Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After losing her job as an appraiser for St. Joseph County, Trayling filed a grievance with her union and a discrimination charge with the Michigan Civil Rights Department. The union refused to pursue the grievance because the collective bargaining agreement’s election-of-remedies clause prohibits use of the internal grievance process and an external process simultaneously. Trayling sued the county for age and disability discrimination, and sued the union and the county for implementing an allegedly unlawful election-of-remedies rule. The district court held that the election-of-remedies rule violated federal law. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court’s order granting partial summary judgment did not amount to a final decision; it did not even fully resolve the election-of-remedies claim (damages remain undecided), much less the whole case. An exception to the finality requirement, 28 U.S.C. 1292(a), does not apply because the order did not involve an injunction. View "Trayling v. St. Joseph Cnty. Emp'rs Chapter" on Justia Law

In 2003 Harris was hired as a resale buyer at Ford. Throughout her employment Harris suffered from IBS, an illness that causes fecal incontinence. On bad days, Harris was unable to drive to work or stand up from her desk without soiling herself. Harris began to take intermittent FMLA leave. Her absences started to affect her job performance. In 2005 Harris’s then-supervisor allowed her to work on a flex-time telecommuting schedule on a trial basis. The supervisor deemed the trial unsuccessful. Although her next supervisor did not approve remote work, Harris worked from home on an informal basis. The days that she stayed home were marked as absences. When Harris worked nights and weekends, she made mistakes and missed deadlines because she lacked access to suppliers. After Ford declined her request for a formal telecommuting arrangement, Harris complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Harris was terminated in 2009 and the EEOC sued, claiming that Ford discriminated against Harris on the basis of disability and retaliated against her for filing a charge with the EEOC. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ford. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding find evidence that created a genuine dispute as to whether Harris was qualified to work as a resale buyer and whether she was terminated in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge.View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked until 2006, when the plant closed, and retired under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); that provided that the employer would provide health insurance, either through a self-insured plan or under a group insurance policy and identified the employer’s contribution to the premium. The CBAs provided that the coverage an employee had at the time of retirement or termination at age 65 or older other than a discharge for cause “shall be continued thereafter provided that suitable arrangements for such continuation[] can be made… In the event… benefits … [are] not practicable … the Company in agreement with the Union will provide new benefits and/or coverages as closely related as possible and of equivalent value." In 2011 TRW (the employer’s successor) stated that it would discontinue group health care coverage beginning in 2012, but would be providing “Health Reimbursement Accounts” (HRAs) and would make a one-time contribution of $15,000 for each eligible retiree and eligible spouse in 2012, and in 2013, would provide a $4,800 credit to the HRAs for each eligible party. The HRAs shifted risk, and potentially costs, to plaintiffs. TRW did not commit to funding the HRAs beyond 2013. Plaintiffs sued, claiming that the change breached the CBAs, in violation of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The district court certified a class and granted summary judgment, ruling that the CBAs established a commitment to lifetime health care benefits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed View "United Steel, Paper, Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. Kelsey-Hayes Co." on Justia Law

Pierson, a Plant Facilities Manager at QG with 39 years of experience in printing and seven years with QG, was terminated after the CEO announced a comprehensive company-wide cost-cutting initiative. Pierson, then 62 years old, had never received a negative performance evaluation and was never disciplined, reprimanded, or warned about performance deficiencies. After he was fired, his job duties were assumed by a 47-year-old employee engaged in energy-procurement and capital projects management functions at another facility. The district court entered summary judgment for QG. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding that the record established a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Pierson’s position was eliminated or whether he was simply replaced by a younger individual. View "Pierson v. Quad/Graphics Printing Corp." on Justia Law

Some of Kaplan’s students obtain financial aid through the U.S. Department of Education. Some Kaplan employees have access to those students’ financial information. About 10 years ago, Kaplan discovered that some financial-aid officers had stolen students’ payments and that some of its executives had engaged in self-dealing, using relatives as vendors. Kaplan implemented measures to prevent abuses, including credit checks on applicants for senior-executive positions and positions with access to company financials, cash, or access to student financial-aid information. Reports include whether: an applicant has ever filed for bankruptcy, is delinquent on child-support, has any garnishments, has outstanding judgments exceeding $2,000, or has a social-security number inconsistent with what the credit bureau has on file. The report does not note the applicant’s race. When the EEOC sued Kaplan, alleging disparate impact on African-Americans, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), (a)(2), (k), EEOC relied on statistical data compiled by Murphy, who holds a doctorate in industrial and organizational psychology. The district court excluded Murphy’s testimony as unreliable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the EEOC uses the same criteria for hiring. EEOC presented no evidence that Murphy’s methodology, which involved Murphy looking at copies of drivers’ licenses to determine race, satisfied any of the factors that courts consider in determining reliability under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Murphy himself admitted his sample was not representative of Kaplan’s applicant pool as a whole. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp." on Justia Law

The Union sought a declaratory judgment to enforce a settlement agreement it had entered into with UPS in 2010 to resolve a labor dispute. UPS maintained that any allegation of failure to abide by the agreement fell within a broad arbitration clause in the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. The district court agreed and dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit held that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction, but affirmed dismissal based on the language of the CBA, which provides that “any controversy, complaint, misunderstanding or dispute” that concerns “interpretation, application or observance” of the CBA “shall be handled” in accordance with the CBA’s grievance procedures. The parties agreed that the alleged breach of the Settlement Agreement constituted a violation of the CBA. View "Teamsters Local Union 480 v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

From 2004 to 2009, Russell worked at Citicorp’s Florence, Kentucky call center. He had signed a standard contract to arbitrate any disputes with the company. The agreement covered individual claims but not class actions. In 2012, Russell filed a class action against the company, claiming that the company did not pay employees for time spent logging into and out of their computers at the beginning and end of each workday. Citicorp did not seek arbitration. In 2012, with the lawsuit still in progress, Russell applied to work again at Citicorp’s call center and was rehired. Citicorp had updated its arbitration contract to cover class claims as well as individual ones. Russell signed the new contract and began work in the call center. Russell did not consult with his lawyers before signing the new contract. About a month later, Citicorp’s outside attorneys learned that he had been rehired and sought to compel Russell to arbitrate the class action, which by then had begun discovery. The district court held that the new arbitration agreement did not cover lawsuits commenced before the agreement was signed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Russell v. Citigroup, Inc." on Justia Law

Demyanovich, an employee of Cadon for more than 20 years, was terminated after he requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act to treat his congestive heart failure. He had previously taken leave and his condition had gotten worse over the course of about 10 years. He claimed that Cadon and his direct supervisor, Ensign, interfered with his exercise of his FMLA rights, retaliated against him for seeking FMLA leave, and discriminated against him on the basis of disability. Ensign denied the FMLA request because he believed that Cadon did not have enough employees to be subject to the Act, but referred to Demyanovich as a “liability” immediately after the request for FMLA leave. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Cadon. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting evidence that establishs a genuine factual dispute as to whether Demyanovich was permanently incapable of working at the time that he was terminated. View "Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coating, L.L.C." on Justia Law

In 2011, Hilltop hired Huffman and others to review the files of mortgage loans originated by PNC Bank to determine whether lawful procedures were followed during foreclosure and other proceedings. Until the end of their employment in January 2013, they regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but were not compensated at the overtime rate because Hilltop classified them as independent contractors. Each employment relationship was governed by a now-expired contract, including an arbitration clause and a survival clause. The clauses listed in the survival clause correspond to ones detailing services essential to the job, the term of employment, compensation, termination, and confidentiality; it did not list the arbitration clause. The workers filed a purported class action. The district court denied Hilltop’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit reversed, rejecting an argument that omission of the arbitration clause from the survival clause constituted a “clear implication” that the parties intended the arbitration clause to expire with the agreement. Sixth Circuit precedent indicates that the parties must proceed in arbitration on an individual basis. View "Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., LLC" on Justia Law

Laster is an African American male who worked as a Public Safety Officer for the KDPS for 23 years. He alleges that KDPS subjected him to heightened scrutiny, selectively enforced policies, and was complicit when individual employees harassed and discriminated against him, and that the disparate treatment was attributable to race or to his complaints about discrimination. He specifically cited a 2006 performance evaluation downgrade, followed by a grievance and reversal; denials of a request to attend outside training and of other requests; reprimands; and tampering with his Obama screensaver. Laster filed two charges with the EEOC. While those were pending, Laster was involved in a conflict with other KDPS officers at an event during which President Obama was present. Information about the incident was released to a newspaper. Laster resigned and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), Michigan’s Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court analyzed the claims for “Race Discrimination” and “First Amendment Retaliation” and dismissed. The Sixth Circuit remanded, stating that activity protected by the First Amendment is different than the type of activity protected by Title VII. Analysis of the Title VII race discrimination claim was insufficient for dismissing the Title VII retaliation claim; the “materially adverse action” element of a Title VII retaliation claim is substantially different from the “adverse employment action” element of a Title VII race discrimination claim. That Laster cannot show that he was constructively discharged is not dispositive of the retaliation claim, given evidence of other adverse actions. View "Laster v. City of Kalamazoo" on Justia Law