Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Doe sued the Salvation Army and its warehouse supervisor, claiming employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a). The supervisor allegedly inappropriately asked him in an interview what kind of medications Doe was taking and refused to hire Doe as a truck driver when Doe responded that he was taking “psychotropic” medications. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, holding that material issues of fact existed as to Doe’s disability and the legitimacy of the warehouse’s safety concerns. On remand, the court granted the Salvation Army summary judgment on the basis that it was a religious organization and not principally engaged in social services. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The statutory definition of “program or activity” permits consideration of the whole organization if the organization is principally engaged in the business of providing social services. That the Salvation Army views its social service as a way of spreading its spiritual teachings is not dispositive; an activity can be both. View "Doe v. Salvation Army in the U.S." on Justia Law

Keys filed a class-action lawsuit against her former employer, alleging claims of race discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court dismissed, finding that Keys failed to plead a prima facie case of race discrimination under the burden-shifting framework of “McDonnell Douglas.” The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply at the pleading stage and the complaint detailed several specific events in each of those employment-action categories where Keys alleges she was treated differently than her Caucasian management counterparts; it identifies the key supervisors and other relevant persons by race and either name or company title; and it alleges that Keys and other African Americans received specific adverse employment actions notwithstanding satisfactory employment performances. View "Keys v. Humana, Inc." on Justia Law

Gecewicz began working for the hospital in 1998. She took Earned Time Off leave and leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, during her employment due to a number of surgical procedures. She was never disciplined for any of these absences. Over the years, her supervisor commented several times about her surgeries. In 2007, Gecewicz accrued a number of unscheduled absences from work. She received a written warning that she had accrued seven occurrences. In 2008, she received a written warning that she had seven occurrences and was eligible for termination at nine. According to her supervisor, Gecewicz failed to show up for work on May 22, 2008, accruing three “occurrences” under hospital policy. At a meeting with management, Gecewicz did not argue the number of absences and was fired. In March 2009, Gecewicz filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC), claiming that her termination violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–12300. The district court entered summary judgment for the hospital, holding that she could not show that she was "regarded as" having a disability, and that the hospital had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Gecewicz v. Henry Ford Macomb Hosp. Corp." on Justia Law

The company services oil wells and hired Wasek as a derrick hand to work in the tower of an oil rig. It assigned Wasek to work on a four-man crew in Pennsylvania that included Ottobre, with whom he initially shared a hotel room. Ottobre discovered that he could rile Wasek with sexually explicit stories. On the rig, Ottobre began touching Wasek in a sexual manner and inflamed the situation with comments such as “you know you like it sweetheart.” Wasek found no help from his boss, who advised Wasek not to report to the Director of Operations or he would put Wasek on a “starvation schedule” and run him off the job. The problem escalated and Wasek left the job site. Wasek called the company on a regular basis thereafter, asking for immediate work. He became frustrated and started work with another company and filed suit, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–5(g), and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2201. The district court granted the company summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Wasek did not show that the bullying and harassment occurred because of his gender. View "Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

The 119-bed nursing home has 43 charge nurses, represented by AFL-CIO Local 1548 since 2003, when the Regional Director found the charge nurses to be statutory employees and the Board denied review. The 45 certified nursing aides are represented by the UAW. Seven stipulated supervisors manage the nursing department. After a 2004 collective bargaining agreement expired, the employer filed a unit-clarification petition to have the Board determine that the charge nurses were statutory supervisors under 29 U.S.C. 152(11). The Regional Director denied the petition. The Board denied review, noting that it may have been error to allow the employer to relitigate the previously resolved supervisor issue. Because the employer refused the Union’s request to bargain and to provide information, the Union filed unfair-labor-practice charges. The General Counsel issued a complaint. The employer admitted refusing to bargain but claimed that the charge nurses were statutory supervisors. The General Counsel filed a summary-judgment motion, which was granted by the Board. The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the Union, rejecting an argument that charge nurses are supervisors because they had the authority to assign, responsibly direct, discipline, hire, and transfer other employees, or effectively recommend these actions. View "Frenchtown Acquisition Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant dismissed Lewis from her position as a registered nurse at one of the company's retirement homes. Lewis sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), in 2007, claiming that the company fired her because she had a medical condition that made it difficult for her to walk and that occasionally required her to use a wheelchair. The company responded that it dismissed Lewis based on an outburst at work. The ADA prohibited discrimination "because of" the disability of an employee. The district court adopted the company’s proposed jury instruction: that Lewis could prevail only if "the fact that plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability was the sole reason for the defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff." The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, and stated that neither the use of "solely" nor plaintiff’s proposed "motivating factor" was appropriate.

Herrera was hired by defendant, a construction company in 2003 and worked as a laborer until he was fired in 2008. The termination letter, referred to unsatisfactory attendance and incarceration following conviction. Herrera filed a complaint with the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission, claiming that defendant garnished his wages improperly and fired him on account of his race and national origin. Herrera is a Cuban of African ancestry. An investigator with HRC, told Herrera that she found insufficient evidence to support his allegations. The agency dismissed. About 10 months later, Herrera sued, alleging discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KY. Rev. Stat. 344.450.1. The district court dismissed the KCRA claim as barred by an election-of-remedies provision and dismissed the federal claim because HRC had already rejected Herrera’s administrative complaint, which was based on essentially the same claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of state-law claims and the federal-law discrimination claim. Because the county agency did not adjudicate Herrera's federal retaliation claim, the court reversed as to the federal retaliation claim.

Plaintiffs, former city employees terminated after the city determined that they had tampered with their water meters, claimed that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when city officials came to their homes to inspect their water meters, that their consents to inspection were involuntary, and that they were terminated in retaliation for asserting those rights. One plaintiff claimed that he was discharged in violation of his First Amendment right to association. The district court dismissed Fourth Amendment claims against individual officials on qualified immunity grounds and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the retaliation, right to association, and municipal liability claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent was not sufficient to put defendants on notice that their progressive series of questions and orders, with no attendant threat of termination, rose to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation. Plaintiffs were terminated for reasons related to water usage and meter inspection, not for asserting Fourth Amendment rights.

Mosholder, a corrections school officer since 2001, patrolled the school and, as necessary, disciplined inmates. In 2005, the facility began housing youthful offenders. Mosholder believed that these offenders were coddled. She claimed that during a 2008 rap competition they referred to gangs and flashed signs. Defendants claim otherwise. Mosholder sent a letter to Michigan state legislators, expressing concerns that the competition created a volatile situation, with promotion of gangs, and that loss of control over youthful offenders increased incidents at the facility. She urged legislators to attend a rap event. The warden responded to inquiries, explaining the purposes of the events. In the meantime, Mosholder had multiple run-ins with the school's new administrator, who viewed Mosholder as too strict. Inmates complained about Mosholder. Mosholder was transferred to a general corrections position, where she would come into contact with more prisoners, and no longer have weekends and holidays off. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on her First Amendment retaliation claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Whatever her personal motivation, Mosholder wrote primarily on a matter of public concern; there is no indication that the letter would materially disrupt her work environment or performance of her duties.

In 2005 Regan began working for Faurecia, 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. She drove 24 miles to work until 2008, when she moved, because of her husband’s new job, to a home, 79 miles from the plant. Regan is being treated for narcolepsy. She no longer falls asleep without warning and has not fallen asleep when driving since 1997. When Faurencia decided to change the work schedule to 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., for efficiency, Regan informed supervisors that commuting in heavier traffic would be difficult with her narcolepsy. She requested to continue working from 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. or to work from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. without a lunch break. Regan claims to have showed supervisors a note from her doctor, but they claim they never saw it. Regan did not complete Family and Medical Leave Act paperwork she was given, but resigned and sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Michigan Disabilities Civil Rights Act, with gender discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Michigan’s Civil Rights Act. The district court ruled in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Regan did not suffer an adverse employment action.