Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Aker’s Louisville team consisted of the project manager, Hudson; electrical and instrumentation (E&I) designers Ash, Kirkpatrick, Sharp, and Whitaker; three piping designers; an estimator/scheduler; and a drafter who was being groomed to become an E&I designer. Sharp began as a contract worker in 2003 and became an employee in 2005. In 2008-2009, several Aker employees, including Sharp, were laid off because customers had canceled or postponed projects. Sharp, then 52 years old, claimed that he was fired because of his age, citing Hudson’s decision to train Kirkpatrick, and not Sharp, as E&I design lead and noting Hudson’s alleged comments about the advancing age of the group and the need to bring in younger people. Aker asserted that Hudson and Ash considered Kirkpatrick a superior employee to Sharp. The trial court entered summary judgment for Aker in Sharp’s age-discrimination claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding adequate evidence that Hudson played a determinative role in the layoff decision to attribute his motivation to the company, that Hudson’s remarks were direct evidence of age discrimination, and that Hudson’s expression of age as a factor in his decision was not merely a proxy for a legitimate business concern. View "Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006 White began working at a job that required him to lift parts weighing between 20 and 75 pounds. White was considered a good worker, but had consistent attendance problems. Between January 26, 2009, and September 24, 2009, White called in 19 absences for reasons, including emergency vacation leave, vacation leave, unpaid leave, and Family Medical Leave Act leave. White took FMLA leave in 2009 due to gout and unrelated back and foot pain. In September 2009, White began suffering complications related to abdominal surgeries following a 1995 car accident. On September 25, White’s surgeon scheduled his surgery for October 7. According to the employer, White did not use the word hernia and only indicated that he might be having surgery soon. White and his employer dispute whether he submitted paperwork concerning a restriction on lifting. White missed several more days and failed to call in, in violation of company policy, and was terminated. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The FMLA expressly permits an employer to enforce its “usual and customary notice and procedural requirements for requesting leave,” 29 C.F.R. 825.302(d). View "Srouder v. Dana Light Axle Mfg., LLC" on Justia Law

Boaz began working for FedEx in 1997, under an agreement that stated: “To the extent the law allows an employee to bring legal action against Federal Express Corporation, I agree to bring that complaint within the time prescribed by law or 6 months from the date of the event forming the basis of my lawsuit, whichever expires first.” She began took on additional responsibilities, previously handled by a male employee, without corresponding compensation, 2004-2008. Boaz sued FedEx in 2009, asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). The district court held that, although the claims were timely under the statutes, they were barred by the agreement. The Sixth Circuit reversed, based on Supreme Court precedent prohibiting an employee from waiving rights under those laws. View "Boaz v. FedEx Cust. Info. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Frazier, a sorter for Publishers Printing, was covered by Publishers’ employee benefit plan, which provided disability insurance. In 2009, at age 42, she left her job due to back pain that radiated down her legs, which she thought was caused by arthritis and a bulging disc, though she could not remember any fall or injury that initiated the pain. An MRI revealed mild disc dislocation. Her family physician diagnosed her with lower back pain and radiculopathy and in 2010 opined that Frazier was unable to return to work at regular capacity. Frazier participated in limited physical therapy. Another physician prescribed lumbar epidural injections and eventually permitted her to return to work. The plan denied Frazier’s claim for long-term disability benefits after reviewing medical evidence and job descriptions from Publishers and the U.S. Department of Labor. A Functional Capacity Evaluation indicated that Frazier “is currently functionally capable of meeting the lower demands for the Medium Physical Demand level on a 8 hour per day.” Frazier sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The district court granted judgment for the plan, reasoning that the administrator had discretion to deny Frazier’s claim, and that denial of benefits was not arbitrary. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Frazier v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am." on Justia Law

Kinds was assaulted and threatened by her live-in boyfriend. She requested time off to find a new place to live, but did not have vacation time available and was not eligible for Family and Medical Leave Act leave because she had worked less than 1,250 hours for her employer during the previous 12 months, 29 U.S.C. 2611(2)(A). The company granted her one week of discretionary leave. She returned to work for about a month, after which she was eligible for FMLA leave. She applied for leave the following day and returned part-time about two months later. Her employer notified the administrator of its short-term disability insurance plan. Three weeks into her leave, a licensed independent social worker diagnosed Kinds as having a severe depression episode. Following approval of disability benefits for part of Kinds’s absence, her employer approved the period after her diagnosis for FMLA leave and asked Kinds to submit medical certification for the period that was not approved. Neither Kinds nor her healthcare providers timely submitted documentation. After an extension, the employer denied FMLA leave, determined that Kinds’s absence during the period at issue was unexcused, and terminated Kinds’s employment. The district court dismissed her FMLA lawsuit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Kinds v. OH Bell Tel. Co." on Justia Law

Carpenter sued Flint, a councilwoman and the mayor, based on Carpenter’s termination from his position as Director of Transportation, asserting age and political discrimination, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, gross negligence, defamation, and invasion of privacy. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to identify which claims were alleged against which defendants, and that the allegations were “excessively esoteric, compound and argumentative.” Carpenter did not respond by the court’s deadline, and about five weeks later, a stipulated order entered, permitting Carpenter to file an amended complaint by April 21, 2011. Counsel manually filed an amended complaint on May 20, 2011, violating a local rule requiring electronic filing. The clerk accepted the filing, but issued a warning. Carpenter failed to timely respond to a renewed motion to strike. Carpenter responded to a resulting show-cause order, but failed to abide by local rules. Another warning issued. Carpenter’s response to a second show-cause order was noncompliant. The court warned that “future failure to comply … will not be tolerated.” After more than five months without docket activity, the court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Defendants bore some responsibility for delays and the length of delay does not establish the kind of conduct or clear record warranting dismissal; lesser sanctions were appropriate. View "Carpenter v. City of Flint" on Justia Law

The plant’s union and TRW negotiated collective bargaining agreements, which included provisions for healthcare benefits for retirees. The last CBA became effective in 1993 and was scheduled to expire in 1996. The plant closed in 1997. TRW and the union entered into a termination agreement that provided that any beneficiary, who is receiving or entitled to receive any payment and/or benefit under the CBA, “shall continue to receive or be entitled to receive such payment and/or benefit as though the CBA and Pension Plan had remained in effect.” In 2011, TRW terminated prescription drug coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees, replacing it with an annual contribution to a health reimbursement account. Plaintiffs claimed that this change modified their benefits in violation of TRW’s contractual obligation and filed a purported class action under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and a claim for benefits under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court granted TRW’s motion to compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the two named Plaintiffs, declining to address the rights of hypothetical plaintiffs. View "VanPamel v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004, Akron held promotional exams for fire department positions of Captain and Lieutenant. The exams were prepared, administered and scored by an outside testing consultant. Each exam contained a 100-question multiple choice section on technical knowledge and two oral assessment exercises. The Lieutenant exam also required a written work-sample; the Captain exam had an additional oral group exercise. Candidates were placed on an eligibility list in an ordered ranking. Plaintiffs alleged disparate-impact age discrimination against 23 firefighters based on age, 29 U.S.C. 621; that the exam for Lieutenant had an adverse impact on three African-American firefighters and that the exam for Captain had an adverse impact on 12 Caucasian firefighters based on race, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and state law violations. The district court concluded that the exam adversely impacted 12 Caucasian Captain candidates and three African-American Lieutenant candidates on the basis of race, and adversely impacted eleven Lieutenant candidates on the basis of their age and ordered promotion of 18 candidates. Each Lieutenant candidate was awarded $9,000 in compensatory damages and $72,000 in front pay. Captain candidate were awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages and $80,000 in front pay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Howe v. City of Akron" on Justia Law

Harkness, a reserve Commander in the Navy Chaplain Corps, was denied a promotion to the rank of Captain by an annual selection board. The Secretary of the Navy denied his request to convene a special selection board (SSB) to review that decision. Harkness filed suit, claiming that promotion policies and procedures for chaplains violated the Establishment Clause. The district court dismissed, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies required by 10 U.S.C. 14502(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that non-promoted officers must first petition the Secretary to convene an SSB. The Secretary must weigh certain factors, including whether an administrative error caused the original selection board not actually to consider the officer, or whether a material error caused the original board to mistakenly fail to recommend promotion. If the Secretary determines that an SSB is not warranted, the officer can seek review of that denial in federal court. The language of Harkness’s request apparently challenged only the composition of the board and fell short of giving the Secretary a meaningful opportunity to respond to Harkness’s constitutional contention. View "Harkness v. United States" on Justia Law

The Center, a licensed nursing home in Springfield, Tennessee, has about 100 employees, providing care to about 120 residents. An executive director oversees the facility, assisted by department heads, including a director of nursing for each of the facility’s two wings. There are 12 RNs, 10 licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and 46 certified nursing assistants (CNAs). RNs and LPNs, called “charge nurses,” report to the director of nursing. Two charge nurses are generally assigned to each wing at a time. The Union petitioned the NLRB, seeking to represent the RNs in collective bargaining. The Center objected, claiming that the RNs were “supervisors” under the Act, not permitted to unionize, 29 U.S.C. 152(3), 157. The regional director concluded that the RNs were not supervisors, certified the bargaining unit, and directed an election. The next day, the RNs elected the Union as their bargaining representative. The Center refused to bargain with the Union, which filed a complaint of unfair labor practices. The Board sustained the Union’s complaint and ordered the Center to bargain. The Sixth Circuit vacated and denied a petition for enforcement, finding that the the RNs have authority to discipline CNAs using their independent judgment and are supervisors. View "GGNSC Springfield LLC v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law