Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Demyanovich, an employee of Cadon for more than 20 years, was terminated after he requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act to treat his congestive heart failure. He had previously taken leave and his condition had gotten worse over the course of about 10 years. He claimed that Cadon and his direct supervisor, Ensign, interfered with his exercise of his FMLA rights, retaliated against him for seeking FMLA leave, and discriminated against him on the basis of disability. Ensign denied the FMLA request because he believed that Cadon did not have enough employees to be subject to the Act, but referred to Demyanovich as a “liability” immediately after the request for FMLA leave. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Cadon. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting evidence that establishs a genuine factual dispute as to whether Demyanovich was permanently incapable of working at the time that he was terminated. View "Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coating, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In 2011, Hilltop hired Huffman and others to review the files of mortgage loans originated by PNC Bank to determine whether lawful procedures were followed during foreclosure and other proceedings. Until the end of their employment in January 2013, they regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but were not compensated at the overtime rate because Hilltop classified them as independent contractors. Each employment relationship was governed by a now-expired contract, including an arbitration clause and a survival clause. The clauses listed in the survival clause correspond to ones detailing services essential to the job, the term of employment, compensation, termination, and confidentiality; it did not list the arbitration clause. The workers filed a purported class action. The district court denied Hilltop’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit reversed, rejecting an argument that omission of the arbitration clause from the survival clause constituted a “clear implication” that the parties intended the arbitration clause to expire with the agreement. Sixth Circuit precedent indicates that the parties must proceed in arbitration on an individual basis. View "Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., LLC" on Justia Law

Laster is an African American male who worked as a Public Safety Officer for the KDPS for 23 years. He alleges that KDPS subjected him to heightened scrutiny, selectively enforced policies, and was complicit when individual employees harassed and discriminated against him, and that the disparate treatment was attributable to race or to his complaints about discrimination. He specifically cited a 2006 performance evaluation downgrade, followed by a grievance and reversal; denials of a request to attend outside training and of other requests; reprimands; and tampering with his Obama screensaver. Laster filed two charges with the EEOC. While those were pending, Laster was involved in a conflict with other KDPS officers at an event during which President Obama was present. Information about the incident was released to a newspaper. Laster resigned and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), Michigan’s Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court analyzed the claims for “Race Discrimination” and “First Amendment Retaliation” and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit remanded, stating that activity protected by the First Amendment is different than the type of activity protected by Title VII. Analysis of the Title VII race discrimination claim was insufficient for dismissing the Title VII retaliation claim; the “materially adverse action” element of a Title VII retaliation claim is substantially different from the “adverse employment action” element of a Title VII race discrimination claim. That Laster cannot show that he was constructively discharged is not dispositive of the retaliation claim, given evidence of other adverse actions. View "Laster v. City of Kalamazoo" on Justia Law

Rorrer worked as a Stow firefighter from 1999 until July, 2008. On July 4, 2008, Rorrer lost all vision in one eye in a bottle-rocket accident unrelated to his work. The city terminated Rorrer because of his monocular vision. In September, 2008, the surgeon who operated on Rorrer’s eye cleared Rorrer to return to work without restriction. Rorrer arranged a return-to-work physical with Dr. Moten, the Department physician. After examining Rorrer, Moten’s colleague, Dr. Henderson, told Rorrer he should be able to return to duty without restriction, but qualified this statement by written cautions about using a self-contained breathing apparatus and driving at high speeds. Fire Chief Kalbaugh took the position that Rorrer was unfit to return to work and told Rorrer to call Moten, who told Rorrer that he “was sorry” for the “confusion” but that Rorrer could not return to work because “fire regs” would not allow it. National Fire Protection Association guidelines state that monocular vision compromises the firefighter’s ability to safely perform an essential Job Task. Rorrer claimed that the city had never adopted or applied those guidelines. The district court granted the city summary judgment on claims of disability discrimination and impermissible retaliation (for Rorrer’s opposition to discipline of another firefighter) under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Ohio law, and the First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of First Amendment and ADA retaliation claims, but reversed as to the other ADA and Ohio discrimination claims.View "Rorrer v. City of Stow" on Justia Law

PTM provided the services of a CEO to the Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority (SORTA) to control daily operations, while ultimate management authority remained with SORTA’s Board of Trustees. PTM hired Plaintiff as SORTA’s Chief Operating Officer. Plaintiff, an African American woman, a graduate of West Point and University of Michigan Business School, had no prior industry experience. Two years later, PTM changed hands and Plaintiff became CEO on an at-will basis. Within months, PTM began questioning her allegiance to PTM. Plaintiff repeatedly declined to participate in PTM programs. Tensions escalated during negotiations for renewal of PTM’s management contract, which prohibited PTM employees from working for SORTA within a year of its expiration. Plaintiff’s PTM contract contained the same prohibition. PTM suspected that Plaintiff and SORTA were conspiring to have SORTA hire Plaintiff directly. The contract was extended and the one-year hiring prohibition was removed from the contracts. PTM executives continued to regard Plaintiff as a “prima donna” and exchanged several emails critical of Plaintiff. Following a dispute concerning unionization of SORTA workers, PTM fired Plaintiff, purportedly for lying about the dispute. The district court rejected Plaintiff’s discrimination action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding PTM’s investigation inadequate to establish that Plaintiff lied.View "Shazor v. Prof'l Transit Mgmt., Ltd." on Justia Law

Javery began working for Lucent as a software engineer in 1998 and participated in Lucent’s Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, qualified disability plan, administered by CIGNA. In November 2002, he reported back pain. His family doctor, Dr. Dorado, prescribed medicine and testing, and recommended some time off work. In January 2003, after Lucent transferred him from Ohio to Illinois, Javery sought treatment from another physician, Seymour. The pain worsened. In May 2005, Javery stopped working on Dr. Seymour’s advice. Lucent approved and paid short term disability benefits from until those benefits expired in November 2005. Lucent notified CIGNA that it believed Javery might be eligible for long term benefits. Javery applied, submitting extensive medical evidence of his pain and resulting cognitive impairment and of his successful application for Social Security disability benefits, but the claim was denied. In addition to claiming that Javery had not shown that he was “disabled” as that term is defined in the Plan, CIGNA claimed that Javery should be judicially estopped from pursuing his ERISA claim because Javery failed to disclose the claim in his Chapter 13 personal bankruptcy action. The district court upheld the denial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. View "Javery v. Lucent Tech., Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan" on Justia Law

Deleon, a 53-year-old Hispanic male, was employed by the Kalamazoo County Road Commission for 28 years. Beginning in 1995, he was an “Area Superintendent” and generally received positive reviews. Deleon alleges a pervasive atmosphere of racial insensitivity and derogatory comments. In 2008, a vacancy arose for an “Equipment and Facilities Superintendent,” described as being in a garage with exposure to loud noises and diesel fumes. After an interview, Deleon did not receive the position. His computer skills were insufficient. In 2009, Deleon was involuntarily transferred to the position. Deleon objected, claiming that, in applying for the position, he demanded a raise because of the “hazard posed by diesel fumes and poor ventilation.” He did not receive a raise. Deleon claims that he developed bronchitis, a cough, and sinus headaches, and would blow black soot from his nostrils. Deleon’s first evaluation indicated that his performance was “acceptable in most critical areas but [was] not sufficiently above minimum satisfactory level in all areas.” Days after a fractious meeting with his supervisor, Deleon was hospitalized for five days. He claimed a work-induced mental breakdown and took eight months’ FMLA leave. Deleon’s psychiatrist cleared him to return to work, but the Commission had terminated him. Finding that Deleon did not suffer an “adverse employment action,” the district court dismissed his claims of discrimination. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that there was sufficient evidence of conditions that would support discrimination claims and that the fact that Deleon applied for the position did not disqualify him from showing that the employment action was “adverse.”View "Deleon v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Road Comm'n" on Justia Law

The former miner sued in 1992 and an administrative law judge determined that he was not medically qualified for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901 and indicated that Arkansas Coals was not the “responsible operator” required to pay benefits. About 17 years later, the miner filed a second claim. After finding that his medical condition had worsened and that he was now disabled, an ALJ awarded benefits and determined that Arkansas Coals was the responsible operator. The Benefits Review Board and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the company’s finality, waiver, and collateral estoppel arguments; the miner was entitled to bring a second claim under 20 C.F.R. 725.309(d)(4) and the determination that Arkansas Coals was the responsible operator was not “necessary” to the resolution of the initial claim. Substantial evidence supports the determination that Arkansas Coals is the responsible operator. View "Arkansas Coals, Inc. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

Maynes, a miner who developed pneumoconiosis after working in Consolidated’s coal mine for 25 years, received benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901-944, from 1997 until he died of respiratory failure in 2003. His widow sought survivors’ benefits. The then-current version of the BLBA conditioned her eligibility for benefits on proof that pneumoconiosis either caused or hastened her husband’s death. Her 2003 claim was denied. The Benefits Review Board and Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act, which amended the law so that survivors are automatically entitled to benefits if the miner received BLBA benefits during his lifetime. Congress specified that the changes would apply to claims filed after January 2005, but did not address whether persons whose claims had been denied under the previous eligibility framework, could receive benefits by filing a subsequent claim. The issue was answered in the affirmative by the Benefits Review Board and affirmed by the Third and Fourth Circuits. Although the Department of Labor, an administrative law judge, and the Benefits Review Board agreed Maynes was entitled to benefits, they disagreed about the appropriate commencement date for benefits. The Sixth Circuit rejected Consolidated’s appeal, upholding the 2009 commencement date. View "Consolidation Coal Co. v. Maynes" on Justia Law

Ogle, born in 1954, worked in underground coal mines for 21 years, most recently in 1996 in Kentucky. Ogle smoked since age 12. He sought black lung benefits in 2007. After the record closed but before the ALJ issued a decision, Congress revived a rebuttable statutory presumption that a coal miner who worked in an underground mine for at least 15 years and suffers from a total respiratory or pulmonary disability is presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4). The ALJ awarded benefits, finding that Ogle suffered from totally disabling respiratory impairment, a conclusion with which all medical opinions agreed. The ALJ stated that the presumption shifts the burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that either the miner’s disability does not, or did not, arise out of coal mine employment or the miner did not, suffer from pneumoconiosis. The Fund demonstrated that Ogle did not suffer from clinical pneumoconiosis, but failed to rebut the presumption that Ogle suffers from legal pneumoconiosis. The Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, finding no evidence that the ALJ improperly restricted the Fund’s ability to rebut the 15-year presumption or that the ALJ applied the wrong standard. View "Big Branch Res., Inc. v. Ogle" on Justia Law