Justia U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ohio's legislatively-established municipal and county courts possess jurisdiction within their territorial limits over certain civil and criminal matters with the same authority as other common pleas judges. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court employees certified a union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for 136 employees, not including judges. A 2016 collective bargaining agreement was to extend through December 2019 and stated that the court would respect its terms until the parties reached a new agreement, the union disclaimed the contract, or the employees decertified the union. In 2019, negotiations stalled. In December 2020, the Juvenile Court sought a declaration that the agreements were void or expired. The union counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Juvenile Court subsequently treated union members as nonunion employees, decided to stop deducting union dues from paychecks, imposed new work schedules, and eliminated grievance procedures.The union sued in federal court, citing the Contracts Clause and the Takings Clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Sovereign immunity bars the union’s claims against the Juvenile Court because it is an arm of the State of Ohio. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the union’s Contracts Clause claims against the individual defendants; qualified immunity barred the money-damages claims against them under the Takings Clause. View "Laborers' International Union of North America v. Neff" on Justia Law

Blanchet sold Charter’s services door-to-door. Blanchet received Charter’s standard maternity leave, short-term disability benefits, and Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) benefits until September 2016, but, suffering from postpartum depression, requested additional leave. Blanchet exhausted FMLA leave, exhausted short-term disability leave, then had long-term disability leave through February 1, 2017, as an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), accommodation. Sedgwick, a third-party administrator, was responsible for all communications with employees who requested leave and customarily delayed paperwork long after initial verbal approvals. In February 2017, Sedgwick received a letter from Blanchet’s doctor, indicating that Blanchet was not capable of working. Blanchet requested accommodation through April 3. Sedgwick representatives reassured Blanchet that her application would be approved. On March 9, Blanchet received a termination letter “effective January 10, 2017.” She received an approval letter for extended leave 10 days later. The next day, Charter’s HR officer notified Sedgwick that the extension was approved.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Blanchet's ADA suit. Genuine issues of material fact remain regarding Blanchet’s disability discrimination claim. A reasonable juror could find that Blanchet would be otherwise qualified for her job after her medical leave accommodation and that Blanchet’s proposed accommodation was reasonable, given that Charter considered it reasonable. Charter did not "engage" with Blanchet concerning her accommodation request. View "Blanchet v. Charter Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ohio National Guard ended its 45-year collective-bargaining relationship with the Union that represents its technicians, who are dual-status employees because their employment is “a hybrid, both of federal and state, and of civilian and military strains.” The Guard announced that it was not bound by the expired collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and that it questioned the applicability of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute to the technicians, then started terminating Union dues deductions. The Union filed Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) charges with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). An ALJ found that the Guard is an “agency” under the Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7103(a)(3), the FLRA had jurisdiction over the Guard, technicians had collective-bargaining rights under the Statute, and the Guard’s actions in repudiating the CBA violated the Statute.The Guard argued that the FLRA cannot regulate state national guards because Congress had not called the militia into service, that its actions were not ULPs, and that the remedies recommended by the ALJ were inappropriate. An FLRA panel adopted the ALJ’s recommended decision. The Sixth Circuit rejected the Guard’s petition for review. The Guard is a federal executive agency in its capacity as the employer of technicians; the FLRA has jurisdiction over the Guard with respect to labor-relations issues under the Statute. It is not unconstitutional for the FLRA to enforce the Statute by issuing orders to state national guards in their role as employers of technicians. View "The Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

In 2011, Hewlett-Packard hired Sloat, then 54, to develop training programs. For the next five years, his performance reviews were notably positive. In 2015, Sloat developed a highly0regarded training program. In 2016 Hewlett-Packard promoted Sloat to an executive-level position; he reported to Keller, who found that Sloat’s performance met expectations. After being transferred to a new team, Sloat then 60, was the oldest person reporting to his new manager, Hagler, who was immediately unfriendly toward Sloat. Hagler called Sloat “Uncle Ron” and “young man,” referred to “old skills," and asked Sloat, “When are you going to retire?” After Sloat reported his concerns, Hagler reassigned Sloat’s remaining responsibilities and tried to have Sloat reassigned. Hagler was told to wait until the company proceeded with a pending “significant downsizing” before firing him. In Sloat’s mid-year performance review, Hagler gave Sloat a performance rating of “Stalled.”After his subsequent termination, Sloat sued, asserting age discrimination and retaliation under both the ADEA and the Tennessee Act. The district court granted Hewlett-Packard summary judgment “based substantially on the post-hoc explanations of Hewlett-Packard’s own witnesses.” The Sixth Circuit reversed. Many of the facts that support Sloat’s prima facie case for the discrimination claim would also allow a jury to find that Hagler had a retaliatory motive in setting Sloat up for termination and that Hewlett-Packard’s explanation for his termination was pretextual. View "Sloat v. Hewlett-Packard Enterprise Co." on Justia Law

In 2008, FTS technicians filed suit alleging that they were unlawfully deprived of overtime compensation for the prior three years. The district court authorized a collective action; 293 technicians opted in to the collective action. In 2011, a jury returned verdicts of liability and determined the average number of unrecorded hours worked per week by each testifying technician. Based on those findings, the court applied a 1.5 multiplier for calculating uncompensated overtime, calculated damages for all technicians in the collective action, and entered a judgment. The Sixth Circuit upheld the certification of the case as a collective action and the jury’s verdicts but held that the district court erred in applying a 1.5 multiplier, and in failing to calculate the hourly rates to reflect the actual hours Plaintiffs worked.After a remand from the Supreme Court, FTS sought to raise new issues that were unrelated to the recalculation of the hourly rate and correcting the multiplier. The district court barred FTS from raising most of those arguments, recalculated damages, and entered judgment. The court also substantially granted Plaintiffs’ counsel’s petition for attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court was constrained on remand to the specific issues; its mandate rule barred FTS and from raising arguments on judicial estoppel, aggregate judgment, and sufficiency of the evidence. View "Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Sofco terminated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a local union. The Ohio Operating Engineers Pension Fund then assessed almost a million dollars in withdrawal liability against Sofco under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1002(41. Sofco challenged the assessment in ERISA-mandated arbitration. The arbitrator upheld the assessment. The district court affirmed in part and reversed in part.The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. The Fund’s actuary used a 7.25% growth rate on assets for minimum funding purposes but for withdrawal-liability purposes, used the “Segal Blend,” which violated ERISA’s mandate that the interest rate for withdrawal liability calculations be based on the “anticipated experience under the plan.” The court vacated the district court’s decision upholding the Fund’s assessment of partial-withdrawal liability for 2011-2013 and remanded. A construction-industry employer is liable for a partial withdrawal when its contributions decline to an “insubstantial portion of its work in the craft and area jurisdiction of the collective bargaining agreement of the type for which contributions are required.” The CBA clearly establishes the union’s jurisdiction over forklift work and Sofco’s obligations to contribute to the fund for that work. The district court did not err by concluding that the Fund properly included forklift work in the withdrawal liability calculation. View "Sofco Erectors, Inc. v. Trustees of the Ohio Operating Engineers Pension Fund" on Justia Law

The Training Academy hired Smith as a firefighter recruit. If Academy recruits do not pass their practical skills exams after three tries, they are dismissed. The vertical ventilation test requires climbing a ladder, then cutting a hole in the roof of a burning building, wearing full firefighting gear, within 10 minutes. Recruits study this skill in the classroom and then practice on a simulator. Smith and his squad took the test on the same house. Everyone passed on the first attempt, except for Smith and one other recruit, who passed on his second try. Smith failed all three attempts. The evaluating instructors noted that Smith hit the ladder with the running chainsaw, “would not follow directions," and “repeatedly cut towards his body.”Because Toledo was trying to attain a more racially diverse fire department, Smith was given two more opportunities to take the test. No other firefighter was ever given more than the initial three attempts. Contrary to Academy policy, Smith was allowed to complete the course with his squad and to participate in graduation. Before each additional attempt, the Academy provided Smith with individual instruction and practice. On his third attempt, Smith again failed three times. Smith was dismissed from the Academy and filed suit, alleging racial discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII) and deprivation of a liberty interest, section 1983; conspiracy to violate civil rights, sections 1985(3) and 1986. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. View "Smith v. City of Toledo" on Justia Law

Johnson, a 56-year-old African American woman, was hired by Ford in 2018, as a production supervisor. While Johnson was shadowing him to learn the job, Rowan was in a position to evaluate Johnson’s performance. Rowan was known to have engaged in consensual sexual relationships with some of the female hourly employees. Rowan started making unwanted and sexually inappropriate comments to Johnson and to the female hourly employees under his supervision. Rowan constantly made comments and sent text messages and pictures to Johnson that were both sexual and racial in nature. Johnson testified first reported Rowan’s inappropriate and sexual comments and conduct in August 2018. In November, Rowan sexually assaulted Johnson by “put[ting] his hand down [her] blouse and grab[bing] [her] breast.” Human Resources eventually investigated. Johnson took unpaid medical leave and never returned to Ford. Rowan was terminated.Johnson sued, alleging racial harassment/racially hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court struck paragraphs in Johnson’s declaration, filed after her deposition was taken and Ford’s motion for summary judgment was filed and determined that Johnson had failed to satisfy the objective prong of the hostile work environment test. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because the declaration did not directly contradict her deposition testimony and was not an attempt to create a sham issue of fact, the district court abused its discretion. There is sufficient evidence that Rowan’s racial harassment was severe or pervasive enough for a reasonable person to find the work environment hostile. View "Johnson v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

In 2011, Briggs, a Black man, began working as a compensation analyst for the University of Cincinnati (UC) Human Resources department. In 2013, the HR department hired Wittwer, a Caucasian woman, in the same position but at a much higher salary than Briggs. Over the next several years, Briggs’s pay stagnated while Wittwer’s rapidly increased. Briggs contends that after he submitted a claim of discrimination, UC retaliated by revising a job posting for which he had been encouraged to apply so that he was no longer eligible.Briggs sued under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting claims of wage discrimination on the basis of race and sex, and retaliation for filing his complaint. The district court granted UC summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. UC did not dispute that Briggs had stated a prima facie case and has not articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its adverse employment action. Even if it had, the record contains ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could find it pretextual. View "Briggs v. Univsity of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Anthem provides health insurance and hires nurses to review insurance claims. The company pays those nurses a salary but does not pay them overtime. Canaday, an Anthem nurse who lives in Tennessee, filed a proposed collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 206. claiming that the company misclassified her and others as exempt from the Act’s overtime pay provisions. A number of Anthem nurses in other states opted into the collective action.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the out-of-state plaintiffs on personal jurisdiction grounds. In an FLSA collective action, as in the mass action under California law, each opt-in plaintiff becomes a real party in interest, who must meet her burden for obtaining relief and satisfy the other requirements of party status. Anthem is based in Indiana, not Tennessee. General jurisdiction is not an option for out-of-state claims. Specific jurisdiction requires a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue. The out-of-state plaintiffs have not brought claims arising out of or relating to Anthem’s conduct in Tennessee. View "Canaday v. The Anthem Companies, Inc." on Justia Law