Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was hired as a nurse by defendant in October 2006, had to take leave for cancer treatment, then was informed that she had been terminated on December 12, 2006 because she did not have "any accrued PTO time or FMLA." The district court dismissed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, finding that plaintiff assented to a valid agreement to arbitrate the claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The employee handbook stated: "Dispute Resolution Process Please refer to the Eby Companies Dispute Resolution Procedure (DRP) for details." That policy does refer to arbitration and contains a signature line. Plaintiff claims she did not receive or sign the policy and defendant did not provide a signed acknowledgment. There was no indication that plaintiff was notified of the existence of the arbitration agreement, much less that she manifested an intent to agree to its terms.

Following their termination from appointed county positions, plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they were terminated without due process of law. The positions were "unclassified" and not protected under the Tennessee Civil Service Merit System. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county and its officials. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiffs had no legitimate property right to their positions and nothing for the Due Process Clause to protect. Plaintiffs, in their positions five to 21 years, never previously challenged the unclassified nature of their jobs

In 1993, the FAA decided to privatize all Level I air traffic control towers. About 1500 controllers were forced to leave the field, be trained to operate higher level towers, or secure employment with the private contractors. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 prohibits the federal government from performing an activity that could be performed for less cost by the private sector. Before privatizing a function, an agency must determine whether that function is inherently governmental or commercial. A governmental function must be performed by government employees. The district court first dismissed, but, on remand, instructed the FAA to undergo Circular A-76 analysis. The FAA continued to privatize towers and controllers again brought suit. The district court again remanded to the FAA for analysis, but refused to terminate private contracts already in place. The court later granted the FAA partial summary judgment, based on a 2003 amendment to 49 U.S.C. 47124, indicating that work in Level I towers is not an inherently governmental function, then dismissed remaining claims for lack of standing. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Every tower privatized in the 1993 program fit within the section 47124(b)(3) mandate.

Husband and wife married in 1996, when husband was a training officer at a juvenile correctional facility and wife was working as the youth-services administrator at the same facility. In 2005 husband was terminated, after a disciplinary incident. He was later reinstated. Wife was subsequently demoted. They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Defendants appealed the district court's partial denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs' right of intimate association was clearly established long before husband was terminated and wife was demoted and transferred; it was objectively reasonable to require defendants to be aware of and observe the constitutional right. There was sufficient evidence that defendants were substantially motivated by wife's marriage in removing her from her position. Defendants did not present sufficient evidence that wife would have been demoted and transferred absent her protected association.

The company fired a worker, claiming poor performance and misconduct; the union claimed that the termination was based on union support and filed an NLRB charge. The union also began a campaign against the company that included auto-generated calls and e-mail that clogged the company's systems. The company filed suit under the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030. The court denied the company's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to enter an injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C. 101, 104) because the suit involves a labor dispute and the union's attempts to publicize that dispute. The court later dismissed the suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to the preliminary injunction, noting that the company had not made "reasonable efforts" to settle the dispute, but remanded the dismissal. The company adequately alleged that the union knowingly caused "transmission" of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caused damage without authorization, to a protected computer. The union did not adequately allege an "unauthorized access" claim.

Petitioner worked as an underground surveyor for a coal company for more than 22 years. He filed an unsuccessful claim for black lung benefits (30 U.S.C. 901) about a year after being laid off. He filed a second claim 10 years later, accompanied by medical opinions and x-ray interpretations. The DOL provided a pulmonary examination for each claim. The first diagnosed shortness of breath of unknown etiology but opined that petitioner suffered no impairment. The second resulted in diagnosis of restrictive lung disease, right mid lung density, bilateral hilar adenopathy and concluded that there was no impairment. An ALJ rejected the second claim. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit vacated for consideration under an amendment to the Act, under which a miner who worked underground for at least 15 years and who demonstrates that he suffers from a total respiratory disability is presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis (30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4)). Rebuttal requires an affirmative showing; it is not enough to show that medical evidence does not include a well documented opinion of pneumoconiosis. The ALJ failed to consider all evidence relevant to the issue of disability.

Plaintiff, employed by a company contracted to do grounds maintenance, was injured while mowing grass at an Army base. A deteriorating steam pipe fell, striking him in the head. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, reasoning that under the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Law, the United States was an up-the-ladder contractor, or statutory employer, so that plaintiff's only remedy was the workers' compensation benefits he received from his direct employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the U.S. government is a "person" entitled to the up-the-ladder defense and that the waiver of immunity under the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, provides for claims in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual. The government "secured the payment of compensation" by hiring a contractor and, therefore, cannot be treated as an employer that did not secure benefits. The work performed by plaintiff was a "regular and recurrent" part of work at the facility and the government was entitled to contractor immunity.

After being fired from his position as operations manager for a regional passenger airline, plaintiff sued, alleging "association discrimination" under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(4). Plaintiff is not disabled; his wife suffers from Polyarteritis Nodosa, a rare and debilitating autoimmune disorder. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While his wife's condition may have precipitated plaintiff's poor performance, plaintiff did not present evidence that he was fired because of her condition, rather than his performance.

In 2005 plaintiff, a long-time member of the operating engineers union (Local 324), was hired as a project developer and labor consultant; he was not initially authorized to negotiate with unions or to bind the company, but he did meet with various unions. Based on his meetings with other unions, he was expelled from Local 324. The expulsion did not interfere with his collective bargaining work. An ALJ concluded that Local 324 had violated section 8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations by restraining or coercing the company in its selection of a representative, but dismissed a claim under 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A) based on the termination of membership. The Board reversed, finding no violation. The Sixth Circuit upheld the decision. Plaintiff's duties extended only to investigation, not negotiation during the relevant period and information-gathering is not an activity protected by 8(b)(1(B), which protects employers, not employees.

Plaintiff, the only female and the only African-American employee in a small office, alleged a sexually and racially hostile environment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court found that plaintiff failed to file a document that meets the test for a "charge" with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on her claim of a sexually hostile work environment and, therefore, failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, holding that plaintiff's first EEOC filing, a "Charge Information Form," satisfied the elements of a charge. Affirming rejection of the charge of racially hostile environment, the court stated that, although despicable, alleged racist statements are not sufficiently "severe" or "pervasive" standing alone to create a jury question.