Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, 91 current and former special investigators (SIs) employed by Nationwide Mutual Insurance claimed that Nationwide improperly classified SIs as administrative employees exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 207 and 213(a)(1)) and analogous provisions of New York and California law. The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of Nationwide, then ruled in the company’s favor following trial on other issues. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A reference to investigators, 29 C.F.R. 541.3(b)(1), read in context, pertains to law enforcement and public safety personnel and not to the Sis employed by Nationwide. Plaintiffs perform work “directly related” to Nationwide’s “general business operations.” The district court properly found that their investigations, with the purpose of resolving the indicators of fraud and the legitimacy of the suspicious claims, are unlike the narrower more formulaic background investigations into facts and records that have been found to not involve the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. View "Foster v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co" on Justia Law

In 1999, Geraldine Fuhr successfully sued to be instated as varsity boys basketball coach at Hazel Park High School, where she had been employed as varsity girls basketball coach. For five years she coached both teams. In 2006, she was removed from her position coaching varsity girls basketball. She claims that her dismissal as the varsity girls basketball coach and other acts of harassment were a result of her 1999 suit. The district court granted the district summary judgment, rejecting claims of retaliation (42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a)), gender discrimination, and hostile work environment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting a substantial time gap between the suit and the complained-of actions and the district’s complained-of actions were not discriminatory. View "Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In October 2008, Deputy Kuhn, a black man, stopped Joseph, a white woman for a traffic violation. Joseph falsely reported that Kuhn had raped her during the stop. An internal investigation into the allegation was not closed until January 2009. Several months after the investigation closed, Kuhn requested medical leave based on stress. Kuhn eventually took approximately seven months of paid and unpaid leave that did not end until he was terminated in January 2010. He filed suit against the county, and his superior. Against the county only, Kuhn asserted claims for termination without due process of law, violation of Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 15.361, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Kuhn asserted a claim against his superior only for tortious interference with business expectancy. Against both, Kuhn asserted racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, racial discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII, and racial discrimination and harassment in violation of Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2101. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Kuhn v. County of Washtenaw" on Justia Law

While working at a Ford Motor plant, Rudisill was hit in the face by a piece of equipment, was knocked against a wall, fell to the floor, and rolled forward through the floor opening into the hot pit below. He lay there unconscious, being burned, until coworkers pulled him out of the pit. Rudisill had gained consciousness by this time and was screaming in pain. Rudisill sustained a head injury that required several staples to close. He was also burned on his arms and legs, abdomen, and left hand. Rudisill continues to experience pain, dizzy spells, ringing in the ears, and memory problems. He has had numerous surgeries and has undergone physical and occupational therapy. After a safety review immediately following the incident, Ford decided to modify the process so that employees slide metal grates over the pit before removing the guard rails. After receiving workers’ compensation benefits, Rudisill sued Ford, alleging intentional tort; his wife asserted a derivative claim of loss of consortium. The district court granted summary judgment for Ford. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding insufficient evidence that Ford acted with deliberate intent to injure Rudisill, as required by Ohio statute. View "Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a teacher since 1976, was diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes. By 1999, she required insulin injections. Until 2008, plaintiff was never disciplined. In 2008, plaintiff was summoned to address allegations that she had been sleeping during class. Plaintiff claimed that she was not sleeping but rather exhibiting symptoms of diabetes. She was formally reprimanded and requested accommodations: training in recognizing symptoms of diabetes; assistance if she appeared asleep; and breaks for insulin injections. The superintendent allowed her to keep snacks in her classroom, to use the nurse’s office if she first obtained classroom coverage, and to disseminate diabetes information to students and staff. Plaintiff was subsequently suspended for missing classes, sleeping in class, and referring to Playgirl Magazine in class discussion. The Board decided to terminate her contract. Plaintiff was 71 years old. A referee upheld the termination. Instead of appealing, plaintiff filed suit, alleging age discrimination under Ohio law; failure to make reasonable accommodations (ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12112, and state law); retaliation for engaging in protected activity (ADA and state law); and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to age discrimination, but reversed on other claims. View "Smith v. Perkins Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Pagliara, a licensed securities broker for more than 25 years, maintained a spotless record with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) except for this case. Under a 2002 licensing agreement, Pagliara served both Capital Trust and NBC until 2008. During that time, Butler followed Pagliara’s recommendation to invest $100,000 in bank stocks that later lost value. Butler’s attorney threatened to sue NBC and Pagliara. NBC retained JBPR for defense. Unbeknownst to NBC and JBPR, Pagliara offered to settle the claim for $14,900, $100 below FINRA’s mandatory reporting threshold. Butler refused. Pagliara then informed NBC of his intent to defend the claim in FINRA Arbitration and objected to any settlement of the “frivolous claim.” NBC insisted that Pagliara not have any contact with Butler, based on the License Agreement signed by the parties, which stated that: “NBCS, at its sole option and without the prior approval of either [Capital Trust] or the applicable Representative, may settle or compromise any claim at any time.” JBPR finalized a $30,000 settlement without obtaining a release for Pagliara. Pagliara sued, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and intentional infliction of harm. The district court rejected the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Pagliara v. Johnston Barton Proctor & Rose, LLP" on Justia Law

KDMC operates a regional medical center. SEIU is a labor union that represents health care and social service workers and has a collective bargaining agreement with KDMC. In 2010, concerned about the cost of health care for KDMC employees, SEIU launched a two-day robo-call campaign, targeting KDMC, to protest proposals that would shift a larger cost to employees. Residents within KDMC’s service area received calls from an automated system that played a prerecorded voice message criticizing KDMC’s plans in dramatic terms. The message did not disclose that the SEIU was responsible for the call. Call recipients who opted to press “1” during the call were patched through to the direct extension for KDMC CEO Jackson. KDMC alleges that Jackson’s extension received 536 live calls over the two-day period and that the high volume of calls overwhelmed its main trunk lines. KDMC filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. 227. The district court dismissed, holding that the Act does not extend to purposeful calls made by individuals seeking to express an opinion, noting that the calls required a real person to “exercise independent judgment” in order to connect to Jackson. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Ashland Hosp. Corp. v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union" on Justia Law

The Fund, a multi-employer pension plan under ERISA, has a Plan, providing for administration by a Board with authority to make benefit determinations and amend the Plan, including retroactively. No amendment may result in reduced benefits for any participant whose rights have vested, except in specified circumstances. Price began receiving Plan disability benefits under the “Total and Permanent Disability Benefit” category in 1990, after work-related injuries left him unable to work. In 2001, the Fund notified Price that he no longer qualified for benefits under this category, but that he could continue receiving benefits under provisions for “Occupational Disability Benefit.” His benefits were discontinued after 2006, according to an Amendment. Price became eligible for early retirement in 2012. The Board rejected an appeal. The district court granted Price judgment in his suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). On remand from the Sixth Circuit, for review determination of vesting under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the judge again ruled in favor of Price. The Sixth Circuit again reversed; the court failed to look to the terms of the plan but instead found that because the Board’s decision letter did not discuss whether the benefits vested, the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. View "Price v. Bd. of Trs. of IN Laborers' Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Sexton, a smoker, spent 25 years working in coal mines. He first applied for Black Lung Act (30 U.S.C. 901) benefits in 1973. The application was unsuccessful as were two other claims. In 2001, two years after the denial became final, Sexton filed a subsequent claim. The district director recommended an award of benefits. Buck Creek Coal requested a formal hearing. While his claim was pending Sexton died. His widow filed her own claim and the district director issued a proposed order awarding benefits in the survivor claim. Buck Creek requested a hearing. The administrative law judge considered four medical opinions, and based on that new evidence, determined that Sexton suffered a total disability from clinical and legal pneumoconiosis and that Sexton established a change in an applicable condition of entitlement pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 725.309 and awarded benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed with respect to Sexton’s claim and affirmed in part and vacated in part with respect to the survivor claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that 20 C.F.R. 725.309 is valid and was correctly applied and that the Board’s decision did not violate principles of finality or res judicata. View "Buck Creek Coal Co. v. Sexton" on Justia Law

Martinez worked for Cracker Barrel until 1999 when she voluntarily left. She was rehired in 2000 as retail manager, a position she held until her termination in 2010, after she engaged in wide-ranging, heated series conversations with four employees, involving the Haiti earthquake, the plight of those in Haiti, and the use of a state public assistance program by several employees. An associate manager overheard the conversations and filed a formal complaint, alleging Martinez made inappropriate racial comments. Martinez claims that she was singled out while all four employees participated in the discussion. During an investigation, it became apparent that other employees, not managers, used inappropriate racial terms such as “ghetto card” and Cracker Barrel imposed policy reviews on those employees, all African-American. Cracker Barrel determined that Martinez had violated specific company rules prohibiting rude and boisterous conduct, or any form of discriminatory or harassing behavior. Martinez sued (42 U.S.C 1981; MCL 37.2101) , alleging “reverse” racial discrimination in the handling of her termination. Cracker Barrel offered reinstatement, but interpreted her response letter from counsel as a rejection. The district court entered summary judgment for Cracker Barrel. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc." on Justia Law