Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff began working for JLF in 2007 at an annual salary of $125,000. He alleges that JLF ceased paying him about a year later because of cash flow problems, but he did not stop working. A few weeks later the entire executive staff was formally laid off. Plaintiff sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, and various state laws. The district court dismissed the FLSA claim on the ground that plaintiff was an exempt salaried employee, rejecting an argument that withholding compensation for several months converted the position to an hourly position. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff adequately pleaded a claim under the FLSA, based on new regulations. Employment agreements are no longer the starting point for whether an employee is paid on a salary basis; the question is what compensation plaintiff actually received.The burden should have been on the employer to prove the exemption.

In 2000 plaintiff, a Caucasian, began working at a juvenile detention facility. He was a member of the Michigan State Employees Association Union and could only be terminated for cause. Between 2005 and 2007, plaintiff was the subject of incident reports, referred to formal counseling, and suspended several times. In 2007, a co-worker filed a Confidential Discriminatory Harassment Report with the Michigan Department of Human Services. Plaintiff responded by filing an EEOC claim of discrimination. He obtained a right-to-sue letter. After his termination and unsuccessful arbitration, plaintiff filed suit alleging race discrimination (42 U.S.C. 2000e) and violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1),(2)). The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, with respected to the Title VII claims, but vacated with respect to the FLMA. Plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant retaliated against him for exercising his FMLA rights.

In a previous proceeding, the National Labor Relations Board found that the medical center violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3) when it fired eight employees because of their union support and participation in a lawful strike. The Sixth Circuit enforced the NLRB order directing the center to pay back pay to one of the eight discriminatees, rejecting arguments that the discriminatee's felony conviction affected her right to reinstatement and back pay; that her resignation from an interim job tolled back pay liability; and that her medical leave terminateds back pay liability.

Plaintiff, then age 58, was terminated from his job as shift supervisor in 1998. He claimed that he was terminated because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code 4-21-10. His performance appraisals before 1997 were positive or average; his 1997 appraisal was negative. The company stated that he was terminated as part of a reduction in force and that his responsibilities were shifted to another supervisor. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. Appeal was stayed due to the employer's reorganization in bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff did not establish that the stated reason for termination was pretextual.

In 1975 federal court held that the city had discriminated against minorities in hiring entry-level firefighters. In 1977, the court approved a consent decree that included racial classifications as a remedy. A 2000 amendment noted that the percentage of minority firefighters had increased from four to 26 and set a goal of 33-1/3 percent; the court required that one of every three hires be minority applicants. During the years that followed, the city did not hire, but laid off firefighters. In 2009, the court declined to extend the decree and its racial classifications for another six years. The Sixth Circuit vacated, noting that the district court did not make findings concerning whether the racial classifications continue to remedy past discrimination.

The company granted plaintiff leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, listing a June 27 return date. The doctor cleared plaintiff for light work beginning on May 31 and set June 13 as the probable date for unrestricted work. On May 31, plaintiff was sent home because the company did not permit employees with non-work-related injuries to perform light duty work after leave. Plaintiff did not return on June 13 and told the company that he was experiencing pain and would return on June 27. He obtained a doctor's note, but the company counted June 13 to 17 as unexcused absence and terminated his employment. The district court ruled for plaintiff on a claim of FLMA interference (29 U.S.C. 2612(a)(1)(D)); awarded $99,960 in attorney fees, $2,732.90 in costs, and $104,354.85 in back pay; and ordered the company to change the termination date, for purposes of pension and retiree health benefits. The court denied statutory liquidated damages because it found that the company acted with reasonable grounds. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on the interference claim and reversed on the liquidated damages claim, noting the company's "obdurate refusal to correct an obvious mistake that constituted a wrongful discharge of a 36-year employee."

Plaintiff began working as an assistant restaurant manager in late 2005 and missed several weeks of work in 2006-2007 for medical treatments. In 2008 her supervisor discovered irregularities with her receipts and suspected that plaintiff improperly discounted orders and pocketed the difference. Her employment was terminated. After filing a grievance with the company, plaintiff declined an offer of three weeks paid leave and employment at a different location. She filed a complaint with the EEOC and Michigan Department of Civil Rights, which appears to have been unsuccessful, then filed suit alleging violation of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12102, and Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that it was not clear that the termination was based on plaintiff's medical conditions or on her taking leave time. There was nonpretextual reason for the firing. Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.

Plaintiff, an African American, began working for defendant in 1987 and was a member of the Army Reserve. In 2004, after rehabilitation for an injury sustained in Iraq, he returned to his job as a supervisor. When he presented orders for training, a manager told plaintiff that he needed to choose between the company and the Army. Plaintiff claimed that managers assigned him more work than others, otherwise treated him differently, and terminated his employment for falsifying a safety form, which, he claimed, was a widespread practice. Plaintiff also claims that he was told to disqualify an African American female trainee, no matter how well she performed, and refused to do so. The district court ruled in favor of the employer on discrimination and retaliation claims under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4311(c)(1), and race discrimination and retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, Title VII, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed with respect to retaliation claims under Title VII, but otherwise reversed. The district court improperly denied discovery with respect to treatment of other supervisors. There were material issues of fact as to whether military service was a factor in the company's actions.

Plaintiff, Head of Reference and Library Instruction at a state university 2004-2007, was part of a committee to choose a book that would be assigned to all freshmen. He recommended a book that contains a chapter describing homosexuality as aberrant human behavior. An ensuing controversy, which came to the attention of the entire faculty, resulted in cross-claims of harassment. The charges against plaintiff were dismissed, but he took a leave of absence based on extreme emotional distress then filed law suits. He subsequently resigned. The district court rejected this suit, filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. federal damages claims against state officials were barred because they were based on the same acts or omissions previously raised in the Court of Claims. There was no adverse employment action to support a First Amendment retaliation claim. There was no evidence of intolerable conditions or that the university intended that he resign to establish constructive discharge. Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the university's sexual harassment policy.

In 1997, at age 39, plaintiff started working as a sales associate in defendant's store. She was later promoted to a full-time supervisor position. In 2008, another employee, age 33, was promoted to assistant manager. In 2007 and 2008, due to economic conditions, defendant underwent restructuring and eliminated the full-time supervisor position, permitting plaintiff to postpone reduction to part-time in order to utilize the medical benefits for an additional month. A new manager (age 28) was brought in from another store, so that the store had too many supervisory employees. Ultimately, plaintiff was given the option to step down to a position as a part-time sales associates or leave the company. She resigned in 2008 and filed suit, claiming violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws. 37.2101. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not prove pretext in the face of defendant's nondiscriminatory reasons for its promotional decisions.