Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Yeager filed a complaint alleging that the defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112, by refusing to hire him or by terminating his employment because he failed to provide a social security number. Yeager alleged that he had no social security number because he had disclaimed and disavowed it on account of his sincerely held religious beliefs. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under either Title VII or Chapter 4112 Yeager was required to prove that he holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; he has informed the employer about the conflicts; and he was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. If Yeager established his prima facie case, his employer has the burden to show that it could not “reasonably accommodate” his religious beliefs without “undue hardship.” An employer is not liable when accommodating an employee’s religious beliefs would require the employer to violate federal law. View "Yeager v. FirstEnergy Generation Corp." on Justia Law

Tilley, 59 years old, began working for the Road Commission in 1993. In 2008, Tilley began reporting principally to Bartholomew, the Commission’s general superintendent. After several disputes between the two, Tilley was fired. He sued, alleging termination based on his age in violation of Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. 37.2201, and that the Road Commission interfered with his right to, and retaliated against him for taking, medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted the Road Commission’s motion for summary judgment on all of Tilley’s claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Tilley’s ELCRA age-discrimination claim, but reversed summary on Tilley’s claims under the FMLA. Tilley presented sufficient evidence to create a material factual dispute on his claim that the Road Commission was equitably estopped from denying that he was covered under the FMLA. Because the district court granted summary judgment on the basis that Tilley was not an “eligible employee,” it did not address the other bases on which the Road Commission sought summary judgment on Tilley’s FMLA interference and retaliation claims. View "Tilley v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Road Comm'n" on Justia Law

Security guards at MotorCity Casino sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act overtime provision, 29 U.S.C. 207(a). They claimed they worked five, eight-hour shifts per week, escorting cash, monitoring the casino floor, and listening to two-way radios. They were required to attend an uncompensated 15-minute meeting before every shift. A guard working an eight-hour shift was entitled to a paid, 30-minute meal period. Guards could not leave casino property, have food delivered, or receive visitors; they spent meal periods in a cafeteria, where free food and drinks were available, or walking along an outdoor path. Guards had to listen to their radios and, if they heard the code, respond to an emergency. Guards who lost meal time responding to an emergency were entitled to have the time made up. Emergencies rarely interrupted meal periods. Guards had to focus on the radio chatter to know if an emergency required occurred, but were able to eat, socialize, and use their phones. The court held that meal periods were non-compensable, that monitoring the radio was a de minimis activity, not a substantial job duty, and that MotorCity could offset paid meal time against time in unpaid, but compensable, meetings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No reasonable jury could find that the meal periods predominantly benefitted the casino. View "Ruffin v. MotorCity Casino" on Justia Law

Michigan corrections officers must perform several pre-shift and post-shift activities, including “punching a mechanical time clock,” “waiting in line” for security, and “walking to assigned locations.” These activities take place off the clock. Corrections officers and their union filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state law to recover overtime payments, 29 U.S.C. 206, 207; Mich. Comp. Laws 408.414, .414a. The Michigan Department of Corrections successfully moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Without a past (or imminent future) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has no remedial power under Section 5 to authorize private lawsuits against the states; absent permissible Section 5 legislation abrogating the state’s immunity from suit, federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain these FLSA claims against the Department of Corrections or to grant a declaratory judgment under Ex parte Young against the Department’s director, to address an alleged ongoing violation of the FLSA. View "Mich. Corrs. Org. v. Mich. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Hoey, who owns a farmers’ market that offers hay rides, pony rides, and pumpkin picking, hired Armbruster to run the hay wagon for eight weekends. Armbruster is now a paraplegic because an accident with the wagon crushed her spine. She sued for negligence in Michigan state court. Armbruster and Hoey also sought a declaratory judgment, again in state court, that Armbruster was covered by Hoey’s General Commercial Liability insurance policy. The insurer, Western, sought a federal declaratory judgment that Armbruster was not covered by the insurance policy. The cases were consolidated in federal court. Counsel, provided by Western to Hoey, filed a workers’ compensation claim on the theory that Armbruster was an “employee” eligible for workers’ compensation. The state tort claim has been stayed until the workers’ compensation claim is resolved. The district court accepted jurisdiction and construed the policy to exclude Armbruster’s injury from coverage. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that it would be helpful for the parties to know whether Western was liable for Hoey’s legal fees, that Western was not playing procedural games, and that the federal forum could resolve the action without interfering in Armbruster’s tort suit or taking on difficult questions of state law. View "W. World Ins. Co. v. Armbruster" on Justia Law

The Department of Energy hired Vander Boegh in 1992 as landfill manager at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. In 1998, DOE awarded the Plant’s contract to BJC, which subcontracted with WESKEM for waste management services. Vander Boegh’s employment continued; he engaged in protected activity as landfill manager, including reporting environmental violations. In 2005, after soliciting new bids, DOE awarded the Plant’s contract to PRS. EnergySolutions provided waste management services by subcontract. In 2006, Plant operations transitioned to PRS-EnergySolutions. Vander Boegh applied to be the new landfill manager, but EnergySolutions hired another candidate. Vander Boegh’s employment terminated. He filed an employment discrimination complaint, alleging retaliation for protected conduct in violation of: the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5851; the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h)(1)); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300j-9(i); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1367; Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2622; and Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. 6971. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to EnergySolutions. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Vander Boegh lacked statutory standing because he was an applicant, not an employee. View "Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2001, Memphis required all newly hired fire fighters to become certified as level four emergency medical technicians (EMT-IV). In 2007, the city began requiring all new fire fighters to become certified as paramedics (EMT-P). Plaintiffs were subject to the new policy. It can take up to 18 months to become trained as a paramedic. The department required applicants to agree that within three years of employment they would become licensed paramedics, but did not indicate that the training would be uncompensated or off-duty. When hired, plaintiffs were required to sign an Acceptance Letter that stated that employment was subject to becoming certified as an EMT. The department considers time spent in EMT-IV, Firefighter I, and Firefighter II training as hours worked and compensates employees for that time, but does not count time spent attending Paramedic Training as work and does not compensate for attending that training. The district court rejected a suit seeking overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the department hired the plaintiffs, not simply as fire fighters, but to perform as both fire fighters and paramedics. View "Misewicz v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

Catholic nuns volunteered with the American Red Cross and the Ross County Emergency Management Agency for an extended time, but did not receive compensation or benefits, complete employment-related tax documentation, restrict their schedules, or submit to the control of either organization by other incidents of an agency relationship. They were not promoted by the Red Cross and were terminated as Agency volunteers. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission rejected their complaint for lack of jurisdiction; the EEOC does not provide a Right to Sue Letter following a jurisdictional dismissal. The nuns sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Ohio Civil Rights Act for religious discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their rights of free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection. Finding that the Sisters had not sufficiently alleged state action, the district court dismissed the section 1983 claims, then held that, because they were not employees of either organization, the Sisters could not maintain a claim against them under Title VII. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A volunteer relationship does not fairly approximate employment and is not covered by Title VII, nor were constitutional rights violated. View "Sister Michael Marie v. Am. Red Cross" on Justia Law

Frieder joined Morehead State University in 2006 as an assistant professor of art history. During his time in probation, Frieder excelled in professional achievement and service but had difficulty teaching. The reviews of his introductory art history class were consistently abysmal. Frieder’s evaluators suggested improvements, asking Frieder to observe other teachers or visit the “Center for Teaching & Learning,” but after four years of renewing Frieder’s contract, the evaluators voted against tenure and the provost and president agreed. Frieder sued, alleging violation of the First Amendment and a Kentucky statute that prohibits disability-based discrimination, KRS 344.040. Frieder argued that his evaluators retaliated against his “idiosyncratic teaching methods,” which allegedly involved context-appropriate uses of the middle finger and that the tenure decision stemmed from his diagnosis of bipolar disorder, which he admitted his evaluators knew nothing about. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No evidence showed that anything other than his poor student ratings and disorganization motivated the tenure decision. View "Frieder v. Morehead St. Univ." on Justia Law

Memphis’s promotional processes have caused controversy for nearly 40 years, prompting numerous lawsuits alleging racial and gender discrimination by such parties including the U.S. Department of Justice, the Afro-American Police Association, and white and minority officers. The city instituted a process in 1996 designed by an industrial and organizational psychologist, and overseen by a Department of Justice consultant and adjusted the process in 2000. After the city discovered that leaked answers compromised the results, it readjusted and ultimately consented to the invalidation of the 2000 process. The city hired outside consultants to design replacement tests that would become the 2002 process. The district court dismissed a negligence claim concerning the already-invalidated 2000 process under Tennessee’s governmental-immunity statute, Tenn. Code 29-20-205; invalidated the 2002 process for violating Title VII’s disparate-impact prohibition, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(1); and awarded back pay and interest to plaintiffs and more than $1 million in fees and expenses to their attorneys. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the immunity-based dismissal, reversed the Title VII judgment invalidating the 2002 process, vacated the fees award and remanded. The court noted that plaintiffs failed to present evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact regarding the availability of equally valid, less discriminatory alternative testing. View "Acosta v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law