Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At Weatherford’s fracking operations, Hammons directed Ayres to drive a truck outside of his driving certification; Ayres refused, telling his district manager, Crabb, that employees were being asked to drive in violation of Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations. At a subsequent employee meeting, Crabb said that anyone who complained to HR would be fired. Ayres spoke by phone with a regional HR manager. Subsequently, Ayers was taken off the schedule and eventually fired, due to a “Reduction in Force.” When Ayres applied for unemployment benefits, Weatherford claimed he had been discharged because he “failed to follow instructions.” The district court dismissed Ayres’s suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Ayres did not appeal.Ayres had also filed a Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) complaint. Ayres died; his estate’s administrator was substituted as the complainant. An ALJ found that: Ayres had engaged in STAA-protected activity; Weatherford knew about the protected activity; the protected activity contributed to Ayres’s discharge; and Weatherford failed to present clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions absent Ayres’s protected activities. The ALJ awarded Ayres $82,119 in back pay, $10,000 for emotional harm, $25,000 in punitive damages, plus attorneys’ fees and costs. The Board and the Sixth Circuit upheld the decision in part, vacating the award of punitive damages. Penal claims, including the STAA right to punitive damages, abate upon the death of the injured party. View "Weatherford U.S., L.P. v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs, former home-health aides, sued A&L under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), claiming that A&L had paid them less than the correct overtime rate and under-reimbursed their expenses. Plaintiffs may bring such claims on behalf of other “similarly situated” employees. 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The plaintiffs sought to facilitate notice of their action to three groups of other employees who had worked for A&L. The court adopted a two-step procedure under which it would facilitate such notice following “conditional certification,” which required a “modest factual showing” that the other employees are “similarly situated” to the original plaintiffs. When merits discovery is complete, the court must grant “final certification” for the case to proceed as a collective action. The court applied that “fairly lenient” standard, and “conditionally certified” two groups for receiving notice. The court declined to facilitate notice to employees who had left A&L more than two years before or who had signed a “valid arbitration agreement” with A&L.On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit rejected the lenient standard, vacated the notice determination, and remanded for redetermination of that issue under the strong-likelihood standard. The court noted that the decision to send notice of an FLSA suit to other employees is often dispositive, in the sense of forcing a settlement. As a practical matter, it is not possible to conclusively make “similarly situated” determinations as to employees who are not present in the case. View "Clark v. A&L Homecare & Training Center, LLC" on Justia Law

The trustees of three multi-employer benefit funds sued Pro Services under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 141, to recover unpaid benefit contributions allegedly owed by Pro Services, an industrial contractor that supplies skilled trade workers in the construction and manufacturing industries. Under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and fund documents, Pro Services must contribute to the fringe benefit funds for work performed within the CBA’s Trade Jurisdiction. The Funds relied on audits conducted by a third-party firm to allege that nearly $8 million in contributions and damages arose from hours worked by 230 Full-Service Maintenance Technicians (FMTs) employed by Pro Services, from 2013-2019.The district court granted Pro Services summary judgment—it was undisputed that the FMTs worked in manufacturing, and the court concluded that the CBA covered workers in the construction industry based only on a caption in the CBA. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The standard form caption cannot be used to limit the application of the CBA’s substantive terms, without the court first finding those substantive provisions ambiguous; the CBA is unambiguous. View "Trustees of Sheet Metal Workers Local 7 v. Pro Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2015, Levine, an African-American woman, applied for the position of supervisor of customer services at the main post office in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Levine had then worked for USPS for over 27 years, in a variety of positions. USPS did not select Levine for the position. Instead, it hired a white employee, Peare, whom Levine alleges was significantly less qualified than Levine. USPS disputes Levine’s allegations that the failure to hire her was racially discriminatory under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.The district court granted USPS summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting various factual disputes. Levine met her burden of producing enough evidence to convince a reasonable jury that USPS’s proffered reasons for not promoting her may have been a mere pretext for racial discrimination, so USPS was not entitled to summary judgment. The parties dispute the position’s requirements. Levine possesses three post-secondary degrees and has had seven different awards from USPS. Peare’s formal academic training ended with high school and she had worked for USPS for nearly eight years. Levine provided abundant evidence that she is arguably more qualified for the position than Peare. USPS’s reliance on Peare’s purportedly superior interview warrants similar scrutiny as does USPS’s contention that Peare had more relevant experience than Levine. View "Levine v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

Smucker’s is a federal contractor that supplies food items to the federal government. In 2021, by Executive Order, President Biden directed all federal contractors to “ensure that all [their] employees [were] fully vaccinated for COVID-19,” unless such employees were “legally entitled” to health or religious accommodations. The order made contractors “responsible for considering, and dispositioning, such requests for accommodations.” In September 2021, Smucker’s notified its U.S. employees that it would “ask and expect” them to “be fully vaccinated.” A month later, in the face of “deadlines in the federal order,” Smucker’s announced a formal vaccine mandate with exemptions based on “sincerely held religious beliefs.”The plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought religious exemptions, then sued Smucker's under the First Amendment's free-exercise guarantee. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. When Smucker’s denied the exemption requests, it was not a state actor. Smucker’s does not perform a traditional, exclusive public function; it has not acted jointly with the government or entwined itself with it; and the government did not compel it to deny anyone an exemption. That Smucker’s acted in compliance with federal law and that Smucker’s served as a federal contractor, do not by themselves make the company a government actor. View "Ciraci v. J.M. Smucker Co." on Justia Law

Based on nominations, UC awarded “triumph cords” to graduating students who had overcome adversity. UC did not vet the nominees and unintentionally awarded a cord to a convicted sex offender. Goldblum, UC’s Title IX coordinator, told her supervisor, Marshall, that she would investigate how UC evaluated admissions applications from convicted sex offenders and address the controversy in the student newspaper. Goldblum forwarded a letter to Marshall, who ordered Goldblum not to submit anything until Marshall coordinated with other University officials. The administration had authorized Dean Petren to address the controversy. Marshall told Goldblum that Petren would issue UC’s response. Marshall also identified problems with the letter’s content. Goldblum texted Marshall that she intended to submit the letter and accept “any repercussions.” Marshall texted: “Please do not send.” Goldblum sent the letter, which was never published. Marshall reported Goldblum’s insubordination. During an investigation, UC discovered additional infractions: Goldblum repeatedly ignored Title IX complaints, criticized her colleagues in front of her staff, and missed reporting deadlines. UC allowed Goldblum to resign in lieu of termination.Goldblum sued UC for unlawful termination under Title VII and Title IX. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. UC had legitimate nonretaliatory reasons to fire Goldblum, who has not produced “sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably reject” UC’s proffered reasons. Her letter was not “protected activity.” No reasonable juror could conclude that UC’s work-performance rationale was not based in fact. View "Goldblum v. University of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Stryker develops, manufactures, and sells spinal implants and products, and employed Abbas from 2013-2022. Abbas purports to have worked exclusively within Stryker’s finance department. Stryker claims that Abbas worked in various roles, including in sales. Abbas regularly used significant amounts of Stryker’s confidential information and trade secrets and supported Stryker’s litigation efforts. Abbas entered into confidentiality, noncompetition, and nonsolicitation agreements with Stryker when he commenced his employment, and again in 2022.Alphatec competes with Stryker. Stryker alleges that Alphatec "systematically misappropriate[s] Stryker[’s] confidential information, trade secrets, customer goodwill, and talent” and is litigating against Alphatec and former Stryker employees in several cases. Abbas resigned from Stryker to take a newly-developed position with Alphatec, a sales role, “crafted to protect Stryker’s confidential information.” Stryker sued for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the issuance of a preliminary injunction on behalf of Stryker. The district court crafted the injunction to preserve the status quo, reserving the possibility that other prospective jobs might be consistent with Abbas's employment agreement. It is not an impermissible industry-wide ban. Stryker is likely to succeed on the merits, based on findings that Abbas worked for Stryker in both sales and finance; Abbas had unfettered access to Stryker’s most sensitive sales and financial information, Stryker’s sales representatives, and key customer decision-makers; the Alphatec position involved work similar to the work Abbas performed for Stryker; and Abbas supported Stryker on litigation matters. View "Stryker Employment Co., LLC v. Abbas" on Justia Law

Hrdlicka, a white female, began working for GM in 1989, sculpting vehicle models. In 2017, Hrdlicka was transferred to the Design Academy. She unsuccessfully requested a transfer back to the Sculpting Department. Hrdlicka began regularly missing work and arriving late and missed crucial work related to her responsibilities for the internship program. The reasons that Hrdlicka gave for being absent or tardy were often not related to her own health and sometimes did not contain any explanation. She never saw a doctor. Hrdlicka’s 2019 performance review noted her decreased performance because of her attendance. Hrdlicka’s attendance problems did not abate. Hrdlicka missed several “critical” days in August. Hrdlicka was given an Attendance Letter, stating the consequences of continued attendance issues and explaining how to seek accommodations if needed. Hrdlicka did not inquire into any of the listed options and was terminated for repeatedly violating the Attendance Letter. Hrdlicka filed an internal appeal, stating that, prior to her termination, she “notified HR of [her] depression,” which she “perceive[d] to be directly related to the work environment.”While her ultimately unsuccessful appeal was pending, Hrdlicka was diagnosed with Persistent Depressive Disorder and a brain tumor that was surgically removed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of her suit alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, and race and sex discrimination under Title VII. View "Hrdlicka v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

Milman worked as an attorney at Fieger. On March 13, 2020, all schools and daycare facilities closed due to COVID-19. Fieger began exploring remote work. Milman was scheduled to work from home on Wednesday, March 18. Over the weekend, Milman e-mailed Harrington, a partner at the Firm, requesting to work from home on Monday and Tuesday. She noted that her children’s daycare facility was closed and her concerns about her son’s heightened vulnerability to COVID-19 as a result of his bout with RSV—a dangerous respiratory infection that put him in the hospital for five days. Harrington advised her to take paid time off (PTO) on those two days. On Monday, Governor Whitmer issued an executive order that banned gatherings of more than 50 people. Milman’s son developed symptoms resembling COVID-19. She contacted Human Resources and offered to take unpaid leave. HR responded that she could work from home for the remainder of the week. Later that day, HR e-mailed Milman a letter, signed by Fieger, that terminated her employment for failure to come into work on Thursday.Milman sued, alleging violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601(b)(1)–(5). The district court dismissed Milman’s FMLA claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Milman’s request for leave was protected—even if she ultimately was not entitled to it. Milman plausibly attempted to engage in the process contemplated under FMLA. View "Milman v. Fieger & Fieger, P.C." on Justia Law

KDE, a thoroughbred racehorse training and care operation, has four locations in Texas, New York, and Kentucky. KDE employed 120-150 employees, including hotwalkers, responsible for walking and bathing the horses to cool them down, and grooms, who prep the horses for training. The hotwalkers work every day of the week from 5:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. Some hotwalkers work additional hours every other day, typically from 3:00-4:30 p.m. On average, the hotwalkers work 44.25 hours per week. Grooms also work every day of the week, usually, from 5:00-11:00 a.m. and from 3:00 p.m. to approximately 4:30 p.m. Grooms typically work between 48.5-52.5 hours per week. Most of the employees did not submit timesheets for the additional hours worked, while others submitted inaccurate time sheets; it is impossible to determine how many hours each employee worked. The Department of Labor (DOL) sought an injunction and damages for KDE’s alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, for failing to pay employees the federal minimum wage, for failing to pay employees overtime wages, and for failing to keep adequate and accurate employment records.The Sixth Circuit affirmed a judgment in favor of DOL on the overtime claims. The district court’s grant of summary judgment on the willfulness issue in favor of KDE was inappropriate; genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether KDE willfully failed to pay its employees in compliance with the FLSA. View "Walsh v. KDE Equine, LLC" on Justia Law