Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Branham began teaching in 1983 and was a tenured law professor. She sometimes suffered from seizures. She had a 12-month teaching contract for 2006. For the spring semester she was assigned to teach constitutional law and torts. Branham indicated that she did not want to teach the classes, citing health reasons and her greater experience with criminal law. She nonetheless taught the courses. In summer Branham sold her house, moved to Illinois, and was granted a leave of absence. Assigned to teach constitutional law after returning from leave, she refused to do so. The dean terminated her employment in December. Her contract required that dismissal be voted upon by faculty. That process was not initially followed. Branham sought damages for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract. The district court dismissed all but the contract claim, granted a motion to limit the remedy on the contract-breach claim to equitable relief, held that the school had breached the contract, and ordered compliance. Faculty and the board of directors concurred in the dismissal. The district court entered judgment against Branham. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Branham v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch." on Justia Law

Since 1979 ADT recognized Local 131 as the exclusive representative of a unit of service employees, defined as “all full-time and regular part-time servicemen employed by [ADT] at its Kalamazoo, Michigan facility; but excluding ....” In 2008 ADT manager Rogers informed Kalamazoo employees that ADT would close its Kalamazoo facility, would consolidate its operations at the Wyoming, Michigan office, and would no longer recognize the union as their bargaining representative. Rogers explained that the employees would continue to: service the same areas; go to their job assignments from their homes; and receive the same hourly wage rates and piece rates. Overtime and drive-time entitlements would be decreased. Vacation eligibility changed. ADT did not notify the union of the changes, but sent a letter stating that consolidation of 14 unionized Kalamazoo employees with 27 unrepresented Wyoming workers meant that the union would not represent a majority of employees. The NLRB determined that the historic unit continued to be an appropriate bargaining unit. The Sixth Circuit enforced the order that ADT rescind its unilateral actions as an appropriate exercise of authority under 29 U.S.C. 159(b).View "NLRB v. ADT Security Services, Inc." on Justia Law

DiPonio Construction entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the Union, which it subsequently terminated according to the terms of the agreement. DiPonio refused to bargain for a new agreement and sought a declaratory judgment. The district court held that even if it possibly had concurrent jurisdiction with the National Labor Relations Board to decide this issue, it would be inappropriate to exercise it, and imposed sanctions (attorney fees) against DiPonio under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The ultimate issue is whether the CBA was entered into pursuant to section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(f), or section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(a). If the CBA was a section 8 contract, DiPonio had no duty to negotiate for a new CBA; however, if it is a section 9(a) contract it did. DiPonio’s claims are clearly “primarily representational” and fall within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB. View "DiPonio Const. Co., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers" on Justia Law

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act guarantees returning veterans reemployment with their former employers and prohibits employers from discriminating against veterans based on their military service, 38 U.S.C. 4301–4335. Petty claimed that Metropolitan Government of Nashville-Davidson County violated USERRA in its treatment of him after he returned to Metro’s police department from active duty in the U.S. Army: Metro failed to restore him to his former position of patrol sergeant and discriminated against him on the basis of his military service. Metro had declined to reinstate him because of his alleged dishonesty concerning his military discipline history. Following remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Petty on his reemployment claims and ordered Metro to reinstate him to his former position as a patrol sergeant; the court awarded Petty back pay and partial liquidated damages on his reemployment claims and ruled in his favor on his discrimination claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Metro was on notice of its obligation to reinstate Petty, but never did so. View "Petty v. Metro. Gov't of Nashvlle & Davidson Cty." on Justia Law

Emswiler sued his employer, CSX, a railroad, and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen after his seniority on the roster of train engineers was adjusted. Emswiler alleged breach of collective bargaining agreement, breach of duty of fair representation, and disability discrimination under Ohio law. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly determined it could not reach the merits of claims for breach of CBA and disability discrimination due to his failure to pursue arbitral mechanisms mandated by the Railway Labor Act, which governs disputes between management and labor in the railroad industry, 45 U.S.C. 151, 153. The RLA divides disputes into two categories: Major disputes concern the formation of collective bargaining agreements, whereas minor disputes deal with the interpretation of existing CBAs. This is a minor dispute. Emswiler’s claim for breach of duty of fair representation lacked merit. View "Emswiler v. CSX Transp. Inc." on Justia Law

Chattman, an African American, worked as a shipping coordinator, and had been with the company for 20 years when Tullock, a Caucasian and then Human Resources Director, recommended that management terminate Chattman’s employment following an incident of “horseplay,” during which a worker was injured. Chattman cited three incidents in which Tullock made racial comments as evidence of his animosity toward African Americans. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on claims under Title VII, 42 U .S.C. 2000e–2(a)(1) and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Chattman has presented evidence of Tullock’s discriminatory animus and offered sufficient proof to create genuine issues of fact as to intent and causation, so that summary judgment was improper. The adverse employment actions alleged by Chattman and any damages are matters to be resolved by a jury. View "Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Doe sued the Salvation Army and its warehouse supervisor, claiming employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a). The supervisor allegedly inappropriately asked him in an interview what kind of medications Doe was taking and refused to hire Doe as a truck driver when Doe responded that he was taking “psychotropic” medications. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, holding that material issues of fact existed as to Doe’s disability and the legitimacy of the warehouse’s safety concerns. On remand, the court granted the Salvation Army summary judgment on the basis that it was a religious organization and not principally engaged in social services. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The statutory definition of “program or activity” permits consideration of the whole organization if the organization is principally engaged in the business of providing social services. That the Salvation Army views its social service as a way of spreading its spiritual teachings is not dispositive; an activity can be both. View "Doe v. Salvation Army in the U.S." on Justia Law

Keys filed a class-action lawsuit against her former employer, alleging claims of race discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court dismissed, finding that Keys failed to plead a prima facie case of race discrimination under the burden-shifting framework of “McDonnell Douglas.” The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply at the pleading stage and the complaint detailed several specific events in each of those employment-action categories where Keys alleges she was treated differently than her Caucasian management counterparts; it identifies the key supervisors and other relevant persons by race and either name or company title; and it alleges that Keys and other African Americans received specific adverse employment actions notwithstanding satisfactory employment performances. View "Keys v. Humana, Inc." on Justia Law

Gecewicz began working for the hospital in 1998. She took Earned Time Off leave and leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, during her employment due to a number of surgical procedures. She was never disciplined for any of these absences. Over the years, her supervisor commented several times about her surgeries. In 2007, Gecewicz accrued a number of unscheduled absences from work. She received a written warning that she had accrued seven occurrences. In 2008, she received a written warning that she had seven occurrences and was eligible for termination at nine. According to her supervisor, Gecewicz failed to show up for work on May 22, 2008, accruing three “occurrences” under hospital policy. At a meeting with management, Gecewicz did not argue the number of absences and was fired. In March 2009, Gecewicz filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC), claiming that her termination violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–12300. The district court entered summary judgment for the hospital, holding that she could not show that she was "regarded as" having a disability, and that the hospital had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Gecewicz v. Henry Ford Macomb Hosp. Corp." on Justia Law

The company services oil wells and hired Wasek as a derrick hand to work in the tower of an oil rig. It assigned Wasek to work on a four-man crew in Pennsylvania that included Ottobre, with whom he initially shared a hotel room. Ottobre discovered that he could rile Wasek with sexually explicit stories. On the rig, Ottobre began touching Wasek in a sexual manner and inflamed the situation with comments such as “you know you like it sweetheart.” Wasek found no help from his boss, who advised Wasek not to report to the Director of Operations or he would put Wasek on a “starvation schedule” and run him off the job. The problem escalated and Wasek left the job site. Wasek called the company on a regular basis thereafter, asking for immediate work. He became frustrated and started work with another company and filed suit, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–5(g), and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2201. The district court granted the company summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Wasek did not show that the bullying and harassment occurred because of his gender. View "Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc." on Justia Law