Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1975 federal court held that the city had discriminated against minorities in hiring entry-level firefighters. In 1977, the court approved a consent decree that included racial classifications as a remedy. A 2000 amendment noted that the percentage of minority firefighters had increased from four to 26 and set a goal of 33-1/3 percent; the court required that one of every three hires be minority applicants. During the years that followed, the city did not hire, but laid off firefighters. In 2009, the court declined to extend the decree and its racial classifications for another six years. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that the district court did not make findings concerning whether the racial classifications continue to remedy past discrimination.

The company granted plaintiff leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, listing a June 27 return date. The doctor cleared plaintiff for light work beginning on May 31 and set June 13 as the probable date for unrestricted work. On May 31, plaintiff was sent home because the company did not permit employees with non-work-related injuries to perform light duty work after leave. Plaintiff did not return on June 13 and told the company that he was experiencing pain and would return on June 27. He obtained a doctor's note, but the company counted June 13 to 17 as unexcused absence and terminated his employment. The district court ruled for plaintiff on a claim of FLMA interference (29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D)); awarded $99,960 in attorney fees, $2,732.90 in costs, and $104,354.85 in back pay; and ordered the company to change the termination date, for purposes of pension and retiree health benefits. The court denied statutory liquidated damages because it found that the company acted with reasonable grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the interference claim and reversed on the liquidated damages claim, noting the company's "obdurate refusal to correct an obvious mistake that constituted a wrongful discharge of a 36-year employee."

Plaintiff began working as an assistant restaurant manager in late 2005 and missed several weeks of work in 2006-2007 for medical treatments. In 2008 her supervisor discovered irregularities with her receipts and suspected that plaintiff improperly discounted orders and pocketed the difference. Her employment was terminated. After filing a grievance with the company, plaintiff declined an offer of three weeks paid leave and employment at a different location. She filed a complaint with the EEOC and Michigan Department of Civil Rights, which appears to have been unsuccessful, then filed suit alleging violation of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12102, and Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that it was not clear that the termination was based on plaintiff's medical conditions or on her taking leave time. There was nonpretextual reason for the firing. Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.

Plaintiff, an African American, began working for defendant in 1987 and was a member of the Army Reserve. In 2004, after rehabilitation for an injury sustained in Iraq, he returned to his job as a supervisor. When he presented orders for training, a manager told plaintiff that he needed to choose between the company and the Army. Plaintiff claimed that managers assigned him more work than others, otherwise treated him differently, and terminated his employment for falsifying a safety form, which, he claimed, was a widespread practice. Plaintiff also claims that he was told to disqualify an African American female trainee, no matter how well she performed, and refused to do so. The district court ruled in favor of the employer on discrimination and retaliation claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4311(c)(1), and race discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, Title VII, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to retaliation claims under Title VII, but otherwise reversed. The district court improperly denied discovery with respect to treatment of other supervisors. There were material issues of fact as to whether military service was a factor in the company's actions.

Plaintiff, Head of Reference and Library Instruction at a state university 2004-2007, was part of a committee to choose a book that would be assigned to all freshmen. He recommended a book that contains a chapter describing homosexuality as aberrant human behavior. An ensuing controversy, which came to the attention of the entire faculty, resulted in cross-claims of harassment. The charges against plaintiff were dismissed, but he took a leave of absence based on extreme emotional distress then filed law suits. He subsequently resigned. The district court rejected this suit, filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. federal damages claims against state officials were barred because they were based on the same acts or omissions previously raised in the Court of Claims. There was no adverse employment action to support a First Amendment retaliation claim. There was no evidence of intolerable conditions or that the university intended that he resign to establish constructive discharge. Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the university's sexual harassment policy.

In 1997, at age 39, plaintiff started working as a sales associate in defendant's store. She was later promoted to a full-time supervisor position. In 2008, another employee, age 33, was promoted to assistant manager. In 2007 and 2008, due to economic conditions, defendant underwent restructuring and eliminated the full-time supervisor position, permitting plaintiff to postpone reduction to part-time in order to utilize the medical benefits for an additional month. A new manager (age 28) was brought in from another store, so that the store had too many supervisory employees. Ultimately, plaintiff was given the option to step down to a position as a part-time sales associates or leave the company. She resigned in 2008 and filed suit, claiming violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws. 37.2101. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not prove pretext in the face of defendant's nondiscriminatory reasons for its promotional decisions.

Plaintiff was terminated from her job as a medical sales representative and filed a complaint alleging she was wrongfully discharged in violation of Michigan’s public policy because of her refusal to unlawfully promote non-approved uses of medical products and to violate anti kickback laws. The district court entered judgment for plaintiff, awarding $880,000. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the court was within its discretion in not requiring plaintiff to prove to the jury that her employer directed her to violate the law and in finding that she had presented sufficient evidence to prove that the cause of her termination was her refusal to violate the law.

The city disbanded its dive team because of budget cuts, after which two children drowned. Plaintiff, a fire department employee and member of the disbanded dive team, spoke at a city council meeting, indicating that the budget cuts caused the deaths and would cause more deaths. Plaintiff was ordered to serve unpaid suspension, equivalent to three 24 hour shifts, on grounds of insubordination, malfeasance, misfeasance, dishonesty, failure of good behavior, and conduct unbecoming of an officer. After a grievance hearing the mayor affirmed the suspension, finding that plaintiff’s statements had been false. The district court granted summary judgment for the city. The Sixth Circuit remanded for determination of whether the statements were false; whether any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; whether a reasonable official would have believed any false statements were knowingly or recklessly made; and, if necessary, whether plaintiff’s interest in speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern outweighed the city’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.

Employee injured her wrist as a result of an equipment malfunction while performing her job and was sent to the hospital, where she was tested for drugs in accordance with a drug policy negotiated as part of a collective bargaining agreement. She tested positive for marijuana and was subsequently terminated. The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the CBA. The arbitrator sustained the Union's grievance, finding that employer lacked just cause to terminate a nine-year and otherwise satisfactory employee, who was not given adequate advance notice of the drug policy and the consequences. The district court ruled in favor of the Union. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The outcome reached by the arbitrator was based on his interpretation of the relevant contractual language, which is all a court is asked to determine in conducting "exceedingly deferential," "very limited" review.

Plaintiff became a firefighter-member in the department in 1991 and also became an administrative assistant in 1997. She alleges that defendant, fire chief until 2005, subjected her to unwanted sexual advances and verbal and physical contact of a sexual nature. She filed charges with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 2004. In 2006 the EEOC determined that firefighter "members" are employees, even if not paid, and that plaintiff was sexually harassed and subjected to a sexually hostile work environment, but that there was insufficient evidence to support allegations of retaliation and constructive discharge. The district court dismissed Title VII claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court did not consider and weigh all aspects of the firefighters' relationship with the department in determining that they were not "employees" under 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b); remuneration is a factor, but not decisive. The firefighters received a number of other benefits, including insurance.