Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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Back was born in 1954 and began working at the food processing plant in 1998. Sometime before April 6, 2005, Hagerman, another Maintenance Team Leader, told Back that someone in human resources had told him that the company was planning to get rid of the three oldest employees and highest paid team leaders, a category that included Back and Hagerman. During the nine years that Back worked at the plant, he received both positive and negative reviews. His reviews became increasingly negative in 2006. Back was disciplined three times in 2006. One write-up specifically warned Back that he could be terminated for further problems. In 2007, Back was suspended for five days. Several weeks later, an explosion occurred at the plant and Back failed in his assignment to restart his line. Back was terminated, for stated reasons relating to history of failing to properly supervise his subordinates and his team’s history of failing to meet expectations. The district court rejected his suit under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.010 to 344.990, finding Hagerman’s statement to be inadmissible hearsay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Back v. Nestle USA, Inc." on Justia Law

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In a 2009 opinion, the Sixth Circuit held that, in a 1998 collective bargaining agreement, CNH agreed to provide health-care benefits to retirees and their spouses for life, but rejected the suggestion that the scope of this commitment in the context of healthcare benefits, as opposed to pension benefits, meant that CNH could make no changes to the healthcare benefits provided to retirees. The court remanded for a determination of reasonableness with respect to CNH’s proposed changes to its retiree healthcare benefits, under which retirees, previously able to choose any doctor without suffering a financial penalty, would be put into a managed-care plan. The court listed three considerations: Does the modified plan provide benefits “reasonably commensurate” with the old plan? Are the proposed changes “reasonable in light of changes in health care”? And are the benefits “roughly consistent with the kinds of benefits provided to current employees”? On remand, the district court granted CNH summary judgment without reaching the reasonableness question or creating a factual record from which the determination could be made on appeal. The Sixth Circuit again remanded.View "Reese v. CNH America LLC" on Justia Law

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Adams worked in coal mines for 17 years, leaving A & E Coal in 1988, after 12 years, because he was having difficulty breathing. He has not worked since. Adams also smoked cigarettes for about 25 years, averaging a pack a day before quitting in 1998 or 1999. Adams filed his first claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act 30 U.S.C. 901 in 1988. His claim was denied: He did not prove that his pneumoconiosis was caused in part by his coal-mine work, or that his pneumoconiosis totally disabled him. In 2007, Adams filed a second claim. Two pulmonologists agreed that he was completely disabled, but disagreed on what lung diseases Adams had, and on what caused them. An Administrative Law Judge awarded benefits, finding that Adams had pneumoconiosis, that the disease was caused by Adams’s exposure to coal dust during his coal-mine employment, and that he was totally disabled because of the disease. The Benefits Review Board and the Third Circuit affirmed. Although the ALJ was not required to look at the preamble to the regulations to assess the doctors’ credibility, he was entitled to do so. View "A & E Coal Co. v. Adams" on Justia Law

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An involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition was filed against Quality Stores, which eventually closed operations and terminated all employees. Under the Pre-Petition Plan, severance pay was based on job grade. Payments were made on the normal payroll schedule, not tied to receipt of unemployment compensation, and not attributable to particular services. The Post-Petition Plan was designed to encourage employees to defer their job searches; the lump-sum payments were not tied to receipt of unemployment compensation, nor attributable to provision of particular services. Quality reported the payments as wages and withheld income tax, paid the employer’s share of FICA tax, and withheld each employee’s share of FICA. Of $1,000,125 at issue, $382,362 is attributed to the Pre-Petition Plan, $214,000 for the employer share and $168,362 for the employee share; $617,763 is attributed to the Post- Petition Plan, $357,127 for the employer share and $260,636 for the employee share. Quality argued that the payments were not wages but supplemental unemployment compensation benefits, not taxable under FICA, and sought a refund of the employer share and the shares of consenting employees. When the IRS did not act, Quality filed an adversary action in the bankruptcy court, which ordered a full refund. The district court and Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Quality Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2003, Berrington began working for Wal-Mart; he took several approved leaves of absence. In February 2007, Berrington began a leave that was approved through April, 2007. Berrington, did not return to work after April 30. Berrington claims that because of conversations he had with managers, he did not believe he needed to update or extend his leave. In mid-May, a personnel manager contacted Berrington and told him to update his paperwork, which Berrington did. Three days later, Berrington was informed that he was fired, but that he could be rehired after 90 days. Berrington applied for unemployment benefits. Wal-Mart opposed Berrington’s request on the basis that Berrington voluntarily terminated his employment by failing to return from a leave of absence. Wal-Mart’s paperwork recommended rehiring Berrington. While the dispute was pending Berrington reapplied, but Wal-Mart did not hire him. He reapplied a second time, without success. Since August 2007, the store has hired employees to positions for which Berrington is qualified. Berrington contends Wal-Mart refused to hire him because he filed for unemployment benefits, which he eventually received. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, declining “to carve an unprecedented category of public policy claims out of Michigan law.” View "Berrington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

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Tingle alleged that she was disciplined and ultimately terminated from employment by the nursing home, in retaliation for speaking with investigators from the Ohio Department of Health following the death of a nursing home resident. She brought her claim under Ohio Revised Code 3721.24(A), which prohibits retaliation for participating in a Department of Health investigation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employer claimed that the termination was justified by the company’s progressive discipline policy. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Once a defendant has advanced a non-retaliatory reason for terminating an employee, it is the plaintiff’s burden to come forward with evidence that would tend to undermine the legitimacy of that reason. Tingle’s allegations were insufficient to suggest that the defendants lacked an honest belief in their proffered reasons for their actions. View "Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, " on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs are retired unionized employees of defendant and were covered by collective bargaining agreements that addressed healthcare benefits. The parties contest whether the CBAs guaranteed employees and their spouses lifetime healthcare benefits after retirement. After retiring, the employees and spouses continued to receive healthcare insurance from defendant. Between ages 62 to 65, defendant paid 80% of the premium costs. When the retirees turned 65, defendant assumed 100% of premium costs. In 2006, defendant informed plaintiffs that the company was instituting a new healthcare plan that would no longer cover 100% of the premiums. Plaintiffs claimed violations of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132. The district court ruled in plaintiffs’ favor as to employee coverage, but in favor of defendant as to spouses. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, in favor of plaintiffs. Although healthcare is a “welfare benefit,” not entitled to the same ERISA protection as pension benefits, employers are free to waive their power to alter welfare benefits. Defendant did so by offering vested healthcare coverage to retired employees and spouses, and by agreeing that CBAs could only be modified with signed, mutual consent of the parties. View "Moore v. Menasha Corp." on Justia Law

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In 2003, Kroll began working for WLAA as an Emergency Medical Technician and was considered to be “good employee” by her direct supervisor, Binns. After Kroll became romantically involved with a co-worker, the office manager, Dresen, received reports of concerns from WLAA employees about Kroll’s well-being. Kroll maintains that Dresen “requested” that Kroll “receive psychological counseling.” Later, Binns told Kroll that he had received a complaint and was concerned about Kroll’s ability to perform her job safely; he told Kroll that she must attend counseling in order to continue working at WLAA. Kroll told Binns that she would not attend the counseling, left the meeting, and did not return to work at WLAA. In Kroll’s suit under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), the district court entered summary judgment for WLAA. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Kroll presented sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could conclude that the “psychological counseling” Kroll was instructed to attend did constitute a “medical examination” under the ADA, although WLAA may still be entitled to judgment if such counseling was “job related” and consistent with “business necessity.” View "Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth." on Justia Law

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While Daugherty worked as a manager in the city’s Department of Public Utilities from January 2006 to March 2007, he complained that he was underpaid and that he was paid less than white managers. His annual salary was $48,500, his white predecessor had earned $56,000, and his white subordinate earned $49,000. In 2006, Daugherty assisted two black DPU employees with discrimination complaints against the City of Toledo and individuals. Daugherty claims he was evaluated more harshly than white employees and that, despite his position as second-in-command in his division, was not placed in charge when the supervisor was absent. He also claimed derogatory remarks by one individual. Daugherty was terminated and filed suit under state law and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court required Daugherty to present more evidence than required under the McDonnell-Douglas framework and failed to adequately analyze evidence of discriminatory comments by the mayor. On remand, the court should also conduct a hostile-work environment analysis. The court erred in excluding testimony regarding other acts of alleged retaliation by the city, basing its decision solely on whether the same person made each termination decision. View "Griffin v. Finkbeiner" on Justia Law

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Gray a roof bolter employed in a mine, filed a complaint of employment discrimination with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 801 - 965 alleging that his employment was terminated for making safety-related complaints. Following a determination that Gray’s complaint was not “frivolously brought,” Gray was granted temporary reinstatement. After investigation of Gray’s allegations, the Secretary determined that no violation had occurred and denied Gray’s complaint and dissolved the reinstatement order. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission reversed an ALJ’s order and held that temporary reinstatement was required to continue pending resolution of Gray’s individual claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed; the Mine Act does not require such continued temporary reinstatement.View "N. Fork Coal Corp. v. Fed.Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n" on Justia Law