Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an employee of the city since 2006, began training for a position at city hall under the supervision of the then-city recorder, Williams. Plaintiff and Williams are friends and landlord-tenant. In 2008, based on a recommendation from Williams, plaintiff was assigned to a deputy clerk position. A few months later, the city fired Williams. The mayor told plaintiff not to call or text Williams, forbade her from promoting any allegations by Williams, and specifically ordered her not to participate in or assist with any lawsuit. He followed up several times, asking plaintiff whether she had been in communication with Williams. Williams did file suit, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation for speaking out against alleged acts of public corruption. Plaintiff then filed suit against the mayor and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the mayor summary judgment of qualified immunity on a claim of First Amendment prior restraint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff's right to speak publicly and participate in a lawsuit addressing workplace discrimination and public corruption in city government was clearly established.

Plaintiffs are 225 current or former employees of steel mills that have changed ownership many times. Calculation of retirement benefits changed with the changes in ownership. The employees claim that their union, employer, and plan administrator violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461, and Ohio common law by intentionally misleading them regarding how pension benefits would be calculated, inducing some to retire early. The district court dismissed, concluding that certain ERISA claims were time-barred, that the others failed to state a claim for relief, and that the common-law claims were preempted by federal law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly applied a three-year limitations period to promises allegedly made in 2003. Plaintiffs did not adequately allege fraud underlying breach of fiduciary duty, nor did they establish that the union was a fiduciary. The court rejected a variety of equitable theories.

Plaintiffs, allegedly injured while working for Cassens, sought worker's compensation benefits under Michigan’ law. Cassens’s third-party administrator, denied each plaintiff benefits. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the denials were fraudulent and violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B), 1962(c), and 1964(c). The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the Supremacy Clause prevents the Michigan legislature from preempting a RICO remedy by declaring its worker"s compensation scheme to be exclusive of federal remedies. An expected entitlement to benefits under the state statute qualifies as property, as does the claim for such benefits, and the injury to such property creates, under certain circumstances, a RICO violation.

Plaintiff, an air traffic controller 1974-1981, was fired by President Reagan and subject to a ban on rehiring until 1993, when he applied for rehiring. He had moved and did not update his contact information. He was not rehired and, in 2002, brought a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621–634against the Secretary, who oversees operations of the Federal Aviation Administration. Plaintiff failed to respond to both the district court's motions deadline and the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment. After the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, plaintiff filed Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, claiming that his attorney did not receive electronic notices of case filings due to a change of his email address. The court denid the motion, citing an affirmative duty to monitor the docket and maintain a current e-mail address, as well as the prejudice the Secretary would suffer were the motion to be granted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, also rejecting the case on the merits.

The union filed a petition to organize employees at an assisted-living facility. Employees voted in favor of the union by a wide margin. The employer objected to the result, claiming the union improperly distributed a flyer that included photographs of employees without their consent. Using employees’ photographs in union election materials without consent may taint an election by conveying the false impression that the employees support the union. At a hearing, the employer tried to introduce a second flyer that also purportedly contained photographs of unconsenting employees. The union objected on relevance grounds because the flyer had not been previously mentioned. The hearing officer excluded it. The hearing officer found that the employees gave oral consent. The Board certified the union as the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of the employees. The employer refused to recognize or bargain with the union, insisting its conduct had tainted the election. The Board found violation of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5). The Sixth Circuit granted enforcement. The employer's failure to mention the second brochure in its objections, resulting in the hearing officer declining to consider it, did not create a due process issue.

The collective bargaining agreement was scheduled to expire. During negotiations, the union disclaimed representation of the company's employees and terminated the collective bargaining process. The company then withdrew from the multiemployer pension plan. The pension fund imposed withdrawal liability and assessed $57,291.50, 29 U.S.C. 1399. The company demanded indemnification from the union pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, which stated: "The Union shall indemnify the Company for any contingent liability which may be imposed under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980." The district court concluded that an arbitration provision was enforceable. The arbitrator ordered the union to pay. The district court upheld the award. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that it would violate public policy for a union to indemnify an employer for any contingent liability to a pension plan established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461.

Defendant, a sheet metal contractor, was bound by bargaining agreements that required journeymen to perform sheet metal work. A 1996 agreement allowed defendant to use lower-wage production workers for some, but not all, journeymen work; defendant continued to assign journeyman-only work to production employees and his sons. In 2004, defendant laid off three of its four journeymen. In 2005, production employees presented a union-disaffection petition. Defendant withdrew from the association that had served as its bargaining agent and declined to recognize the Union as the journeymen’s representative. The Union petitioned for an election; defendant laid off its last journeymen. After laid-off journeymen voted in favor of the Union, defendant hired a non- journeyman for work restricted to journeymen under the agreements. The Union claimed that defendant was bound and had unlawfully repudiated the agreement. The Board dismissed. The Union filed charges under Sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, alleging that defendant refused to recall laid-off journeymen because of anti-union animus, unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union, and refused to provide requested information. An ALJ dismissed the failure-to-recall charge, but concluded that defendant had committed the other violations. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding substantial evidence to support the decision.

Plaintiff, hired as a temporary hourly employee, wanted to take an additional week off after the annual plant shutdown to tour with his band. He did not speak with his assigned union representative or any member of GM management, but to his stepfather, a union committeeman, who spoke to a labor relations representative, who stated that temporary employees were not entitled to leaves of absence. His stepfather told plaintiff that he was “good to go.” Plaintiff neither requested nor receive any paperwork. When he returned, he again went through his stepfather, who was told that there were no openings. Plaintiff took no action for a year. In 2008, he was re-hired as a temporary employee. Having never filed a grievance, he filed suit alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement against GM and breach of the duty of fair representation against UAW, 29 U.S.C. 185. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's fair representation claim is interdependent with his section 301 claim; he must prevail on his fair representation claim before he may litigate the merits of his claim against GM. Plaintiff failed to undertake his obligation to exhaust internal union remedies mandated by the UAW Constitution.

Dorn Sprinkler, formed in 1977 and operated by its owner, David, failed to contribute to benefit funds required by its collective bargaining agreement for three months in 2006-2007. Employees organized a work stoppage. Sprinkler went out of business with its required contributions still unpaid. David’s son, Christopher, lead salesman at Sprinkler, had formed a company called Dorn Fire Protection during the 1990s but had not started doing business. Shortly before financial troubles at his father's business, Christopher began operations. The Union submitted a request to arbitrate to Fire Protection under the theory that it is an alter ego of Sprinkler. Fire Protection refused. The district court, finding that Fire Protection is not an alter ego of Sprinkler, granted summary judgment to defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The management structures at the companies were not substantially identical; there was no substantial continuity in employees, customers or equipment. There was no proof of intent to avoid the bargaining agreement.

Current and former African–American employees brought suit alleging that they were exposed to a racially hostile work environment in defendant's warehouses and, in response to a motion for summary judgment, submitted a detailed list of incidents, scattered sporadically over 25 years, including vulgar graffiti, overtly racist comments by coworkers, and racially motivated pranks. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly found that plaintiffs failed to show they were aware of the majority of harassment alleged by their fellow employees and correctly concluded that plaintiffs' claims should be considered individually.