Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

White was an emergency department nurse for Baptist 2005-2007. She did not have a regularly scheduled meal break; breaks occurred as work allowed. White received a copy of Baptist’s employee handbook, which stated that an unpaid meal break would be automatically deducted from their pay checks and that if a meal break was missed or interrupted because of work, the employee would be compensated. Employees were to record time spent working during meal breaks in an “exception log.” White signed a document concerning the policy and recorded occasions where her meal break was interrupted. She claims that if her entire unit missed a break, she was compensated, but that if she individually missed breaks she was sometimes not compensated. She never told her supervisors or human resources that she was not. Eventually, White stopped using the exception log. White knew Baptist’s procedure to report and correct payroll errors, but did not utilize this procedure to correct the unreported interrupted meal break errors because she felt it would be “an uphill battle.” White filed suit, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201. The district court granted Baptist summary judgment and class decertification. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "White v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp." on Justia Law

Two former employees of Coca-Cola claim that they were injured while performing their jobs. They reported their injuries to Coca-Cola’s third-party administrator for worker’s compensation claims, Sedgwick, which denied benefits. Plaintiffs claim that the medical evidence strongly supported their injuries, but that Sedgwick engaged in a fraudulent scheme involving the mail: using Dr. Drouillard as a “cut-off” doctor. They sued alleging that the actions of Sedgwick, Coca-Cola, and Dr. Drouillard violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B), 1962(c), and 1964(c). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, noting that since the dismissal, several of the issues were resolved by its 2012 opinion in another case. The district court misapplied the elements of a RICO cause of action to the plaintiffs’ allegations. The court declined to abstain from exercising jurisdiction pending the outcome of state workers comp proceedings. The alleged acts have the same purpose: to reduce Coca-Cola’s payment obligations towards worker’s compensation benefits by fraudulently denying worker’s compensation benefits to which the employees are lawfully entitled. The allegations suggest that the defendants’ scheme would continue on well past the denial of any individual plaintiff’s benefits View "Jackson v. Segwick Claims Mgmt Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

While employed at PPG, plaintiffs were represented by three labor unions. In 2001 PPG modified health benefits for retirees, requiring that retirees pay a portion of the cost. The unions thought the modification was a breach of collective bargaining agreements and sued, requesting that the Pennsylvania district court order PPG to arbitrate the benefit dispute with the unions. The district court entered judgment for PPG, holding that the benefits had not vested. The Third Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, in 2005, more than a year before the district court entered judgment, several individual retirees filed a putative class action in the Southern District of Ohio. Their core allegation was identical to that in the Pennsylvania action; they asserted claims under the Labor Management Relations Act and ERISA and sought monetary damages and an injunction ordering reinstatement of full coverage. The district court held that the Pennsylvania judgment collaterally estopped the plaintiffs from arguing the contrary in this case. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court in the Pennsylvania action neither certified a class nor employed any other “special procedures” to protect the retirees’ interests in that action, so the plaintiffs are not bound to that decision. View "Amos v. PPG Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Auday, age 47, started work at a Wet Seal store. In 2009, Wet Seal fired her. She claimed that the termination was unlawful and discriminatory. Days later, Auday filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing $510,725 in liabilities and $204,370 in assets, without mention of the age-discrimination claim, required by 11 U.S.C. 521(a)(1)(B)(i). Three months later, her lawyer (Pinchak) asked the trustee how to be hired to pursue the claim. Neither the trustee nor Pinchak informed the bankruptcy court, which discharged Auday in January 2010. In February, the trustee applied for authority to hire, Pinchak to pursue the claim against Wet Seal. The court granted the application, but the trustee did not hire Pinchak nor was the schedule amended. Auday later sued Wet Seal, seeking $500,000 in damages. The district court granted Wet Seal judgment, holding that failure to list a potential claim on her bankruptcy petition barred her from bringing the claim. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. When Auday filed for bankruptcy, her estate became the owner of all of her property, including tort claims that accrued before filing, 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1) The trustee may bring the claim or abandon it, returning it to Auday, which would require notice to creditors View "Auday v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc." on Justia Law

Mortgage banker Henry and 445 of his colleagues sued Quicken Loans, claiming failure to pay them overtime wages from 2003 to 2007, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201. Quicken responded that the mortgage bankers fell within an exemption to the FLSA. The district court entered judgment for Quicken. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, based on an FLSA exemption for employees, compensated at a rate of not less than $455 per week, whose primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers, and whose primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. View "Henry v. Quicken Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

Blizzard, born in 1951, was hired as a part-time clerk at MTC in 1992 and was promoted to in 1996. Blizzard’s supervisor, Nutter, began as MTC’s Controller in 2001. In 2005, MTC began installing a new management information system, overseen, in part, by Nutter. Blizzard experienced difficulty. MTC asserts that Blizzard resisted and fell behind in learning to use the new software. Blizzard contends that Nutter gave a co-worker special treatment, more opportunities for training, and sometimes required Blizzard to work extra hours so that the co-worker could attend training. In 2006 and 2007, Blizzard made several oral complaints to MTC. In 2006, Nutter evaluated Blizzard’s work as falling below expectations in several areas. Blizzard submitted a rebuttal. In 2008, Nutter wrote a memo, “Conduct of Peggy Blizzard,” which documented reasons for recommending termination. Blizzard, fired at age 57, filed a charge with the EEOC, claiming retaliation, age discrimination, and sex discrimination. In 2009, she filed a complaint against MTC and Nutter, asserting age discrimination and retaliation under the federal Age Discrimination Enforcement Act and Ohio law, as well as claims for “Breach of Policy” and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted MTC summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll." on Justia Law

Circle C contracted to construct buildings at the Fort Campbell military base. The agreement included determinations of hourly wages for electrical workers. Circle C has had government contracts for 20 years; its co-owner and a bookkeeper attended training on the prevailing wage requirement for federal government contracts. PT was Circle C’s subcontractor on 98 percent of the electrical work, but did not have a written contract. Circle C provided PT with the wage determination excerpts from its contract, but did not explain the Davis-Bacon Act (40 U.S.C. 3142) prevailing wage requirements nor verify whether PT submitted its own payroll certifications, nor monitor PT’s eight employees’ work on the project, nor take measures to ensure payment of proper wages. One of the PT electricians claimed violation of the federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(2). The Department of Labor found inaccurate or false payroll certifications. The district court awarded treble damages: $1,661,423.13. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, but remanded for recalculation of the damages. Circle C, an experienced contractor, made false statements, acted in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information, and the false statements were “material” to the government’s decision to make payment.View "Wall v. Circle C Constr., L.L.C." on Justia Law

Clay was appointed as public records coordinator for the City of Memphis. The volume of public-record requests increased substantially during an FBI investigation into awards of city contracts. Clay claims that her efforts to comply with requests were thwarted by delays in response from city employees and even delays in requests for office supplies and a place for the public to review documents. Clay was also concerned with the conduct of various other employees, such as not reporting absences, and “issues regarding nepotism and favoritism based upon personal relationships.” Clay repeatedly raised her concerns to various officials. When a new mayor was sworn in, she began to suspect the new city attorney of abuse of policies and sought records concerning employees in that office. Clay’s employment was terminated and she sued, asserting violations of the Tennessee Public Protection Act, common law retaliatory discharge and wrongful termination, tortious interference with at-will employment, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, deprivation of constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, and violation of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to a First Amendment retaliation claim, but otherwise affirmed. View "Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, TN" on Justia Law

In 2008, Michigan passed the MMMA, Comp. Laws 333.26421, to protect medical marijuana. Any “qualifying patient” who possesses a registry identification card is not “subject to arrest, prosecution, or penalty of any manner, or denied any right or privilege, including but not limited to civil penalty or disciplinary action by a business.” Plaintiff was employed by Wal-Mart for five years before he was terminated after testing positive for marijuana, in violation of the company’s drug use policy. The test was administered on the day after Plaintiff injured his knee at work. Plaintiff was diagnosed with sinus cancer and an inoperable brain tumor at age 17; he experiences constant pain and side effects of medications. In 2008, Plaintiff’s oncologist recommended marijuana; Plaintiff obtained a registry card and maintains that he followed state laws, never used marijuana at work, nor did he work under the influence. Plaintiff sued in state court for wrongful discharge and MMMA violation; defendants removed to federal court based on diversity. The district court denied remand and dismissed. The court held that the store manager, a Michigan resident, was fraudulently joined and that the MMMA does not regulate private employment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the manager had no potential liability. View "Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

A collective bargaining agreement governs the relationship between Acument and its retired employees. Prior to 2008, the company paid healthcare and life-insurance benefits to qualified retirees. When Acument ended these benefits in 2008, a class of 64 retirees claimed that the company had violated the CBA in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and the Labor Management Relations Act. The district court granted Acument summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, characterizing the issue as “a matter of contract.” The relevant language states that the company “reserves the right to amend, modify, suspend, or terminate the Plan,” consisting of: retiree medical coverage; retirement income; disability income; and life insurance. View "Witmer v. Acument Global Tech., Inc." on Justia Law