Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The 119-bed nursing home has 43 charge nurses, represented by AFL-CIO Local 1548 since 2003, when the Regional Director found the charge nurses to be statutory employees and the Board denied review. The 45 certified nursing aides are represented by the UAW. Seven stipulated supervisors manage the nursing department. After a 2004 collective bargaining agreement expired, the employer filed a unit-clarification petition to have the Board determine that the charge nurses were statutory supervisors under 29 U.S.C. 152(11). The Regional Director denied the petition. The Board denied review, noting that it may have been error to allow the employer to relitigate the previously resolved supervisor issue. Because the employer refused the Union’s request to bargain and to provide information, the Union filed unfair-labor-practice charges. The General Counsel issued a complaint. The employer admitted refusing to bargain but claimed that the charge nurses were statutory supervisors. The General Counsel filed a summary-judgment motion, which was granted by the Board. The Sixth Circuit ruled in favor of the Union, rejecting an argument that charge nurses are supervisors because they had the authority to assign, responsibly direct, discipline, hire, and transfer other employees, or effectively recommend these actions. View "Frenchtown Acquisition Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant dismissed Lewis from her position as a registered nurse at one of the company's retirement homes. Lewis sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), in 2007, claiming that the company fired her because she had a medical condition that made it difficult for her to walk and that occasionally required her to use a wheelchair. The company responded that it dismissed Lewis based on an outburst at work. The ADA prohibited discrimination "because of" the disability of an employee. The district court adopted the company’s proposed jury instruction: that Lewis could prevail only if "the fact that plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability was the sole reason for the defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff." The Sixth Circuit reversed, citing the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, and stated that neither the use of "solely" nor plaintiff’s proposed "motivating factor" was appropriate.

Herrera was hired by defendant, a construction company in 2003 and worked as a laborer until he was fired in 2008. The termination letter, referred to unsatisfactory attendance and incarceration following conviction. Herrera filed a complaint with the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Commission, claiming that defendant garnished his wages improperly and fired him on account of his race and national origin. Herrera is a Cuban of African ancestry. An investigator with HRC, told Herrera that she found insufficient evidence to support his allegations. The agency dismissed. About 10 months later, Herrera sued, alleging discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KY. Rev. Stat. 344.450.1. The district court dismissed the KCRA claim as barred by an election-of-remedies provision and dismissed the federal claim because HRC had already rejected Herrera’s administrative complaint, which was based on essentially the same claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of state-law claims and the federal-law discrimination claim. Because the county agency did not adjudicate Herrera's federal retaliation claim, the court reversed as to the federal retaliation claim.

Plaintiffs, former city employees terminated after the city determined that they had tampered with their water meters, claimed that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated when city officials came to their homes to inspect their water meters, that their consents to inspection were involuntary, and that they were terminated in retaliation for asserting those rights. One plaintiff claimed that he was discharged in violation of his First Amendment right to association. The district court dismissed Fourth Amendment claims against individual officials on qualified immunity grounds and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the retaliation, right to association, and municipal liability claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent was not sufficient to put defendants on notice that their progressive series of questions and orders, with no attendant threat of termination, rose to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation. Plaintiffs were terminated for reasons related to water usage and meter inspection, not for asserting Fourth Amendment rights.

Mosholder, a corrections school officer since 2001, patrolled the school and, as necessary, disciplined inmates. In 2005, the facility began housing youthful offenders. Mosholder believed that these offenders were coddled. She claimed that during a 2008 rap competition they referred to gangs and flashed signs. Defendants claim otherwise. Mosholder sent a letter to Michigan state legislators, expressing concerns that the competition created a volatile situation, with promotion of gangs, and that loss of control over youthful offenders increased incidents at the facility. She urged legislators to attend a rap event. The warden responded to inquiries, explaining the purposes of the events. In the meantime, Mosholder had multiple run-ins with the school's new administrator, who viewed Mosholder as too strict. Inmates complained about Mosholder. Mosholder was transferred to a general corrections position, where she would come into contact with more prisoners, and no longer have weekends and holidays off. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on her First Amendment retaliation claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Whatever her personal motivation, Mosholder wrote primarily on a matter of public concern; there is no indication that the letter would materially disrupt her work environment or performance of her duties.

In 2005 Regan began working for Faurecia, 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. She drove 24 miles to work until 2008, when she moved, because of her husband’s new job, to a home, 79 miles from the plant. Regan is being treated for narcolepsy. She no longer falls asleep without warning and has not fallen asleep when driving since 1997. When Faurencia decided to change the work schedule to 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., for efficiency, Regan informed supervisors that commuting in heavier traffic would be difficult with her narcolepsy. She requested to continue working from 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. or to work from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. without a lunch break. Regan claims to have showed supervisors a note from her doctor, but they claim they never saw it. Regan did not complete Family and Medical Leave Act paperwork she was given, but resigned and sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Michigan Disabilities Civil Rights Act, with gender discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Michigan’s Civil Rights Act. The district court ruled in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that Regan did not suffer an adverse employment action.

AT&T hired Kalich as a store manager, supervised by Rich, the area sales manager. Rich visited the store about 10 times per month and made comments that Kalich found offensive. These comments involved calling Kalich by a woman’s name, references to his "girlish" appearance and his dog, and calling him a necrophiliac in the presence of employees. Rather than pursue AT&T's internal options, Kalich retained an attorney, who wrote to Rich's supervisor. AT&T began investigation and informed Kalich that Rich would no longer oversee Kalich’s store. Rich was given final written warning and was required to take classes on promoting a professional environment. Kalich resigned, stating that he was uncomfortable with the prospect of encountering Rich and sought damages under Michigan's Civil Rights Act, alleging hostile work environment. The district court granted AT&T summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Harassment or discrimination because of actual or perceived sexual orientation is not prohibited conduct under the Act. The necrophilia comment, the only comment that could conceivably constitute sexual harassment, is not an extremely traumatic experience that Michigan courts recognize as creating a hostile work environment by a single occurrence. AT&T made adequate efforts to remedy the situation when it received notice.

Seeger worked since 1979 under a union contract. Employees on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601-2654, were also eligible for paid disability leave under the employer’s (CBT) disability plan. CBT’s plan required that the employee work in a light-duty position tailored to individual needs and medical restrictions, if medically able. In 2007 Seeger suffered a herniated disc and commenced FMLA and paid disability leave approved by CBT. CBT later asked the physician to consider part-time sedentary work. The doctor indicated that Seeger was unable to perform any work. Days later, Seeger was seen walking, seemingly unimpaired. Human Resources investigated and suspended him. The doctor responded that Seeger could walk, but could not perform even limited duties for eight hours. The company concluded that Seeger was avoiding work required by the policy and terminated his employment for disability fraud. Seeger alleged violation of the FMLA. The district court granted CBT summary judgment, finding that CBT articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination and Seeger failed to show that it was pretextual. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Although Seeger established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, he failed to refute evidence that CBT had an honest belief in its basis for termination.

In Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the airline extracted concessions that resulted in an approximate 40 percent wage cut for pilots in return for an $888 million claim in bankruptcy to be disbursed as stock shares. The union first suggested that a pilot's share should reflect time that the pilot worked during the 85-month concessionary period, but ultimately adopted a cutoff date for determining which pilots would receive full shares. The cutoff assumed that any pilot employed on the effective date of the Restructuring Agreement would remain employed through its termination four years later. Any pilot who left before the date would receive a share based the number of months that the pilot worked during the concessionary period. All participants in the Early Retirement Program retired after the cutoff date. Plaintiffs, retirees who reached mandatory retirement age and left before the cutoff, received shares at least $100,000 less than expected. The union rejected appeals. The district court granted summary judgment to the union. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the union breached its duty of fair representation, Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 15, and discriminated based on age, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(c)(1), and Mich. Comp. Laws 37.2204(a).

A class of retirees who had worked under a collective bargaining agreement and their survivors and dependents obtained monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief requiring that defendants provide vested lifetime healthcare benefits to the class members depending on the relevant date of retirement (Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B); Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that defendant Newell Window is bound as a successor liable under earlier collective bargaining agreements to which it was not a party; that members of the plaintiff class had vested rights to company-paid health insurance and/or Medicare Part B premium reimbursements; and that the claims were not barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations.