Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Nine multi-employer pension and welfare fringe benefit trust funds sued G&W Construction and its president, under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1145, to recover delinquent fringe-benefit payments under a contract between G&W and the Union. The defendants raised affirmative defenses of laches, estoppel, and waiver, alleging that the Union led G&W to believe that fringe benefit payments were due only for union members and that G&W relied upon the acts and omissions of the Union and the funds by bidding and accepting work on the reasonable understanding that Union wages and benefits did not apply to non-members. The Funds moved to strike the affirmative defenses, arguing that ERISA bars equitable defenses. The district court denied the motion to strike. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The district court should have granted the motion to strike the defenses of laches and equitable estoppel; the court declined to consider the district court’s ruling on the waiver defense. View "Operating Eng'rs Local 324 v. G & W Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Harris, a Ford Motor Company employee had irritable bowel syndrome. Ford initially tried to accommodate Harris, allowing telecommuting. After three attempts failed, Ford denied her request to work from home on an as-needed basis, up to four days per week, deeming regular and predictable on-site attendance essential to Harris’s highly interactive job. Harris had placed in the bottom 22% of her peer group in her fourth year on the job (2007) and in the bottom 10% in 2008. By her last year (2009), Harris “was not performing the basic functions of her position.” Ford said she lacked interpersonal skills, delivered work late, was not concerned with quality, and failed to properly communicate with suppliers. In 2008, she missed an average of 1.5 work days per week; in 2009, she was absent more than she was present. After Ford terminated her employment, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued Ford under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5). The district court granted summary judgment to Ford. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that the ADA does not endow all disabled persons with a job—or job schedule—of their choosing. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Miri is a satellite-internet-dish installation company. Keller installed satellite internet dishes for Miri’s customers six days each week. Keller alleges that Miri did not compensate him adequately as an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207, by failing to pay him overtime compensation. Miri contends that Keller was an independent contractor, not entitled to overtime pay. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Miri. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The FLSA’s definition of “employee” is strikingly broad and “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles.” Keller offered sufficient evidence that he was an employee and that he worked more than 40 hours each week to survive summary judgment. View "Keller v. Miri Microsystems LLC" on Justia Law

Colosi lost a wrongful termination suit against her former employer, JLL. As the prevailing party, JLL filed a $6,369.55 bill of costs that the court clerk approved without modification, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Colosi objected to most of the charges and moved to reduce the bill to $253.50. The district court denied the motion, finding each cost reasonable, necessary to the litigation, and properly taxable under statute, 28 U.S.C. 1920. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Most of the costs Colosi challenged related to witness depositions. Necessity is determined as of the time of taking, and the fact that a deposition is not actually used at trial is not controlling. View "Colosi v. Jones Lang LaSalle Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Berera worked at Mesa, a health care organization, as a nurse practitioner, 2011-2013. After Berera’s employment ended, she allegedly discovered that the wages on her W-2 did not reflect the wages that Mesa owed her. Berera sued in state court, asserting a class of current and former employees whom Mesa “forced to pay [Mesa’s] share of payroll taxes and other taxes and withholdings,” that this “forced payment resulted in the employees receiving less money than they earned,” and that Mesa paid employees “less than the wages and overtime compensation to which the employees were entitled.” The complaint contained no additional substantive allegations, but recited an unpaid wages claim under section 337.385 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes and claims of conversion and negligence under Kentucky law. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA), 26 U.S.C. 3101–3128, which imposes a 7.65% tax on wages to fund Social Security and Medicare, requires parties seeking a refund to file a claim with the IRS before bringing a federal tax refund suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the purported state-law claims are truly FICA claims. View "Berera v. Mesa Med. Grp., PLLC" on Justia Law

Kruse, a Norfok train conductor, was injured on the job in March, reported his injury, and took leave until August. Shortly after he returned to work, Kruse was suspended for 30 days without pay for exceeding speed limits. Kruse’s union appealed under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153. Both the on-property investigation and the arbitration board concluded that Norfolk “was justified,” but reduced the suspension. While his grievance-related appeal was pending before the arbitration board, Kruse filed a Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) complaint with the Department of Labor, claiming that his suspension was in retaliation for reporting his prior work-related injury. The ALJ ruled in favor of Kruse, denying Norfolk’s motion to dismiss based on FRSA, which prohibits a railroad carrier from retaliating against employees who report work-related injuries and potential safety violations, and provides that “[a]n employee may not seek protection under both this section and another provision of law for the same allegedly unlawful act of the railroad carrier,” 49 U.S.C. 20109(f). The Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board affirmed and the Sixth Circuit denied review, reasoning that prior arbitration of a grievance under the RLA did not trigger the FRSA’s election-of-remedies provision. View "Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Perez" on Justia Law

The website for InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA states that all employees must annually reaffirm their agreement with IVCF’s Purpose Statement and Doctrinal Basis. The website includes statements that: Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-1(a)) (Title VII), IVCF has the right to, and does, hire only candidates who agree with IVCF’s Purpose and Doctrinal Basis and that the status of [IVCF] as an Equal Opportunity Employer does not prevent the organization from hiring staff based on their religious beliefs so that all staff share the same religious commitment. Conlon began working at IVCF in Michigan in 1986 as a spiritual director, involved in providing religious counsel and prayer. In 2011, she informed IVCF that she was contemplating divorce. IVCF put her on paid (later unpaid) leave. When her marital situation continued to worsen despite counseling efforts, IVCF terminated her employment. After exhausting administrative remedies, Conlon sued IVCF and her supervisors under Title VII and Michigan law, alleging that male employees were treated differently. IVCF claimed ministerial exception to employment laws. The district court dismissed, holding that the First Amendment’s ministerial exception barred all of Conlon’s claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Conlon v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA" on Justia Law

Yeager filed a complaint alleging that the defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112, by refusing to hire him or by terminating his employment because he failed to provide a social security number. Yeager alleged that he had no social security number because he had disclaimed and disavowed it on account of his sincerely held religious beliefs. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under either Title VII or Chapter 4112 Yeager was required to prove that he holds a sincere religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; he has informed the employer about the conflicts; and he was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. If Yeager established his prima facie case, his employer has the burden to show that it could not “reasonably accommodate” his religious beliefs without “undue hardship.” An employer is not liable when accommodating an employee’s religious beliefs would require the employer to violate federal law. View "Yeager v. FirstEnergy Generation Corp." on Justia Law

Tilley, 59 years old, began working for the Road Commission in 1993. In 2008, Tilley began reporting principally to Bartholomew, the Commission’s general superintendent. After several disputes between the two, Tilley was fired. He sued, alleging termination based on his age in violation of Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. 37.2201, and that the Road Commission interfered with his right to, and retaliated against him for taking, medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601. The district court granted the Road Commission’s motion for summary judgment on all of Tilley’s claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on Tilley’s ELCRA age-discrimination claim, but reversed summary on Tilley’s claims under the FMLA. Tilley presented sufficient evidence to create a material factual dispute on his claim that the Road Commission was equitably estopped from denying that he was covered under the FMLA. Because the district court granted summary judgment on the basis that Tilley was not an “eligible employee,” it did not address the other bases on which the Road Commission sought summary judgment on Tilley’s FMLA interference and retaliation claims. View "Tilley v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Road Comm'n" on Justia Law

Security guards at MotorCity Casino sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act overtime provision, 29 U.S.C. 207(a). They claimed they worked five, eight-hour shifts per week, escorting cash, monitoring the casino floor, and listening to two-way radios. They were required to attend an uncompensated 15-minute meeting before every shift. A guard working an eight-hour shift was entitled to a paid, 30-minute meal period. Guards could not leave casino property, have food delivered, or receive visitors; they spent meal periods in a cafeteria, where free food and drinks were available, or walking along an outdoor path. Guards had to listen to their radios and, if they heard the code, respond to an emergency. Guards who lost meal time responding to an emergency were entitled to have the time made up. Emergencies rarely interrupted meal periods. Guards had to focus on the radio chatter to know if an emergency required occurred, but were able to eat, socialize, and use their phones. The court held that meal periods were non-compensable, that monitoring the radio was a de minimis activity, not a substantial job duty, and that MotorCity could offset paid meal time against time in unpaid, but compensable, meetings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No reasonable jury could find that the meal periods predominantly benefitted the casino. View "Ruffin v. MotorCity Casino" on Justia Law