Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Keith has been deaf since his birth in 1980. Wearing a sound transmitter, he can detect noises. He is unable to speak and communicates using American Sign Language (ASL). In 2007, Keith successfully completed a lifeguard training program, with assistance from an ASL interpreter, and applied for a position at the county’s wave pool. Stavale, the county recreation specialist, explained to her supervisors that Keith had requested an ASL interpreter for meetings and classroom instruction. Having received no objection, Stavale extended an offer of employment, conditioned upon a pre-employment physical. During that physical, the doctor stated: “He’s deaf; he can’t be a lifeguard” and “I have to [fail him]. If something happens … they’re going to come after me.” Aquatic safety and risk management consultants expressed concern about whether a deaf individual could perform effectively as a lifeguard. Stavale identified accommodations that she believed could successfully integrate Keith. The employment offer was withdrawn. The district court granted the county summary judgment in his suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that issues of material fact exist regarding whether Keith is otherwise qualified to be a lifeguard, with or without reasonable accommodation. View "Keith v. Cnty. of Oakland" on Justia Law

Diaz, a Michigan Department of Corrections employee, he was diagnosed with heart and abdominal conditions that forced him to take intermittent leave. Diaz alleges he was fired for attendance violations after taking leaves and brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking damages and reinstatement, alleging: interference with Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2612 (a)(1)(D) rights; retaliation for exercising FMLA rights; and deprivation of a protected federal right. Boden, an employee of the Michigan Department of Human Services, was placed on stress leave by her doctor; she claims that her supervisor dramatically increased her workload and disciplined her for petty infractions because of that leave. She brought suit with the same allegations. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit remanded the claim for reinstatement, but affirmed with respect to claims for damages. The Supreme Court has held that a state employee may recover damages for a state’s failure to comply with family-care provision of the FMLA, but the Sixth Circuit has held that the rationale did not extend to FMLA self-care provision. Suits against the states for damages under 2612(a)(1)(D) are barred by the states’ sovereign immunity and public employers cannot be held individually liable under the FMLA.View "Boden v. MI Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

In 2004 Taylor, an employee of the IRS, began applying for promotions and transfers, and was rejected until she received a promotion in 2006. In 2004, after being denied a promotion, Taylor filed her first discrimination complaint and was assigned to work in a unit supervised by Shields. While working in this unit, Taylor alleges that Shields took several retaliatory actions against Taylor, including written reprimands, a three-day suspension without pay, and providing negative references for Taylor to prospective employers. Based on these alleged actions, Taylor filed additional complaints for retaliation. In 2005, the IRS and Taylor entered into a settlement agreement. Taylor subsequently alleged noncompliance by the IRS. In 2006 and 2008, the agency issued decisions concluding that although the IRS had breached the agreement, it was currently in compliance. Taylor did not appeal either decision, but filed a complaint alleging retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(a) and breach-of-settlement-agreement. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the breach claim, holding that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to such claims, but reversed with respect to retaliation.View "Taylor v. Geithner" on Justia Law

The Office of the Racing Commissioner regulates the Michigan horse-racing industry. The ORC hires racing stewards as independent contractors to perform regulatory, judging, and enforcement functions in conjunction with three types of horse races. The plaintiffs were appointed as racing stewards in the 1980s and 1990s. Hall currently works as a state steward for the Michigan Gaming Board. Dye was appointed in 1988 and was promoted to Administrative Liaison Steward in 1998, but was demoted to State Steward in 2006 and was terminated in 2009. Perttunen was appointed in 1994, and remains employed as a racing steward for the Gaming Board. Erskine was appointed in 1999, and was terminated in 2009. The four claim that their Democratic supervisors retaliated against them for voicing support for or being perceived as affiliated with the Republican candidate in the 2006 gubernatorial election. Although certain stewards openly endorsed the candidate in the workplace, others remained silent. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court with respect to Dye’s protected-speech, holding that retaliation based on perceived political affiliation is actionable under the political-affiliation retaliation doctrine. View "Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2008, Dixon, an African-American woman and then-interim Associate Vice President for Human Resources at the University of Toledo, wrote an op-ed column in the Toledo Free Press rebuking comparisons drawn between the civil-rights and gay-rights movements. Shortly thereafter, Dixon was fired. Claiming violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Dixon filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The speech of a high-level Human Resources official who writes publicly against the very policies that her government employer charges her with creating, promoting, and enforcing is not protected speech. View "Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo" on Justia Law

In 1992 Navistar attempted to reduce its costs for retired employee health and life insurance benefits. Navistar’s retirement benefit plan is a registered employee health benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 and Navistar is both plan administrator and fiduciary. In 1993, the district court entered judgment in a class action challenging the change, adopting an agreement between the parties and retaining jurisdiction. The Agreement established the Retiree Health Benefit and Life Insurance Plan. The Plan established the Health Benefit Program Summary Plan Description, which contains a description of the health benefits and is furnished to all beneficiaries. The Agreement divides health benefits into two plans: Plan 2 for those eligible for Medicare and Plan 1 for those who are not eligible. A prescription drug benefit was provided under the Agreement, identical for both Plan 1 and Plan 2. When Navistar moved to substitute Medicare Part D into the Plan, class members claimed violation of the Agreement. The district court ordered Navistar to reinstate, retroactively, the prescription drug benefit that was in effect before Navistar made the unilateral substitution. The Sixth Circuit affirmed,View "Shy v. Navistar Int'l Corp." on Justia Law

Watts began working for UPS in 1990; in 2000 she injured her back while unloading her truck. She was diagnosed with acute back strain and placed on medical leave. Watts was awarded Temporary Total Disability (TTD) payments, including medical treatment, and did not return to work for two years. In 2002 a doctor reported that Watts had reached “maximum medical improvement,” as defined by the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation and was ready for gradual return to normal work in a restricted time frame. UPS terminated Watts’s TTD payments. UPS had a light-duty work program, Temporary Alternative Work. Typical tasks included answering phones, pumping gas, and washing cars. Watts was rejected from the program. UPS claims that Watts was not qualified for the program under the collective bargaining agreement. Watts’s claims have gone to trial three times and been appealed once before. Most recently the district court granted UPS judgment as a matter of law on grounds that Watts’s claim was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, and was untimely under the six-month limitations period. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that section 301 does not preempt an Americans with Disabilities Act claim in federal court. View "Teresa Watts v. United Parcel Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

Paul brought state law claims for disability discrimination and retaliation against her former employer after her 12-year employment as a CT Technologist came to an end following a work-related injury. The employer removed the action to federal court on the basis of complete preemption under the Labor Management Relations Act, contending plaintiff’s claims implicated rights under the collective bargaining agreement, which included a mandatory arbitration requirement. The district court denied remand to state court and dismissed for failure to submit to mandatory arbitration. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Although plaintiff’s claim of unlawful discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment by refusing to reasonably accommodate her disability implicates an employment relationship created and defined by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the employer did not demonstrate that resolution of the claim is so “inextricably intertwined” with interpretation of CBA terms as to trigger complete preemption. View "Paul v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of OH" on Justia Law

Norfolk employees who run trains include train service workers and engine service workers. Engineers are engine service workers who operate locomotives. Train service workers perform switching and groundwork; they include conductors and trainmen. BLET is the authorized representative under the Railway Labor Act for Norfolk’s locomotive engineers, while UTU represents conductors and trainmen. Despite this division, an employee may pay dues to UTU or BLET and have either union handle grievances, 45 U.S.C. 152. Train service employees advance to engine service positions through Norfolk’s Engineer Training program. UTU’s CBA governs the employee’s work until he completes the program. After that, the employee is covered by BLET’s CBA. UTU filed a grievance on behalf of members in Norfolk’s Virginia Division. The men challenged the engineer seniority roster, arguing they should be ranked in the order they became trainmen, not in the order they became engineers. The national agreement between BLET and Norfolk, the national agreements between UTU and Norfolk, and regional arrangements among BLET, UTU, and Norfolk were presented to the Public Law Board arbitration panel, which decided in the employees’ favor. BLET sought to vacate; the district court granted summary judgment to UTU and Norfolk. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Bhd of Locomotive Eng'rs v. United Transp. Union" on Justia Law

Cintas’s SSRs drive trucks to deliver products and act as sales representatives, providing customer service, pitching sales, and collecting payments. Serrano, a female, unsuccessfully applied for a position as an SSR and filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC in 2000. In 2002, after investigating Serrano’s claims and expanding the investigation to include Cintas’s female hiring practices throughout Michigan, the EEOC issued a reasonable-cause determination and sent a proposed conciliation agreement to Cintas suggesting that relief be provided to Serrano, 111 other specified women, and an unspecified number of “other similarly situated females.” Cintas did not respond. In 2005, the EEOC notified Cintas that it was terminating conciliation efforts. In 2004, Serrano filed a Title VII class-action complaint, in which the EEOC intervened. In 2008, the district court denied nationwide class certification. By April 2010, all individual plaintiffs, save Serrano, had their cases resolved. In 2009 the EEOC filed an amended complaint, limiting its allegations to “a class of women in the State of Michigan” The district court granted Cintas’s judgment on 13 individual and “pattern or practice” claims, denying the EEOC’s discovery motions, and awarding costs and fees. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded View "Serrano v. Cintas Corp." on Justia Law