Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Banks worked as a coal miner for 17 years and smoked about one pack of cigarettes per day for 38 years. His employment ended in 1991. After two unsuccessful attempts, in 2003, Banks filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, which provides benefits to coal miners who become disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 901. An ALJ found that Banks had shown a change in his condition and that he suffered from legal pneumoconiosis which substantially contributed to his total disability. Banks was awarded benefits and the Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, adopting the regulatory interpretation urged by the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. The ALJ relied on reasoned medical opinions. View "Cumberland River Coal Co. v. Banks" on Justia Law

Ondricko had been working in the gaming industry since 1994 and began working for MGM in 2003. MGM promoted Ondricko to floor supervisor in 2005. As a floor supervisor, she was responsible for supervising dealers at as many as six gaming tables in an area referred to as a “pit.” MGM claims it fired Ondricko because she participated in a “bad shuffle” at a blackjack table she was supervising. At least six other supervisors had engaged in misconduct related to shuffle procedures. Only two were terminated. She sued for race and gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L.37.2101. The district court found that Ondricko admitted the employment misconduct that resulted in her termination and that she had not shown disparate treatment of similarly situated comparators. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the misconduct was insufficient to justify termination and that Ondricko had established disparate treatment of male comparators. View "Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC" on Justia Law

Rosebrough was born without a left hand. After she expressed interest in a job as a school bus driver, the supervisor informed her that a waiver is required from the Ohio Department of Education before an individual who is missing a limb is allowed to operate a school bus and told her to come to the office to pick up the waiver forms. Rosebrough received approval of the waiver. After having conflicts with her assigned trainer, Rosebrough stopped short of obtained her commercial driver’s license and filed suit asserting violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 and the Ohio Revised Code, 4112.02, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finding that Rosebrough was not qualified to be a bus driver because she did not have a CDL, the district court granted summary judgment to the school. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Rosebrough’s ADA-covered position as a trainee was at issue, and she could not be required to have a CDL to be “otherwise qualified” for the position of training to obtain a CDL. Having a CDL was not necessary for Rosebrough to perform the essential functions of her training position View "Rosebrough v. Buckeye Valley High Sch." on Justia Law

In August 2008 Ellington accepted the position of Deputy Clerk of the City Council of East Cleveland. The City Council wanted him, but then-Mayor, Brewer, stood in the way. After resolution of an approximately three-month-long standoff between the sides, Ellington began receiving regular paychecks and compensation for wages unpaid since he had begun performing services. Ellington sued, claiming that failure to issue him paychecks between August 2008 and November 2008 violated the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201–219, article II, section 34a of the Ohio Constitution; and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, Ohio Rev. Code 4111.01–.99. The district court concluded that Ellington, as an employee of the City Council, was subject to the “legislative employee” exclusions to the federal and state minimum wage and overtime provisions and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. To conclude that Ellington, who has been found to be an employee of a legislative body, is covered by the FLSA because, as Deputy Clerk of Council, he is also part of the City of East Cleveland’s workforce would effectively excise the FLSA’s “legislative employee” exclusion. View "Ellington v. City of East Cleveland" on Justia Law

Branham began teaching in 1983 and was a tenured law professor. She sometimes suffered from seizures. She had a 12-month teaching contract for 2006. For the spring semester she was assigned to teach constitutional law and torts. Branham indicated that she did not want to teach the classes, citing health reasons and her greater experience with criminal law. She nonetheless taught the courses. In summer Branham sold her house, moved to Illinois, and was granted a leave of absence. Assigned to teach constitutional law after returning from leave, she refused to do so. The dean terminated her employment in December. Her contract required that dismissal be voted upon by faculty. That process was not initially followed. Branham sought damages for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. The district court dismissed all but the contract claim, granted a motion to limit the remedy on the contract-breach claim to equitable relief, held that the school had breached the contract, and ordered compliance. Faculty and the board of directors concurred in the dismissal. The district court entered judgment against Branham. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch." on Justia Law

Since 1979 ADT recognized Local 131 as the exclusive representative of a unit of service employees, defined as “all full-time and regular part-time servicemen employed by [ADT] at its Kalamazoo, Michigan facility; but excluding ....” In 2008 ADT manager Rogers informed Kalamazoo employees that ADT would close its Kalamazoo facility, would consolidate its operations at the Wyoming, Michigan office, and would no longer recognize the union as their bargaining representative. Rogers explained that the employees would continue to: service the same areas; go to their job assignments from their homes; and receive the same hourly wage rates and piece rates. Overtime and drive-time entitlements would be decreased. Vacation eligibility changed. ADT did not notify the union of the changes, but sent a letter stating that consolidation of 14 unionized Kalamazoo employees with 27 unrepresented Wyoming workers meant that the union would not represent a majority of employees. The NLRB determined that the historic unit continued to be an appropriate bargaining unit. The Sixth Circuit enforced the order that ADT rescind its unilateral actions as an appropriate exercise of authority under 29 U.S.C. 159(b).View "NLRB v. ADT Security Services, Inc." on Justia Law

DiPonio Construction entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Union, which it subsequently terminated according to the terms of the agreement. DiPonio refused to bargain for a new agreement and sought a declaratory judgment. The district court held that even if it possibly had concurrent jurisdiction with the National Labor Relations Board to decide this issue, it would be inappropriate to exercise it, and imposed sanctions (attorney fees) against DiPonio under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The ultimate issue is whether the CBA was entered into pursuant to section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(f), or section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(a). If the CBA was a section 8 contract, DiPonio had no duty to negotiate for a new CBA; however, if it is a section 9(a) contract it did. DiPonio’s claims are clearly “primarily representational” and fall within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB. View "DiPonio Const. Co., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers" on Justia Law

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act guarantees returning veterans reemployment with their former employers and prohibits employers from discriminating against veterans based on their military service, 38 U.S.C. 4301–4335. Petty claimed that Metropolitan Government of Nashville-Davidson County violated USERRA in its treatment of him after he returned to Metro’s police department from active duty in the U.S. Army: Metro failed to restore him to his former position of patrol sergeant and discriminated against him on the basis of his military service. Metro had declined to reinstate him because of his alleged dishonesty concerning his military discipline history. Following remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Petty on his reemployment claims and ordered Metro to reinstate him to his former position as a patrol sergeant; the court awarded Petty back pay and partial liquidated damages on his reemployment claims and ruled in his favor on his discrimination claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Metro was on notice of its obligation to reinstate Petty, but never did so. View "Petty v. Metro. Gov't of Nashvlle & Davidson Cty." on Justia Law

Emswiler sued his employer, CSX, a railroad, and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen after his seniority on the roster of train engineers was adjusted. Emswiler alleged breach of collective bargaining agreement, breach of duty of fair representation, and disability discrimination under Ohio law. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly determined it could not reach the merits of claims for breach of CBA and disability discrimination due to his failure to pursue arbitral mechanisms mandated by the Railway Labor Act, which governs disputes between management and labor in the railroad industry, 45 U.S.C. 151, 153. The RLA divides disputes into two categories: Major disputes concern the formation of collective bargaining agreements, whereas minor disputes deal with the interpretation of existing CBAs. This is a minor dispute. Emswiler’s claim for breach of duty of fair representation lacked merit. View "Emswiler v. CSX Transp. Inc." on Justia Law

Chattman, an African American, worked as a shipping coordinator, and had been with the company for 20 years when Tullock, a Caucasian and then Human Resources Director, recommended that management terminate Chattman’s employment following an incident of “horseplay,” during which a worker was injured. Chattman cited three incidents in which Tullock made racial comments as evidence of his animosity toward African Americans. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on claims under Title VII, 42 U .S.C. 2000e–2(a)(1) and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Chattman has presented evidence of Tullock’s discriminatory animus and offered sufficient proof to create genuine issues of fact as to intent and causation, so that summary judgment was improper. The adverse employment actions alleged by Chattman and any damages are matters to be resolved by a jury. View "Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc." on Justia Law