Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

AT&T hired Kalich as a store manager, supervised by Rich, the area sales manager. Rich visited the store about 10 times per month and made comments that Kalich found offensive. These comments involved calling Kalich by a woman’s name, references to his "girlish" appearance and his dog, and calling him a necrophiliac in the presence of employees. Rather than pursue AT&T's internal options, Kalich retained an attorney, who wrote to Rich's supervisor. AT&T began investigation and informed Kalich that Rich would no longer oversee Kalich’s store. Rich was given final written warning and was required to take classes on promoting a professional environment. Kalich resigned, stating that he was uncomfortable with the prospect of encountering Rich and sought damages under Michigan's Civil Rights Act, alleging hostile work environment. The district court granted AT&T summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Harassment or discrimination because of actual or perceived sexual orientation is not prohibited conduct under the Act. The necrophilia comment, the only comment that could conceivably constitute sexual harassment, is not an extremely traumatic experience that Michigan courts recognize as creating a hostile work environment by a single occurrence. AT&T made adequate efforts to remedy the situation when it received notice.

Seeger worked since 1979 under a union contract. Employees on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, were also eligible for paid disability leave under the employer’s (CBT) disability plan. CBT’s plan required that the employee work in a light-duty position tailored to individual needs and medical restrictions, if medically able. In 2007 Seeger suffered a herniated disc and commenced FMLA and paid disability leave approved by CBT. CBT later asked the physician to consider part-time sedentary work. The doctor indicated that Seeger was unable to perform any work. Days later, Seeger was seen walking, seemingly unimpaired. Human Resources investigated and suspended him. The doctor responded that Seeger could walk, but could not perform even limited duties for eight hours. The company concluded that Seeger was avoiding work required by the policy and terminated his employment for disability fraud. Seeger alleged violation of the FMLA. The district court granted CBT summary judgment, finding that CBT articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination and Seeger failed to show that it was pretextual. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although Seeger established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, he failed to refute evidence that CBT had an honest belief in its basis for termination.

In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the airline extracted concessions that resulted in an approximate 40 percent wage cut for pilots in return for an $888 million claim in bankruptcy to be disbursed as stock shares. The union first suggested that a pilot's share should reflect time that the pilot worked during the 85-month concessionary period, but ultimately adopted a cutoff date for determining which pilots would receive full shares. The cutoff assumed that any pilot employed on the effective date of the Restructuring Agreement would remain employed through its termination four years later. Any pilot who left before the date would receive a share based the number of months that the pilot worked during the concessionary period. All participants in the Early Retirement Program retired after the cutoff date. Plaintiffs, retirees who reached mandatory retirement age and left before the cutoff, received shares at least $100,000 less than expected. The union rejected appeals. The district court granted summary judgment to the union. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the union breached its duty of fair representation, Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 15, and discriminated based on age, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(c)(1), and Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2204(a).

A class of retirees who had worked under a collective bargaining agreement and their survivors and dependents obtained monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief requiring that defendants provide vested lifetime healthcare benefits to the class members depending on the relevant date of retirement (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B); Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that defendant Newell Window is bound as a successor liable under earlier collective bargaining agreements to which it was not a party; that members of the plaintiff class had vested rights to company-paid health insurance and/or Medicare Part B premium reimbursements; and that the claims were not barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations.

Plaintiff, an employee of the city since 2006, began training for a position at city hall under the supervision of the then-city recorder, Williams. Plaintiff and Williams are friends and landlord-tenant. In 2008, based on a recommendation from Williams, plaintiff was assigned to a deputy clerk position. A few months later, the city fired Williams. The mayor told plaintiff not to call or text Williams, forbade her from promoting any allegations by Williams, and specifically ordered her not to participate in or assist with any lawsuit. He followed up several times, asking plaintiff whether she had been in communication with Williams. Williams did file suit, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation for speaking out against alleged acts of public corruption. Plaintiff then filed suit against the mayor and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the mayor summary judgment of qualified immunity on a claim of First Amendment prior restraint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff's right to speak publicly and participate in a lawsuit addressing workplace discrimination and public corruption in city government was clearly established.

Plaintiffs are 225 current or former employees of steel mills that have changed ownership many times. Calculation of retirement benefits changed with the changes in ownership. The employees claim that their union, employer, and plan administrator violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461, and Ohio common law by intentionally misleading them regarding how pension benefits would be calculated, inducing some to retire early. The district court dismissed, concluding that certain ERISA claims were time-barred, that the others failed to state a claim for relief, and that the common-law claims were preempted by federal law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly applied a three-year limitations period to promises allegedly made in 2003. Plaintiffs did not adequately allege fraud underlying breach of fiduciary duty, nor did they establish that the union was a fiduciary. The court rejected a variety of equitable theories.

Plaintiffs, allegedly injured while working for Cassens, sought worker's compensation benefits under Michigan’ law. Cassens’s third-party administrator, denied each plaintiff benefits. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the denials were fraudulent and violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B), 1962(c), and 1964(c). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Supremacy Clause prevents the Michigan legislature from preempting a RICO remedy by declaring its worker"s compensation scheme to be exclusive of federal remedies. An expected entitlement to benefits under the state statute qualifies as property, as does the claim for such benefits, and the injury to such property creates, under certain circumstances, a RICO violation.

Plaintiff, an air traffic controller 1974-1981, was fired by President Reagan and subject to a ban on rehiring until 1993, when he applied for rehiring. He had moved and did not update his contact information. He was not rehired and, in 2002, brought a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–634against the Secretary, who oversees operations of the Federal Aviation Administration. Plaintiff failed to respond to both the district court's motions deadline and the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment. After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, plaintiff filed Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, claiming that his attorney did not receive electronic notices of case filings due to a change of his email address. The court denid the motion, citing an affirmative duty to monitor the docket and maintain a current e-mail address, as well as the prejudice the Secretary would suffer were the motion to be granted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, also rejecting the case on the merits.

The union filed a petition to organize employees at an assisted-living facility. Employees voted in favor of the union by a wide margin. The employer objected to the result, claiming the union improperly distributed a flyer that included photographs of employees without their consent. Using employees’ photographs in union election materials without consent may taint an election by conveying the false impression that the employees support the union. At a hearing, the employer tried to introduce a second flyer that also purportedly contained photographs of unconsenting employees. The union objected on relevance grounds because the flyer had not been previously mentioned. The hearing officer excluded it. The hearing officer found that the employees gave oral consent. The Board certified the union as the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of the employees. The employer refused to recognize or bargain with the union, insisting its conduct had tainted the election. The Board found violation of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5). The Sixth Circuit granted enforcement. The employer's failure to mention the second brochure in its objections, resulting in the hearing officer declining to consider it, did not create a due process issue.

The collective bargaining agreement was scheduled to expire. During negotiations, the union disclaimed representation of the company's employees and terminated the collective bargaining process. The company then withdrew from the multiemployer pension plan. The pension fund imposed withdrawal liability and assessed $57,291.50, 29 U.S.C. 1399. The company demanded indemnification from the union pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, which stated: "The Union shall indemnify the Company for any contingent liability which may be imposed under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980." The district court concluded that an arbitration provision was enforceable. The arbitrator ordered the union to pay. The district court upheld the award. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that it would violate public policy for a union to indemnify an employer for any contingent liability to a pension plan established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461.