Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an air traffic controller 1974-1981, was fired by President Reagan and subject to a ban on rehiring until 1993, when he applied for rehiring. He had moved and did not update his contact information. He was not rehired and, in 2002, brought a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–634against the Secretary, who oversees operations of the Federal Aviation Administration. Plaintiff failed to respond to both the district court's motions deadline and the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment. After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, plaintiff filed Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, claiming that his attorney did not receive electronic notices of case filings due to a change of his email address. The court denid the motion, citing an affirmative duty to monitor the docket and maintain a current e-mail address, as well as the prejudice the Secretary would suffer were the motion to be granted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, also rejecting the case on the merits.

The union filed a petition to organize employees at an assisted-living facility. Employees voted in favor of the union by a wide margin. The employer objected to the result, claiming the union improperly distributed a flyer that included photographs of employees without their consent. Using employees’ photographs in union election materials without consent may taint an election by conveying the false impression that the employees support the union. At a hearing, the employer tried to introduce a second flyer that also purportedly contained photographs of unconsenting employees. The union objected on relevance grounds because the flyer had not been previously mentioned. The hearing officer excluded it. The hearing officer found that the employees gave oral consent. The Board certified the union as the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of the employees. The employer refused to recognize or bargain with the union, insisting its conduct had tainted the election. The Board found violation of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5). The Sixth Circuit granted enforcement. The employer's failure to mention the second brochure in its objections, resulting in the hearing officer declining to consider it, did not create a due process issue.

The collective bargaining agreement was scheduled to expire. During negotiations, the union disclaimed representation of the company's employees and terminated the collective bargaining process. The company then withdrew from the multiemployer pension plan. The pension fund imposed withdrawal liability and assessed $57,291.50, 29 U.S.C. 1399. The company demanded indemnification from the union pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, which stated: "The Union shall indemnify the Company for any contingent liability which may be imposed under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980." The district court concluded that an arbitration provision was enforceable. The arbitrator ordered the union to pay. The district court upheld the award. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that it would violate public policy for a union to indemnify an employer for any contingent liability to a pension plan established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461.

Defendant, a sheet metal contractor, was bound by bargaining agreements that required journeymen to perform sheet metal work. A 1996 agreement allowed defendant to use lower-wage production workers for some, but not all, journeymen work; defendant continued to assign journeyman-only work to production employees and his sons. In 2004, defendant laid off three of its four journeymen. In 2005, production employees presented a union-disaffection petition. Defendant withdrew from the association that had served as its bargaining agent and declined to recognize the Union as the journeymen’s representative. The Union petitioned for an election; defendant laid off its last journeymen. After laid-off journeymen voted in favor of the Union, defendant hired a non- journeyman for work restricted to journeymen under the agreements. The Union claimed that defendant was bound and had unlawfully repudiated the agreement. The Board dismissed. The Union filed charges under Sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, alleging that defendant refused to recall laid-off journeymen because of anti-union animus, unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union, and refused to provide requested information. An ALJ dismissed the failure-to-recall charge, but concluded that defendant had committed the other violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding substantial evidence to support the decision.

Plaintiff, hired as a temporary hourly employee, wanted to take an additional week off after the annual plant shutdown to tour with his band. He did not speak with his assigned union representative or any member of GM management, but to his stepfather, a union committeeman, who spoke to a labor relations representative, who stated that temporary employees were not entitled to leaves of absence. His stepfather told plaintiff that he was “good to go.” Plaintiff neither requested nor receive any paperwork. When he returned, he again went through his stepfather, who was told that there were no openings. Plaintiff took no action for a year. In 2008, he was re-hired as a temporary employee. Having never filed a grievance, he filed suit alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement against GM and breach of the duty of fair representation against UAW, 29 U.S.C. 185. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's fair representation claim is interdependent with his section 301 claim; he must prevail on his fair representation claim before he may litigate the merits of his claim against GM. Plaintiff failed to undertake his obligation to exhaust internal union remedies mandated by the UAW Constitution.

Dorn Sprinkler, formed in 1977 and operated by its owner, David, failed to contribute to benefit funds required by its collective bargaining agreement for three months in 2006-2007. Employees organized a work stoppage. Sprinkler went out of business with its required contributions still unpaid. David’s son, Christopher, lead salesman at Sprinkler, had formed a company called Dorn Fire Protection during the 1990s but had not started doing business. Shortly before financial troubles at his father's business, Christopher began operations. The Union submitted a request to arbitrate to Fire Protection under the theory that it is an alter ego of Sprinkler. Fire Protection refused. The district court, finding that Fire Protection is not an alter ego of Sprinkler, granted summary judgment to defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The management structures at the companies were not substantially identical; there was no substantial continuity in employees, customers or equipment. There was no proof of intent to avoid the bargaining agreement.

Current and former African–American employees brought suit alleging that they were exposed to a racially hostile work environment in defendant's warehouses and, in response to a motion for summary judgment, submitted a detailed list of incidents, scattered sporadically over 25 years, including vulgar graffiti, overtly racist comments by coworkers, and racially motivated pranks. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly found that plaintiffs failed to show they were aware of the majority of harassment alleged by their fellow employees and correctly concluded that plaintiffs' claims should be considered individually.

Plaintiff began working for JLF in 2007 at an annual salary of $125,000. He alleges that JLF ceased paying him about a year later because of cash flow problems, but he did not stop working. A few weeks later the entire executive staff was formally laid off. Plaintiff sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and various state laws. The district court dismissed the FLSA claim on the ground that plaintiff was an exempt salaried employee, rejecting an argument that withholding compensation for several months converted the position to an hourly position. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff adequately pleaded a claim under the FLSA, based on new regulations. Employment agreements are no longer the starting point for whether an employee is paid on a salary basis; the question is what compensation plaintiff actually received.The burden should have been on the employer to prove the exemption.

In 2000 plaintiff, a Caucasian, began working at a juvenile detention facility. He was a member of the Michigan State Employees Association Union and could only be terminated for cause. Between 2005 and 2007, plaintiff was the subject of incident reports, referred to formal counseling, and suspended several times. In 2007, a co-worker filed a Confidential Discriminatory Harassment Report with the Michigan Department of Human Services. Plaintiff responded by filing an EEOC claim of discrimination. He obtained a right-to-sue letter. After his termination and unsuccessful arbitration, plaintiff filed suit alleging race discrimination (42 U.S.C. 2000e) and violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1),(2)). The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, with respected to the Title VII claims, but vacated with respect to the FLMA. Plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant retaliated against him for exercising his FMLA rights.

In a previous proceeding, the National Labor Relations Board found that the medical center violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3) when it fired eight employees because of their union support and participation in a lawful strike. The Sixth Circuit enforced the NLRB order directing the center to pay back pay to one of the eight discriminatees, rejecting arguments that the discriminatee's felony conviction affected her right to reinstatement and back pay; that her resignation from an interim job tolled back pay liability; and that her medical leave terminateds back pay liability.