Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Catholic nuns volunteered with the American Red Cross and the Ross County Emergency Management Agency for an extended time, but did not receive compensation or benefits, complete employment-related tax documentation, restrict their schedules, or submit to the control of either organization by other incidents of an agency relationship. They were not promoted by the Red Cross and were terminated as Agency volunteers. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission rejected their complaint for lack of jurisdiction; the EEOC does not provide a Right to Sue Letter following a jurisdictional dismissal. The nuns sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Ohio Civil Rights Act for religious discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of their rights of free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal protection. Finding that the Sisters had not sufficiently alleged state action, the district court dismissed the section 1983 claims, then held that, because they were not employees of either organization, the Sisters could not maintain a claim against them under Title VII. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A volunteer relationship does not fairly approximate employment and is not covered by Title VII, nor were constitutional rights violated. View "Sister Michael Marie v. Am. Red Cross" on Justia Law

Frieder joined Morehead State University in 2006 as an assistant professor of art history. During his time in probation, Frieder excelled in professional achievement and service but had difficulty teaching. The reviews of his introductory art history class were consistently abysmal. Frieder’s evaluators suggested improvements, asking Frieder to observe other teachers or visit the “Center for Teaching & Learning,” but after four years of renewing Frieder’s contract, the evaluators voted against tenure and the provost and president agreed. Frieder sued, alleging violation of the First Amendment and a Kentucky statute that prohibits disability-based discrimination, KRS 344.040. Frieder argued that his evaluators retaliated against his “idiosyncratic teaching methods,” which allegedly involved context-appropriate uses of the middle finger and that the tenure decision stemmed from his diagnosis of bipolar disorder, which he admitted his evaluators knew nothing about. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No evidence showed that anything other than his poor student ratings and disorganization motivated the tenure decision. View "Frieder v. Morehead St. Univ." on Justia Law

Memphis’s promotional processes have caused controversy for nearly 40 years, prompting numerous lawsuits alleging racial and gender discrimination by such parties including the U.S. Department of Justice, the Afro-American Police Association, and white and minority officers. The city instituted a process in 1996 designed by an industrial and organizational psychologist, and overseen by a Department of Justice consultant and adjusted the process in 2000. After the city discovered that leaked answers compromised the results, it readjusted and ultimately consented to the invalidation of the 2000 process. The city hired outside consultants to design replacement tests that would become the 2002 process. The district court dismissed a negligence claim concerning the already-invalidated 2000 process under Tennessee’s governmental-immunity statute, Tenn. Code 29-20-205; invalidated the 2002 process for violating Title VII’s disparate-impact prohibition, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(1); and awarded back pay and interest to plaintiffs and more than $1 million in fees and expenses to their attorneys. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the immunity-based dismissal, reversed the Title VII judgment invalidating the 2002 process, vacated the fees award and remanded. The court noted that plaintiffs failed to present evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact regarding the availability of equally valid, less discriminatory alternative testing. View "Acosta v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

Scheick was hired as Principal of Tecumseh High School in 2004, at 51 years of age, and continued in that position until 2010. For the first three years, Scheick was employed directly by TPS. Then, by agreement, the 54-year-old Scheick formally retired from TPS and was hired by the staffing firm PESG to continue working as principal under a three-year contract between TPS and PESG. Under that arrangement, Scheick began receiving pension and health care benefits from the retirement system, and TPS avoided more than $29,000 in payroll and benefit costs per year. The next year, several other TPS employees entered into similar arrangements as cost-saving measures. In early 2010, when Scheick was almost 57 years of age, TPS decided not to renew the contract. Scheick claimed that the contract was not renewed because of his age and filed suit against TPS after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1), and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2202(1)(a). The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding a genuine issue of material fact.View "Scheick v. Tecumseh Pub. Schls." on Justia Law

Dura began testing employees at its Lawrenceburg, Tennessee manufacturing facility for substances in illegal drugs and in prescription medications packaged with warnings about operating machinery. Plaintiffs, none of whom has a disability under the Americans with Disability Act (ADA), worked at the facility and took various prescribed medications. After they tested positive, Dura directed the employees to disclose their medications to FFS, a third-party company hired to administer the tests. FFS reported the machine-restricted drugs to Dura, which warned plaintiffs to discontinue using the offending medications. After retests came back positive, Dura terminated their employment. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), which prohibits employers from requiring “medical examination[s]” or “mak[ing] inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability ... unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” A jury found for all but one plaintiff and awarded damages of more than $870,000. The Sixth Circuit reversed a holding that Dura’s drug-testing protocol constituted as a matter of law, a medical examination or disability inquiry and the related punitive-damages award. On remand, the jury must decide whether Dura’s drug testing constituted a medical examination or disability inquiry, relying on definitions and illustrative examples provided by EEOC guidance. If the jury finds Dura liable, it can proceed to consider punitive damages. The court affirmed with respect to the availability of statutory damages and the jury’s adverse business necessity/ job-relatedness verdict. View "Bates v. Dura Auto. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Wallace worked for FedEx for 21 years in a variety of positions. By 2007, she was a senior paralegal, but she had a variety of health problems that required her to take leave from her position. FedEx offered Wallace leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and its representatives verbally asked her to complete a medical-certification form. FedEx never explained the consequences of not returning a completed form. Wallace failed to provide FedEx with medical certification, and once she was absent for two consecutive days after the form was due, FedEx terminated her employment. Wallace filed suit under the FMLA, alleging that FedEx interfered with her rights under the statute. A jury awarded damages of $173,000, which the judge reduced to $90,788. The Sixth Circuit reversed the remittitur decision and ordered the magistrate judge to enter judgment in favor of Wallace in the amount of $173,000.View "Wallace v. FedEx Corp." on Justia Law

Dr. Kutty ran Tennessee and Florida medical clinics under several corporate entities. Physicians employed by the clinics entered the U.S. on J-1 nonimmigrant visas, 8 U.S.C. 1182(j)(1) that allow physicians to remain in the U.S. for graduate and medical training, but require them to return to their home country for two years following the J-1 visa’s expiration upon completion of their studies. A government agency may request a J-1 waiver of the two-year requirement on the physicians’ behalf if the physician has a contract to practice medicine for at least three years in an area designated as having a shortage of health-care professionals. Each of the 17 physicians Kutty employed obtained a J-1 waiver. Kutty signed Labor Condition Applications, certifying that they would be paid the greater of the actual wage level the employer paid to other individuals with similar experience for the type of employment at issue or the prevailing wage level for the occupational classification in the area of employment. Applicable rates ranged from $52,291 to $115,357. When an administrator told Kutty that physicians were absent or arriving late, Kutty withheld salaries, which he released when they began seeing more patients. The doctors complained to the Department of Labor claiming. The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division found multiple violations. An Administrative Law Judge affirmed, found the clinics liable for back wages and the costs of obtaining J-1 waivers and H-1B visas, held Kutty personally liable, and assessed a civil penalty. The Administrative Review Board affirmed; the district court dismissed Kutty’s petition for review. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Kutty v. U.S. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law

Kroll was an emergency medical technician (EMT) for WLAA when she began a romantic affair with her married coworker. As the relationship unraveled, Kroll became increasingly emotional at work. After Kroll had a personal altercation with one a coworker, her supervisor expressed concern regarding her “immoral” sexual conduct and demanded that she undergo psychological counseling. When Kroll refused, she was fired. Kroll claimed that WLAA violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by requiring a medical examination that was not “job-related and consistent with business necessity,” 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A). On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of WLAA. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that there was evidence record to establish a genuine factual dispute as to whether the required counseling was “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” View "Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth." on Justia Law

Over several years, Douglas sexually abused the dead bodies of murder victims held at the Hamilton County Morgue. His abuse of a body in 1982 led to a false rape conviction. Douglas’s actions were discovered in 2007 after his DNA was matched to semen found in the bodies. Douglas admitted to the abuse. He was under the influence of alcohol, marijuana, or cocaine every time he abused the bodies. Douglas was supervised by Kersker, the morgue director. Kersker admitted having concerns about Douglas’s tardiness and dependability as early as 1980. A co-worker testified that he often smelled alcohol on Douglas before, during, or after his shift. Douglas testified that his cocaine addiction was so bad by 1992 that he could not perform his duties due to heavy shaking. Douglas’s former wife testified that she called Kersker to complain that Douglas was drinking at work. Kersker hung up on her. Kersker may have known that Douglas was often having sex with live women at the morgue. Kersker knew about a domestic violence charge and DUIs because Douglas requested vacation time for incarceration. Douglas testified that he told Kersker about his suicide attempt, his psychiatric hospital stay, and his alcoholism. Kersker’s supervision of Douglas never changed. Relatives sued Douglas, who was also convicted of gross abuse of a corpse, and his supervisors, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court rejected the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A jury could find that the defendants recklessly and wantonly failed to supervise Douglas despite the known risks he posed to the bodies, so the court properly denied Ohio statutory immunity. The relatives, however, cannot establish a constitutional violation, despite the special nature of their relationship to their deceased relatives.View "Range v. Douglas" on Justia Law

DiGeronimo and other employers contributed to the Teamsters Local Union No. 293 Pension Plan, which is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461. Defendants are trustees of the Plan and managed the Plan, including negotiating and ratifying contribution rates and overseeing the Plan’s investments and expenses. Defendants terminated the Plan in December 2009 because substantially all of the Plan’s contributing employers withdrew from paying contributions. Defendants assessed $1,755,733 in “withdrawal liability” to DiGeronimo, which represents its share of the $49,000,000 in unfunded, vested benefits that the contributing employers owed the Plan. DiGeronimo sued defendants under 29 U.S.C. 1451(a), alleging that defendants negligently managed the Plan’s assets, causing increased withdrawal liability. The district court dismissed holding, that there was no substantive basis for the negligence claim in any section of ERISA or under the federal common law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed: a contributing employer to a multiemployer pension plan has no cause of action against plan trustees for negligent management under the federal common law of ERISA pension plans.View "DiGeronimo Aggregates, LLC v. Zemla" on Justia Law