees, including five pilots, sued Kalitta under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, claiming that the mandate discriminated against them based on their religious beliefs and/or disabled status.The district court found that the Railway Labor Act precluded it from hearing certain claims by the pilots, who were subject to a collective bargaining agreement. These claims had to first go through arbitration as minor disputes. The pilots appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the pilots' claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act required interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and thus were minor disputes that had to be resolved through arbitration. The court also held that the pilots' claim of discrimination based on perceived disability would require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and was therefore also precluded by the Railway Labor Act. View "Odell v. Kalitta Air, LLC" on Justia Law

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The case involves Benjamin Stanley, who was employed by Western Michigan University (WMU) for about a month before his employment was terminated. Stanley, who has severe ADHD, claimed that WMU and certain supervisors discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). He also brought a claim under Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), as well as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed Stanley’s federal claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and dismissed his state-law claims for failure to comply with the Michigan Court of Claims Act’s notification statute.The district court's dismissal of Stanley's claims was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Stanley’s federal claims and the denial of Stanley’s motion for leave to amend his complaint. However, the court vacated the judgment in part and remanded to the district court to dismiss Stanley’s federal and state-law claims without prejudice. The court found that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Stanley’s ADA claims because the defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Stanley lacked standing to request injunctive relief from the individual defendants. The court also found that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide Stanley’s state-law claims because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over any federal issues. View "Stanley v. Western Michigan University" on Justia Law

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Jeffrey Capen, a former employee of Saginaw County, Michigan, sued the county and Robert V. Belleman, the county's Controller and Chief Administrative Officer, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Capen claimed that his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when he was scheduled for two fitness-for-duty evaluations. The evaluations were ordered after a co-worker reported that Capen had threatened to kill other employees. Capen was subsequently placed on paid administrative leave and later terminated for failing to participate in an "interactive process" meeting to identify potential reasonable accommodations for his work, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that Capen lacked a constitutionally protected interest, that he received the process he was due, and that Belleman was entitled to qualified immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Capen's ability to refuse his fitness-for-duty evaluations did not constitute a protected interest under the Due Process Clause. The court noted that while the evaluations were stressful and deeply personal for Capen, he failed to demonstrate that his constitutional rights were violated. The court also observed that compelling circumstances justified the county's decision to require the evaluations, given the reported threats of violence. View "Capen v. Saginaw County, Michigan" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around Yvonne Craddock, an African American woman who was terminated from her employment at FedEx Corporate Services following a workplace altercation. Craddock alleged that her termination was racially motivated, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The case was presented to a jury, which concluded that FedEx's reason for termination was pretextual, but that Craddock had failed to demonstrate that FedEx intentionally discriminated against her because of her race. Craddock appealed, arguing that the district court had made several errors, including forcing her to bifurcate the liability and damages portions of her trial and excluding testimony and evidence pertaining to events post-termination.The district court had granted FedEx’s motion to dismiss Craddock’s libel claim, Family Medical Leave Act claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim, and spoliation claim, but denied dismissal of her Title VII claims. After discovery, the court granted FedEx’s motion for summary judgment on Craddock’s Title VII claims. The case was then taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion regarding the claims raised by Craddock, and affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court found that the district court's decision to bifurcate the trial was not an abuse of discretion, and that the court's exclusion of testimony and exhibits postdating the termination was not erroneous. The court also found no error in the district court's trial rulings and case management decisions, and concluded that the jury verdict form was not plainly erroneous. The court further held that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors did not deprive Craddock of a trial consistent with constitutional guarantees of due process. View "Craddock v. FedEx Corporate Services, Inc." on Justia Law