Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Berrington began working for Wal-Mart; he took several approved leaves of absence. In February 2007, Berrington began a leave that was approved through April, 2007. Berrington, did not return to work after April 30. Berrington claims that because of conversations he had with managers, he did not believe he needed to update or extend his leave. In mid-May, a personnel manager contacted Berrington and told him to update his paperwork, which Berrington did. Three days later, Berrington was informed that he was fired, but that he could be rehired after 90 days. Berrington applied for unemployment benefits. Wal-Mart opposed Berrington’s request on the basis that Berrington voluntarily terminated his employment by failing to return from a leave of absence. Wal-Mart’s paperwork recommended rehiring Berrington. While the dispute was pending Berrington reapplied, but Wal-Mart did not hire him. He reapplied a second time, without success. Since August 2007, the store has hired employees to positions for which Berrington is qualified. Berrington contends Wal-Mart refused to hire him because he filed for unemployment benefits, which he eventually received. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, declining “to carve an unprecedented category of public policy claims out of Michigan law.” View "Berrington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Tingle alleged that she was disciplined and ultimately terminated from employment by the nursing home, in retaliation for speaking with investigators from the Ohio Department of Health following the death of a nursing home resident. She brought her claim under Ohio Revised Code 3721.24(A), which prohibits retaliation for participating in a Department of Health investigation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employer claimed that the termination was justified by the company’s progressive discipline policy. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Once a defendant has advanced a non-retaliatory reason for terminating an employee, it is the plaintiff’s burden to come forward with evidence that would tend to undermine the legitimacy of that reason. Tingle’s allegations were insufficient to suggest that the defendants lacked an honest belief in their proffered reasons for their actions. View "Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are retired unionized employees of defendant and were covered by collective bargaining agreements that addressed healthcare benefits. The parties contest whether the CBAs guaranteed employees and their spouses lifetime healthcare benefits after retirement. After retiring, the employees and spouses continued to receive healthcare insurance from defendant. Between ages 62 to 65, defendant paid 80% of the premium costs. When the retirees turned 65, defendant assumed 100% of premium costs. In 2006, defendant informed plaintiffs that the company was instituting a new healthcare plan that would no longer cover 100% of the premiums. Plaintiffs claimed violations of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132. The district court ruled in plaintiffs’ favor as to employee coverage, but in favor of defendant as to spouses. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, in favor of plaintiffs. Although healthcare is a “welfare benefit,” not entitled to the same ERISA protection as pension benefits, employers are free to waive their power to alter welfare benefits. Defendant did so by offering vested healthcare coverage to retired employees and spouses, and by agreeing that CBAs could only be modified with signed, mutual consent of the parties. View "Moore v. Menasha Corp." on Justia Law

In 2003, Kroll began working for WLAA as an Emergency Medical Technician and was considered to be “good employee” by her direct supervisor, Binns. After Kroll became romantically involved with a co-worker, the office manager, Dresen, received reports of concerns from WLAA employees about Kroll’s well-being. Kroll maintains that Dresen “requested” that Kroll “receive psychological counseling.” Later, Binns told Kroll that he had received a complaint and was concerned about Kroll’s ability to perform her job safely; he told Kroll that she must attend counseling in order to continue working at WLAA. Kroll told Binns that she would not attend the counseling, left the meeting, and did not return to work at WLAA. In Kroll’s suit under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(4)(A), the district court entered summary judgment for WLAA. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Kroll presented sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could conclude that the “psychological counseling” Kroll was instructed to attend did constitute a “medical examination” under the ADA, although WLAA may still be entitled to judgment if such counseling was “job related” and consistent with “business necessity.” View "Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth." on Justia Law

While Daugherty worked as a manager in the city’s Department of Public Utilities from January 2006 to March 2007, he complained that he was underpaid and that he was paid less than white managers. His annual salary was $48,500, his white predecessor had earned $56,000, and his white subordinate earned $49,000. In 2006, Daugherty assisted two black DPU employees with discrimination complaints against the City of Toledo and individuals. Daugherty claims he was evaluated more harshly than white employees and that, despite his position as second-in-command in his division, was not placed in charge when the supervisor was absent. He also claimed derogatory remarks by one individual. Daugherty was terminated and filed suit under state law and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court required Daugherty to present more evidence than required under the McDonnell-Douglas framework and failed to adequately analyze evidence of discriminatory comments by the mayor. On remand, the court should also conduct a hostile-work environment analysis. The court erred in excluding testimony regarding other acts of alleged retaliation by the city, basing its decision solely on whether the same person made each termination decision. View "Griffin v. Finkbeiner" on Justia Law

Gray a roof bolter employed in a mine, filed a complaint of employment discrimination with the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 801 - 965 alleging that his employment was terminated for making safety-related complaints. Following a determination that Gray’s complaint was not “frivolously brought,” Gray was granted temporary reinstatement. After investigation of Gray’s allegations, the Secretary determined that no violation had occurred and denied Gray’s complaint and dissolved the reinstatement order. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission reversed an ALJ’s order and held that temporary reinstatement was required to continue pending resolution of Gray’s individual claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed; the Mine Act does not require such continued temporary reinstatement.View "N. Fork Coal Corp. v. Fed.Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Banks worked as a coal miner for 17 years and smoked about one pack of cigarettes per day for 38 years. His employment ended in 1991. After two unsuccessful attempts, in 2003, Banks filed a claim for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, which provides benefits to coal miners who become disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 901. An ALJ found that Banks had shown a change in his condition and that he suffered from legal pneumoconiosis which substantially contributed to his total disability. Banks was awarded benefits and the Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, adopting the regulatory interpretation urged by the Director of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. The ALJ relied on reasoned medical opinions. View "Cumberland River Coal Co. v. Banks" on Justia Law

Ondricko had been working in the gaming industry since 1994 and began working for MGM in 2003. MGM promoted Ondricko to floor supervisor in 2005. As a floor supervisor, she was responsible for supervising dealers at as many as six gaming tables in an area referred to as a “pit.” MGM claims it fired Ondricko because she participated in a “bad shuffle” at a blackjack table she was supervising. At least six other supervisors had engaged in misconduct related to shuffle procedures. Only two were terminated. She sued for race and gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L.37.2101. The district court found that Ondricko admitted the employment misconduct that resulted in her termination and that she had not shown disparate treatment of similarly situated comparators. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the misconduct was insufficient to justify termination and that Ondricko had established disparate treatment of male comparators. View "Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC" on Justia Law

Rosebrough was born without a left hand. After she expressed interest in a job as a school bus driver, the supervisor informed her that a waiver is required from the Ohio Department of Education before an individual who is missing a limb is allowed to operate a school bus and told her to come to the office to pick up the waiver forms. Rosebrough received approval of the waiver. After having conflicts with her assigned trainer, Rosebrough stopped short of obtained her commercial driver’s license and filed suit asserting violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 and the Ohio Revised Code, 4112.02, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finding that Rosebrough was not qualified to be a bus driver because she did not have a CDL, the district court granted summary judgment to the school. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Rosebrough’s ADA-covered position as a trainee was at issue, and she could not be required to have a CDL to be “otherwise qualified” for the position of training to obtain a CDL. Having a CDL was not necessary for Rosebrough to perform the essential functions of her training position View "Rosebrough v. Buckeye Valley High Sch." on Justia Law

In August 2008 Ellington accepted the position of Deputy Clerk of the City Council of East Cleveland. The City Council wanted him, but then-Mayor, Brewer, stood in the way. After resolution of an approximately three-month-long standoff between the sides, Ellington began receiving regular paychecks and compensation for wages unpaid since he had begun performing services. Ellington sued, claiming that failure to issue him paychecks between August 2008 and November 2008 violated the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201–219, article II, section 34a of the Ohio Constitution; and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, Ohio Rev. Code 4111.01–.99. The district court concluded that Ellington, as an employee of the City Council, was subject to the “legislative employee” exclusions to the federal and state minimum wage and overtime provisions and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. To conclude that Ellington, who has been found to be an employee of a legislative body, is covered by the FLSA because, as Deputy Clerk of Council, he is also part of the City of East Cleveland’s workforce would effectively excise the FLSA’s “legislative employee” exclusion. View "Ellington v. City of East Cleveland" on Justia Law