Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a sheet metal contractor, was bound by bargaining agreements that required journeymen to perform sheet metal work. A 1996 agreement allowed defendant to use lower-wage production workers for some, but not all, journeymen work; defendant continued to assign journeyman-only work to production employees and his sons. In 2004, defendant laid off three of its four journeymen. In 2005, production employees presented a union-disaffection petition. Defendant withdrew from the association that had served as its bargaining agent and declined to recognize the Union as the journeymen’s representative. The Union petitioned for an election; defendant laid off its last journeymen. After laid-off journeymen voted in favor of the Union, defendant hired a non- journeyman for work restricted to journeymen under the agreements. The Union claimed that defendant was bound and had unlawfully repudiated the agreement. The Board dismissed. The Union filed charges under Sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, alleging that defendant refused to recall laid-off journeymen because of anti-union animus, unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union, and refused to provide requested information. An ALJ dismissed the failure-to-recall charge, but concluded that defendant had committed the other violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding substantial evidence to support the decision.

Plaintiff, hired as a temporary hourly employee, wanted to take an additional week off after the annual plant shutdown to tour with his band. He did not speak with his assigned union representative or any member of GM management, but to his stepfather, a union committeeman, who spoke to a labor relations representative, who stated that temporary employees were not entitled to leaves of absence. His stepfather told plaintiff that he was “good to go.” Plaintiff neither requested nor receive any paperwork. When he returned, he again went through his stepfather, who was told that there were no openings. Plaintiff took no action for a year. In 2008, he was re-hired as a temporary employee. Having never filed a grievance, he filed suit alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement against GM and breach of the duty of fair representation against UAW, 29 U.S.C. 185. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's fair representation claim is interdependent with his section 301 claim; he must prevail on his fair representation claim before he may litigate the merits of his claim against GM. Plaintiff failed to undertake his obligation to exhaust internal union remedies mandated by the UAW Constitution.

Dorn Sprinkler, formed in 1977 and operated by its owner, David, failed to contribute to benefit funds required by its collective bargaining agreement for three months in 2006-2007. Employees organized a work stoppage. Sprinkler went out of business with its required contributions still unpaid. David’s son, Christopher, lead salesman at Sprinkler, had formed a company called Dorn Fire Protection during the 1990s but had not started doing business. Shortly before financial troubles at his father's business, Christopher began operations. The Union submitted a request to arbitrate to Fire Protection under the theory that it is an alter ego of Sprinkler. Fire Protection refused. The district court, finding that Fire Protection is not an alter ego of Sprinkler, granted summary judgment to defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The management structures at the companies were not substantially identical; there was no substantial continuity in employees, customers or equipment. There was no proof of intent to avoid the bargaining agreement.

Current and former African–American employees brought suit alleging that they were exposed to a racially hostile work environment in defendant's warehouses and, in response to a motion for summary judgment, submitted a detailed list of incidents, scattered sporadically over 25 years, including vulgar graffiti, overtly racist comments by coworkers, and racially motivated pranks. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly found that plaintiffs failed to show they were aware of the majority of harassment alleged by their fellow employees and correctly concluded that plaintiffs' claims should be considered individually.

Plaintiff began working for JLF in 2007 at an annual salary of $125,000. He alleges that JLF ceased paying him about a year later because of cash flow problems, but he did not stop working. A few weeks later the entire executive staff was formally laid off. Plaintiff sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and various state laws. The district court dismissed the FLSA claim on the ground that plaintiff was an exempt salaried employee, rejecting an argument that withholding compensation for several months converted the position to an hourly position. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff adequately pleaded a claim under the FLSA, based on new regulations. Employment agreements are no longer the starting point for whether an employee is paid on a salary basis; the question is what compensation plaintiff actually received.The burden should have been on the employer to prove the exemption.

In 2000 plaintiff, a Caucasian, began working at a juvenile detention facility. He was a member of the Michigan State Employees Association Union and could only be terminated for cause. Between 2005 and 2007, plaintiff was the subject of incident reports, referred to formal counseling, and suspended several times. In 2007, a co-worker filed a Confidential Discriminatory Harassment Report with the Michigan Department of Human Services. Plaintiff responded by filing an EEOC claim of discrimination. He obtained a right-to-sue letter. After his termination and unsuccessful arbitration, plaintiff filed suit alleging race discrimination (42 U.S.C. 2000e) and violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1),(2)). The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, with respected to the Title VII claims, but vacated with respect to the FLMA. Plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant retaliated against him for exercising his FMLA rights.

In a previous proceeding, the National Labor Relations Board found that the medical center violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3) when it fired eight employees because of their union support and participation in a lawful strike. The Sixth Circuit enforced the NLRB order directing the center to pay back pay to one of the eight discriminatees, rejecting arguments that the discriminatee's felony conviction affected her right to reinstatement and back pay; that her resignation from an interim job tolled back pay liability; and that her medical leave terminateds back pay liability.

Plaintiff, then age 58, was terminated from his job as shift supervisor in 1998. He claimed that he was terminated because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code 4-21-10. His performance appraisals before 1997 were positive or average; his 1997 appraisal was negative. The company stated that he was terminated as part of a reduction in force and that his responsibilities were shifted to another supervisor. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. Appeal was stayed due to the employer's reorganization in bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not establish that the stated reason for termination was pretextual.

In 1975 federal court held that the city had discriminated against minorities in hiring entry-level firefighters. In 1977, the court approved a consent decree that included racial classifications as a remedy. A 2000 amendment noted that the percentage of minority firefighters had increased from four to 26 and set a goal of 33-1/3 percent; the court required that one of every three hires be minority applicants. During the years that followed, the city did not hire, but laid off firefighters. In 2009, the court declined to extend the decree and its racial classifications for another six years. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that the district court did not make findings concerning whether the racial classifications continue to remedy past discrimination.

The company granted plaintiff leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, listing a June 27 return date. The doctor cleared plaintiff for light work beginning on May 31 and set June 13 as the probable date for unrestricted work. On May 31, plaintiff was sent home because the company did not permit employees with non-work-related injuries to perform light duty work after leave. Plaintiff did not return on June 13 and told the company that he was experiencing pain and would return on June 27. He obtained a doctor's note, but the company counted June 13 to 17 as unexcused absence and terminated his employment. The district court ruled for plaintiff on a claim of FLMA interference (29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D)); awarded $99,960 in attorney fees, $2,732.90 in costs, and $104,354.85 in back pay; and ordered the company to change the termination date, for purposes of pension and retiree health benefits. The court denied statutory liquidated damages because it found that the company acted with reasonable grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the interference claim and reversed on the liquidated damages claim, noting the company's "obdurate refusal to correct an obvious mistake that constituted a wrongful discharge of a 36-year employee."