Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McKelvey served in Iraq. In 2004, he attempted to defuse a roadside bomb, and it exploded. He lost his right hand, among other injuries. McKelvey moved back to Michigan and accepted a civilian position with the Army as an operations specialist. At the new job, he received only menial assignments and was constantly taunted by colleagues, often about his war-related injuries. He eventually reached the breaking point and resigned in 2007. McKelvey sued the Army for disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791. The Army offered to reinstate him in a new position at a new location that was otherwise equivalent to his old job and later offered $300,000 to settle the whole dispute. He rejected both offers. His claims of hostile work environment and constructive discharge, went to trial. The jury ruled in his favor, awarding him nearly $4.4 million in front pay. The district court vacated that award, however, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, precluding front pay and holding that reinstatement was the proper remedy under the statute. A year after the remand, McKelvey and the Army settled. The district court awarded attorney’s fees to McKelvey as a prevailing party. View "McKelvey v. Sec'y of U.S. Army" on Justia Law

Forester was awarded benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901-944, as amended by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119, after the ALJ determined that Forester’s five years of private coal mine employment with Navistar’s predecessor, combined with his16 years of employment as a mine inspector with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Mine Safety and Health Administration , rendered him eligible for the rebuttable presumption that, having been employed for at least 15 years in underground coal mines, and having a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, he was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, commonly known as black lung disease. The Benefits Review Board upheld the award. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that a federal mine inspector is not a “miner” for purposes of the BLBA, and remanding for determination of whether Forester is entitled to an award of BLBA benefits without the benefit of the 15-year presumption. View "Navistar, Inc. v. Forester" on Justia Law

Loyd, an African-American woman, began working as a hospital security guard in 1986. In 2001 Loyd had a written warning for failing to help restrain a patient because she questioned the authority of the medical staff to have the patient restrained. Loyd received a warning in 2004 for refusing to work overtime. In 2010 Loyd left work due to illness without first obtaining permission, and, another time, was found on the porch of a nearby house while on duty. The hospital placed Loyd on final-written-warning status. Loyd was dispatched on June 16, 2011 to a room containing a combative female psychiatric patient. Instead of helping to restrain the patient, according to the hospital, Loyd told the patient that she could leave if she had been admitted for a drug-related or alcohol-related (not psychiatric) reason and demanded to see the admissions paperwork. Loyd’s actions agitated the patient, who tried to pull an IV out of her arm. Other guards restrained the patient. Loyd admits much of the incident, but denies that she failed to assist. The hospital conducted an internal investigation, after which it terminated Loyd’s employment. Loyd filed a union grievance, which was denied. The union declined to seek arbitration. The hospital hired a 39-year-old African-American woman for the position. After filing charges of discrimination with the EEOC and Michigan Department of Civil Rights, Loyd filed suit. The district court granted the hospital summary judgment on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland" on Justia Law

Daily Services, owned by Mason, provided short-term temporary employment services. Mason also owned I-Force, which provided longer-term temporary employment services. After losing coverage under the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation group insurance rating plan, I-Force unsuccessfully applied for self-insurance status. I-Force owed $3 million in premiums. Unable to make payments, I-Force closed. Daily acquired some of its customers and began offering longer-term temporary employment services. Ohio law provides the employer with notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Bureau may file a judgment or lien against it and allows the Bureau to deem one company the successor of another for purposes of an experience rating to calculate premiums, and, if an employer “wholly succeeds another in the operation of a business,” to transfer the obligation to pay unpaid premiums. The Bureau decided that Daily wholly succeeded I-Force, but did not provide notice of its assessment or an opportunity to be heard before it filed judgments and liens against Daily for more than $54 million. A state court vacated the judgments. The Bureau tried again and provided prior notice, but filed a lien before hearing an appeal. The court again vacated. The Bureau’s efforts to recover continue. Daily sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of procedural due process. The district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, recognizing that under the Supreme Court decision Parratt v. Taylor, a state may sometimes satisfy due process without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard pre-deprivation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Parratt doctrine does apply, and Daily did not plead that Ohio provided inadequate post- deprivation remedies . View "Daily Services, LLC v. Valentino" on Justia Law

In 2002, Freeze was hired by the Decherd Police Department. He became Chief of Police in 2007. Colvin, Freeze’s brother-in-law, was hired as a patrolman in 2007. The Board of Aldermen is responsible for hiring and firing. During a February 2009 meeting, the Aldermen told Freeze that they “might need to just let [him] resign as the Chief and put [him] in as a sergeant at $15 an hour.” Freeze stated that “if it’s going to keep my job, yes, I will take a demotion.” After several confrontations during a March meeting, the Board terminated the employment of Colvin and Freeze. The city did not provide notice that terminations would be considered at the meeting, but claims that it provided oral notice that “general job performance may be discussed.” Neither officer was allowed to present witnesses or evidence. The separation notice regarding Freeze reads: “No reason given.” The city’s 1999 Personnel Resolution designates every city worker as an at-will employee with no property right in employment, but a 2000 Police Resolution states that “discipline shall be for cause and shall follow the basic concepts of due process.” The district court dismissed, finding that the officers possessed no property interest in continued employment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on the unequivocal language of the Police Resolution. View "Freeze v. City of Decherd" on Justia Law

The Gallia County (Ohio) Public Defender Commission contracted with the non-profit Corporation for defense attorneys to represent indigent criminal defendants. The Corporation hired Bright, who represented R.G. before Evans, the county’s only trial judge. Bright negotiated a plea agreement, but R.G. hesitated during the plea colloquy. “Mere seconds” later, R.G. informed Bright and Evans that he would take the deal after all. Evans refused. Bright and the prosecutor met with Evans to convince the judge to accept R.G.’s plea. He refused. In pleadings, Bright criticized Evans’s policies as “an abuse of discretion,” “unreasonable,” “arbitrary … unconscionable.” Bright’s language did not include profanity and did not claim ethical impropriety. Evans subsequently contacted the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and filed a grievance against Bright and filed a public journal entry stating that Bright’s motion, although not amounting to misconduct or contempt, had created a conflict. He ordered that Bright be removed from the R.G. case. He then filed entries removing Bright from 70 other felony cases. The Corporation terminated Bright’s employment, allegedly without a hearing or other due process. Bright sued Evans, the Board, the Corporation, and the Commission. The district court concluded that Evans was “not entitled to absolute judicial immunity because his actions were completely outside of his jurisdiction.” The court held that Bright failed to sufficiently plead that the Board or the Commission retaliated against him for exercising his constitutional rights or that liability attached under the Monell doctrine, then dismissed claims against the Corporation. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to Evans. While Evans’s conduct was worthy of censure, it does not fit within any exception to absolute judicial immunity. The court affirmed dismissal of claims against the Board and Corporation; the First Amendment offers no protection to an attorney for his speech in court.View "Bright v. Gallia Cnty." on Justia Law

Hoven, a licensed pharmacist and a former at-will employee of Walgreen, is also the holder of a Michigan license to carry a concealed weapon. He experienced an armed robbery at work in 2007. Walgreen did not comply with his subsequent requests for additional security devices. In May, 2011, gun-wielding robbers entered Walgreen while Hoven was working the overnight shift. After one of the masked individuals pointed a gun at Hoven, Hoven drew his concealed weapon and fired it multiple times. No one was shot or injured during this incident. Eight days later, Hoven was terminated for violation of Walgreen’s non-escalation policy. Hoven brought suit alleging that he was terminated in violation of public policy for exercising his rights of self-defense, defense of others, and to carry a concealed weapon. The district court granted Walgreen’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that Hoven failed to identify a public-policy source that supports his claimView "Hoven v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

Brown claimed that he injured his shoulder while paving a road for his employer Ajax Paving, and sought workers’ compensation. Ajax introduced medical testimony suggesting that the injury occurred outside of work. While the case remained pending before the Michigan administrative agency, Brown and Ajax settled. Brown, however, thought that Ajax had introduced false medical testimony and that it had done the same to other employees, and sued Ajax and its insurers, claims administrators and the doctor, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1964(c). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Act, Brown must show that illegal racketeering activities have “injured [him] in his business or property.” The Sixth Circuit has held that “loss or diminution of benefits the plaintiff expects to receive under a workers’ compensation scheme does not constitute an injury to ‘business or property’ under RICO.” View "Brown v. Ajax Paving Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee “because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to [the Act],” 29 U.S.C. 1140. Sexton made a one-time unsolicited internal complaint to his employer about alleged violations of the ERISA, with respect to seating employees on the company’s board of directors. About six months later, the company fired Sexton from his job as a general manager. Sexton sued in Michigan state court for violating the state Whistleblower Protection Act and for breaching his employment contract. The company invoked complete preemption under ERISA and removed the case to federal court. Sexton did not challenge the company’s removal of the case or its use of complete preemption. The district court granted the company summary judgment on the ERISA claim and declined supplemental jurisdiction over Sexton’s breach-of-contract claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Sexton’s complaint did not amount to “giv[ing] information ... in any inquiry” under ERISA. View "Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc." on Justia Law

Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties. In 2011 Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager under then-existing law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of retired city employees and severance benefits, including pension benefits, for retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. Retired employees sued under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied an injunction. In 2013, the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters later rejected Public Act 4 by referendum. Following rehearing, en banc, the Sixth Circuit again vacated and remanded for consideration of whether, under section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, Public Act 4 prescribed a method of composition of indebtedness that binds the retirees without their consent and, if so, whether principles of state sovereignty preclude application of section 903(1) in this case; whether the emergency manager’s orders were legislative acts under the Contract Clause; whether the reductions and eliminations of health care benefits were “necessary and reasonable” under the Contract Clause; whether the retirees’ procedural due process claim is viable; and, assuming the Due Process Clause’s procedural protections apply, whether the collective bargaining agreements, considered in their entireties, establish protected property rights. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law