Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Band, a federally recognized Indian tribe, has more than 4,000 enrolled members, most living within or near its aboriginal lands in Michigan. Under the Little Bands Act and the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. 476, the Band enacted a constitution that vests its legislative powers in the Tribal Council and grants the Council power to operate gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 2701. The Band entered into a compact with the State of Michigan to conduct gaming activities on Manistee trust lands. The casino has 905 employees: 107 are enrolled Band members, 27 are members of other tribes, and 771 are not members of any Indian tribe. Most casino employees live outside the Band’s trust lands. Apart from the casino, 245 employees work for the Band: 108 are Band members. The Council enacted a Fair Employment Practices Code, which essentially prohibit or drastically restrict most concerted activities, collective bargaining, and organization efforts. Acting under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151–169, the National Labor Relations Board issued an order to the Band to cease and desist enforcing provisions that conflict with the NLRA. The Sixth Circuit entered an enforcement order, finding that the NLRA applies to the casino. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians" on Justia Law

Defendants own and operate Auto Pro repair shops in Warren and Troy, Michigan. Plaintiff was employed as a mechanic at the Warren shop in 2011-2013. Syed manages that shop. The parties disagree about the beginning date of Plaintiff’s employment and his compensation. Plaintiff claimed that he worked 65-68 hours per week and was never paid overtime. He admitted to receiving “a little extra” money on occasion. Defendants claim that Plaintiff never worked more than 30 hours per week. They put forward paystubs and timesheets, indicating that he was paid $300 per week, (30 hours at $10 per hour). Syed stated that he security footage to determine employees’ arrival and departure times, from which he created timesheets. Defendants also submitted an affidavit from a manager, Blue. Blue stated that he did not permit Plaintiff to work after the shop closd to the public. Blue stated that “Plaintiff … never worked over 30 hours per week. The district court granted Defendants summary judgment in a suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201. The Sixth Circuit reversed; a plaintiff’s testimony alone may be sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff put forward testimony that contradicted that of Defendants, describing his typical work schedule with some specificity. View "Moran v. Al Basit, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued USBI, alleging retaliation in violation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. 1514A. Plaintiff was disciplined and fired in retaliation for an email he sent alerting his superiors to unsuitable trades made by a co-worker, Harrigan, to the detriment of Plaintiff’s elderly client, Purcell. The trades occurred while Plaintiff was on disability leave. Plaintiff learned of the trades from his assistant shortly after they were made. He called his supervisor twice to express concern and wrote an email to his supervising principal, criticizing the trades for “destroy[ing]” Purcell’s estate plan. Upon returning, Plaintiff was reprimanded for his email. His superiors threatened his job, placed him on an aggressive “performance improvement plan,” and fired him when he ultimately failed to meet its goals. The jury awarded damages for economic loss and emotional damages, finding that Plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he had an objectively reasonable belief that Harrigan committed unsuitability fraud and that his email was a contributing factor in his termination; and that USBI did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have discharged Plaintiff even if he had not sent the email. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff established that he engaged in protected activity. View "Rhinehimer v. U.S. Bancorp Inv.., Inc." on Justia Law

Wheat, an African-American male, began working at the bank in 2001. By 2010, he was a payment processor in the wholesale-lockbox department and functioned as an “auditor” who “double-check[ed] [other] payment processor[s’] work.” In February 2010, Wheat was involved in a verbal altercation with a Caucasian worker, whose work Wheat had checked. Wheat’s employment was terminated because he “violated workplace violence policy … made a threat of physical violence … violated anti-harassment policy and … was in violation of [the bank’s] core values.” The other worker was given only a written disciplinary action, having been deemed a “nonaggressor.” Wheat contacted the Ohio Civil Rights Commission; the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found reasonable cause to believe that violations of the statutes occurred but could not obtain a settlement. The district court rejected Wheat’s claims under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Ohio Civil Rights Act, Ohio Rev. Stat. 4112.02(A). The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Wheat met his less-than-onerous burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination and identified genuine disputes of material fact that preclude a finding that the bank’s stated reasons for firing Wheat were not pretextual. View "Wheat v. Fifth Third Bank" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a Title VII sexual harassment and retaliation action against New Breed Logistics, alleging that Calhoun, a New Breed supervisor, sexually harassed three women and retaliated against the women after they objected to his sexual advances. The EEOC also alleged that Calhoun retaliated against Partee, a male employee, who verbally opposed Calhoun’s sexual harassment and supported the women’s complaints. All four employees had been terminated from New Breed. A jury found New Breed liable under Title VII for Calhoun’s sexual harassment and retaliation and awarded the four employees compensatory and punitive damages totaling more than $1.5 million dollars. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence as to liability and punitive damages and to the instructions submitted to the jury concerning employer knowledge with respect to retaliation. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. New Breed Logistics" on Justia Law

Ragozzine was a tenure-track professor at Youngstown State University. He did not produce much scholarship. Ragozzine attributed the delay to his lab’s not being fully operational until his second academic year. In his fifth academic year, his mother and his wife fell ill, with some caretaking responsibilities falling on him. He was granted a year’s delay in the review of his tenure application. Although he met the minimum requirements with a last-minute flurry of publications, he was denied tenure because YSU determined that he lacked promise of consistent scholarly production. Ragozzine sued, alleging that he was discriminated against on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause; that YSU violated his rights under the Family Medical Leave Act, and that irregularities in his tenure review violated his procedural and substantive due process rights. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. Ragozzine subsequently moved to disqualify the judge, based on a previously undisclosed dating relationship between the judge and a YSU faculty member, arguing that the relationship created an appearance of impropriety under 28 U.S.C. 455 and the Code of Conduct for Judges. The district court denied that motion, concluding that no reasonable person would question her impartiality. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ragozzine v. Youngstown State Univ." on Justia Law

BLET, a labor union under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151, represents locomotive engineers and trainmen, including conductors and brakemen, who work for the railroad, a regional common carrier with 840 miles of track in Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Maryland. In 2003, the railroad served notice, seeking to eliminate the “crew consist” of the Trainmen Agreement, so that it would not have to assign a union conductor to each train. BLET refused this proposed change. After several years of failed efforts at negotiation, the railroad began substituting management employees for contract conductors. BLET went on strike. The district court entered a preliminary injunction barring BLET from taking economic action against the railroad, finding that the parties were engaged in a minor dispute. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for dismissal of the railroad’s complaint, finding that the dispute is major, not minor. Under the status quo requirement of the Act, the railroad was not free to implement at will the very change it sought to accomplish when it served the Section 6 notice on BLET. It did so anyway and prematurely resorted to self-help before the conclusion of the major dispute process. View "Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Nine multi-employer pension and welfare fringe benefit trust funds sued G&W Construction and its president, under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1145, to recover delinquent fringe-benefit payments under a contract between G&W and the Union. The defendants raised affirmative defenses of laches, estoppel, and waiver, alleging that the Union led G&W to believe that fringe benefit payments were due only for union members and that G&W relied upon the acts and omissions of the Union and the funds by bidding and accepting work on the reasonable understanding that Union wages and benefits did not apply to non-members. The Funds moved to strike the affirmative defenses, arguing that ERISA bars equitable defenses. The district court denied the motion to strike. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The district court should have granted the motion to strike the defenses of laches and equitable estoppel; the court declined to consider the district court’s ruling on the waiver defense. View "Operating Eng'rs Local 324 v. G & W Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Harris, a Ford Motor Company employee had irritable bowel syndrome. Ford initially tried to accommodate Harris, allowing telecommuting. After three attempts failed, Ford denied her request to work from home on an as-needed basis, up to four days per week, deeming regular and predictable on-site attendance essential to Harris’s highly interactive job. Harris had placed in the bottom 22% of her peer group in her fourth year on the job (2007) and in the bottom 10% in 2008. By her last year (2009), Harris “was not performing the basic functions of her position.” Ford said she lacked interpersonal skills, delivered work late, was not concerned with quality, and failed to properly communicate with suppliers. In 2008, she missed an average of 1.5 work days per week; in 2009, she was absent more than she was present. After Ford terminated her employment, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued Ford under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5). The district court granted summary judgment to Ford. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the ADA does not endow all disabled persons with a job—or job schedule—of their choosing. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Miri is a satellite-internet-dish installation company. Keller installed satellite internet dishes for Miri’s customers six days each week. Keller alleges that Miri did not compensate him adequately as an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207, by failing to pay him overtime compensation. Miri contends that Keller was an independent contractor, not entitled to overtime pay. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Miri. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The FLSA’s definition of “employee” is strikingly broad and “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles.” Keller offered sufficient evidence that he was an employee and that he worked more than 40 hours each week to survive summary judgment. View "Keller v. Miri Microsystems LLC" on Justia Law